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The philosophy of Common, Sense became "the Scottish philosophy" and schoolc
several generations of Scotsmen. It "penetrated the universities", Victor
Cousinfjü says, looking back over its history in Scotland at the beginning of its
history in France, "spread among the clergy, among the lawyers, among men of
letters and men of the worldj and, without producing a movement as vast as that
I.
of the German philosophy, had the same kind of effect within narrower limits".
It had by the second decade of the nineteenth century attained with htewart a 
canonical dignity in Scotland when RoyerCollard, breaking the orthodoxy of 
’Gondillacisme*’* , found in Reid and Stewart principles and doctrines for the 
work. As the constant foundation upon which the Eclectic philosophy then built 
its shifting structures, the philosophy of Common Sense became in a manner ttie 
official philosophy of France, taught in the colleges for more than half a centu 
The philosophy of Common Sense influenced Rosraini in Italy and the Belgian 
‘ Ontologists’ at Louvain, and dying in Europe, it had a brief American renaissan 
through the energy of James McCosh of Princeton.
The philosophy of Common Sense arose as an 'answer* to Hume. No past philoso 
er is more our contemporary than Hume. And the insistence on the authority of 
ordinary language , the language of common sense is of course especially 
contemporary. The philosophers who nowadays refer philosophical disputes to the 
decision of ordinary language do not characteristically think of themselves as 
opposing Hume; opinions similar to opinions which Hume held (but differently 
worded) are indeed as likely to be found among them as anywhere else. The Commoi 
Sense philosophers thought that Hume's opinions contradicted the beliefs of dommi 
sense. They were perhaps not mistaken in thinking so. Mistaken or not, they ha^  
something to say which ought to be heard in modem discussions on the nature and
I» Oeuvres (Revised edition, 1846), Vol.IV ("Philosophie Ecossaise") p.645,
authority of common sense.
The philosophy of Common Sense has historically important and has again 
become interesting. We shall in this thesis piece it together from its fragment­
ary state in the writings of Reid and the other members of his school, consider j 
in relation to Hume, and tiy to show (mainly in the third chapter) the relevance 
of the doctrine of common sense in the philosophy of Common Sense to present-day 
discussion.
The members of Reid's school: Collective denunciation by Joseph PriestleyI.
who spoke of them as "a set of pretended philosophers", by Kant who spoke of thei2.as "appealing to the judgment of the crowd", and by others; the label 'Common 
Sense'; and their dependence upon Reid bracketed Beattie and Oswald with Reid 8j 
members of a school. Beattie’s philosophy is Reid's vulgarized, with the vulgar^  
misunderstanding of the philosophers ha along with Reid was opposing. Oswald's 
philosophy is Reid's burlesqued. Beattie now and then makes a point which Reid 
has not made, or makes a point better than Reid made it. These small contributif 
can be built into the structure of the philosophy o5; Common Sense. There are no 
contributions from Oswald. Oswald, and to a lesser extent, Beattie, will be use: 
when in order to see what the philosophy of Common Sense is, it is necessary to 
see what it is not.
George Campbell (1719-1796), principal of Marischal College, Aberdeen, would 
count as a member of Reid’s school if his concern with the philosophy of Common
Sense had been less marginal.
Stewart was Reid's acknowledged successor. We shall treat the philosophy of
Common Sense as ending with Stewart. Two other philosophers are sometimes recko:
as belonging to Reid's school. Thomas Brom Xl778-182o), Stewart's pupil, and f
X. Examination of Dr.Reid’s Inquiry etc. p.5.2. Prolomena to any Future Metapiwsice, Preface.
eleven years conjoint-profsssor pf moral philosophy with Stewart at the Univers!t 
of Edinburgh, attacked Reid openly and Stewart by unconcealed implication;. (%Vhil
Royer-Collard was introducing the Scottish philosophy into France as something to
put in place of the philosophy of Condillac. Brown was introducing "French
I.philosophy" into Scotland and using it against Reid and Stewart. ) There was more 
of a family quarrel in Broi-m' s disagreement with Reid and Stewart than he 
supposed, but the differences between his philosophy and their*s were nevertheleE 
sufficient to make his philosophy another philosophy. These differences will be 
indicated when we have their contexts.
Sir William Hamilton (1791-1856), Reid's editor and Stewart's , regarded him­
self as continuing the philosophy of Common Sense and giving it a powerful new 
development. The extent of the development would perhaps be enough to make 
Hamj.lton*s philosophy another philosophy, even without a break with any of Reid's 
principles. If Hamilton's axiom of the relativity of all knowledge is a signifie 
ant principle, he breaks, as we shall see, decisively with Reid.
By the 'Common Sense philosophers* then, we shall mean Reid, Beattie and ■ 
Stewart, When the opinions of Reid, Beattie and Stewart need to-be marked off 
against which opinions which simulate them, we shall reckon Oswald as one of the 
Common Sense philosophers, and the contrast will often be betewwen Reid and 
Stewart on the one hand and Beattie and Oswald on the other.* Q e o f i e i ÿ o  o 4 ^
Something may be briefly said of Reid's sources. Cousin and subsequent 
commentators on Reid have noticed that he never mentions Turnbull, Turnbull had 
been Reid's teacher. Reid was not concealing a heavy debt. He had learnt from 
Turnbull that the method of enquiry into the mind was to be the same as the methc 
of enquiry into "any part of nature" : the method of observation, inductive 
inference and the rigorous proscription of conjecture. Cousin quotes one of a
  --- -— - "jr—    — —  - "— — ----—^
I* F. Retore, Critique de la Philosophie de Thomas Brown, p.v,
number of passages he might have chosen from Turhbull's Principles of Moral
Philosophy (published 1740) and a sics whether it is Reid or lumbull. It could
be either. Reid may have felt that he had .nade the proper acknowledgments in
making them to bacon and Newton as Turnbull had made his to Kewÿon.
"And if natural Philosophy in all its Parts, by pursuing this Method, shall
I.
at length be perfected, the Rounds of Moral Philosophy will be a,lso enlarged." 
Many philosophical works in the eighteenth century begin with a puzzling echo o: 
Newton’s prophecy, propose, as Hume did, some application of "experimental 
philosophy" to "moral subjects". The application is never obvious even after 
the books have been studied. Nhen we have gone some distance with Reid, we sha 
be in a better position to try and understand how he supposes that the rules of 
niv.thod which he had learnt from Turnbull and hela on the authority of Bacon and 
Newton were relevant to a philosophy of common sense and to philosophy in gener; 
Reid perhaps reflects Turnbull in other matters which will be noticed later on.
The anonymous translator of Buff 1er’s Traite^  des Premit^ res Tcéltez prefixed 
to his translation a "detection of the plagiarism" of'the Doctors Reid, Beattie 
and Oswald". He had found the book behind their books. They had paraphrased 
Huffier and corruptly paraphrased him. (Before the charge of plagiarism had bee 
made , Reid remarked casually that he had "lately" about ten years that is, afte 
he had written the Inquiry become acquainted with Huffier’s treatise. After it 
had been made he mentions, without mentioning himself, that he had reason to
2ebelieve that neither Beattie nor Oswald had known Huffier.)
Huffier’s opinions, if stolen by Oswald, are unrecognizable in Oswald. 
Beattie has borrowed all he needed from Reid. There are strong resemblances 
between the philosophy of Reid and the philosophy of Huffier, and no trace of
1. Newton, Opticks, Bk.III, pt.I, (4th, edition reprinted 1931) p.405.
2. Reid's Collected Works, Note A, p.789? where Hamilton gives the references.
any dependence of Reid on Huffier, No dependence of anything in tne Inquiry on
Huffier; Reid's later books show some signs of Buffier's influence, A philosophy
of common sense is a reaction to philosopMcal paradox and scepticism. The
doctrines of common sense are the same in Reid and in Buffier; they could hardly
be doctrines of common sense unless they were. Their doctrine of common sense i;
just
substantially the same, with^the amount of variation to be expected from their
independence. The polemical features of a philosophy of common sense will alte]
according to circumstances. The philosophical situation is constituted for Buffi
by an emergence from Cartesian doubt which lias been unable to get beyond subject]
certainties to anythin^ objective; .tor Reid, by the inevitability of Berkeley
after Locke and of Hume after Berkeley, Common sense, they both agree, is the
only remedy for a situation which nas resulted from a break with common sense.
An obvious break, as Buffier sees it: the "first truths" of common sense, without
which we are cut off from ever^  thing beyond the present states of our consciousne
have been simply rejected. An unobtrusive break in Reid's opinion: the result of
the theory of ideas which looked as innocent as the Trojan horse and had "death i
its belly", Buffier accepted the theory of ideas.
"The primary, as well as secondaiy qualities of matter, cause, effect,
connexion, extension, duration, identity, and almost all about which i-aiowledge is
conversant, have been represented as only qualities of our minds; truth itself,
and belief, or knowledge, represented as a species of sensation: The idea
confounded with its object: The esse and the percipi maintained to be universail
the same and the impossibility asserted of any thing different from impressions,
I.
or various kinds of weak and lively sensation.
This is Price and might equally well be Reid summarizing the final consequenc
I, Review of Morals (first edition) p.88.
of the theory of ideas. *'I .know nothing tnat can be said or done to a person,
who professes to deny these things, besides referring, him to common sense and
reason." (p.35.) This is again Price. The Review of Morals was published in •
I.
1758, six years before Reid's Inquiry. Mr, Tegerstedt has detailed the very 
considerable resemblances between Reid and Price. In spite of them there is no 
more evidence for Reid’s dependence on Price than for Reid's dependence on Buffi 
(Reid several times mentions Price with approval in his later books.)
The doctrines of common sense, the doctrine, for example, of the necessity o: 
q cause for every event, do not have to be borrowed by one philosopher from anot: 
and Price has no doctrine ofi common sense, Reid claims to have an explanation 
for the development of philosophy into paradox and scepticism, and claimed 
originality for it. It was a development of the theory of ideas as a theory 
of mediate cognition, and as a theory of conceptual limitation. Locke's 
principles are the premisses for Plumie's conclusions. Price did not examine the 
consequences of the principle that it is ideas that are the objects of the under 
standing when we think. He did examine the principle that we have no ideas tha 
we do not have from sensation or reflection. But there is no trace of any borro 
ing here in Reid from Price, And for Price it is the relativity of the senses 
applied to all knowledge that ends in the way described, Hume, Price appears to 
be saying, is Protagoras over again. Alternatively, it is Berkeley's principle ■ 
the esse and the percipi universally the same - wiiich Hume takes to its sceptica 
conclusion,
Reid was taught the philosophical method he professed. His philosophy of
common sense is substantially his ov/n, owing something to Aristotle, something t
Descartes, more to Berkeley than to anyone else, and something to Hume, "I once
believed this doctrine of ideas so firmly as to embrace the whole of Berkeley's 
I. The Problem of Knowledge in Scottish Philosophy, pp.21-30,
I.
system in consequence of it", Berkeley's influence on Reid was permanent and i
obvious. And when Reid told Hume that he would always consider himself Hume’s2, more
disciple in metaphysics, he was perhaps aciaiowledging that he nad learnt fromA
Hume than the consequences of the theory of ideas,
_ 1 og raphi cal K ot e.
Thomas Reid: Born 1710; Presbyterian minister at New nachar, 1737; professe:
of philosophy at Ring’s College,Aberdeen 1752; appointed professor of moral 
philosophy in the University of Glasgow, 1763; published the Inquiry into the 
Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, 1764; the Essays on the Intellecti 
Powers of Man 1785; the Essays on the Acjive Powers of Man 1788; Reid died^ 1796 
James Beattie: Born 1^735; appointed professor of philosophy, Marischal
College, Aberdeen, 1760; published the Essay on the Nature and Immutability of 
Truth, 1770; acquired with The Minstrel a considerable reputation as a poet in 
the new mood of mournful and Gothic romance; Beattie died,1802,
James Oswald: published the first volume of An Appeal to Common Sense in 
Behalf of Religion, 1766, and the second 1772. Oswald died 1^793.
Dugald Stewart: Born 1^753; studied at Edinburgh under Adam Ferguson and at 
Glasgow under Reid; appointed professor of moral philosophy in the University oJ 
Edinburgh, 1785; published the first volume of the Elements of tne Philosophy of 
the Human Mind, 1792 (the second volume in 1821 and the third in 1827) the 
Phi1osophical Essays in 1810 and the Philosophy of the Active.and Moral Powers i 
te wart died 1828, Stewart as the philosopher of Edinburgh at theMan in 1828; S
end of its "golden age" was most eminent in his pupils. Among those who attendee
his lectures were the men who founded the Edinburgh Review, Walter ocott, James A - ..
Mill, Palmerston, Lord John Russell, and Thomas Chalmers who led the Disruption,
I. Intellectual Powers, II, Gh.X, p.283,
^ei^'s Collected Works, p,91*
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CHAPTER I. THE SCEPriCjSt PRIHCIPIS
I • Ideas
Hume is the vast figure In Reid’s intellectual world. Other philosophers 
hardly matter to him except in so far as they are implicitly Eumian. And they ali 
are, he believes. They all leave common sense at one and the same point and. are\ 
on the road to Hume. Whether they speak of ’eidola* with Democritus, or of 
'sensible and intelligible species' with the Schoolmen, or, since Descartes and 
Locke, of 'ideas', they all, according to Reid, accept the 'ideal hypothesis' in/ 
one form or another. They all hold the theory that the immediate object of everyd 
sort of cognition is some representative substitute for what we would ordinarily - 
say that we saw or touched, that we remembered, or in any way thought of.
Briefly the theory (with what Reid regarded as the most significant reason ; 
for it) is this; When you look at a distant mountain what you directly see, 
leaving out all inference and interpretation, is not something miles away but its. 
image at no distance from you. When you remember yesterday's bitter wind, what 
you are directly aware of is something now present doing duty for something that
was once present but now is past and gone, and so no longer there to be directly
accessible. When you think of happenings historically and geographically remote, 
the alternative to supposing that the soul reaches out ectoplasmically through 
time and space to immediate contact with them is to suppose that what it contem-r. ; 
plates is here and now their mediatory ideas ^ fithin itself.
The ruin of worlds, the Dedication to the Inquiry declares, with virtue
brought down in the general catastrophe, is involved in the principle that ideas:
are the mind's only immediate objects. Sun, moon and stars, body and soul,
"all things without exception" dissolve into subjective atoms as fugitive and
transitory as the experience of them. For the necessary consequence of the
principle that ideas are the mind's only immediate objects is that they are its
only objects, the only tilings that there are at all. The Treatise of Human
Nature showed what the principle worked out to, laid bare the universal
I,scepticism "inlaid" in the ideal system and "reared along with it". Half the
credit, therefore, for the reformation in philosophy that would make Hume
2,impossible is unintentionally Hume's, So Reid says in effect in a letter to him. 
Reid's share in the credit was to have seen that 'ideas' had been invented by 
philosophers and therefore that the pliilosophers' principle from which Hume had ' 
validly deduced absurd consequences was a sophisticated illusion, "The merit of 
what you are pleased to call my philosophy", he writes to James Gregoxy , "lies,
I think, chiefly in having called in question the common theory of ideas,,.,I thii
there is hardly anything that can be called mine in the pliilosophy of the mind,
. ' 3.which does not follow with ease from the detection of this prejudice."
Reid's critics did not disparage his work, asktewart was afraid they might
( with the theory of ideas decaying into an historical curiosity), on the ground
that to refute sometidng so obviously false as the theory of ideas was a small 
4.achievement. The most notable of Reid's critics, Joseph Priestley and Thomas 
Brown,held that what Reid called 'the theory of ideas' was something he had made
up himself out of his clumsy misunderstandings of the philosophers he attacked.
1. Inquiry, Ch. I, Sec. VII, p. 103,
2. Hatfriltc-n-'-fj Reidg 9'ï-» . , uiicuf^3 . Sam rlton ^  IS iâ } ,  '!?• 8^*
4. Life of Reid in •Harrprlt'orr'-s Reidj^^ p. 21,
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Or, if, Brown allowed, the Aristotelians had to some extent anticipated him, d- 
and there were latter-day eccentrics who meant by 'ideas' more or less what
-A
Reid meant, at least Reid tried to fasten opinions on to the whole of modem /•'
philosophy which it was one of the characteristics of modern philosophy to haved;
rejected. Reid has astonishingly acquired the reputation of having been "the 'Mi
overthrower of a mighty system of metaphysical illusion", when all ho did was to;
show that the metaphorical language of philosophers was intended to be metaphor?/
ical. The old words having become mere figures of speech, his whole attack on ÿ
'images in the mind' was as pointless as a theological refutation of the poet-
aster who "still talks in his rhymngs to his mistress of Cupid and the Graces"
Nothing like what Reid thought of as 'the common theory of ideas* was held by .
anybody of any consequence, except Malebranche and Berkeley, after the emergenc#I. f:
from Aristotelian darkness. "•
Brown's criticism of Reid and Priestley's have only one point in common, 
that Reid took philosophical metaphors literally. We shall begin with Priestley/^  
criticism, and as there is not much of Priest]^, we shall use what he says 
mainly as an occasion for an exposition of what Reid says. We shall be principal 
ly occupied in this section with ideas as objects of perception.
Priestley has Reid standing in foolish triumph over the theory of ideas - 
simplified for simple refutation to the view that perception is by means of f
' I
literal images, mirror-pictures, replicas of the outside world. He quotes the  ^
passage in which Reid proposes an ‘* experimentum crucis by which the ideal system'" 
must stand or fall", and remarks that everyone knows that when philosophers
I. T M  Philosophy of.the Human Mind. I4th edition, pp. 168-174# Nothing else
that Broim. said marked so deliberately his break with Reid's school as this 
denial of a great part of its historical justification.
■1
Il ' 11
called ideas 'images of external things’ they were using a figurative
expression, "denoting not that the actual shapes of things were delineated
in the brain, or upon the mind, but only that impressions of some kina or
othor were conveyed to the mind by means of the organs of sense and their
corresponding nerves." The theory of ideas, as the philosophers have held
it; is the theory that external things cause sensations or ideas in the
mind, and thus are perceived inferentially. Reid tiiinks that this theory
is destroyed by the observation that sensations are not like bodies or any
I.of their qualities - As though an effect had to be like its cause.
Reid had said ; "Extension, figure, motion, may any one, or all of them,
be taken for the subject of this experiment. Either they are ideas of
sensation, or they are not. If any one of them can be shewn to be an idea
of sensation, or to have the least resemblance to any sensation, I lay my
hand upon my mouth, and give up all pretence to reconcile reason to common
sense in this matter, and must suffer the ideal scepticism to triumph. But
if, on the other hand, they are not ideas of sensation, nor like to any
sensation, then the ideal system is a rope of sand, and all the laboured
arguiaents of the sceptical philosophy against a material world, and against -
the existence of every thing but impressions and ideas, proceed upon a2.
false hypothesis."
It is quite obvious what Priestley thinks Reid is doing here, and hard 
to see what he is doing, Priestley thinks that Reid is meeting a simple 
assertion of similarity between things and the ideas of them with a simple
1. Examination of Dr. Reid’s ’Inquiry’ etc. pp. 28-31.
2. Inquiry, Ch. I, Bee. VII, p.128.
12
denial. And he refutes Reid by denying’ that this similarity is asserted, 
or needed for a causal theory of perception. Priestley has misunderstood 
Reid, though Reid is partly to blame with a sprawling argument (or 
arguments) ending with the £imbiguous histrionics of the crucial experiment.
There is a tempitation to re-word the argument of the crucial experiment 
into an argument not about extension, figure and motion, but about the 
ideas of extension, figure and motion 'idea' throughout meaning 'concept' 
Take it, hovrever, as it stands and with Reid's meaning for 'sensation' 
gathered from the context, it seems to come to tiiis : The theory of ideas 
supposes extension, figure and motion, in so far as they are matters of 
direct experience, to be 'ideas of sensation', that is , sensations. They 
cannot be. For what are sensations ? They are feelings. Run your finger 
lightly along the edge of a table and you get a sensation; press it hard 
against the table and you get a different sensation; press it harder still 
and you get a different sensation - this time one of pain, Extension, figure 
and motion are not sensations and are utterly unlike sensations. Therefore 
the external world of our direct experience is not constructed out of 
sensations and the images of sensations which are their fainter copies.
The philosophers may have given a peculiar meaning to the word
I.'sensation' and Reid may have used it up to a point more correctly. But
the difference between what he explains that he means by 'sensations' and 
what they meant, the difference between feelings in the finger-tips as 
typical instances of the one and felt shapes as typical instances of the 
other, is a difference that will not allow his argument even to begin.
lo Up to a point, since he elsewhere speaks of sensations of colour, 
sound, taste and smell.
'• • ' . ' '• ' " ' " ' .'s/ si '=p.
. ■ ■ 13 ': #w;iAnd there does not seem to be any way of reformulating' it so that it will . M;?
-F?be effective against what the theory of ideas does assert; that is that the-^l
1,
direct objects of perception have no existence apart from perception, %
This, however, may not have been Reid's argument aÿ all. The crucial ■ ’./
experiment is introduced by a discussion in which the emphasis is on "the - y
' fconception of extension, motion and the other attributes of matter" (with, 
a clear reference to Locke*s account of the origin of these conceptions)# y
The following passage comes from the general context : • f
iî"Upon the whole, it appears that our philosophers have imposed upon ÿj
themselves and upon us, in pretending to deduce from sensation the first ,'f
origin of our notions of external existences, of space, motion and extens-, y/- 
ion... .These qualities do not at all tally with any system of the human /'J
faculties that haih been advanced. They have no resemblance to any .
sensation, or to any operation of our roinds; and, therefore, they cannot 
be ideas either of sensation or of reflection. The very conception ofthem /:
is irreconcilable to the principles of all our philosophic systems of the -/
understanding. The belief of them is no less so,"
I. "It has been pertinently asked ...what were the experiments by which 
Dr, Reid made this pretended comparison [between sensations on the one 
hand and bodies and their qualities on the otherj? Whether in comparing, 
as he supposed, the qualities of matter with his sensations, he did not 
merely compare one set of these sensations or ideas with another ? And 
indeed whether he could possibly do any thing else? " Reid copied this 
out with no comment on a scrap of paper. (Aberdeen MSS. 2I3I.3) It comes 
from a very favourable account of Priestley's 'Examination' in the 
London Review for Jan. 1775.
Inquiry, Ch. IV, Sec. VI, p. 126.
14
What Reid is doing here (though still with a Mnt of ambiguity), and 
perhaps also with the crucial experiment, is trying to turn the conceptual 
empiricism, which he regarded as an aspect of the ideal theory, into a 
refutation of it. According to this pfeture of the ideal theory, all our 
ideas (concepts) are, or are complications of, ideas of sense or of 
reflection. What is beyond sense or introspective experience is concept­
ually blank. There is no moaning in the words in which we talk about it.
And Reid argues:
*'Soneat±oris^  Sensations are feelings such as those of touch, pressure, 
and so on. Our concepts of extension, figure and motion arc not concepts 
of sensation, nor of any of the operations of our minds. They are of things 
that are as different from sensations as any thing can be. Therefore the 
theory that lays it doim that we have no concepts except those of sensation 
and of reflection is false, and its consequence, the inconceivability of 
any world independent of ourselves, the meaninglessness of any description 
of it, groundless.
Some damage is done this time, even w:i.th Reid's misunderstandin^. of 
'what had been meant by 'sensations' or by 'ideas of sensation'. Reid is 
attacking the theory that the immediate objects of sense are indivisible 
from sensation. If they are, and the principle of conceptual empiricism 
is added, it follows that we have no conception of extension and the other 
qualities of bodies as existing uneensed. Of course, with suffici.;nt 
resolution, Reid's incredulity could be met with the insistence that in 
fact we do not have any. We shall have to come back to this matter later.
In the meantime this is clear: these preimlsses cannot be true and the
conclusion false, Locke at least is a casualty even if Berkeley is not.
15
Did then Reid think that the theory of ideas was a doctrine of ideal
facsimile reproductions of the outside world? How could he have done so?
He watched with polemical satisfaction Locke's distinction between ideas
that resemble what they are ideas of and ideas that do not, dissolve away
under Berkeley's criticism that ideas could not be like anything but ideas,
The dissimilitude between ideas and any qualities of external things is a
characteristic feature of the new theory as contrasted with the old pre-
Cartesian theory of ideas, (locke had not fullynrealized the implications
of what it is to be 'in the mind'.) It is this feature which at once
prepared it for refutation - we know what the theory cannot allow us to
know, that there is an external world and what it is like - and unrefuted
hurried it on towards its sceptical conclusion. The old philosophy made
t»fo mistakes in its account of our knowledge of the world and was
comparatively harmless. The new philosophy made only one eind was deadly.
Both made the mistake of thinking that ideas are the immediate objects of
knowledge. But the old philosophy said that our ideas are like the things
they are ideas of. We know ideas immediately and through them we are abJ.e
to know what the world beyond them is like. The new philosophy went on
past Locke to say that the ideas we have have no similitudes, and finally
I.
to draw the conclusion : We know them and our knowledge stops there.
Apart from the sceptical inglications in the change, the hieroglyphic 
ideas, Stewart remarks, were "at least an attempt to solve the problem 
about the means by which the mind carries on its intercourse with things 
external". The substitution for them of ideas which have no more 
resemblance to things than the conventional signs in speech and writing
I. Inquiry, Ch. VI, Sec. VI
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I/. _ ghave, left the problem altogether untouched.
Yet, however improbably, Reid sometimes forgets what he emphasises so f
carefully. On the second of the alternative locations which had been ' ji
proposed foi' ideas - "in the mind"* or "in the brain'» - he is at his best i
against nonsense of which he is himself at least the only distinguished ‘ /
author. 1
The physiological theories of perception which went beyond systematic- <
ing the results of experimental Investigations into the behaviour of parts /
of the body when we see, hear, touch, taste and smell, and offered explanat- 
ions of what it is to see, hear and the rest were, in Reid's opinion, 
guesses at the machinery which performed the impossible function offehifting f
images of things from the sense organs to the brain, in order to have them 1■7
perceived there by the mind and mistaken for things outside. After a list :
of the physiologists' conjectural 'engines' (which angered Priestley by its2. 7contemptuous inaccuracy) - hydraulic machines operating with animal "i
spirits, stringed systems of vibrating chords, wind instruments and elastic / 
ether - Reid goes on ; 1
"Since, therefore, a blind man may guess as well in the dark as one that  ^
sees, I beg leave to offer another conjecture touching the nervous system... -
Why may not the optic nerves, for instance, be made up of empty tubes, open- 
ing their mouths wide enough to receive the rays of light which form the image i 
on the retinae, and gently conveying them safe, and in their proper order, to 
the veiy seat of the soul, until they flash in her face ?...
"It is a peculiar advantage of this hypothesis, tha.t, although all /
1. Elements. Vol. I, Note 8, p.502.
2. A disgrace to Reid and to M s  university. Examination, p.102,
17
philosophers believe that the species or images of things are conveyed
by the nerves to the soul, yet none of their hypothesis shew how this
may be done. For how can the images of sound, taste, smell, colour,
figure and all sensible qualities, be made out of the vibrations of
musical chords, or the undulations of animal spirits, or of ether | he
I.
ought not to supposev means inadequate to the end."
What, Reid asks, can anyone possibly be supposed to mean by images
of heat, cold, hardness, softness, sound, smell and taste in the brain ?
The shapes of things might be able to have images there, but not their
colours in its darkness. "With regard to most objects of sense, the phrase
is absolute]_y unintelligible, and conveys no meaning at all." And that we
perceive " images in the brain, and external objects only by means of them"
is "as improbable as that there are such images to be perceived. If our
powers of perception be not altogether fallacious, the objects we perceive
are not in our brain, but without us. "
When Newton spoke of the 'sensible species' of things brought through
the nerves to the sensorium "that there they may be perceived by their
3.
immediate presence" to the mind; when Locke, adding at least the
appearance of a further inconsistency to the tangle of his theory, echoed
Newton with a remark about the brain as "the mind's presence room'' to
4.
which ideas are admitted in audience, it is incredible that they could
1. Inquiry. Ch. VI, Bee. XIX, p. 179.
2. Intellectual Poifers. II, Ch. IV, p.257.
3. Opticks, Ft. Ill, Qu. 28, 4th edition, (reprinted I93l) p.370.
4. Essay Conceming Itoian Understanding, hk. II, Ch. 3.
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have meant that i^ hen we see something, the mind is viewing tiny pictures
painted on fle^, that when we taste and smell there are faint tastes
I.and smells under the skull and so on. Reid was grossly mj.staken. The 
images perceived in the brain are not really images, Still his object- 
ion remains that nothing is perceived in the brain. ‘Images* or * ideas * 
in the brain mean, no doubt, i-ipressions of some kind or other on the 
brain. But what does it mean to say that these are perceived ? when 
this word in turn gets a plausible sense given to it, all that is left of 
the original mysteiy is the banality that certain modifications of the 
brain are causal antecedents of perception. ‘Ideas in the brain* are no 
longer alternatives to ‘ideas in the mind* as the immediate objects of 
perception.
Reid would go further and reject all talk of * causal antecedents to 
perception* if more than ! constant conjunction* is meant, if it included 
any suggestion that anything that goes on in the body does anything to 
the mind. We know nothing whatever about the nature of the connection 
between the two and any ways of speaking that throw an illusory bridge 
over the gap have to be repudiated. In particular, Reid will not have 
* impressions * made upon the mind. There is no neutrality in this word 
as a philosophers* word. It is dangerous long before it acquires the 
foimdable that it has in Hume's vocabulary. Impressions are
I. Reid was always convinced that he had to deal with cerebral replicas
of sensible qualities. See also Phi1oscphical Dratione, edit.
W. R. Humphries (Aberdeen University Press), p.35.
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made on wax and things like wax, and what Reid is resisting is the suggest­
ion that the mind is in any way a thing like wax. If impressions are made on 
the mind, we shall next be hearing how this is done, and it will be in one of 
the ways in which body acts on body. With the progressive corporealization 
of the mind, the uniqueness of its activity disappears from view.
Ordinary language has a metaphorical use for 'impressions on the mind'; 
something or other made o. great(little, or no)impress!on on somebody's mind.
And just because it has tliis use, I cannot say “that an object I see with 
perfect indifference makes an impression upon ray mind." We know the literal 
paraphrases of the every day metaphor according to the context in which it 
occurs. The philosophical metaphor has us baffled. "If philosophers mean no
more but that I see the object, why should they invent an improper phrase to
I.express what every man knows how to express in plain English?" It is,of 
course, theory which drives them into strange speech, and theory that 
"contradicts^ the common sense of mankind," which does not think of percept­
ion as anything's action on the mind or as the mind's action on anything. It 
thinks of perception as an action of the mind certainly, but, if one may reluct­
antly borrow the Schoolmen's language,as an immanent and not a transitive 
action.
How would Reid have dealt with the argument that perception is not an act- 
ion ajî all, any more than winning a race is an action ? There is no reason 
why he should not have admitted that he had shared with philosophers in general 
an insensitivity to the logic of verbs of perception. Then his reply would
1.' Intellectual Powers, II, Ch. IV, p. 254.
2. Intellectual Powers, II, Ch. XIV, p.301.
3o 0. Ryle Dilemmas , p.99 ff. : The Concept of Mind, p.
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presumably be along the lines of a recent reply to Professor Ryle; "But,even 
if we concede that 'see' is always, and without qualifications, an achieve­
ment word, so to class it does not banish out of existence the process of 
visual experience. On the contrary, seeing, like any other successful termin­
ation, presupposes the process which it ternu/nates: a race to be won must be
I.
run. "
We do not perceive ideas in the brain, and if our powers of perception
are not altogether fallacious, we arc not in employing them, contemplating
ideal objects in the mind either,TThe reason why ordinary people "look upon
it as perfect lunacy to call in question the existence of external objects"
2.is that they never doubt that they see and handle them. We have the same
reason for thinking that what we see and touch is external to us and independ-
3*ent of us as for thinking that it is there at all. It makes no difference ' . 
whether the supposed mediators are regarded as separate both from what they 
represent and from the perceptual act, or whether they are regarded an insep­
arable aspects of the perceptual act. It is their presence at all that common 
sense cannot understand.
In the "percept!onof an external object, all languages distinguish three 
things - the mind that perceives, the operation of that mind,which is called
perception, and the object perceived... Philosophers have introduced a fourth
4.thing in this process, which they call the idea of the object." The same 
three-termed structure of agent, act and object is the linguistic scaffolding 
for the description of memory, imagination and thought. Here again the
1. W, R. F. Hardie, ' Ordinary Language and Perception*, PM  1 osophical
Quarterly. April 1995, p. 108.
2. Intellectual Powers, II, Ch. VIII, p.274.
3. Stewart, Philosophical Essays Pt.I, EssayI, Ch. I, p.57.
4. Intellectual Powers II, Ch. XII, p.293.
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philosophers have wedged in a fourth thing between the second and third 
terms. The 'fourth thing* in JBrown-fs opinion, is an optical illusion of 
Reid's as far as the main tradition of modem philosophy is concerned; 
turning to modem philosophy after loolcing hard at ancient philosophy he 
sees double. And having dislocated ideas from their unity with the act of 
cognition, he proves that there are no ideas. He could not recognize his 
own opinions when he saw them in other philosophers. On the question of 
perception, for example "so far is Dr. Reid from having the merit of conf­
uting the universal, or even general illusion of phi-losophers, with respect 
to ideas in the mind, as images or separate things, distinct from the 
perception itself, that his own opinions as to perception, on this point at 
least, are precisely the same as those which generally prevailed before.
Prom the time of the decay of the Peripatelic Philosophy, the process of 
perception was generally considerdd as involving nothing more than the pres­
ence of an external object, an organic change or series of changes, and an 
affection of the mind immediately subsequent, without the intervention of 
any idea as a fourth separate thing between the organic and the mental 
affection. 1 have no doubt that, with the exception of Berkeley and MaD^e- 
branche, who had peculiar end very erroneous notions on the subject, all the 
philosophers, whom Dr. Held considered himself as opposing, would, if they 
had been questioned by him, have admitted, before they heard a sin^ ,le argu­
ment on his part, that their opinions, with respect to ideas, were precisely
Ithe same as his own. "
Reid often speaks, as in the passage last quoted from him, as though he
I. Brovm, The^Philosophy of the Human Mnd. Lecture XXVII, (I4th edition)
p. 174»
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thought that philosophers thought of ideas as separate entities;separate
that is from the awareness of them. And he often worked on the contrary i
assumption that philosophers regarded ideas as Identical with the awareness |
of them. Thus in the crucial experiment ’ideas of sensation’ are sensations, 1
and sensations for Reid are experiences which have no object distinct from *|I.themselves. It may be true that Reid did not distinguish clearly between, ''ÿ
in Hamilton’s words, the ’gross’ and the ’subtle’ form of the theory of ideas.ÿ 
It is not true that he did not allow for the subtlety of the identification g
of ideas with the cognitive acts as their objectmve aspects. He did, and i
meant his arguments to reach it. He was not denying the existence of |
ideas as separate objects, but as objects, and therefore denying what -J
philosophers had been asserting, whether they held the theoty of ideas in :
gross or subtle form. Ideas under another name perhaps do figure as direct i
objects in Reid’s own theory of perception. If they do - we shall be con- 1
sidering this question in the fifth chapter - it would have been no justif- t
i cat ion for Reid to say that no one could say that the ideas in his theory ’.1
were separate entities, f-;
’Idea’ is and was by Reid’s time a word in ordinary, everyday use. To j
have an ’idea’of something is to think of it, or to imaginelit, or to 
remember it (the thinking, remembering,imagining, all with some hesitancy 
or vagueness.) Men’s ’ideas’ are their opinions. In these senses it goes ^
without saying that we have ideas,. ’Idea’, however has another meaning in I
the vocabulary of philosophers. In this other meaning "it does not signify {■
1. Intellectual Powers. II, Ch.XVI, p.310.
2. mtellectual Powers, II, Ch.XII, p.292.
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that act of the mind which we call thought or conception, but some object
I.
■i
:
of thought," some object even of perception. . These idea-objects are the tT'2,illusory ideas; ideas as "that which we think about." The double meaning 
of 'idea' laives the denial that there are ideas an irritating sound of 
paradox, when its sense is a protest against paradox.
Reid does not suggest that the philosophers' usebof the word 'idea' 
was a misuse of it. He was probably right not to. One might conjecture 
that the suggestion of duality in the ordinary phrase 'having an idea of 
was there to be misinterpreted; the noun given something- to designate and %
the objectification of ideas the result. Too often, though, in the detection 'fg 
of the sources of philosophical theory in misimderstood idiom, it turns out r b 
that the idiom which is supposed th liave produced the theory was produced by - V
the theory, and in this case there is some reason to think that 'having an . -
3. ?
idea' passed from technical into common use.
If, however, the idiom is not significant for.the origin of the theory : -
of ideas, it has some significance for its eighteenth century development.
For once 'to have an idea of had established itself in ordinary use as.a - -
near alternative for' to think of , 'remember' and 'imagine', and once
a*1, Intellectual Powers,I, Gh,I,p.225. Cp.II, Ch.XIV, p.298.
2. Lectures on Pneumatolofcv, Aberdeen M88, 2I3I.5.
3* The Oxford English Dictionary says that the word 'idea' was first ^
adopted into modern languages in its developed Platonic sense of 
'archetype,' 'pattern,' 'standard.' It then seems to have acquired a
pre-Platonic meaning of 'figure' or 'visible/? The earliest reference thsQ'g 
Dictionary gives to 'knowing an idea' in the sense of 'having a conception 
is to Hobbes. Reid speaks of the comparatively recent introduction of the- 
word in this use into "popular discourse," and of its being more ccKmCn 
in French than in English, (intellectual PoXfsrs, I^  Ch.I, p.224. ./ ÿi)
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philosophers (prepared by the Cartesian extension of 'perception' to cover v
all the cognitive acts) had accustomed themselves to the strangeness of ren- ,
'dreing 'to perceive' by 'to have an idea of,' idealism would begin to acquire rv|
a sort of linguistic necessity. Obviously it is impossible for ideas to exist
.4':any longer than we have them, as obviously as that we are thinking only as
long as we are thinking. |: I
Since the word 'idea' has this act and object ambiguity, it is not always %
-4clear how we are to interpret statements like "I take,..the idea of an object i
I. #and the perception of an object to be the same thing." They may be express-1ing Reid's own doctrine: that is rejecting altogether ideas as objects wliile ^
allowing them as ideas of objects, 'having an idea of an object' meaning yS
nothing but thinking of it, or imagining it, remembering, or tn the regrettably
. ')widened use of the phrase, perceiving it. On the other hand, they may be doing 
something quite different. They may be multiplying entities while appeariîig to..# 
reject their multiplication, rejecting ideas as objects distinct from'perception'' 
in order to re-assert them as objective components of'perception.* The opposite'
%meanings of which such statements are capable explains why Reid was unsure as tpT^  
whether or not he was encountering the ideal theoiy when he encountered them in ÿ
Arnauld, . 3
The view that exchanges ideas as separate.entities, for ideas which form an 4 
inseparable unity with the awareness of them, has against it the common sense 
insistence that the operations of the mind and their objects are quite different-# 
things; so different, Reid says, that many assertions true of the object would
2* Inot even be false of the awareness of it, but absurd. And indeed when the
I. Arnauld,'Des Vraies Et Des Fausses Idees, ' Ch.5, Oeuvres,Tome XXXVIII\P*I98.
2. Intellectual Powers, II, Ch. IX, p.277.
' ■ i
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ideas are ideas of sense, the assertion of their identity with the act of
perception is qMte especially puzzling,
I.
To develope some hints of Reid's on ttiis point; When 'idea' is taken
in the theory sense as meaning the direct object of an act of perception,
what is meant by 'the unity of the idea and the perception?' what is meant by
the idea and the perception not being distinct, 'but the same, a modification2.
of the mind and no tiling more?' Burely not the nonsense that when we see
something red and round the seeing of it is red and round. Then what do the 
'unity' and 'identity' mean? 'Modification' does not have its ordinary, every­
day sense of 'alteration* here. It is a technmcal term, and according to the 
traditional conventions in metaphysics for its technical employment, you can 
only say that X is a modification of Y when you are prepared to say Y is 
adjectivally X; if redness is a modification of the tomato, the tomato is red. 
If ideas are modifications of the mind in this sense, they have moved so 
completely into the mind that 'in the mind' is a phrase without any sense 
left to it at all*
The unity and identity then, of the idea and the having of it is not of 
the kind that allows the transposition of predicates. What kind of unity or 
identity is it? What corrections doss the subtle theory of ideas want to 
make in the crude, theory? The dependence of ideas for existence on their 
being perceived is common to both, so the language of identification cannot 
be merely an extravagant way of asserting that dependence. What more is it 
asserting? No plausible meaning appears to replace the obvious and impossible 
one*
1* Inquiry, Ch.VI, .Sec. XI, p.155; Intellectual Powers, ,Ch. I, p.221;
Aberdeen Mss.,2I3I,6.
2. Brown. The Philosophy of the Mind. pp. 171 & 174,
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If, however, the view that identifies ideas and perception, in order to ;
. become intelligible turns into the view that separates them, the view that 
separates them, in order to become intelligible turns into the view that 
identifies them. What can ‘in the mind* mean in this context except 
* modification ' of the mind? Contained in the mind? The mind has no dimens- .
ions. Perhaps it is only an extravagant way of asserting: that ideas deprnd
for their existence on being perceived. If it is, the reason for their 
dependence seems to have gone. One had supposed that the reason why ideas 
had no existence when unperceived was that they were 'in the mind,' the only 
'place' where ideas could be. One had construed these metaphors to mean that 
an act of perception and its ideal object wezre not two things, but one'and 
the same thing, thak an idea can be no more separated from the perception of 
it than a thing can be separated from itself. Difficulties are proposed 
about the unity of contraries, about the identity of extended acts with extend#; 
ed objects. Hylas cannot understand how there can be room in the mind for so 
many houses and trees. What is it to be ‘in the mind^* Philonous explains
I*;that for .an object to be ‘in the mind' is no more than for it to be perceived. #
Hylas does not ask him to go over once again the reasons for holding that
what is perceived must be perceived in order to exist.
2. Direct Objects
What makes ideas ideas, as far as Reid is concerned, is the fact that they 
can exist no longer than we are conscious of them. We have now to consider yw- 
ideas in more detail as direct objects, and more especially in other capacities 
than as perceptual objects. In doing so we shall be able to see why they were 
wanted. ;
I.• Berkeley, Throe Dialogues. Ill, Works, Vol.II, P.250.
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"....philosophers have been led to think that, in every act of momory 
and of conception, as wellas of perception, there are two objects - the 
one, the immediate object, the idea the species, the form; the other, the 
mediate or external object. The vulgar know only of one object, which, in y; 
perception, is something external that exists; in memory something that did. 
exist; and, in conception, may be something that never existed. But the
immediate object of the philosophers, the Idea, is said to exist, and to 'g.
I. : ^be perceived in all these operations." .
Wliat is- it that made philosophers think this way? In a very brief :
summary; For perception, there are allthe reasons that can be listed , j:
under 'perceptual relativity' - the penny that would have to be at once . 1
round and elliptical, if what vras directly seen by different observers
ifas its upper surface; the jaundiced landscapes viewed through sick eyes, 
coinciding with the blue, green and brown world of the healthy; consider- 
ations of this sort, all seeming to point unmistakably to the conclusion 
that the immediate objects of sense experience are private objects. We : 
have false memories and these have no intrinsic marks to distinguish them 
from true memories. While the object of a true memory could perhaps be q#
a past event as it actually was, the object of a false memory could not y;
be a past event as it actually was. The false object must be an idea .And 
how could an idea of an event be mistaken for an event? We can only supposes: 
that the direct objects of both true and false memories are ideas, the one 
corresponding and the other failing to correspond to something that act- 
ually happened. Ideas, under a variety of names, came in similarly to 
provide objects for false beliefs and, since true and false beliefs are #
I. Intellectual Powers, IV, Ch.II, p.369, #
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psychologically indistinguishable, immediate objects for true beliefe. We 4.
make mistakes in perception, memory and belief which we could not make if 
in perception we were face tp face with physical objects, in memory with 
the past, and in even tiue belief with facts. Finally, ideas provi.de imag- 1
inary objects for the mind which cannot think without objects, but can 
think of what does not exist.
Most of these traditional reasons for a theory of ideas were curiously
II
Ignored by the philosophers of the Common Sense school. They are all silent %:iabout the objects of false beliefs and memories. Reid and Beattie saw that
perceptual relativity was a difficulty that a doctrine of direct perception
had to meet and proceeded to meet it without anxiety. (Their handling of this' 1" 
problem belongs to the chapter dealing with the theory of perception. ) It 
was the philosophers' conviction that ideal substitutes had to be found for 
non-existant objects of thought that was really significant in Reid's eyes,
3and he fastened on to this as one of the two great persuasives towards the 'li 
theoiy of ideas. The other is the principle which, to give it a name, might
be called the 'principle of cognitive contact. ' Together thev "carry us into Ik 
the whole phi 1 osopliical system of ideas" and he adds (forgetting the percept- ><>'
3ual variations) "furnish every argument that ever was used for their exist-
X eence." ’* The two postulates are not independent ; the second is not true 
if the first is false, and Reid is prepared to show that the first is false.
We shall be concerned later in this section with Reid's elimination of 
ideal substitutes for non-existent objects of thought and shall now consider 
the principles of cognitive contact. It is the epistemological analogue of 
"no action at a distance,’* ideas doing something similar to what the medium
I, Intellectual Powers. IV, Oh.%1, p.369.
I
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does between remote interacting bodies, Nothing further from the mind than r 
the mind itself can be its direct object, nothing a;fc a different time from 
the mind's cognitive act; anything there and then must be mediated by some­
thing here and now in order to be perceived, remembered or in any way • [
thought of,
It is hard to believe that this principle was taken seriously by many 
philosophers, but it was. To give one or tvjo instances:. It weighs heavily# ,
with Locke, The following passage from his second reply to Stillingfleet
is particularly interesting, as it shows ideas at their double work of
annihilating distance and providing objects for false beliefs, . 4
"Not thinking your Lordship therefore yet so perfsct a convert of Mr,
|john Sergean^ that you are persuaded, that as often as you think of your
cathedral church, or of Des Cartes's vortices, that the very cathedral
church at Worcester, or the motion of those vortices, itself exists in your " ;
under-standing ; when one of them never existed but in that one place at
Worcester, and the other never existed any where in rerum natura; I conclude,objects
your Lordship has immediate of your mind, which are not the very things/v.
themselves existing in your understanding," These, immediate objects,
I, '
Locke says, can be called indifferently 'representations* or 'ideas'
Sergeant opposed to Locke's theory of ideas a version of the Thomist • y
interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine that the mind 'becomes' the 
thing it knows. The thing known exists in the understanding- and outside it, . 
Ideally in the understanding,really outside it,Reid would insist that -
Sergeant meant, and therefore he is opposing the theory of ideas to the 
theory of ideas. The "self same thing,'*/ Sergeant says , in two different
I. Works (llth. edition) Vol.IV, pp.390-391= ■ '
modes of existence: and existence, non-existence and mode of existence are
;
logically accidentai to the nature of everything except God; so that the /'#
' I*external thing is identical with the thing in the understanding, g.
In 80 far as the theoiy of ideas is a straightfonward doctrine of double
objects, the Thomist doctrine reproduced by Beigeant is plainly not a form : r';
. ■of the theory of ideas, but what interests us here is the way it coni'orms to /k? 
the principle of cognitive contact: If not a representative of the thing, '
thennthe thing itself must be in the mind in order to be known, ##
Malebranche supposes that he can take for granted that distant objects
are perceived by means of ideas. It is quite improbable that the soul moves
out of the body to where the objects are and impossible that remaining where
it is, it could perceive them across distance. Reid's examples are from
Newton and Clarke. Clarke says:
"Without being present to the Images of tilings perceived, ite (the soulT
could not possibly perceive them;,.. .a Living Substance can only there
perceive where it is present, either to the Things themselves, (as the
Omnipresent Cod is to the whole Universe;) or the Images of Things, (as the t
Soul of Man is in its proper heni^ oiy). Nothing can any more Act, or W  Acted
' ~ 3."upon, where it is not present ; than it can Be, where it is not,"
The principle of cognitive contact is behind the theory of ideas. Behind 
the principle is the false analog^ r bet&feen the behavior of bodies and minds,
the analogy which, according to Reid and Btewart, is always devastating the
philosophy of the mind, and here persuading us to look at. cognition after ^
  — — ...........  ' ■■■"         —    —
1, Bolid Pl'iilosophv Asserted. P. 38 ff, .
2, Recherche de la Verite, Bk. Ill, Pt.II, Ch.I.
3, Papers between Leibnitz and Clarke (I7I7 edition), pp, 41-42; Reid,
Intellectual Powers, II, Ch.17, p.255*
the model of a physical transaction, involving like it contiguity, in space
and time. Then when the damage ia done, the analogy,Reid thinks, is arbitra- I
'
rily given up. We can admittedly love and hate what is absent. Why must,
the mind in its intellectual operations, though„pot in its affections and /
desires, be always in immediate contact with its objects, acting on them orI. -
being acted on by them?
We do not, of course, know how we perceive or remember or think of things
out of immediate contact with the mind. But then neither do we know how
things in immediate contact with it would be perceived. ( Has 'in* or * out %
of contact* any meaning at all in this context7?) In any case, perception
is not a simple consequence of contact. Wlien anyone explains to Reid how we
perceive ideas, he will undertake to explain how we perceive things further 2.away. Memory mediated by ideas is not any more intelligible than memory #
with out them. Ideas are contemporaneous with the act of remembering but
not with the past events they represent. The difficulty, if it is one, is
exactly what it was before. Thought about what is separated from us in spaco
and time is not explained by doubling up its objects into direct and indirecb;*■
distance now lies between these. Apply the principle pf cognitive contact 
rigorously, and the world shrinks in duration"to the present and in dimens- 
ions to the circumference of the mind. Apply it only until objects are split 
into direct and indirect, and the original difficulty is,not touched. We are 
quite in the dark as to how we perceive,.remember add think of things and, as 
an explanation, the theory of ideas leaves us there,
No light on the mechanics of perception, memoiy and thought and in addit- 
ion these familiar things become unrecognizable - memoiy especially. What is
1. Intellectual Powers, IV, Gh, IJ p.369,
2,_InqMry, Ch.VI, Bee. XII, p. I57+,
' ■ . - " . •
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:# - memory when the theory of ideas has been to work on it?
■ ■ .".. .the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it had
Ï  ' ., ' once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had# I, ' .
them before," - We would not have known that this was memory unless Lookb %
had told us that it was.
"We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the 
mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after 
two different %mys: either when in its new appearance it retains a consider-
able degree of its first vivacity, and is someifhat intermediate betwixt an #
impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a per-2. rfeet idea." The first of these is memory, Eume says, the second imagination, \ 
Again we have to be told that these are memory and imagination. The define
itiens "convey no notion of the thing defined" and "they may be applied to 
things of a quite different nature from those that are defined," For example,
to a man banging his head against a wall (impression) ; bumping it gently * -
(diminished vivacity - memory); jusk touching the wall with his head (no viv-
3.acity - imagination).
Is memory unrecognizable in these descriptions of it by Locke and Hume, 
becquse the descriptions are fragments torn off complete accounts of memory? ' 
No, the rest can be added; the Lockian metaphors - the mind a repository, its 
power to repaint its perceptions upon itself - all that Hume has t,o say about 
the images being tied down in an invariable order and even about their feeliiig 
of authenticity; the descriptions still need sign-posting; Do we just, not ,
1, Locke, Essay, Bk.II, Ch. X, (Fraser's edition) Vol.Iÿ. p. 194.
2. Eume, Treatise of Human Mature, Bk.I, Pt, I, Sec. Ill, p.8. 
3# Intellectual Powers . Ill, Ch. VII, p.357.
c. W.-v; .,/CU 4/.- : : r.'T. -______ »  £____  '
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understand the technical language in the descriptions? (Reid's comment on
Eume gets its satirical edge from pretending not to.) It is not that either.
When we have learnt the new uses for 'perception', 'impression' and 'idea',
the descriptions remain opaque. Is the trouble perhaps that we are looking
for less than we are being given? Locke and Eume are not trying to tell
someone who does not know what memory is what it is; they are analyzing
momory, disclosing the structure of a familiar thing. But description or
analysis, they are equally baffling. 'The mind reviving a perception with
the additional perception of having had it befoB*, 'an impression again
making its appearance'; taken literally these are'self-contradictions, since,
by definition, perceptions and impressions disappear for ever as soon as the
' I.experience of having them is over. Then they are not to be taken literally.
There arc two real possibilities of a meaning for them that will survive 
examination, and an illusory third. To 'revive a perception (or to 'repeat C 
an impression' ) might be a completely unilluminating synonym for 'to remem­
ber' . Completely unilluminating, because no explanation of the meaning of
\
the phrases is forthcoming except that they mean.the same as 'to remember'. ' 
That is one possibility , What the phrases may be intended to convey is the 
statement that memory is knowing the past indirectly through its present 
representative image. But this statement breaks down on examination. Either 
we do know the paist in memorjf or we do not. If we do, we have got thicugh 
and beyond the present image to it. It was only temporarily an indirect obj­
ect. Once this is realized it becomes clear that there never was any indir- 
ection in memory knowledge.(We may fumble through 'ideas* towards memory, but 
while WG are on the way to remembering we are not remembering.) There never
I. Intellectual Powers. Ill, Ch.VII, p.357.
- . - - . . / \ g . . . ' ' ^4 - ; . 'r-
. l ywere two objects, direct and indirect in remembering; only one, something in
I.the past. The duplication of objects is an unintelligible complication. Thei-
other possibility is that we do not know the past, or, if you like,that know- '/ 
ing the past is nothing but having a present experience which tias a certain
1special quality ('vivacity! - whatever that means, unless it means simply
'remembering'). There are not two objects; only one, something present. But .
ifmemoiy has gone even its name is being kept. The sign that it has gone is 
that the distinction between true and false memoiy has to go& Ifyou are equal-' 
ly convinced that you are remembering T'dien you are ramemboring and when you 
are only imagining, if both experiences have the same degree of 'vivacity', 
have an equally strong feeling of authentidjzty, then, by definition, bothn are 
remembering The evolution of the theory of ideas shows itself in the passage 
from. Hume just quoted with its Lockian beginning and Humian 'end,
"The knowledge which I have of things past, by my memory, seems to me as2,unaccountable as an immediate knowledge would be of things to come," Memory . 
has disappeared when the theory of ideas has fini.shed explaining how it is 
possible. We are in no great danger of taking the impressions on the brain, 
spoken of in ^physiological theories of memory, as surrogate memory-objects,
These impressions are supposed to function causally in memory. And there may 
be tracings on the brain loft from our past experiences, for all Reid loiows 
and for all the theorist who has conjectured their existence knows. Let us 
agree that there are. How does their presence make memory any more intelligible? 
Perhaps if we knew more about their nature the question would be answered. Wê i
know all there is to know about the impression which a pin makes in the hand 
when it pricks it. But can any philosopher say how pain is caused by this impr- ' 
ession? If we had a complete description of the atate of the brain which is
I' ihtellectiial Powers ,11, Ch.IX,PP,278-279; Vi, Ch.III,p.227.2. Intelleotual Powers , III, üh.VII, p.354.
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supposed to cause memory "we should still be as ignorant as before how that % -, 1 
state oontributes to memoiy. We might liave been so constituted that the prick h
of a nin in the hand, instead of causing pain, should cause remembrance; norI. '-'à
would that constitution be more unaccountable than the present."
Reid has an analysis of perception into a complexity of sensation, con­
ception and belief. Without needing to know any more about it at present, we 
can see that it will not be easily reconciled with a theory of direct percept- 
ion. Memory and imagination he left simple. Memory involves belief (in the 
past existence of what is remembered) as a consequence,not as a component. /= 
There is no belief in imagination. Stewart breaks up the simplicity of memory 
and adds belief to imagination. 3:
You cannot remember an event without a conception of it; you cannot remem- , " 
her it without a belief in its past existence, "'...the renienaberance of a past.# 
event is not a simple act of the mind... the mind first forms a conception of
■'tthe event, and then judges from circumstances of tlje periodof time to which it g
2.is to be referred.*" Memory is the reference of a particular conception to a 
past event.. The ideal version of memory seems to be vaguely back again. f'"
r■ 4This , however would probably be to misinterpret Stewart. Although he s)
occasionally uses the language of representation (as in the definition of
3,•conception* in the Outlines), when he speaks of conceiving a thing, all he v
' Imeans is thinking of it, not thinking of it through an intermediary. In mem-
ory something is first thought of without any location in time and subsequently " 
dated. Why there should have to be this sucesslon Stewart does not explain*
It is as though he thought that all remembering begins with the hesitancy of
intellectual Powers, III, Oh.VII, p.354.
2. Stewart, Elements, Vol.I, Ch.VI, Sec,I, p.350.
3. Collected Works. Vol.II, p.3#
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"Yes, it was Wednesday because... /'only more so, so much more so that to begin 
with it is only conception becoming memory. But Stewart does not want to deny 
the "anparent instant"neOLisness"of memory judgements. The analogy he finds
I.
illuminating is with the "estimate of distance we learn to form by the eye".
There is no conception and no imagination, in otewart * s opinion, without 
a temporary belief that what is conceived or imagined is real. We should per­
haps have the distinction that he draws between conception and imagination 
before us . "The business of conception... .is to present us with an exact 
transcript of what we have felt or perceived" ( ! conception* implying "no idea
of time whatever"). Imagination is the power "to form new; wholes" out of these2.
transcribed materials. "I am at a loss to know," Reid wrrote, "whether acc­
ording to your meaning- of the wiord- conception, I may conceive a golden mount­
ain, a centaur, or a man only a foot high. These are not transcripts of what
I have perceived. I think it is memory only that gives us exact transcripts
3.of what we have perceived or felt." Stewrart is clear enough, (lie is not 
claiming that his meaning for ‘conception* and ‘imagination' is their "proper 
English meaning". ) The gold mountain is ‘imagined‘ ; Ben Nevis is 'conceived' • 
if it is pictured as it wras wfhen seen on some past occasion; it is remembered 
if the thought of the past occasion is added to the conception.
Why does Stewart thinlc that wdiat is conceived or imagined is momentarily 
taken to be real? The characteristics of any form of mental activity, he says, 
stand out clearly when nothing interferes writh it; and w-æ find that when
1. Elements. Vol.I, Ch.VI, Sec.I, p.351,
2. Elements, Vol.I, Gh. Ill, pp.I44-I45,
3. Criticism and Remarks on Stewart‘s "Elements", Aberdeen MSS., 2131,4.
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imagination wholly absorbs our attention, as in dreams, at the theatre and
I »■so on, vre cannot help being except into belief. * Reid is completely sceptical.4
"I can conv^ eive the steeple of the cathedral church of Glasgow standing upon
its point.... I cannot find a vestige of belief accompanying it. If there be I#
any", he adds referring to another of Stewart's theories which he disliked,
"it .must be one of those hidden operations which are accompanied %fith no 1^;.
memory." j,
' Memory and imagination, in Stewart's account of them thus move close to-
■gether. The materials presented by experience are reorganized in imagination. #
Other^ i^se memory and imagination are reparated only by a difference in the
relative st;?en^ bh of the belief involved in them. Add the ambiguous analysis .
of perception into sensation-conepiptmnn-belief, which Stewart shared with -
Reid, and Steweurt can be seen to be some distance along the road to wliat Reid
regarded as the sceptical conclusion of the ideal principle: the real, the
remembered and the imagined as higher and lower on a single scale of intensity*
The ordinary man thinks that he can think of what does not exist, He has,
according to Reid, the authority of philosophy ancient and modem against him,
"The philosopher says, Though there may be a remote object vfhich do^ s^ not
exist, there must be an immediate object which really exists; for that which
3.
is not, cannot be an object of thought." ,
This is the second prinoiple behind the theoiy of ideas and its falsity 
infects the first. Contact with an object cannot be a cognitive necessity 
if we can think of what does not exist and is therefore incapable of acting , 
on the mind or being acted on by it. The ordinary man is content with the
                ... .      P m,.,.
I.. Eléments. Vol.I, Ch.III, p.I49ff. '
2, Oriticism and Remarks on Stewart's "Elements"
3.Intellectual Powers, IV, Ch.II, p.369. .
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fact that he can remember what did exist, perceive what does exist and imagine
what does not exist. He is not interested in how this is done. Philosophers are.
And looking round for explanations they found the too obvious models: For cognition 
in general, the modification of bodies by mutual contact and impulse, with,Stewart 
remarks, its illusoiy appearance of transparent intelligibility. (Pervasively re- ' 
commending the appropriateness of the model, the etymological roots of familiar 
words for intellectual activity go down into the tactual notions of taking hold of, 
moulding the hand round and others of the same kind.) And an everyday experience * 
was there to illuminate the supposition of representative ideas. We are "accustomed 
to see objects by their images in a mirror, or in water;and hence are led, by anal­
ogy, to think that objects may be presented to the memory or imagination in some .
T 2similar manner." * For conception and imagination * specifically, the analogy xdth
painting was to hand, and the whole apparatus of metaphor derived from it. The 
real and the unreal can be painted and conceived. Many of the adjectives that desc­
ribe a painting - clear, distinct, vague, blurred,accurate - describe a conception.' 
There are ontological temptations in the noun ‘conception' and its adjectives(from'^  
which the corresponding verb and its adverbs are free) and more especially so,since 
analogy has made‘having a picture in the mind' an ordinary synonym for 'having a 
conception of* something. It is important to see where the ahalogy breaks down.
When a man is painting, his action is bringing something into existence. When he ' ; 
has finished painting, there is a picture there. Painting is a "transitive act, 
which produces an effect distinct from the operation". Suppose a man merely con­
ceives his picture and does not go on to paint it. "What is this conception? It is ■
When we conceive ofan act of the mind, a kind of thought." Does it produce some object? None at all.
I* Intellectual Powers, II, Ch.XIII, p.296.
2. Reid's meaning for 'conception' is too complicated to be put in a few words
and will have to be shown as we go along. As a very rough indication beforehand, :ît What the logicians meant by apprehensio simplex, but extended to individuals.
Imagination in Reid is visual 'conception'.
=. » - <• . i • -.5 V C- • . . -■>- " - . . L .!-'»' ' ' " W / .
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801X16thing, there is nothing in. the mind except the act of conceiving.
'Having a picture in the mind* of something means no more than'having a
. ' Mconception* of it, and that means no more than conceiving it. To claim the 
sanction of ordinaiy language for objective images in the mind is to mis-.
understand the language just "as if, from the phrases of deliberating and ;#it
balancing things in the mind, we should infer that .there is really a balance2.exj.sting in .the mind for weigtiing motives and arguments. "
Every conception must have an object, because every conception is of
something, v/hen it is a conception of Rome, Rome is the object. When it is 
a conception of Caesar crossing the Rubicon, Caesar crossing the Rubicon is ; 
its object. When it is the conception of the colour white, the whiteness in 
anything white is its object. When it is a conception of something that has 
never existed what is its object? centaur, for example.
"'Ihe philosopher says, I cannot conceive a centaur without having an idea 
of it in my mind, I am at a loss to understand what he means. He surely
does not mean that I cannot conceive it without conceiving it. This would
make me no wiser. What then is this idea? Is it an animal, half horse and ' 
half man? No. Then I am certain it is not the thing I conceive. Perhaps he "
will say, that the idea is an image of the animal... .This one object which Î -i.
conceive, is not the image of an animal - it is an animal. I know what it is #
to conceive an image of an animal, and what it is to conceive an animal; and '
I can distinguish the one of these from the other without any danger of 
3,mistake."
The circle..."What is the idea of a circle? I answer, It is the concent-
ion of a circle. What is the immediate object of this conception? The
1.Intellectual Powers, IV, Ch.I, pp. 362-363.
Intellectual P6vTera.IV. Ch.II, p.373,
3, Intellectual Powers, IV, Ch.ll, p.373,
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immediate and the only object of it is a circle. But where is this circle?
It is nowhere* If it was an individual, and had a real existence, it must
have a place; but, being an universal, it hae no existence, and therefore no
place. Is it not the mind of him that conceives it? The conception of it is
in the mind, being an act of the mind" but this conception is not a circle and
has no resemblance to one ;;."no two things can be more perfectly unlike, than
I*a species of thought and a species of figure."
By all means say ttiat when you conceive a centaur or a cirole, you have its 
image in your mind - so long as you remember that to have an image of a cent­
aur or of a circle in the mind, is just to conceive a centaur or a circle*
If you insist that No, by 'having an image' of one or other of these you do 
not mean merely that you conceive it; you mean that to conceive it is to have 
its image as the objeot of the conception, then, up to a point, Held could 
understand you, Ke Imows what it is to think of an image of a centaur or of 
a circle. Imagining a drawing of a centaur or the diagram of a circle would 
be the sort of thing that should be meant. What Reid does not understand is 
your io^lication that things and their representations are identical. Think­
ing of the image of a centaur or of a circlo is quite different from thinking 
of the things themselves - nothing can bo its own image. If you again correct 
him, and say that the image is not on paper but in the mind (especially if you 
add that the act of conception and its object are identical), then, again, it 
is the centaur and the circle and not their representations that are being 
thought of, and nothing in the mind is half man and half horse, nothing circjl- 
ar, nothing in it is remotely like a centaur or a circle.
1. Intellectual Powers, IV, Ch.II, p.374.
Both the centaur and the circle arc ruled out oT oxiskoico for 1.01 d % .
heeauae hoth^afe univereals. Though on Reid's view of the nature of univer-
\ . ' 4sals it. will turn out to be as misleading to say that Uni versais do not ez'i.ct
as to say that they do.) The centaur, hoxfever, is clearly picked out for '
‘ . ' " ■' -■ ' .  ^>consideration because anyonerwould accbpt it as an example of a non-existent
. : ' object. Only.a philosopher would ask whether it.was or was not non-existent
because it was a universal. The circle is selected as a typical universal
azid denied existence on that account; wliiténess would l^ve done instead.
The fact that the Euclidean circle y from the definition, of the line des-  ^ -
cribing its circumference, ' has no real existence isi not directly under dis- ' ^ ,
.... -,, 3cussion hère. But the discussion applies to it, as to everything else that 
is thou^t and does not exist.
. • What does Reid mean when he says that a centaur is the direct object of the
' the conception of a centaur and that there are no centaurs? One would like 
to be quite sure that Reid liimself knew even vaguely. He goes on as if wliat
he had said was perfectly straight forwhrd, as though there..was nothing in it
that looked self-contradictory and needed to be explained away. The meaning i
he might have had has to be worked out from obscure and conflicting materials. ' .
. . . . . .  . ' ' ' '4Is Reid pi'oviding non-existent.objects of ccmception with a twilight * #
- ' ' 1
'subsistence' somewhere between being and nonentity? It is not what you would 
expect, with his down to earth mind, yèt a touch would bring the more probable '
of two,interpretations of what'he says (or the stronger of two inconsistent
- ' . ' ' ' ' .... \ f 1:vie%m that he hold)very close to it. ,
' ' ' . ' . .  ^ . . ' . ' /  ^We shall begin with the less probable iT-terpretation (or the weaicer view).
"...my conception of felony is true and just, when it.agrees vith the méània
of that word in the laws relating to it, :ahd in adthors who understood the 3aw.
The meaning of the word is the thing conceived; and tliat meaning is the
3 . ' # ' ' . " ._y ' \ . 3% .
. 3  3  ' 42 '\:3
- . , '■ I.conception affixed to it by those who best understood the language.", ’
I understQnd what felony is v/hen the meaning. Ï have for the word is the-‘'33 
meaning it has in the law and in legal usage. And the meaning it has there, . ' 
Reid says unmistakably, is "the thing conceived*', that is the, meaning of t.- .,
2, ,v3'
'felony* is felony. Since there is nothing that the word "* centaur * applies-'; 
to, the meaning of the word 'centaur*, at any rate, cannot be what the ;
word applies to. We may notice incidentally that this identification of theQ',
it ' .meaning of a word with what^applies to is a crude expression of Reid's , -
view, which on other occasions shows itself more subtly, that the word is
directly related to the world; that there is no psychological entity, its yy#
'meaning*, floating in between He eliminates the ideas signified by words:'' ;
and in turn signifying things, though there is no formal announcement that
ideas in yet another of their mediatorial capacities have gone. There is y
' . . ■ 3 #no direct polemic in Reid against the Lockian theory of signification and 
and no comment on its p^arallel with the Lockian theoxy of perception.
Now .RReid is quite well aware tliat a word may have no ajpplication and. 3 : 
still have meaning. And it is perhaps not reading too much into, the * felony * 3 
passage to find in it vaguely the view that to conceive X (where X is not • 
an individual) is to understand how the woxd'X* is used by those who,under­
stand the language thoroughly, the denotative use, where there is one,being 
part of the total use."^ ”* (Where Reid identifies meaning with the ‘thing
1. Intellectual Powers, IV, Ch.I, p.,564. ::J
2, Cp. "To conceive the meaning of a general word, and to conceive what It;.##3 
signifies, is the same thing." He adds that what is signified is "what is ; 
common to many individuals". (Intellectual Powers, V, Ch.II, p.393.)
3. In the Philosopl'iical Orations there is a brief hostile reference,to the 
philosophers who hold "Verba esse non re rum sed Idearura signa", (p,32,)' y 43 3#
4, Professor Woozley drew my attention to so.uething like this as a possible 
interpretation of Reidi
cori.ceived‘ he-iB -he%ng doubly ‘careless,) This fits in with scattered hints  '.
elseuhere; for example:"The meaning, of., other general .wpzd's other than those / 
of which we are given definitions we collect, .by à kind of induction, Irom 
'the way in .which we see them used on various occasions by those who under- ‘  ^
island the language". - Onione interpretation of Reid then, to think of things 
that do not exist is to know the meaning, of the words that stand for them, 
and to kno%f' the meaning bf these words is to know how they are used, and bhis , 
includes knowing that there is nothing they apply to. what becomes of the ' i
-principle which Reid regards as axiomatic, the principle that every act of
' " 'conception must have an object? ^
When we are thinking of what does not exist, there is necessarily no ■' 
object which isethe non-existent thing we are thinking of* And if the
principle will not be satisfied with something else 'instead, it has to be
' . . .  :  .
given up. All that can be done is to explain the feeling that there must be '
what there canhot be. The demand for an object when,something unreal is
. ' _ . ' .  ^thought of is. the shadow of the necessity for an object when something real
is thought of * The linguistic forms ' thought of a etc., appropriate in
the one case, persist inappropriately in the other. The demand cannot be
satisfied and.no analysis of the notion of imaginary being or ens rationis
can take away all the uneasiness that results from frustration,
It mightibe said that the mind does have objects when we think of non- ~ ;
existent things, though not the impossible objects of the demand. It is,, to
widen slightly the application of a remark of Stewart's , words with which
our attention is then occupied. The plain man believes that he can think of
■what does not exist and he has a plain way of expressing his disbelief in
something alleged to .exist; he calls it mere:.words. , '
1.' Ihteliectual Rowers, Ch. VI, p.4 %
2,' g i W  5ed. ,111, p T - i æ *
. . Thé questions/hovrever, which Reid had for the ideal objects, proposed 
as substitutes for non-existent real, objects, are waiting for these word-objects- 
is. the word .‘•centaur*, half horse and half man? And the plain ;#n can express 
his disbelief in something by calling it a mere idea. - The only commitment 
coïïBïioh sense has in the matter is that we can think of what; does, not exist.
Reid's other explanation of what it is. to think of objects that do not . 
eMst (or the other interpretation of his one explanation) is an inference, 
from his views on the nature of generality in things, 'Reidview of the 
nature of gerieiality in things may be summed up by saying that he regards the 
attributes of a thing as numerically different in each individual but capable 
of qualitative identity in any number of individuals. Even if it was an ,
empirical fact that no attribute in any one thing is exactly the same as any 
attribute in another thing, the capacity for repetition is a logical characterLf i; 
istic of an attribute, and in fact very often different individuals do have 
the same attributes, ddiere are many men above six feet .in height and many 
below it, many poor and many rich, many born in.France and many in England; 
many things have many qualities in common. And if . this is what the Schoolmen i.
meant, . Reid says, by universals a parte rei , then there'are certainly such 
universals. ' .
Then comes one of the places in which talks obscurely of the non-existencer
of universals: the whiteness of this’sheet is one - thing, whiteness is
another; the conceptions signified by these two forms of; speech are as differ­
ent as. the expressions.’ The first signifies an individual quality really 
existing... the second signifies a general conception, 'which implies no exist-' 
ence, .but loay be predicated of everything that is white,uand'in the sapie "Sense,
On this account, if one should say that the vdiibeness of this sheet is the 
■ whiteness of another' sheet, every man perceives this to be absùrd;, but when
 ,.
 ^/y-'
./ . lie;;says both sheets are white, this is true and perfectly 'understood, ’She . Ù
'* conception “Of wiirtehess implies no existence; it would remain the same bhoughl#^
/  ' . - ' ' .y.,\ 'everything in thç^universe that is white were annihilated." ■ : .-y.H
' . 1 -There is another passage. found a few pages, further on which should be in'■ >’ %
front of us; ".. llmiversais have no real existence. When we ascribe existence *
'«to"them, it is„.not an existence in time or .place, but existence in some " Î!
individual • subject; and tMs existence means no more but that they are truly. - - %
• 1 attributes of such a subject'. Their existence is nothing but predicability, ' -f
or tke capacity,of being.attributed to a subject." (p.407)- ./.gj
' : A minor difficulky, and an ingi'ort&nt feature, in the first passage is the.'..1^
meaning of 'conception'. Reid has, however, warned us near the end of the,
previous chapter that 'conception’ may be used for ’thing conceived’ (tiiing/vy.-'y#
when the.word has objective signification, not an idea or notion of a thing),
and it is used in this way here. The-stubborn difficulty is vdth the general
whiteness which does not imply existence and would remain the same even bhoü^lÇ
there was nothing white* Reid’s language suggests that he thought there were
ownerless abstractions, like the Platonic ideas, , but non-existent. His reBiarks'X
on the Platonic ideas tend to confirm this impression. If Plato iiad denied
existence to his ideas, all would have been well; everything else that he says
about them, about their eternity and their other characteristics, would have
P ' ’sfjbeen "level to the human understanding",
The second passage provides something less unintelligible, in spite of the 
-fact thatKReid seems to change his mind in between sentences as to the sense 
in which universals can be said to exist. And the first passage can be inter- '
,preted consistently with it. There is no whiteness in general existing as
1. Intellectual Powers, V.Ch. Ill, p. 595. ' • ■
. 2. intellectual Potfers, Y, Ch. VI;, p;404. ,
quality over and above the vjhite colour of particular things. Whiteness as a 
universal is the fact that many things are or could be white. And similarly 
With other universals.
When, therefore, an X is conceived and there are no Xs, the object of the . ^ 
conception is the fact that there could be an X. (Or perhaps Reid would say 
the object of the conception is a possible X - not quite something, not quite 
nothing, but not just the fact that X is possible.) Against this view thé -h
Reidi'an questions still echo; Is the fact thai there could be centaurs something 
which is half horse and* half man? (Are possible centaurs hooved?) The problem f/'- 
exemplified by the geometer’s circle is not solved. Leaving, however these 
considerations aside, the equation of the conception of X with the conception 
of the fact that X is possible (or with the conception of a possible X)iriâis 
into infinite regress.
Something should be said here about Reid's account of ‘abstract general 
conceptions’ in relation to Locke and Berkeley, whom he criticizes, and to 
Stewart who criticized him. It will emphasize still further Reid’s (and 
Stewart’s) rejection of concepts as psychical entities. Against Berkeley Reid 
insists that we do have ’abstract general conceptions'. Stewart complains that ; 
Reid is manufacturing mystery where everything- is plain and straightforward, ■
Everyone agrees that we can, for example, reason ‘'concerning a figure considered ,
« ■ ■ ;
merely as triangular" without attending to its particularities. What additional/g
light does it throw on the subject to tell us in ”scholastic language" that we
are enabled to do so because of the power which the mind has for forming
I. ' -
’abstract general conceptions'? Stewart, however, has no deep quarrel with
Reid's views; the words'abstract general conceptions’ prevented him from seeing
how shallow it was, * .
1. Elements, Vol.II, Ch* II, Sec, II, p.83.
2. Reid and Stewart are usually contrasted as ’conceptualist' and ’nominalist’.
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The words are Locke's but Reid does not use them in Locke's sense; he 
argues with Berkeley without really disagreeing with him; and he does not 
make mistalces that Stewart corrects. For the problem which interested Locke, / 
Berkeley and Stewart - how we can refer significantly to generality - is not .i*; 
directly Reid's interest. Of course we refer to generality by general words,rg
with or without the assistance of representative members of a class, "General- 
ization", Reid says in a fragmentary draft of the Intellectual Powers, »* is -, 
nothing' else in my apprehension than observing some attribute or circumstance i 
to be common to two or more objects, and givingittoaoname which must of 7/4/
consequence be applicable to all the individuals in which the thing signified 
by it is found," What Reid is concerned with is the threat to the knowledge ' 
of real generality in things, lie thinks this threat comes in different ways
from Locke and Berkeley, and he is still preoccupied with the theory of ideas. '-
' ■ :
Locke and Berkeley, he thinks, have ^ot themselves into positions in which ones6^''
of them can allow us knowledge only of general ideas (which Reid misconstrues. • '2, _ 
in Locke to mean images), with no emergence beyond them; and the other can.. ,:
allow us knowledge only of particular things (and Berkeley ' s ' things' Reid
insists, imless they are minds, are ideas whidh have supplanted things.
The direct thouljht of a particular thing is a particular conception; of x/kf
one of its attributes, separated from the rest, an abstract particular con- '
caption; of such an attribute as actually or potentially common to a number f
of individuals, an abstract general conception. Neither a %)articular, nor an '
abstract, nor an abstract general conception, is an idea in Locke's sense. T o .
abstract is to consider separately what may or may not be able to exist i
1. Aberdeen IVjBB, 2I31.6
2. Intellectual Powers, V, Ch. VI, p.408,
separately, and Berkeley in trying to deny it acimits it. For be admits tbai.rn
considering;, for .example, a triangle, he can consider it merely as such wikhout  .
attending to its differences from other triangles. And, says Reid, you. cannot t 
consider what you cannot conceive. So Berkeley does conceive a triangular -
figure merely as such. "1 know no more that is meant by an abstract general
"33, ■ ■
conception of a triangle." Locke meant more, and Berkeley did not mean less by 
the abstraction he allowed, and Reid, if he is to be held to the sense he put 
upon ’conception’, meant what Berkeley did, since the proposition that nothing 
can be considered unless it is conceived, is, with ’conception’ used as Reid used 
it, tautological. ' ' ,
Against Berkeley’s view that the particular is given a functional universality; 
by being made representative of a class, Reid objects that the use of a member of ' 
a class as its representative implies a conception of the defining properties of ' 'v 
the class. It does., but it is open to Berkeley to reply that the class properties 
are in the first place determined by a decision to take into consideration some 
properties of a particular and to leave others out of-consideration. The class 
properties are calculated from the degree of abstractionrapplied to the particular 
not the other way round. And there is no reason why Reid should regard this - , 
reply as-unsatisfactory.
Stewart has a heavily, linguistic 'view of the nature of general conception. j 
Unfortunately no more than hints and fragments of it emerge from a hundred pages , - 
of exposition, divided between the first two volumes of the. Elements. Language,. 
or at any rate, a system of signs, is the indispensible.instrument of abstraction 
and general reasoning, which cannot begin without primitive signs or cannot . ' 
devèlopGsucessfully withoutna-"class of signh^expressive of all the circumstances ' 
which we wish our reasonings to comprehend; and, at the same time, exclusive of all 
those which we wish to leave out of consideration. The word triangle « for 
I. Intellectual Powers, V, . VI, p. 408. \ , -
' ::■ ' x : - ‘:‘. : ''/ ' ""' ' ■ "' ■ ■ 4 9-
itistance, when used without any additional epithet, confines thé attention to
the three angles and three sides of the figure before us: and reminds us, as we <
proceed, that no step of our deduction is to turn on any of the specific
 ^ C:varieties which that figure may exhibit." Reid's criticism of Berkeley, that 
a member of a class cannot be made its representative without- an abstract 
conception of the characteristic properties of the class, is answered simply :
, Ï:/ -,
a class is specified by a class name with its definition. ' It is not too much 
to say that "we think as well as speak by means of words". When particulars are
at once generalised by general words, and the words in turn given meaning by f-
being given things to stand for, general reasoning with a factual application bee
becomes possible. With the representative particular kept in mind, it proceeds,?
as far as content though not form is concerned, like an operation in geometry;,
with the particular dropped from view, like an operation in algebra, the,words in
their manipulation no more having to call up immediately the thought of things
than algebraical symbols do. The difference between the two procedures, is
like the difference between hieroglypMc wtiting and writing in alphabetical2. ' ' ' . 
ciiaracters. Finally, whenever thought is general, signs are the object ofof <
its attention whether there is any thing existing to be thought or not,.
Reid has not told us what it is to imagine a thing that does not exist, as 
distinct from conceiving it intellectually, but he has, as We have seen, .left , 
some scattered materials for an answer,’ These might be put together and devel­
oped slightly. Imagination is one kind of conception, the conception of an 
individual sensible object. It is the up of the look of it, and though
Reid.does not think it good English to speak of imaginary sounds, tastes and 
so on, it is the sumiing up of. sounds, tastes, smells - of any sensible quality
or pattern of them. Ho conception, unless it is of an internal object, has an
 _ ■ •
1. Elements, Vol.II. Ch; 1%. Sep. II. P; 8 ;^ P. 91,'P.: 98. - ' -
2.-JSfaniehts , Vol.I.., mk.a;' SëcIT, .p.' T74/. ' . . . ' ' - . ' 'I
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internal object. No remoteness in space or time is a bar to the. direct con-
ception of an external object. There is an analogy between perception and \
imagination emphasized by philosophers and reflected in everyday language in
metaphorical uses of ‘see’, ’hear’, ’touch’ etc.; only the point of the analogy
is not that both perception and imagination have inward objects but that :
neither does,( Held does not believe that when people say imaginary objects
are’"in the mind’, they want somehow to localize them there, with some sort, of
analogy to the way in which things are physically in things. ) When you imaginé^
something that once happened to be^ hap'pening now, that thing- with its real
characters, and not any ‘idea’ of it is the object of your imagination. When
you imagine unreal things; real characters of real things arc still before the
mind, but formed into unreal combinations; a centaur pictured is an unreal '
combination of real components. The objects of imaginative conception are 
limited, as the objects of intellectual conception are not, to what has been 
experienced or to rearrangements of what has been experienced.
This treatment of the .objects of imagination, for what it is worth, could 
be extended to the objects of false memories. Having once realized that there t 
is no place for ideas as direct objects in remembering, one is inclined, to say 
that what they are wanted for is pseudo-remembering; that indeeddthe difference 
between the two is constituted by the fact that the first does not have, and :, .1 
the second does have, ideas for objects. To say this, is to create the problem;. 
how can present ideas be mistaken for past events when they have not a single 
property in common? Finding it insoluble, ideas are reinstated for both true y 
and false memory.
There is no need to have ideas as the objects of false memories. When you 
remember what actually happened, you are retrospectively aware of persons;. 
things, events, times and places, as they actually were. When you are sure
' ' y/:;' ' ' - k , - 51"
you remember and do not,, you are still retrospectively aware of persons, / 3 -
things, events, times and- places, but . one person is confused with another,
things and events are mistaken for other things and events, or the times are
wrong, or places muddled.; , some features of the past are not recognized for' : \
what they, were. When you positively remember returning to the library àftér-. /h'-.
- ' ' ' ' ' ' ' \  4
wards found slipped down behind the shelves, you do recall the book and you do 
recall returning books, to. the library and you tiiinic you did with this book vdiat. 
you did with btherbbooks. You dp not, with all the sceptical implications in - 
doing so, mistake the idea (in the theory sense) of.returning the book for
returning the book. You may 'have an idea' (in the sense that Reid would % - 3,
allow) that, you did what you never did, but this is to fail to, recognize some- 
feat ure of the past for what it was, not to mistake the present for the past.
Si.
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I. The Logical Deduction ;
"Ideas seem to have something in their nature unfriendly to other existences," 
They begin their career humbly as rejpresentatives of things, and in this capacity 
appear to do the very useful work of making the Operations of the mind intellig- ] ^
' ' ' ' ' 'ifMpible, and they end by pushing everything, out of existence, except themselves*
 ^ .There is a short logical deduction of the sceptical consequences of the theory 
of ideas and there is the historical deduction of Hume, from Locke. The short 
deduction;
"When I thinlc of Alexander, I am told that there is an image or idea of . -p-.'
Alexander in my mind, which is the immediate object of this thought. The ■
necessary consequence of tiiis seems to be, that there are two objects of this
thought - the idea, which is in the mind, and the person represented by that. ,
idea; the first, the immediate object of the thought, the last, the object of " p‘
the same thought, but not the immediate object. This is a hard saying; for it
makes every thought of things external to have a double object. Every man is vpSS
conscious of his thoughts, and yet, upon attentive reflection, he perceives no ■ .
such duplicity in the object he thinks about. Sometimes men see objects double/.
but they always know when they do so: and I know of no philosopher who has ,
expressly owned this duplicity in the object of thought, though it follows
necessarily from maintaining that, in the same thought, there is one object that./ :
is immediate and in the mind itself, and another object which is not immediateyp-':" '
and which is not in the mind,
 : :  ^
I, Inquiiy, Ch.II, Sec. ¥I,p,I09. ''
' :"Bé8ide8 this, it seems very hard, or rather i^og^ihle, to Understand, 
what is meant by an object of thought that is not an inmediate object bf 
thought,*,.There is a sense in which a thing may be said to be perceived by 
a medium. Thus any kind of sign may ..be said to be the medium by which I 
perceive, of understand the thing signified. The sign by custom, or compact, 
or perhaps by nature, introduces the thought of the thing:’signified. Bub here ' 
the thing signified, when it is introduced to the thought,/is an object of 
- thought no less immediate than the sign was before. And there are here two , 
objects of'thought, one succeeding another, which we have shown not to be the 
case with respect to an, idea, and the object it represents. . ' -
"I apprehend, therefore, that, if philosophers will maintain that ideas in 
the mind are the only immediate objects of thought, they will be forced .to ' j 
grant that they are the sole objects of thought, and that it is impossible for 
'men. to think of anything else," ' '
Are there two objects before the mind when, say, Alexanderiis thought ofj 
one of them the historical person and the other the idea of him? If there are, 
this .could hardly fail to be noticed. Ideas especially should be obvious 
since they are immediately known, and are what they.appear.to be, and anything 
else t%t' is known is loiown only through them.
, ÿet in spite of these characteristics,. unaiiJjnously. ,accorded to ideas by 
philosophers, there must be something unstraightforward about them, Reid tiiinks,' 
; to account for the fact that the history of philosophy'is almost the history ' 
of an ;argument over the nature of ideas. Ideas have been held to be self- 
eimstent, in the Divine Wind, in our minds, in our bràinS; to be all innate, 
all ,advent it i ous, some innate and some adventitious; when adventitious, to 
have Cod, external things, impressions, as their causes; abstract ideas have 
been held to..exist, abstract ideas have been denied as an absurdity. We must
be better acquainted with ideas tlian with anything else, if there are idcae,
. . . :, I-and yet there has been all this disagreement and more about their nature.
Quite different sorts of things are of course called 'ideas' in this chaos
of philosophical disputes/"and even when any one of them is separated oufc from,
the others, the powers of inspection would need to be vpry formidable to settle, 
as Reid seems to think they .should be able to, all the questions that might 
arise about it. It might well be beyond.them even to detect the ideas that 
are objects of cognition, for though in a way they must be more obvious than 
anything else, they may not be obviously ideas, Certainly the descriptions of , 
ideas that we have to go on do not point unmistakably to their application;
’immediate objects', 'lasting no longer than the consciousness of them*,
'located in the mind' - least of all 'immediate objects'. When Locke said 
that he meant by ideas whatsoever was "the object of the understanding when a  ^
man thinks", and that he supposed it would be granted him that there are sucho
ideas, the supposition was too well founded; the trouble is that everyone
would grant it. And there is no way of supplementing these metaphysical 
descriptions with a list of typical examples of ideas of thought or memory.
Could we be helped obliquely to a recognition of them? ' The objects of all 
false beliefs are ideas; we know what false beliefs are, so we know in a gener­
al way what ideas are. This is no help. Even if we knew that the objects of 
false beliefs are ideas, we would not be in any better position to recognize 
the ideas involved as direct objects in true beliefs.
A list of typical examples of ideas of sense does not sound straightaway 
an impossible We would know what to look for when told bo look y
for patches of colour and so on. But when Locke says that these are ideas, 
meaning by 'ideas' all that he does mean, the trouble is that many people would - 
X. Intellectual Powers, II, Ch. XIV, p.305.2. Essay, Introduction (Fraser's edition) , Vol.I, pp. 32- 33. , " t,;
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not allow that they are- ideas*
However, when looking*'for the ideas of thought/'we do have this to go oh;/’xS' 
we do know that there are to be two objects of thought, respectively immediate 
and remote, whenever we think of what is not itself in the mind; and the ' -fy't 
immediate object is the idea and it is in the mind and to be looked for there*
So if two objects.are not to be found, then either ideas are fictitious or it* 
is false that we can tiiinlc (except, perhaps, introspectively where "the mind 
is its own archetype") of anything else*
Are there then, two objects? We are thinking of events in Alexander's life, 
and very likely while we are , there is a flickering succession of images 
(wliich might be quite different the next time we thought of the same events).
Are these the ideal objects representing remote and directly inaccessible objects 
that the theory is speaking of? If so, it is a psychological banality not ■ y 
worth powder and shot, For we are certainly thinking directly, in a perfectly 
clear sense of the word, of the past events, and what argument there is would - 
be over the propriety of calling the images to which no attention is being paid, 
objects of thought at all, let alone direct objects. If it is two different 
sorts of objects before the mind at the same time that we are to find, with a; .
significant epistemological relation between them, the search lias been .
disappointing. Should we have looked for successive objects? ■ '-'f/’•'
There are the familiar experiences in which we come to tiiink of one thing ' 
by first thinking of another, as in any chain of reasoning or in any causal
inference; as in memory we sometimes grope back from clue to clue towards an /.
accurate recollection; as in the transition from any sign to its signification. 
The mediation is temporary and has failed unless it is. It ends in our thinking 
directly of the later thing to which the earlier has led us There is no , 
analogy here with the structure of cognition in the theory of ideas where the. ' 
indirect object never becomes the direct object. This structure, Reid claims
is unintelligible bUrough and througlu "For, idiaicvor the object be, the man 
Wither thinks of ft ,/of ' he/dobs not// There is no laediim/betwëen these * If 
hé thinks .of. I'W -it iÿ an immediate object of thought while-he thinks of it, 
Ifthe<hpes hot think-of i 1/:It' rs^  object of thought - at all*. Every object '
of . thought/ therefore, is an immediate object of thought,%,and the word 
immediate', .joined to objhcts of thought, seems to be a mere expletive."
.-Jt It is: hot surpfisin^ finds; himseif wohderihg for' a moment if , .
.the the dry of: the'two objects has Vbe en a theory udiich, anyone has ever tried , 
.tojhold; he cannot remember :any. philosopher actually saying, that tnere are the'I 
twdi'' But add t(^ether :ïiimèdil^el and 'med%^ ahd:.yÔu:hûv^ two,and 
. !imiediàté': implies its correlative even if this is not W^pfessly mentioned,
And what lias Locke, for instance,, been trying to: say in : saying "the mind knows' J 
'hot'tMngs iimediatëlÿ, but only by the interypntioh of the.tdoas we have of 
them't,. if not what .Reid shows cannot be, said?,. That ;'there are not two objects 
discoyerable • on inspection,- but only the idea with, however, its represejitative, 
syEibblical , .relative:ffunctioh? Reid is not,, answered, .Either we know what is 
:represented, symbolized, 6r we do not. . If we do, thèn there-are the two 
objects. If we do notyi.thefidea is absolute and has. no : representative, j
s^ymbolical.-function. Unless we can get beyond ideas to what they', are ideas /  ^
of ,''we:'are in the -portion of a,/savage shown, a book in ,à language he cannot 
-read/^d does not eveh'&iiow 'to be a lâi%ùage. / :J . ' J
■' Reid' s.-criticism--of a representative theory,.of cognitioh reaches down to 
a deeper .selftdest in'it than/the inconsistencyb brought put by the ' ,
standard- criticism. The /standard criticism' is that. Y cannot be representative 
'hf X/ihiie.ss, cqhtrary to thejhyp^ X and,Y càn be' cbii^red. hithoub'
i. Intel 1 èctUal Bowers', - Vi/(Gh/ ÏIIp :
'2.' E s È a y /' Z/i .  fv: /  3 ,   ^ f
3. Philosophical Orations, p.35. '
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tlfis■;comparison, we have notMng but-'groundless belief ;: we do not know whether -y. 
Y represents X; vre do hot know whether there is. an X to be represented, Or if wej;; 
may be permitted to know that there is by a non-hpipi/rtca-1 causal inference, it ."1/ 
remains blankly X for us. '-'h:
Reid's criticism is that,a general theory of mediate cognition implies the 
necessity of what it asserts to be impossible;- If X cannot be thought of directly^ 
it cannot be thought of indirectly through the idea of it. For to think of Y ash
the idea of X is to thinlc of X directly, Y directly, and directly of the relationV; 
between X and Y, (The alternative: an infinity of m.diating ideas between X and : ;
I.) Ideas overcome no barriers. If the barrier is the thing's = remoteness; ' .• *V§4 
ideas leave it remote; if it is that the conditions of thought impose phenomeimly 
distortion, then ideas either are this/distortion, or.they are involved in it. 
Therefore, either it is impossible to know X, or it is necessary to know it
immediately. To’ say that nothing but ideas can be immediately‘known, is .alréady/V^; 
to have given up the theory of mediate cognition, for it is bo say that nothing 
but ideas can be known - ".immediately" here is a mere expletive^ One way . or 1h( 
other the unintelligible duality of cognitive-objects has to be given up. - If tne. ;. 
ideas are cut out, we are back at coomon sense. If the alternative excision is;V.:‘;. 
made, Hume is inevitable. ‘ . ’ ’
A theory, of representative sense perception by itself, detached from a gene 
theory of representative cognition, is free from self-contradiction, A thing.
able to be thought/ of directly could possibly be perceived, only indirectly. The,.,y y
- '■ ' ■ , . . . . - .■/•fe''3@
statement that the senses never show us the thing itself, nor any of its pfopertiç.È
in themselves, nothing but its-fugitive and ideal appearances, is a statement
that can be understood. Require all cognition: thinking, remembering, imaginihgV’i'3
and perceiving to be indirect in the way the theory means, and none can be.
Of course, as the standard criticism points : out, the content of our thou^t//||p
3 — V""- % "-iVv/"' /'V: :’"' b8- ':
,':. ■ ‘ of the, object lying behind, its ideal manifestations in sense experience is going
;,1. to be qiute arbitrary; we shall not have any reasons for supposing that there -
is any hidden object there at all, let alone for a claim to know what it is liter 
The supposition and claim, however, are not formally invalid, though the fact tMt 
we have no reason for them is a good reason for their sceptical rejection, for '/ 
striking out here too ’immediate ' from the proposition that ideas are the mindls 
only ^immediate objects. Vt
The sceptical deduction from the principle of mediate cognition is reinforc-r'
ed by the implications of the principle of conceptual empiricism. They are -3.V
independent principles which the Mstory of British pMlosophy had tightly ■ tC
connected. The theory of ideas for Reid included both as components, and he isc-; f
liabld igithout w^rmng .tolme^ -by 'the theory of ideas' either of them. He ali/ays '
regards the principle that we have no concepts going beyond sense or introspect- y
ive experience as a "necessary and allowed consequence" of the principle that
, I " . cthings are known only through their 'images' in the mind. . He says nothing
that would enable us to see why he thought it was a.necessary consequence.
" There is a tribunal of inquisition erected by certain modern philosophers- ' ' f' y A
before which everything in nature must answer. The articles of inquisition 
are few indeed, but very dreadful in their consequences. They are only these: 4% 
Is the prisoner an Impression or an Idea? If an idea, from what impression 't/ 
copied? Ho%'f, if it appears that the prisoner is neither an impression, nor an 
idea copied from some impression, immediately, without being allowed to offer 
anything in arrest of judgment, he is sentenced to pass out of existence,and to y ; 
be, in all time to come, an empty unmeaning sound, or the ghost of a departed >-'3 
entity."'^ '
I.Inciuiry. Ch.¥I, Sec.¥I,p.I40.
2.lMulry. Ch. ¥1, Sec.TIII,p.I44,
%V,pv#y.(y^rWqy/.%. ,. .. . y../
If the biily possible objects of thought are possible objects of sense/or 
introspective experience, and if the objects of sense experience are ideas 
(counting 'impressions* as 'ideas'), then, the world becomes at once exclusively 
my world, its history part of my autobiography, and I become what is introspect- .
ively discoverable in me. ■
This picture of the consequences of the two principles has exaggerated 
features. (Reid woiild insist that.:in one respect it is not strong enough: it 
should have blacked out any sort of history at all, since the intervention of y.
ideas shuts off memory and thought from the past.) It has room for no more than 
one experient,, who is himself reduced tô a succession of experiences somehow 
linked together as his by à pervasively personal quality in all of them. But 
there could be other private worlds for other minds. It is true that no one's 
mind can be an object of experience to someone else. The principle of conceptual' 
empiricism, however, was not quite the modem verification principle. It allowed . 
significance to syntactically correct statements if their descriptive language 
had possible application to the same sort of things as one's ovm sense and 
introspectlme data, even though these things could never become part of one's 
own sense and introspective data. The question How do we know that there are « ,
other minds? remains, but the question How do we know? is an embarrassment for 
any. philosophy except one which claims to know less than we do know.
And the queerness of as many sensible worlds as there are sentient beings, a ,5
world a piece, surrounding each one with a visible and tangible aura, but visible 
and tangible only to each one, is already there before the deduction, as part of
the queerness of a physical world unreachably beyond its different ideal appear- -. ;
ances to different individuals. For these appearances constitute as many differ­
ent sensible worlds as there are individuals; never left by them as long as they
' ■ '■ ' , ' :.- .66
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live and never entered by anybody else. There are even linguistic palliatives .
available, now that there are no longer both these multitudes of private worlds
and a single physical world neither private nor public. A material object
might be defined as a class made up out of its sense appearances to different
individuals. It would thus be given a sort of independence of any one individual,
//and the perception of any member of the class could permissibly be called a 
perception of the object. (People who see different bits of a thing rightly say
:
tie y see the same thing. ) How far this verbal gesture of reconciliation would 
do would depend on how stubborn the common sense was that had to be appeased.
At any rate, on a metaphysics where appearance and reality coincide, as they do ^
after the deduction, the words ' see ', 'touch*, 'hear* etc. could be usea with
unforced meanings. We no longer have to choose between saying, on the One liend, , 
that we see and touch what is invisible and intangible, and,on the other, that wc '
' ' ado not see and touch material objects.
Finally, numerical self-identity has gone but a qualitative self-identity 
remains, and anyone making the change would probably deny that common sense was /
committed to the first, and so deny that there is anything sceptical in the
substitution of the second for it*
HReid spes the principle of conceptual empiricism for what it is; he sees
2the a priori behind the empirical front. * You got the idea of scarlet by having 
that colour shown to you; of anger by feeling angry; the idea of a centaur by
1. There are all the things in the "universe of objects or of body'J"; And there' ' 'is "another sun, moon,and stars; an earth, and seas, cover'd and inhabited by - 
plants and animals; towns, houses, mountains, rivers" in the universe of "my 
impressions and ideas". (Hume, Treatise Bk. I. Pt.IV, Sec.?, p.242.) It is- 
one of Hume’s merits to have shown how astonishing the view was''which most of 
his educated contemporaries had accepted effortlessly from Locke and the 
scientists.2. Active Powers, IV, Ch. II, p.604.
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mentally joining half a man and half a horse; you have never tasted pineapples,
BO you have no idea of the taste of a pineapple. It is a safe proposition that ;> 
every idea you have has had a similar origin. Too safe; quite invulnerable, for 
notMng will be allowed to count against it. * The fact that an alleged concept 
lias no empirical derivation is a complete reason for regarding it as a pseudo- , }; 
concept. "And when he suspects that any philosophical term has no idea annexed 
to it (as is too common) he always asks from what impression that idea is derived? 
And if no impression can be produced, he concludes that the term is altogether2. "t
insignificant."
Hume does not quite do that, at least not when the terms are in philosophical
and ordinary use. To write off such expressions as meaningless is to invite
the reply: "It would.be very strange indeed if manlcind had always used these words
so familiarly, without perceiving that they had no meaning and that this discovery
3.should have been first made by a philosopher of the present age." What Hume 
does maintain, when he is careful, is that if a pliilbsopher borrows a term from ' 
common speech and does not annex to it an idea wiÿh the prescribed origin, he 
uses it without its common meaning, without, indeed, any meaning. "' And since / 
whenever Reid would call something a material object, Hume would also; since both 
could agree on the criteria for applying the expessions 'personal identity*,
'cause and effect', 'free will', 'right and wrong* and so on, Reid cannot prove 
that Hume means more by them than he admits, and Hume cannot prove that Reid means 
less by them than he claims, and neither can he prove that he has the rest of 
mankind with him against the other.
1. As an empirical generalization, Hume does allow it a minor exception (the 
shade of blue never seen but imaginable); but none to it as an a priori criterion 
of meaning.
2. Hume, Abstract. p.II. ‘
3. Active Powers, I, Ch.I, p.515. It is the word 'power' that Reid has particular 
ly in mind, and the other words that are logically related to it.
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2. The Historical Deduction ■- -
As everyone with a sufficiently brief acquaintance with the history of 
British philosophy knows, its development from Locke to Hume is straightforward. /'■ 
and can be illustrated by a simple diagram. Three concentric circles would -
represent Locke s position, the outer one standing for material objects, the 
middle one for ideas and the inner one for the self. Berkeley deleted the first V-, 
of these circles; Hume deleted the first and the third, leaving nothing but ideas/4 
Very crudely, this is the Common Sense school's derivation of Hume from Locke.
Two successive sceptical revisions of Locke, the first surrendering the independ- 
ence of the external world with the intention of countering his implicit sceptic-// 
ism, the second with the intention of making what was implicit fully actual;
Berkeley and Humé .respectively; Berkeley, Locke made more self-consistent; Hwoe, ■.y 
Locke made quite self-consistenb. The influence of Reid,, Beattie and Stewart //- 
fixed this as the outline of the standard version of the progress of philosophy y 
from the Essay on Human Understanding to the Treatise of Human Nature. (They were " 
not responsible for the modification of it which derives Hume indirectly from / 
Locke through Berkeley, which has Hume pruning Berkeley as Berkeley had pruned 
Locke.) It has kept its authority in spite of one or two ineffectual protests 
until quite recently, .
I ' ■The historically decisive Locke, in the eyes of the Common Bense philosophers ; 
was Locke saying that, "the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no2. ■ 4-
other immediate object but its own ideas", and at the same time not wanting to - ; 
deny that we can know any of the things that we can ordinarily claim i;o know. ' / Vf 
The contradiction had to be ended in one of two ways. If the theory of ideas is - , ./ 
true, "there can be no loiowledge of anything but ideas. And, on the other hand, f
I..For British philosophy. In France, Stewart says, it was Locke determinedly - •tnlsunderstood as deriving all concepts from sensation. (Philosophical Essays, Pt. I.,Essay HI.) , 2. Essay, Bk.IVy Ch.I,.
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if we have knowledge of anything besides ideas, that theory must be false." 
Berkeley and Ihme accepted the theory and went on, Berkeley half-way, Kume with/# 
a harder logic to its consequences.
Reid's Locke, however, is not Locke simply tailored to a deductive premiss;  ^/ 
Locke keeps some of his ambiguities. Reid genuinely wonders whether his state
V
ment8 can mean what, they seem to mean. In some contexts, 'idea' with Locke is 
a synonym for 'act of thought' or 'act of perception* ; in others it is a deploT/^
able word for the objective qualities of things. Does it, perhaps, however "
unlikely, have one or other of these meanings in all contexts, so that there iét^^
nothing wrong with Locke's theory of knowledge except the wording? it is not
' keasy to be quite sure: "ideas, being supposed to be a shadowy kind of beings,
intermediate between the thought and the object of thought, sometimes seem to
coalesce with the thought, sometimes with thé object of thought, and sometimes 
to have a distinct existence of their own." When Locke says that "the mind, 
in cillits thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own- - 
ideas," can he really have intended to imply that there are objects of thought 
which are not immediate? How could he have helped seeing that to say ' immediate 
object* is necessarily to say 'only object'? And Indeed, is not this exactly '//f 
what he does say in the continuation of the same sentence - "no other immediate/<% 
object but its oi«i ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate"? Then t^e 
definition of knowledge as "the perception of the connection and agreement, or dis/ 
agreement;and repugnancy, of any of our ideas)' Locke says this is what i{nowledg%% 
is, but he cannot mean it, because he is to be found asking and failing to - 
answer the question how the mind, perceiving- nothing but its own ideas, can know/l^ 
their correspondence with tMngs. It is especially difficult to know how to take#
I' Intellectual Powers. VI, Ch.Ill,p.433, ^
■ ■ ' . aIntellectual Powers, II, Ch. IX, pp.279-280.
■V. ..r^ '\/- ■ %, '.. : . . ', M: u:‘'
the persistent formula, describi^ khowledge as a matter of;perceived relation-/
ships between ideas* It at least, perhaps, puts forward no theory but only a
new terminology*' "X say a sensation exists, and I think I understand clearly
what I mean* But you want to make the thing clearer, and for that end tell me,
that there is an agreement between the idea of tiiat sensation and the idea of ;
existence. To speak freely, this conveys to me no light, but darkness; I can 
. ■I.;/:;.'conceive no otherwise of it, than as an odd and obscure circumlocution." If ;
Locke had been thinking merely of the abstract knowledge we have in axioms and
deduction, the formula would be intelligible and unobjectionable* Abstract
knowledge is a matter of the perceived relations of ideas; provided that by# 3/
•ideasA are understood the attributes of things conceived without regard to
4'. ' ; 4' . #2* ' .  ^ -, 3  . : 3their actual existence* "But I cannot see how, in any sense, it can be ' , 
applied to the evidence of consciousness, to the evidence of memory, or to 
that of - the senses." ' 4'4'44.
These are all possible interpretations of parts of Locke, and some of them 
may be the mbstbprobable interpretations of some of his statements in some of 
their contexts^ An interpretations of the Essay as a whole which did not find 
in it * the theory of ideas' would be the interpretation of some other book. .
It required no Samson, says Reid, to bring down the pillars on which 
Locke supported the external world. But Berkeley* s motive was not a destroyerf a 
he was countering scepticism by a sceptical manoeuvre. Reid misunderstood 
Berkeley's intentions. He thought that Berkeley was abandoning the material .
world in order to secure the immaterial world. It was better to make a clean
1. Inquiry* Ch. II. Sec* V. p.107. — —
2. Intellectual Powers.VI. Ch* III, P.429 ff. 4 43 :/3. Intellectüal Powers. II. Ch. XX. p.330. The formula was of course invWhtMwith the entailments and exclusions of à deductive system in mind, and Lockevirtually gives it up for the kinds of knowledge to which Reid cannot see that it can have any application.
' ' ' ■ ; ■ ■ ■  ■ . ,
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sweep of what was doomed in any case and: might involve more important things 3 
in Its ruiné Matter could go without loss and with advantage. The grounds/of#/ 
of atheism and irréligion went with it (and, incident ly, Berkeley must have cal­
culated, the metaphysical foundations of transubstantlationj.
Berkeley, however, was not concerned simply with protecting religion and 
the soul. Nothing, he would have claimed, has gone except the fiction of 
material substance; he was not surrendering the materiar world; he; was beat# : 
ing back scepticism from it in the one way possible, by showing tiiat our senses 
openon to/it. Material things are precisely what we see,’handle, hear/taste 
and smell. Berkeley did, J. F. Ferrier remarks, wliat Reid talked about doing: 
Berkeley showed that the laaterial world is directly perceived.
"I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into tilings." . 
Berkeley ciianges things into ideas both in name and in nature, the Common Sense 
philosophers say/ He turns things into thought, Beattie insists, detemined:/ : ■ 
not to let huge absurdity escape. Ideas are thoughts, as everyone who knows the 
language knows, and if we allow Berkeley to persuade us to accept the transform­
ation, we have to give up any claim to being able to distingui^ anything from/'4 
anything else.
"All external objects have some qmalities in common; but between an external 
object and an idea, or thought of the mind, there is not, there cannot possibly#  
be, any resemblance. A grain of sand, and the globe of the earth; a burning 
coal, and a lump of ice; a drop of ink, and a sheet of white paper, resemble://' 
each other, in being extended, solid, figured, coloured, and divisible; but a; 
thought or idea hath no extension, solidity, figure, colour, nor divisibility: 
so that no two external objects can /be so unlike, as an /external object - and.^ ::////} 
(what philosophers call) the idea of it. Now we are taught by BEHKELEÏ, that
I. Works. Vol. Ill, p.417.
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external objects (that is, the things we take for external objects) are nothing 
but ideas in our minds; in other words, that they are in every respect different 
from what they appear to be ... The candle may be a lump of ice, an Egyptian 
pyramid, a mad dog, or nothing at all ... for anything I know, or can ever know 
to the contrary, except you allow me to judge of its nature from its appearance; .
which, however, I cannot reasonably do, if its appearance and nature are in everyI'.' ' y,;,respect so different and unlike as not to have one single quality in common." /
Part of the price a philosopher has to pay for saying that stones, trees and 
books are collections of ideas is to have a Beattie gyrate round the word, grin at 
the absurdities and be utterly incapable of seeing that it is essential to his 
theory to have no implications for experience. So Beattie thought that if Berkel­
ey was right we ought to be able to stride over precipices with impunity ("my neck/ 
Sir, may be an idea to you, but to me it is a reality"); that to stand on the 
grpimd is to perform the astonishing feat of getting the ideas in our heads under 
our boots, and so on. Nothing of this, of course, is a consequence of Berkeley's 
theoiy: death comes in the accustomed ways, no psycho-physical acrobatics are 
involved in standing up, the tissue-paper flimsiness to which the solid earth and  ^
everything’ on it is attenuated by becoming clusters of ‘ideas* is an illusion 
which the word casts on the imagination; nothing in ordinary experience is changed/ 
What would the world be like if things were clusters of ideas? Just like it is.
For Reid, Berkeley's metaphysics is not the gross affront to common sense - #2.that Beattie makes it out to be. Nevertheless common sense rejects it decisively.
1. Immutable Truth, Pt. II. Ch. II^ Sec. II. nt>. 284-2854 Beattie wonders if/V Y / perhaps, he has misunderstood Berkeley. It is more than possible; after all Berkeley did not really understand liimself or he would have seen that "his system leads directly to atheism arid universal scepticism." (pp.286-287# ) / I ;4,
2, Of the other Ooromon Sense philosophers, Stewart thought that no one could be an idealist in practice.(Philosophical Essays.) Oswald is definite; everything he saw and touched refuted Berkeley who maintained that the system "of matter we inhabit is a mere nonentity". Anneal td Common Sense, Vol.I, p.94.
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If things “are collections of ideas j nothing that I perceive exists any Ihnger 
I perceive it, and nothing that I perceive can be perceived by: ^ yone else. The , 
plain man never doubts that what he perceives exists independehtly of his percepfe- 
ion of it. and that many people can perceive the very same thing. Berkeley claims 
to be on the side of common sense here also. He allows that material things eiast
independently of the mnd of any one of us, denying them o n l y ans absolute exist-
:4,; / - 4 # 4 .ence distinct from their being perceived by God, and external to all minds. Reid
lets it go at that and does not. use the weapon he has in his hands.
Berkeley's theory, Reid maintains, would make us entirely sceptical about the 
existence of other finite minds than our own. Why? Because it disembodies eveiy 
•person, except oneself, and so cuts off mind from mindi "What I call a father, a 
brother, dr a friend is only a parcel of ideas in my own mind; amd, being ideas; ?; 
in my mind, they cannot possibly have that relation to another mind which they 
have to mine; any: more than the pain felt by me Can be>the individual pain felt# : ^' ' ; -2 . ' ---4 ; ' ' ' 4  ' 4 - ' 3-:' 3  - . #by another." Do I see other people's minds? "No. Do I see their ideas? No. Nor
do they see me or my ideas." • - / - / •'
However Berkeley chose to meet Reid's difficulty about other people's bodies,
and our knowledge of their minds - perhaps the analogical argument is as unaffected
' 4. - ,4" 4 -..-;by the privacy of ideas as Berkeley thinks it is - Reid could have argued withv; .
some success that Berkeley had two alternatives before him with regard to the stat44
us of ideas. One of them will alienate him from common sense, and the other //v #,
destroy the foundation of his idealism. Either ideas are related to perception,
as pain to feeling,, or they are not. If they are, then undoubtedly, they must 'be4j34
perceived in order to exist. But then my ideas are as fleeting,as my perceptions
of them, and (theplogical difficulties apart) I could have no acess to God's ideafe/
1."%ree Dialogues" I, Works. Vol. II. P .2357 ' ~2. Intellectual Powers. II. Ch. X, p.285.3. : Intellectuai Powers; VI. ch/V,. ■ P.446. ' :#v434. "Principles" . Works. Vol. II3 P. I(#4 4 4 / 3
: ? .  ' " / '  ' '  :  : '  - '  - -  - - ' -  \  - - - - ' -  '  . /  /  i  \  " -  ^  , 6 ( 3  . '  . V y i y
which would he as private ascray owni Nothing that I see or touch was there, befbref 
I saw or touched it, nor will be afterwards. No two people see and touch the 
same; tiling, except in the sense of *same‘ in which they can both have the same ; 
headache. (Reid quotes, surprisingly without comment, the passage in which
Berkeley shifts the word ’same* when it means * individually the same* out of ordin-îv; ' .  ^ . r . . - : - _ ' .. ][, '
aiy speech into the theoretical vocabulaiy of philosophers.)
If, on the other hand, individual pwnersiiip is made accidental to the nature y
of ideas (the possessive pronoun wedged off the word) ideas may then be public 
' - ' 2. . / objects, but they are loosed from their dependence on perception. To be is to, ^
be perceived by someone or other but not necessarily by anyone in particular, is S
not a proposition shining with the light of its intrinsic self-evidence. .
In a further recession from common sense Berkeley, Reid says, seems to make
ideas of sensation and of imagination differ in nothing but degree; ideas of
imagination are "less regular, vivid and constant** than ideas of sensation. On
"this doctrine, if we compare the state of a man racked with the gout, with hiss T,-:
state when, being at perfect ease, he relates what he has suffered, the difference :
of the two states is only this - that, in the last, the pain is less regular, vivid
and .constant, than in the first. We cannot possibly assent to this. Eve^ man .
knows that he can relate the pain he suffered, not only without pain, but with
pleasure; and that to suffer pain, and to think of it, are things which totally
3»differ in kind, and not in degree only."
It is a pity, Reid says, that Berkeley who is always opposing common sense to 
philosophical paradox, should have taken over, without suspicion, the philosophers' 
principle upon which his own paradoxes are founded. But there it is at the beginn­
ing of the Principles _qf Human Knowledge ; "It is evident to anyone who takes a
1. Berkeley,"Three Dialogues" III, Works, Vol.II, p.247; Reid, Intellectual Powers.
2. **Berkeley's position is that there is only one corporeal realm, which God and we alike apprehend directly ..." (T. E. Jessop, Berkeley*s Works. Vol.II, p.268.)5# Intellectual Powers, II, Ch.^I, p.291.
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survey-of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas, actually/;. 
imprinted on the senses .
Reid did not see that this statement for all its Lockian ring is already
Berkeleyan, and not a premiss provided bt|Locke for his own refutation. Berkeley 
did not reach his idealism by taking a razor to Locke's representationalism; His ^ ^ 
idealism was axiomatic, could be read off from the meaning of 'existence* as 
predicted of sensible objects, which again (especially when called 'ideas' or .  ^
•sensations') show their dependence on mind. And he does not move against Locke 
by arguing that there is no room for 'immediate' in the proposition that ideas 
are the only immediate objects of knowledge. He eliminates Locke by a number of 
good and bad arguments; Locke's independent physical world is inconceivable -
what would it be like? it is inconceivable - the attempt to conceive it would
- 'I.:'"" 'fail by succeeding^ These arguments, and others which Berkeley uses, do not 
turn on the implications of the principle of mediate cognition.
As a description of the results of the transition from Locke to Berkeley, 
Reid's account is near the truth: Berkeley dropped the hidden independent . :
physical world; he changed ideas into things only by calling them things from 
time to time; his real world has all the characteristics of Locke's ideal world:, 
it has to be as private and fugitive if there is to be any reason for the depend­
ence of esse on percipij. And Locke's ideal world has all: the ciiaracteristics of ; 
Berkeley's real world, is as palpable, as full of colour and sounds and scents. 
Reid's deduction, however, of Berkeley from Locke is unhistorical.
I: ÏW How does Berkeley, beginning with Locke, as Reid supposes, avoid ending with
I. "Philonous. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same ■ time:;unseen? % y  ^ » \Hylas, No, that were a contradiction.Philonous. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a tiling which is unconceived?"("Three Dialogues."tWorks Voll II, p.200.) Perrier paraphrased Berkeley; We want) matter per se; ' we get matter in relation to mindi "We may ring for Noèl, . - but Noi 2 always answers the bell." (Works. Vol.III. p;44I.) Reid, he says, must be roistàken in confronting; Berkeley with a common sense belief in indépend- , ent ioatter; common sense does hot believe logical impossibilities#
Hume? He inconsistently departs from"the common opinion about ideas" and allows 
that there are some tilings, notably our : own minds, .other finite minds, and God, pf; 
which we iiave no ideas but of which we do have notions. By 'notion', Berkeley ;- 
meant, as far as Reid can see, what the word does mean, (He saw;so little ihto#;;ki 
Berkeley's meaning that he cannot make out the difference Berkeley supposed there 
to be between notions and 'idea of imagination'.) "A notion is an act of the -5 
mind conceiving or thinking of some object." The object may be in or outside the, 
mind. And "if cbhscibdshess and reflection furnish us with notions of spirit 
and of their attributes, without ideas, may not our senses furnish us with notions
' ' : . . I' . .of bodies and their attributes without ideas"? ,
Hume corrected Berkeley's deviation. Locke taught us that "all the immediate ; 
objects of human knowledge are ideas in the mind. Bishop Berkeley, proceeding 
upon this foundation, demonstrated, very easily, that there is no material world*; 
... while he gives up the material world in favour of the system of ideas, he . > 
gives up one-half of that system in favour of the world of spirits; and maintains 
that we can, without ideas, think and speak, and reason intelligibly about spi|^ |ïij 
and what belongs to them,
"Mr Hume shows no such partiality in favour of the world of spirits. He adop-, 
ts the theory of : ideas in its full extent; and in consequence, shows that there 
is neither matter nor mind in the universe; nothing but impressions and ideas.
What we call a body, is only a bundle of sensations; and what we call the mind % 
is only a bundle of thoughts, passions, and emotions, without smy subject,"
Reid, popularized by Beattie, imposed a caricature on the history of philos^ / 
ophy, Professor Kemp Smith maintains, in representing Hume's teaching as 
"sheerly negative, being in effect little more than a reductio ad absurdum of 
the principles which Hume's predecessors, and Hume himself, have followed in
their enquiries. Hume, in other Words, is depicted as having done no more th^
1. Intellectual Powers. II. Ch; XI. 0.288.  ■ ; . ' :
2 . Intellectual Powers. II. Cht XII. p.293.
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■• , ' ■- ■ . . ■ ' •= V ' •■ ' Ï .'V . .:\  ^\ . ; V 'V' - -deliver his successors from a bondage to which he himself remained subject, A -■ 
strangely paradoxical verdicti. Hume, whose genius is ahalytic and critical, 
and whose criticism is eulogised as being so clear-sighted and thorough-going, 
is declared, to have been unable to perceive what was already so patent to Reid 
and even to Beattie, that the source of the trouble lay in his unconsidered ; 
acceptance of the hypothesis coimnonly entitled the 'theory of ideas*. Hume, V‘ 
who was sceptical - so it was alleged - about almost everything else, lias yet 
been so uncritical as to erect the elaborate body of argument that constitutes 
the Treatise on a foundation which he has not been concerned, to examine, and 
to the unreliability of which he has himself, though all unconsciously, been a
' ' I. ' ' - . ' \ .chief witnessÎ"
Reid and Beattie do not make any special point of saying that Hume took over
the hypothesis without examination, (in fact the one argument for it, not of an
• ’ - '   ' ' 2#,,.'analogical* type, examined by Reid is Hume's argument from perceptual réiàtivilÿjl
Reid and Beattie say that Hume took over the hypothesis. It is what Hume bays
himself, in a letter to Reid after having been shown most of the Inquiry before
its publication.
Hume begins the letter by telling Reid that he has gone through his work 
"with great pleasure and attention; It is certainly very rare that a piece so.:. 
deeply philosophical is wrote with so much spirit, and affords so much entertain- . 
ment to the reader." There seemed to be some obscurities in it, but these, Hirnfe 
thought, might have disappeared if he could have had the whole of it in front of"':-
him at once. There were some objections he woUld have liked to, make to the chapt^
er "Of Sight", if he had not suspected that he had insufficiently understood it;
He would not go into anÿ further difficulties until he had seen the whole book;
"I shall only say that if you have been able to clear up these abstruse and
!♦ The philosophy of David Humé. PB.3-4. - :r - '- x*::-2. Intellectual Powers. II. Chi XIV. pp.302ff>
important subjects^ instead of being .mortified, I shall be so vain as to jretend;| 
to a share of the praise; and shall think that my errors by iiaving at least
some coherence, had led you to make a more strict review of my principlesylwhich#
- V  . , - , ' ' / I. ■, . . ' -;y
were the common ones, and to perceive their futility." ..
It is not as 'candid and liberal' a letter as Stewart supposed when he inserted;:;'! 
it into his Life of Reid, to give credit where credit was due, but a kinder 
letter than Kemp Smith supposes, and not as ironical. It is ironical - Hume 
was not recanting - but not so ironical as to mean that Humé had not adopted thois: 
'common principles'• He could, not have denied, and would not have wished to, 
that ih the Treatise impressions and ideas are the components of experience.
Reid and Beattie say that Hume pushed Locke's theory of ideas to its sceptic­
al conclusion. Kemp Smith agrees (p^Il). What looks like Locke's principle is % 
to be found in the Treatise in its sceptical potentiality, and with a reference ! 
which Rèid might have written in himself to its universal sanction by philosoph­
ers; * 'tis universally allow'd by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious ■
of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions 
- 2'- ' 'V. . y-..., " The sceptical deduction is not made with the simple logic that Reid : : Ml
favoured from the theory of ideas as a theory of mediate cognition. 'Perceptions'
occupy existence exclusively only after Hume has added the principle of concept- ' '
ual limitation though it is true that this principle is implicit in Locke and is M
part of what Reid meant by Locke's theory of ideas. .iM
In Books II and III of the Treatise Hume develops his psychological and moral;,
theory on the assumption of a permanent physical world perceived indirectly
through the impressions it makes on the mind. (Here :and there the same assumption
emerges in the first book, islands left from a drowned continent.) On the
traditional interpretation of Hume this is put down to inconsistency. On
I; Reid's Collected Works, pp. 7-82. Bk. I/Pt. IIv 8ectionVI,^ ^^ p^ ^^  ^ . c:
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Smith's important reinterpre tail on it is ho inconsistency; To stop at the . 
impressions and ideas is to stop with the sceptical half pf Hume (somewhat-as if ,;) 
one took for the Cartesian philosophy only what feoes before the Cogito, ergo 
sum); Hume has pushed the sceptical implications of Locke's theory hard in I,; 
order to show its inadequacy; he was unperturbed by Reid’s criticism that it 
wrecks our, coramon sense beliefs, because he had himself already shown that by ‘ 
itself it does so,. but that supplemented it leaves : them intact; it needed to be 
limited and could not be abolished; not Locke and Berkeley's "view of sense",. 
but "their view of the function of reason", their demand for reasons for any é 
beliefthat we are entitled to hold, had to be rejected; feeling has a coghitive!;! 
primacy over reason; Hume's scepticism is p^ rovisional; it is where reason alone <
; . 1 / ■ V . \ 1Would leave us, but; where reason leaves us^hatureM-takes over imperatively,
There are two questions here, in one of which Reid would be Very interested, 1 
and in the; Other only faintly. The first is whether the theory oi ideas can be ! 
combined with anything else so as to have its sceptical implications cancelled.
And the answer depends oh how much content is put into the* theory. If the !"
theory is a general theory of mediate cognition, channelling all thought of what. 
is not in the mind through ideal objects that are in the mind, Reid would claim !| 
that the answer is No, and that he had shown that the theory is logically incoh- : ; 
erent, and that if the ideal objects are to be retained they must be retained as !
the only objects there are , If the theory is taken more moderately to be a ;>
representative theory of sense perception, there is no logical impossibility in 
our managing to possess true beliefs for which we can produce no evidence, and 
this belief, which we cannot shake off, in a permanent world behind its fugitive; ! 
manifestations may be one of them. But what is this world like? How would; you
' it?'describe'^ ' To say that anything in it is like the impressions which are its effects 
is to ask for the. reminder that nothing can be like an impression except its : I, 
I. The Philosophy of David HUme. Ch. I and II. : .;
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...fainter copy in the imagination. To say that it is not like its effects makes 
it very difficult to answer the question, and impossible if one is also demand­
ing definitions for all descriptive words in terms of ingressions or of the
"manner" in which impressions present themselves to the mind. Hume has put
himself into the position of being unable to allow any content to our natural ~
, . ' ' ' ' ' . - beliefs'* in an external world without contradicting himself, unless he rejects y
any form of a representative theory of perception.
And of course he does, when he is expressly dealing with the question.; The -0
world does not contain objects that resemble impressions, or objects that do not !
resemble them; it is the world of impressions themselves. The senses cannot
justify a belief in the "distinct" and “continued" existence of any object of
sense, and reason shows the belief to be unjustifiable. The way in which
"imagination" works to produce it can be explained. If Hume does not say that
the belief is a true belief, he is still where Reid saw him. And he could not,
in Reid's opinion, even say that it might be a true belief.
What is an 'impressi on ? ? "I ask the philosopher this question; but I find ;|
" ’ _:sxno answer to it. And when I read all that he has written on this subject, I find 
this word impression sometimes used to signify an operation of the mind, sometimes: 
the object of the operation; but for the most part, it is a vague and i^etezs!'!# 
mined word that signifies both .... Mr Hume's system, with regard to the mind, 
required a language of a different structure from the common: or, if expressed 
in plain English, would have been too shocking to the common sense of mankind .. '
if a man would persuade me that the moon which I see, and my seeing it, are not
■ -;■ ■ '■ .two things, but one and the same thing, he will answer his purpose less by arguing
this point in plain English, than by confounding the two under one name - such ^
I.as that of an impression." .
I. Intellectual Powers. I. Ch. I. nn.227-228. '
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Reid's puzzlement is not genuine. Everything Hume says of impressions leads' 
us to think that the thing I see and ny seeing it "are not two things, but 
and the same thing". Hume has been meaning by 'impression' or 'perception*
Reid is perfectly certain - something which is at once an object and an act of: 
perception. He has meant by the words what Berkeley meant by 'idea'. Ideas %
cannot exist unperceived; nothing can be separated from itself. The same dis- ,, 
ability prevents the unperceived existence of'impressions* or 'perceptions*. If 
the time, has now come to sanction our belief that the moon is there whether we-' - ' 
see it or not, it will be necessary to change the meaning of 'impression'. -
The "supposition of the continu'd existence of sensible objects or perceptions 
involves no contradiction", Hume says^ What then is an 'impression* or a 'percept:
tion'? We are not helped at this point by being told that 'perception* and
' object* are interchangeable words which Hume will be using to refer simply to 
anything presented to us by our senses, to the sort of thing that a common man 
calls "a hat or shoe or stone". We want the "more philosophical way of speaking % , 
and thinking" which Hume has dispensed with for the moment in giving tMs 
explanation (p.202). When this is restored, it is clear that the words Jimpressiod 
and 'perception' do not have the metaphysical neutrality of the word 'object* if • 
this word is used for a thing with no implications as to the conditions of the); 
thing's existence. The principle that nothing is ever really present to the mind 
besides its own perceptions would be the most banal truism, if 'objects', keeping 
its neutrality, could replace 'perceptions'. Reid is not mistaken in thinking:)!/.;:!)! 
that in Hume's meaning perceptions and impressions are objects which have ho being 
when they are not being' perceived. How then is the 'continued' existence of our 
perceptions possible? We-say that iiats, shoes and stones exist in 6ur absence^ ? 
Is Hume merely authorizing us to go on saying so, provided we mean that they would
I. Treatise. Bk. I, Pt. IV, Sec, II, p.208.
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exist,. or could be perceived^ if we were present? He has too much respect/for,{y.^  ^
our natural beliefs. When he denies that there is any contradiction, any absur­
dity in the supposition that objects of sense continue to exist after we have - 
ceased to perceive them, he means by 'continue to exist' what we mean.
The continued existence of;our perceptions when we do not iiave them is possibl 
because "what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different 
perceptions, united together by certain relations, and sui)pos*d, tholfalsely, to! 
be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity. Now as every perception is %-
distinguishable from another, and may be consider'd as separately existent; it !
evidently follows, that there is no absurdity in separating any particular . Mil 
perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations, with that 
connected mass of perceptions, wtiich constitute a thinking being." (p. 207) ' 0:
All perceptions have the same metaphysical status. "'Tis also evident, that ,
colours, sounds, etc. are originally on the same footing with the pain that arises)
from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a fire; and that the difference
betwixt them is founded neither on perception nor reason, but on the imagination^'!
(p. 192 ) All perceptions are separable existents. There could not be uhfelt
pain, but there might be a pain which no one felt. Colours and sounds are
necessarily sensations, but possibly ownerless sensations, Reid said that Hume
had discovered that there could be thought without a thinker, love without a lover,
treason without a traitor; a*bundle is a mere aggregation. One dismisses this =
rhetoric of Reid's perhaps as a crude misunderstanding invited by a crude word.
But unless Hume has changed the meaning of 'perceptions' when he comes to speak v
of the detachability of perceptions from the bundle, or unless - and this would !, !
make Hume unrecognizable - he has never meant more by'perceptions' than objects ;
of awareness, never meant that they were indissoluble hyphenations of object and M  
ï.~ Inquiry! Ch. II, Sec. VI, p. 109. ~  ^ ^
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awareness, some such possibility is his discovery.
Whether Huïùe aimed at philosophical scepticism, is a question to which Reid
would have answered Yes and, preoccupied as he is with the implications of the M
theory of ideas, would not have thought particularly important. He would have
thought it important to insist that if Hume intended, as Kemp Smith maintains,
to avoid scepticism by bringing common sense beliefs into line with moral beliefs,
he would first have had to reform his account of moral beliefs. "Mr Hume will
I. . ;;;have the Moral Sense to be only a power of feeling without judging*! If the . v||
convictions of conmon sense are beliefs merely in the sense that Huiae allows ;
moral beliefs to be beliefs, they may be monitored by Mature herself and there
is no i.epistemological mystery, since they make no episteraological claims.
And it is with very dubious epistemological claims that common sense breaks
through in the Treatise. Reid and Beattie thought that Hume was speaking with ;■
them against Mmself when they came on the places where he seems to say that
nature silences the sceptic. But it is hard to make out what significance Hume M
attaches in the Treatise to the fact that when you have finished philosophizing
you have to "live, and talk, and act like other people". You must yield to the i
current of nature. And in this *‘blind submission" show a final scepticism? Or '
yielding to the current, are you safely trusting yourself to something that will
sweep you out of scepticism into truth beyond the reach of reason? Hume does
not seem to have made up his mind, but the tone is wrong for the second interpret-r
ation and not really so very much better when he says that nature forces belief, !
5. , . ■
like breathing and feeling, on us. That is how, as a matter of fact, it is,
with a shrug as to whether that is all there is to it.
The tone changes in the Enquiry; our natural beliefs have acquired a less :!/
ambiguous authority. The extreme sceptic can raise difficulties to which no
1. ActiveiBowers. V, Ch.VII, pi674.
2. Bk.I, Pt.IV, Sec;VII, p; 269.
3. Bk; l! .Pt;IVf, Sec;I, p;I83. !
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solutions can be found, but he knows himself, as we all do, that his conclusions) !
I*are dream-rconclusions. "Common sense and reflection" are correctives , (in the / ! 
Treatise ‘’carelessness and in-attention"). The change is strongly.marked in the ; 
section where Hume deals with pur belief in the uniformity of nature. . !
"Sceptical Solutions of Sceptical Doubts"; Beattie runs the title-phrases ‘ ! 
contemptuously together, but HUme speaks a subtler Reid; "My /
practice, you may say, refutes my doiibts |respecting the inference to the futile 
from the past ] But you mistake the purport of my question. As, an agent, I am > 
quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher .... I want to learn the !
foundation of this inference." The foundation is still 'custom* , as in the - / 
Treatise but without the sceptical implications of 'custom' in the Treatise! /The 
subjective principle is somehow able to be the foundation for an objective Jf
inference, as though the correspondence*between the)succession of our ideas 
determined by custom and the course of nature had been arranged, as perhaps it !
' . '*%./ - 7 :has. ■ '
If we are to hold the beliefs which are sanctioned in thé Enquiry, what .are)'k'% 
we to believe concerning the world presented to the senses? That when our eyes \ ^  
are shut it is like it is when they, are open? That there is ; something there> . 
but something so indeterminate as not to be. worth a sceptics cavil? Mature and 
reason are in contradiction and no directions for pur belief emerge. . . y?
Hume made the Enquiries the standard of his "philosophical sentiments and. / ' !
principles" - "a compleat Answer", he tells his publisher Btrachan; "to Dr Reid)!#
4. '  : ' " )# 'and to that bigotted. silly Fellow, Beattie". They would.not have thought so; -7
the theory of ideas has not been abandoned, and the scepticism of the Treatise
is what it leads to. ' ■-_________ ■ ' / . ' ^1. Sec. XII, Pts.II,:.and III, PP.I60I6I. " ! ■ ‘
2. 8ec.IV,Pt'.II,p:.38.3. Sec; V, Pt.II, p.52-54. - • ) ■4. Greig. The Letters of David Hume. Vol;II ; p;3QI. :/
;.ÿ. ; > 7  , ,V;. # :  x79\4Y#!:
3. The Sceptical Conclusion 
When philosophers split objects into two "where others find but one", they 
compensated for the extravagance by economizing on the number of the mind's : •
operations, making one of these do the work of three; perceiving, remembering, 
imagining all became the perception of an idea. The uniqueness of each is a 
matter of plain experience, and plainly expressed in common lar^uage. Coaman0'i0 
language was not good enough for the philosophers who knew what was going' on in. 
perceiving,, remembering ahd imagining. They substituted their theory-darkened- 
language and ih itsishadowuwhat was clear becomes opaque and different things are
blurred into one another.
The linguistic accidents behind the extended use of the term 'perception', 
quite escaped Reid.* He did not see that it was as non-coramital, as satisfactory, 
and as unsatisfactory a word as his own word ' thought' "which includes all the, ; 
operations of our minds"., For him it was implicated ini the ideal theory from 
the first. And with Hume,.''Love is a perception, hatred a perceÿt&on; désire 
is a perception, will is a perception; and by the same rule, a doubt, a question,
a command, is a perception. This is an intolerable abuse of language, which he !
. . .philosopher has authority to introduce." The extent of the abuse ought to have % 
warned Reid that its purpose was not even in Hume to achieve a coalesence of 
perception, memory and imagination. Reid has sunk too much polemical capital into 
the opinion that the modern philosophers have been turning' the different kinds of 
cognitive act into a single kind^ to match a single kind of object, for him to! 77:;# 
give it up on being told that historically the extended use of the word 'perception* 
did hot have significant theoretical implications. If there are ideas, one is'- 0 0
simply aware of them, though the awareness may be called by the different names of .
' - . : ' :■■■ . ^'perceiving', ' remembering ', ' imagining *. .
iT Ihteliectual Powers, "lV/;Gh.Il7p.369'ahd'll7ch^^^^^ " ' 72. Intellectual Powers. I, Ch. 1, p.227. _ -
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And he would not have been impressed by the protest that the word 'perception'
never was used because it never could have been used to smudge perception, mem-)
ory and imagination into one. and the same thing. Reid knows that nobody ever
held that the three words are synonyms and proposed a simplified vocabulary in
which 'perception* takes their place. Everyone admits that there is a difference
between the three thi.ngs, but Hume made the difference a matter of degree Act '
and object is in each case identified, and this identity of act and object is a
'perception'; perceptions are either impressions or ideas; "the difference
betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they '
I.
strike upon the mind"; they are perceptions, therefore, in a diminishing order 
of intensity. And notiiing but perceptions exist or are conceivable; " 'tis / !> 
impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically 
different from ideas and impressions. Let us chase our imagination to the )
heavens, or to the utrnosj; limits of the universe ; we never really advance a 
step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those percept- 
ions, which have appear'd in that narrow compass." Not only then do perceiviiig;.7 
remembering and imagining differ only in degree, but the real the remembered and 
the imaginary shade off into one another as higher and lower on a single sçale of ! 
intensity. Hume's outrageous doctrines are not merely Hume's doctrines Reid- 
insists; they are "justly deduced" from the theory of ideas, ,
Beattie has a jocose refutation of Hume; If Hume is right 'it will follow 
that the idea of a roaring lion must emit audible sound, almost, if not altogeth- 
er, as loud, and as terrible, as the royal beast in person could exhibit; - that Ij 
two ideal bottles of brandy will intoxicate as far at least as two genuine bottles 
of wine; - and that I must be greatly hurt, if not dashed to pieces; if I am so * ■;.
imprudent, as to form only the idea of a bomb bursting under my feet.'
1. Treatise. Bk.I, Pt.I, Sec.I, p.I.
2. B W ,  Pt.II, :8ec'.VI, p.67-68. : .3. Immutable Truth, p.248^ , :,''7\ ! 5 #
, ■ 7 ■■ ■' ' BiV;
' ■ Y ■ ■ '■ " ''y:
Reid^ .adding'-HiMe'? s-opinion that belief and expectation are enlivened ideas,-'-7
expounds the doctrine of the ideal scale of intensity; y:'
"The belief which we have in perception, is a belief of the present existence 
of the object; that which we have in memo^, is a belief of its past existence; # 
the belief of which we are now speaking ]^e belief involved in expectatioQ is
' : ' .a belief of its future existence;- and in imagination there is no belief at all. y
Mow, I would gladly know of this, author, how one degree of vivacity fixes the axis
tence of the object to the present moment; another carries it back to time past;
A
a third, taking a contrary, direction, carries it into futurity; and a fourth ! 
carries it out of existence altogether. Suppose, for instance, that I see the
sun rising out of the sea; I remember to have seen him rise yesterday; I believe
he will rise tomorrow near the same place; I can likewise imagine him rising in y- 
that place, without any belief at all. Mow, according to this sceptical hypoth-! 
esis, this perception, this memory, this foreknowledge, and this imagination, are
all the same idea, diversified only by different degrees of vivacity. The percept^- ' ' ! ' ;
ion of the sun rising is the most lively idea; the memory of his rising yester- .
day is the same idea a little more faint; the belief of his rising tomorrow is ^
the same idea yet fainter; and the imagination of his rising is.still the same 
idea, but faintest of all. One is apt to think, that the idea might gradually ; ; -ï 
pass through all possible degrees of vivdcity without stirring out of its place. ; 
But, if we think so, we deceive ourselves; for no sooner does it begin to grow 
languid than it moves baclofards into time past. Supposing this to be granted,
-we expect, at least, that, as it moves backward by the decay of its vivacity, the#
■ ' ' ■ - #
more that vivacity decays it will go back the farther, until it remove quite out 7
of sight. But here we are deceived again; for there is a certain period of this !
■declining vivacity, when, as if it had met an elastic obstacle in its motion
■ ■ . , ■ :
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backi^ ard, it sudi(enly rebounds from the past to the future, vrithout taking the # /  
present in its way* And now^ haying got into the regions of futurity, wé;'are 
apt to think that it has room enou^i to spend all its remaining vigour: but still
we are deceived; for, by another, sprightly bound, it mounts up into the airy - 
région of imagination;. So that ideas, in the gradual declension of their vivacity 
seem to imitate the inflection of verbs in grammar. They begin with the present;-/ 
and proceed in order to the preterite, the future, and the indefinite. This 
article of the sceptical creed is indeed so full of mystery, on whatever side we! 
view it,, that they who hold this creed are veiry injuriously charged with incred#!'! 
ulity; for, to me, it appears to require as much faith as that of St. Athanasius.';
There are two questions: Supposing, that this is Hume, does thé theoiy of : ;
ideas end in Hume? Is this: Hume? ■
The premiss, that the mind's only immediate objects are ideas does not,even : ;  ^
conjoinediWithbthe principle of conceptual empiricism, entail the conclusion, that 
the real, the remembered and the imaginary are more or less of the same thing. # 
It.does not end up in that nonsense, because it does not turn perceiving wlmt is-.- 
there, remembering what was once there, and imagining wliat was never there into 
a single awareness of some modification of oneself, strong, weaker and vanisMngly 
faint. Ideas could occupy existence exclusively and remain uniquely distinct 
species. Reid was historically wrong and logically wrong; 'perception' was not 
reductive term when applied to all the cognitive acts, and the theory of ideas 
does not call for any such reductive term. '
Eos mini calls attention to, the various half-similarity between Reid’s.yiew 
and Hume's. ' On Reid's view, perceiving, remembering'.and imagining all have the . : 
same kind of object ; they differ as different kinds of awareness of it. RosmixnJ's
1. Inquiry,- Ch. VI, Sic, XXIV, pp.198-199. -
2. TheyOrimn of Ideas. VÔ1! I, pi71. //
\ y,.;.  ^■ . -.'C
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reference is to a passage from the Inquiry; "I beg leave to think, nwith the-; y;# 
vulgar, that,,when I remember the smell of the tuberose, that very sensation 
which I had yesterday, and, which has now/no more any existence, is the immediate , ) 
object of my memory; and when I imagine it present,, the sensation itself, and.npf l 
any idea .of it, is the object of my imagination. But, though the object of my 
sçnsâtion;n$emory, and imagination, be in this case the same, yet these acts''of/'y''":-
operations of the mind are as different, and as easily distinguishable, as smellj .
7 ■ ' /-I. ■ ' ' . : ' .
taste and sound."
The situation which Reid is here describing is not one of pure imagining but
a hybrid of remembering, imagining and perceiving. Even so, in spite of his
determination to say that things imagined may or may not exist j Reid is driven, as i
we have seen, by the,pressure of his argument against the theory of ideas towards /
saying that they must exist - at least the fragments of them must. Reid would
certainly deny that there is any significant resemblance between M s  views and
Hume's,.; On Hume's view the ; act of the mind and its object are identical, andWith #
the object drawn into the act and the act of perception merging into the act of .7.
imagination the real merges into, the imaginary. But though Reid keeps the act and '
the object separate, he has not explained how he keeps the imaginary and the real, 'C
w t
separate, and perhaps they could be kept separate unless imaginary objects are ideas 
And if this is so, one proposition in the theory of ideas has to be true to avoid 
the conclusion to which the theoiy of ideas is supposed to lead. y:-/#
The conclusions to which the theory of ideas leads are not as paradoxical as
. 7. 7 ■ .. ■ .;,77..;y
Reid supposed. Are Hume's conclusions as paradoxical as Reid supposed? Humé does;
say that perceptions, are the only conceivable existents; that they fall into two
classes, impressions and ideas; that the difference between impressions and ideas.
consists in their relative degree of vivacity (without metaphor, that they differ '
I. cETTr;'Heel III, p.lOb. " — -------- — ------  —
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"only in degree not in nature". It is no more than putting together thesethings? 
that Hume does say to have him holding that the real, the imagined and the 7,71 
remembered are graduations on a single scale. Mo more possibly for single ,Y
impressions and ideas,^ut the real is only half real without the other impression^ 
which cluster round a genuine impression when a thing is actually seen or touchedj
and are absent in memory and imagination. And the ideas of memory do, and the y)- . - - " '
, 77ideas of imagination do not preserve the original order of impressions; This 
difference seems to disappear on Hume's second thoughts ; but it appeared , !
ambiguously and it disappears ambiguously; it came in perhaps as a constitutive.%$
feature of meraoiy and it goes out perhaps as an applicable criterion of memory.
YAnd when Hume says that impressions and ideas differ "only in degree, not ih y' 
nature", he may not have meant it, because he goes on to say things that seem to# 
imply that impressions and ideas, and ideas and ideas differ not only in degree Li 
but in nature.
Comparing memory and imagination in the first section of the Treatise in ' b#' "77
which he deals with them, Hume speaks of the contrast of force and languor as.a y!■i-/ - ; Y#
1'sensible signof the difference between the two bspecies of ideas'! In the
second of the sections he says that an idea of the memory can lose its vivacity y y :
until it is mistaken for an idea of the imagination qnd that an idea of the
imagination can acquire such a vivacity that it becomes a "counterfeit** memory. ^ /
- ' ' :As Kemp Smith points out, there could be no question of mistake and counterfeit­
ing if the difference between ideas of memory and imagination was a relative , ’7•#Y
degree of vivacity. Similarly an exchange of vivacity between an impression and#
an idea causes one to be mistaken for the other. There must therefore be some #
other difference between them than a difference merely in degree._________
I.. Bk. I, Sec. I, p.3. Humé is speaking of simple impressions and simple ideas, 
but as complex ideas are formed either by simple aggregation or by reflecting'/ ' Y^ g 
the order of impressions, the principle.is unaffected; #
2. Treatise. Bk.I, Pt.I, See.I and Bk;I, Pt.ill, Sec.Y. . ! :
! " Y - ' .  ^ 7. Y ' -
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We now need to know what is meant bt 'vivacity* and its synonyms and their 
opposites. They are xfords we Would have to use to express the familiar distinct- 
ion between clear and vivid, and faint and blurred imagery# Hume does not use 
them in this way; we are not deceived by sharp Imagery into taking fancies lor 
realities#. The situations in which an impression and an idea coincide in the 
vivacity Hume means are those borderline experiences between sense and imagination 
in whichj for example, we are not sure whether we have heard a sound or only ' 
imagined it; those situations in which the two sorts of ideas coincide in vivac- " 
ity are situations in which we are not sure whether we are remembering or just 
imagining# And there is no feature in these dubious experiences for the faint  ^
intensity to mark except the fact that they are dubious, and in the first kind 
the fact that the sound, smell or whatever it might have been, if there was one,
was veiy faint* If after keeping clear of the invitation in the scale of relative j
' . ' \ "jintensity to compare the sound of a pin drop with an imaginary clap of thunder,  ^| 
or the potencies of real wine and unreal brandy, one sets about thinking of what
- ' ' - 7 .there is to be said in its favour, it is hard to find anything# . I
' a ' - /! - ' - - !In the appendix to the Treatise memory and imagination are distinguished "by i
' ■ ' Ithe different feeling of the ideas which they present" (P. 628)# If Hume had i 
said that there is ah indescribable difference between remembering and imagining ' 
as. psychological experiences, he would have conveyed the same unexciting but use­
ful information. He goes on, however, to consider the nature of the feeling:
"And here I believe every one will readily agree with me, that the ideas of the
memoiy are more strong and lively than those of the fancy. Çj
' . - "  ^ f ' : ' . 'Hume's last words oh belief are less equivocal, "An idea,assented to feels'"
different from a fictitious idea." To explain this different feeling by calling
: \ - - ' ' 7-' ' j;it 'a superior force, or vivacity or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness' is to
\ Y ' /  ^' . ' ' ' '
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use words that "express something near it", "But its true and proper name is
■ I'belief, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life;
as indefinable, Hume says ih)the Enquiry, as "the feelingoof cold or passion of 
2, . - . : 
anger", Hume has come a long way round to reach Reid.
That is if it is Reid that has been reached. One would not have been surpris# 
ed to find Reid claiming that there was nothing in Hume more utterly sceptical 
than the assertion that the "three acts of the understanding", conception, judgmeh 
and reasoning, "all resolve themselves into.the first, and are nothing but. partie#
' ;.. ' 7 ' 3.; ' - . 7 ' ^ular ways of conceiving our objects". As Reid understood ’conception*, as, the: . 
logicians had understood 'conception*, the question whether a conception is true , 
or false in the sense of corresponding "or conflicting with reality cannot arise, i  
And if judgment, and therefore belief, is resolved into conception, the question : 
whether a belief is true of false in. the sense of corresponding,or conflicking ! 
with reality cannot arise. And Hume may have' really intended by the resolution to 
make it a question tliat could not arise. If he had intended this, and kept to 
his,intention, "enlivened ideas*' could give way to "feeling*' and " feeling": to 
'belief' in the description of the phenomenology of belief, and Hume would still' # 
be as,-far. from Reid as when he first began to speak of the nature of belief. , 
And perhaps Hume did mean, though not consistently^ that the difference, between 
impressions and ideas of memory and ideas of imagination is constituted by a 
difference in,'vivacity*; that there is no more to being real (and really remember­
ing) and being imaginary, as, far as individual impressions and ideas are concerned^; 
than feeling real and feeling imaginary. Real and imaginary, in any further sense,: 
is a matter of what comes(or could have come) before .and after the individual 
impression or idea. Did I hear or merely imagine the footfall on the path? Well, ' 
did I hear the door-handle being tried a moment later? Would I have seen someone; !
1. .Treatise, Appendix, p.629;
2.'"8eb.V, Pt.II,7pl48.
3. Treatise. Bk.I, Pt. Ill, Sec.VII, p.97.
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there if I had pulled aside the. curtains, and looked out? Reid has perhaps not ‘-:-,
altogether misunderstood Hume in the ironical exposition of the scale of intensity.;was ' '■/Where he lost Hume'*s meaning in thinking that a single impression or idea could be■ ■ ■ ) - A ■ ' - ' - : ,
considered by itself . )'' '
The theory of ideas is to have Hume as its conclusion. If Hume is to. be piniied! 
dom to shading off the real, the remembered and the imaginary into one another, r 
its,sceptical implications, as we have seen, do not go so far. At least they go. y % 
so far that nothing but perceptions are left, nothing but ideas ^ to return to Held IS 
word’. Or has Reid made a mistake here also? .. ' ■
The question is whether the theoiy is. a universal solvent, of /'mind*'*as well aaj. 
of'matter-*. The answer depends oh whether, according to the theory, alludirect. 
objects without exception,are ideas. If they are, then itiis . But why should 
they be, if Reid is right about the principle from which the theory itself is deriv­
ed. This is the principle of cognitive contact, and nothing could be closer to the 
mind than the mind itself & When Raid is deducing from the theory of ideas Hume's. 
conclusions with regard to the mind he states the theory in a form that is already); 
Htunian; "The received doctrine of ideas is the principle from which it |^he opinion 
that there may be thought vrithout. a thiijker]is deduced, and of which indeed it seems
' ' ' Y'to be a just and natural consequence .... It is a fundamental principle of the ideal 
system, that every object of thought must be an impression or an idea - that is, a 
faint copy of some preceding impression. This is a principle so commonly receive##: 
that the;,.author above mentioned, although his whole system is built upon it, never q, 
offers the least, proof of it. It is upon this principle, as a fixed, point that he ' 
erects his metaphysical engines to overturn heaven and earth, body and spirit. And,
' . ' ' ' ): ' I. - \indeed, in my apprehension, it is altogether sufficient for the purpose." '
If Berkeley had worked from the theory of ideas as a premiss for the élimination
I. Inquiry. Ch.II, Sec.VIy pp.Ip8fI09# #
of external objects, from the theory as'found in Locke, he could consistently have,
stopped at his o\m, conclusions and need not have gone on to Hume' s - So far .at'#^ '<
least as the self is cohcemed. For its dissolution other- premisses are needed. ;
Mot even if the theory of ideas is understood as including the principle of ./ Y'
conceptual empiricism do we have adequate premisses. We need to know also thatv:-#;
there is no 'impression' of the self as a single thi.ng, unanalysable into its:
experiences or into any mode of .their combination. And its absence is not ' an|’-*'c‘i‘#'f
empirical discovery - at least vre loxow. before we look what we have got to find. , ;
The introduction to the introspective experiment wliich reports nothing but a :
"bundle of-perceptions’* ends axiomatically: ,"All these our particular perceptions
are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be
separately consider'd, and may exist separately, and have nO need of anything)$6 #
. I.support their existence."
With this axiom to secure the appeal to introspection from any inconclusiveness,
Hume defeats the metaphysicians' "claim that the self is simple at any time ahd:7';y
numerically identical through time", and defeats his own patient.and subtle attempt.
to find an alternative unity for it. He has to leave its fragments stuck together
2. '# and"plead the privilege of a sceptic". !
"Three laws of association, joined to a few original feelings", says Reid; 
make up a human being when Hume is his creator. "Is this the man that Nature
made?.... A puppet. It shows tolerably by candle light ; but, brought into clear
' '  ^  ^ \ / . '#/ - /day, and taken to pieces, it will appear to be a man made with mortar and a trowel." 
Reid attacks the principle that we begin, in exppmWc#: with,,s and build, !
up complexities out of them. lie attacks it as an isolated opinion - Locke has 
made a
1. Treatise, Bk.I." Pt.IV. Sec.VT^pIk^
2. Appendix, p.636» . , ÿy3. Inquiry. Introduction, 8eCVI, p.I02.
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further by Locke's hesitancy over the status of relations) between this opinion
and the fragmentation of everything in which Reid saw the theory of ideas ending; %
how easy it would be to go on and say that in building up the complexities we suppl
supply the cement ourselves, Locke's mistake ought to be corrected. The truth ,
is, as we discover by reflection on experience, that we begin with the complex
and reach the simple by analytic abstraction* "Nature presents no object to the
senses or to consciousness, that is not complex," Complex, and \Wnt.i.l,:we have p
learnt to distinguish its components, vague, "So that it is not by the senses
immediately, but rather by the powers of analysing and abstraction, that we get
I. V
the most simple and the most distinct notions even of the objects of sense,"
Many of Hume's "peculiar tenets", R^id says, are built upon the maxim that 
whatever we can conceive is possible* The maxim has the general sanction of phi.l- 
osophers; Reid has never seen it questioned* (Reid is inclined to think that the 
maxim is a consequence of the "received doctrine of ideas"; since every idea copies 
an impression, there can be no idea of something impossible.) Some philosophers v-. 
take it further tlmn others and hold also that whatever we cannot conceive is im­
possible, If they are not mistaken, we have "a short road to the determination 
of every question about the possibility or impossibility of tlûngs. We need only 
look into our pwn breast, and that, like the Urim and Thumrai.m, will give an infall# 
ible answer. If we can conceive a thing, it is possible; if not,it is impossible.; 
And,surely, every man may laiow whether he can conceive what is affirmed or not."
The maxim, even in its narrower extent, Reid thinks is false in every plausible 
meaning(shorÿ of a completely tautological meaning) which can be given to it,
"Whatever is said to be possible or impossible, is expressed by a proposition»" 
What is it to conceive a proposition? Is it something more than understanding it? 
By the * simple apprehension' or 'conception' of a proposition there does not seem ' '
to be anything more that could be meant. Take a true proposition and one stating 
I, Intellectual Powersl lvV Gh.ïï'ï','‘'p«376'.‘
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an impossibility, a demonstrated conclusion in geometry, for example, and its |
■ -icontradictory. The second is as easily miderstood as the first. Every necessar­
ily true proposition has a contradictory which is impossible, and "he that ■ :
conceives one conceives both". Every reductio ad absurdum "requires us to 
conceive things that are impossible, in order to prove them to be so",
The meaning of the maxim is perhaps that nothing we conceive, that is judge 
to be possible, is impossible. Have people never thought something to be possible
and been mistaken? They have "contradictory judgments about what is possibleI. ■
or impossible, as well as about other things."
Reid does not trace the connection between the maxim of possibility and any of
Hume's conclusions, nor the connection between it and another of Hume's principles;
the conceptually distinguishable is capable of separate existence, Reid examines 
this principle in his discussion of abstract ideas and then it disappears from , ; 
his attention,
"Things inseparable in their nature may be distinguished in our conception.
And we need go no farther to be convinced of thiA than the instance here brought; 
to prove the contrary. The precise length of a line,|^Hume says,i\is not
distinguishable from the line. When I say, This is a line, I say and mean one
thing. When Issay^ %t rê a line of three inches, I say and mean another thing.
If this be not to distinguish the precise length of the line from the line, I
3.know not what ft is to distinguish,"
Reid has had one of Hume's most fundamental and persistent postulates under 
scrutiny, and too intent on deducing Hume';s conclusions from a single premiss, he
does not see where they largely come from. That "the mind never perceives any #
4. 5*-real connexion among distinct existences" is its immediate corollary, and the
ïT ïnteliectual Powers. IV,~Ch.III. pp.377-379.2. Treatise, Bk.I, Pt. I, Sec.VII, pp.l8-I9.3. Intellectual Powers.V, Ch.VI, p,4I0. #4. Treatise, Appendix, p.636. Hume very puzzlingly says that he cannot render this principle consistent with the principle that "all our perceptions are distinct existences", and that he cannot give up either of them. But 'distinct' existences
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negative side of Hume's doctrine of the self and of causation is given with it,
Rpid would have admitted that it shattered the self. He would have wanted to :) 
speak carefully of the damage it does to the relation of cause and effect. In orie;t 
way, of course, it is fatal: nothing can owe its existence to anything else, if
everything is entirely loose and separate from everything else. And it is part ofi 
common sense belief that everything that happens has a cause that makes it happen; 
On the other hand, Hume is right (except for leaving out the Divine agency) in : 
reducing causal transactions between Jodies to a matter of regular antecedence 
and consequence. He is wrong in thinking that the future is locked up against us 
because we have no justification for tMnking that the mere regularity will 
continue. The inductive principle - Reid never gets it to more precision than tha# 
the future will be like the past, or some such vague equivalent - is an autonomous 
principle of common sense.
Supposing Hume had been willing to dismiss his doubts about induction, could 
he have secured the empirical philosophy he always wanted, except in his destruct-:7 
ive moods, to secure? Could the scientific as well as the mathematical treatises 7 
be saved from the burning of the books?, Phenomenal!stically interpreted, they 
could be, but this would not have satisfied Hume except in the first book of the 
Treatise, and not always even there. Is a phenoraenalistic interpretation the 
condition of their acquittal? To waive it Hume would either have to withdraw his 
demand for ‘impressions* to match concepts and also allow causal inference to
transcend experience; or, alternatively, allow sense experience to transcend /
'perceptions'. Hume could not have gone where he wanted to, in the way he wanted
to, and taken the theory of ideas even in its mildest form (as a theory of sense #
perception) along with him. At its mildest it was too strong for his moderate
ore exi.stence8 between which there are no * real ' connexions, or between which a t least no connexions "are ever discoverable by human understanding", (p*635).
From the context it is clear that Hume means, not that the inconsistency is between 
the principles themselves, but between them and any satisfactory analysis of 
self-identity. :
92
conclusions without a revolution in his other principles; at its strong#;^ !^  net
strong enough for his radical conclusions, Reid was asking Hume to be too economic­
al; that there is nothing but ideas connected by merely casual associations, is 
not a deduction from the theory of ideas alone.
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CHAPTER 111 c o m m  SEHSE r (l) ' ;
1* Plain Truth and Strange Doubt
To ask whether common sense beliefs are true is to ask a disreputable
question A philosopher who had any appreciation of what makes philosophers
look foolish would carefully avoid it in the company of plain men if there was 
any risk that he might be taken seriously. One would not look more ridiculous 
attacking or defending the existence of tables and chairs, of other people '
besides oneself and so on than in asicing doubtfully whether there are any. And 
the question is not to be asked any longer in the company of philosophers. -
James Oswald’s prophetic eye foresaw the day when even aiaong them common sense : 
would overwhelm scepticism and incredulity. However let us bring ourselves to 
ask the question and ask it concretely.
Do I, for example, know that I am sitting on a chair with a table in front-
of me? Do I know that I am the same person as I was yesterday; that what I am,
doing now I am doing of ray own free will? Do I know that there are other people 
besides myself with their own thoughts and feelings? Do I know that this day 
will end and that another day will come? Of course I know all these things and
many more of the same sort, and I know that other people know the same sort of
1 ’■ things about themselves and about other people.* * I know, therefore, that there
are material things, that there is personal identity and free will, that there
are other minds and valid inductions. And the man who denies or doubts such ,>
plain truths of common sense must be ‘'disordered in his intellectuals", Oswald J
says; must be "out of his senses", Beattie says; needs for a cure not logic and
metaphysics, Reid says, but "physic and good regimen". The contradictory of a
sense belief, they all agree is ’absurd*, and is properly met not with argument iv:
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but wi th laughter.giiue ,
Beattie and Oswald object to argument as an appeal to the wrong tribunal. " :e ■ 
In fact it is the mad determination to argue everything out that has caused ■ .1;;
many philosophers to set themselves up against common sense, Reid is very yt
serious about the absurdity of opinions that contradict a belief of common ' /
. %sense: "Opinions which contradict first principles, jthat is the principles g .
of common sensel are distinguished from other errors by this;- That they are I;;
* -Wf'not only false but absurd". To iiave absurd opposites is one of the criteria yt
which distinguish common sense beliefs from inveterate prejudices. And apart ; 
from the fact that the absurd is the absurd and any argument against it out of ffh'' 
place, argument would need..premisses more obviously true than the truths of comm- 
on sense, and there are none. ;
They are too obviously true - how could anyone deny or even doubt them?
What philosopher in fact ever has? Who was it, for instance, that Moore refuted,’ 
when, with a more sophisticated simplicity even than Reid's, he proved the exist-d, .. ,
ence of material things by holding up his hands?
There has surely been the absolute scepticism with a blanket claim to know. - 
nothing about, anything - Pyrrho who lived to beenineby led round by a keeper, =
’ ' - y wAnd, Beattie and Oswald would ask without hesitation, is not the denial that there' 
are material things just what constitutes any phenomenal!sm, the denial of other: -? 
minds a feature of a sufficiently radical positivism, the denial of personal 'I
identity the negative side of every serialist view of the self, the denial of 
' ' 'free will the meaning of determinism, and the denial of inductive validity Huiae|h
1. Intellectual Powers, VI, Ch.IV, p.438.
2. V/e might have thought that the refutati on was meant for phenomenalists of ' oneëlk 
sort or another. But Moore explains (The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, edit. Schlippj 
p.670) that it was directed against the philosophers who have "used 'material' ; 
thing' in such a sense that from "There are no material things' there does follow
'There are no human hands'",
3. Inquiry, Ch.I, Sec. V, p. 102.
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Special discovery? More carefully than Beattie and Oswald, Reid and Stewart / 
would insist that though one might not find philosophers saying that there are no . 
material things etc, it would follow from what many philosophers do say (and too f 
plainly for anyone not to see it) that there are none, ' r>'
The total sceptic's scepticism was a pretence - othenfise he was mad. And
if there was a man who really believed that there were no tables and chairs, or .
ill.who was absolutely convinced that he was another person every other minute, or 1. 
who never spoke to anyone else because he was quite sure that there was no one g'g 
else to speak to, or who really thought that his food was as likely to poison
111him as not..,,he would be mad. The Common Sense philosophers cannot bring them-
selves to say simply that is vîhat the paradoxical philosophers are. They do iiot/gj
adopt that reassuring explanation of philosophers' extraordinary doubts and :
denials of the plain truths of corrimon sense; in spite of the therapeutic recoimn- '
. ■ -DVendation, in spite of the comparison of the man who doubts his own existence I#
.until a Cartesian demonstration of it is provided with the man who is afraid 1 .
■ . ■ l : : : !
that he might be made of glass, and in spite of the most deliberate of Reid's 
explanations of wliat he means by 'common sense': "This inward light or sense - il­
ls given by heaven to different persons in different degrees. There is a certaih^ , 
degree of it which is necessary to our being subjects of law and governiaent,
ill’capable of managing our own affairs, and answerable for our conduct towards ■ I
others; this is‘called common sense, because it is common to all men with whom 
we can transact business, or call to account for their conduct, tl
"The laws of all civilised nations distinguish those who have this gift of 
heaven, from those who have it not,,. It is easily discerned by its effects in 'I ■ 
men's actions, in their speeches, and even in their looks; and when it is a yvir 
question whether a man has this natural gift or not, a judge or a jury, upon a 
short conversation with him, can, for the most part, determine the question with I -
96
•L •great assurance. 1^.
Beattie and Oswald, although they attributed to philosophers a number of 
opinions wliich no sane loan could hold, at least did not muddle the senses of 
'common sense' in the disastrous way Reid did, when they came to say what they2, ' I'
meant by it. Reid's definition would leave him with no work at all to do. He 
would have no philosophical opponents in his defence of common sense truth (exceptI 
those who would tell him that he had none) if the only attacks on it were from 
people without common sense as he has defined it. There is no arguing with mad- Il­
men.
The wildest philosophical paradox, however, does not prevent its advocates ‘ f
pi'iilosophers
from behaving like other men. All the Common Sense see this, and they would all 
like to give the same explanation. Beattie and Oswald sometimes say that the
3.philosophers'did not believe their doctrines sincerely enough to act on them.
- ' . 4.The paradoxical opinions cannot be translated into practice, Stewart says. And' {
Reid agrees; they have to be given up in practice. If Hume's friends had suspected
that even in solitude he tried to put into practice tile principles which he confesd-
ed he could hold in society, they would have had the charity never to have left
him alone.
If, however, tiie Common Sense philosophers really believed that the paradoxic­
al piiilosophers did not really believe their paradoxes (because no mm in his
senses could), what need was there for the fierce refutations ? Common sense had
no genuine opponents. The paradoxical philosophers had to be refuted because they
were unaccountably both sane and not merely pretendiing to hold the opinions they y
did. Or is this -strange perversity not there at all and only seems to be there '""I
through a misunderstanding- of these opinions?
I.Intellectual Powers, VI, Ch.II,P.422, I
2, Stewart never liked the term because of its ambiguities. See Chapter IV.3* Beattie, Immutable Truth, Pt.I, Ch.II,Sec.VIII, p.134; Oswald, A Pled to Common,, %
4. Elements, VolII, Ch.I, Sec.II, p.49. I''5* Inquiry, Ch.I, Sec.V, p.102.
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Many philosophers nowadays are very sure that philosophers, what ever they , 
might have said, have never disbelieved or even doubted the plain truths of '• 
coiiunon sense. The phenomenal 1st is not doubting the existence of tables and 
chairs. The positivist does not tiûnk. that other people are untenanted bodies. , 
Ho one who holds a serialist view of the self believes that he is continually ■ 
going out of existence and being replaced by someone with the same name and a 
siililar body. Determinism does not take away the difference between having to 
do something and doing it of your own free will. Hume had no need to be re­
lieved every time he woke up and found that daylight had come a^ain. If phil­
osophers have said that there were no material objects etc, (or that perha%js 
there were none), they did not mean what the^ seem to have meant. When they 
have said things that seem to have i mid led those denials, nothing that they have 
said really implied them, So there is no need to suppose that they only half 
believed their paradoxes (in theory but not in practice), or believed them only yj 
while philosophizing and the rest of the time with the rest of the world (Hume 
in solitude and in society). They were not engaged in an impossible conflict 
with common sense. To think, that they were is to misunderstand either them or ,V 
it. In fact, this criticism of Reid and his school would run, the Cormaon Sense 
philosophers misunderstood both. Beattie and Oswald steadily misunderstood 
the nature of the theories they attacked; Reid and Stewart intermittently, ;l; 
They all misunderstood the nature oft.common sense. And udsunderstanding it, 
they could not see why they were right in claiming final authority for it.
The Rargument of the paradigm case" would show why. Crudely: if there iSyil
any word the meaning of which can be taught by reference to paradigm cases, then 
no arg;uiQent whatever could ever prove that there are no cases whatever of what- . 
ever it is . Thus, since the meaning of 'of his own freewill' can be taught ,.y :
oy reference to Siich paradigm cases as that in which a man, under no social .
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marries the girl he wants to marry (how else could it be taught?); it cannot be 
right, on any grounds whatsoever, to say that no one ever acts of his own freewii 
For cases such as the paradigm, which must occur if the word is ever to be thus 
explained (and which certainly do in fact occur), are not in that case specimens 
which might have been wrongly identified: to the extent that the meaning of the
expression is given in terms of them they are, by definition, what 'acting of 
one's own freewill is'..,
"To see the power, and the limitations, of the Argument of the Paradigm Case 
is to realise how much of common sense can, and how much cannot, be defended 
against T)hilosopiiical paradoxes by simple appeal to the ordinary use of words; ah 
why,"
If this argument shows why the CoKimon Sense philosophers were right about the 
absurdity of the denial of the truths of common sense, it also shows why-they 
were wrong in reading this denial into the language of philosophical paradox,
(Or else that they were in a stronger position than they realized; what they 
thought was factual absurdity was logical nonsense.) And if the truth of the
propositions of common sense is to be established in the way the argument pre­
scribes, its further consequence is that in loading the\a until their truth is no 
longer given with their meaning, the Common Sense philosophers loaded them with 
an alien content. And with this content their denial is no longer absurd.
Supposing,-for the time being that philosopMcal propositions can never really 
collide with the propositions of common sense, they can seem to do so in two ways\ 
They can seem to state or imply that common sense propositions are doubtfully 
true. They can seem to state or imply that common sense propositions are certaih- 
ly false or meaningless or radically confused and are to be rejected altogether. 
We shall now look at the first df these apparent conflicts. Common sense takes 
common sense beliefs as certain, will not allow the possibility that they may be 
mistalcen, repudiates, for example, the statement that there may be no material 
things as decisively as the statement that there are no material things. The 
pMlosophical positions with which we are here concerned appear to represent no ' 
matter of fact belief as certain, or more extremely no belief as certain, or more
extremely no belief as more probable than any other. We are not at present
concerned with the certainty or othen^ise of common sense beliefs outside this general context of doubt,
Reid and his school are quite sure that there are philosophical assertions
which really do conflict with common sense in the
moral or othenfise",
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first of these ways, though Reid and Stewart had some idea why one might want 
to hold that some of these assertions merely, seem to.
The statement that there is no knowledge of matters of fact takes common 
sense truth into its orbit. Reid does not like restrictions on the use of the 
word 'Icnowledge' which would allow it only a fraction of its usual application, 
but he does not find anything disturbing in the statement or in its familiar 
equivalent that matters of fact are matters of probable opinion. In either 
variant it is a logician's classificatory marld.ng, not a matter of fact proposit­
ion; the word ' probable' is given a teckmical sense different from its ordin­
ary sense, "In common language, probable evidence is considered as an inferior . 
degree of evidence,,and is opposed to certainty: so that what is certain is
more than probable, and what is only probable is not certain. Philosophers 
consider probable evidence not as a degree, but as a species of evidence, which 
is opposed, not to certainty, but to another species of evidence, called 
demonstration. ..."That there is such a city as Rome, I am as certain as of any, 
propositions in Euclid; but the evidence is not demonstrative, but of that kind 
which philosophers call probable. Yet, in common language, it would sound oddly
to say, it is probable there is such a city as Rome, because it would imply ;
I.
some degree of doubt or uncertainty."
Stewart agrees with Reid that the statement that no matters of fact are 
more than probable is a logician's statement, and does not mean what it would 
mean in ordinary speech. "As certain as death - as certain as the rising of 
the sun - are proverbial modes of expression in all coimtries; and they are, 
both of theiri, borrowed from events which, in philosophical language, are only 
probable or contingent. In like manner, the existence of the city of Pekin, and.
I» Intellectual Powers, VII, Ch.p.482.
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the reality of Caesar's assassination, which the iphilosopher classes with 
•probabilities, because they rest solely upon the evidence of testimony, are univ-- 
ersally classed with certainties bv the rest of mankind; and in any case but 'the 
statement of a logical theory, the application to such truths of the word 
probable would be justly regarded as an impropriety of speech." ’ I*
Stewart, however, is more concerned than Reid about the ambiguity of the 
word ‘probable*. It has caused at least some philosophers to mistake cerbainties 
for mere probabilities and to look for demonstrations to convert them into what :■ 
they already are. "This difference between the technical meaning of the word 
•probability, as employed by logicians, and the notion attached to it in the 
business of life,• together with the erroneous theories concerning the nature 't? 
of demonstration.... have led many authors of the highest name, in some of the 
most important arguments ifhich can employ human reason, to overlook that irres­
istible evidence which was placed before their eyes, in search of another mode ' 
of proof altogether unattainable in moral enquiries, and which if it could be
3. .1attained, would not be less liable to the cavils of sceptics,"
If all that is meant by saying that we might be mistaken in all our empirical,;’
judgments is that this is always logically possible, Reid would have accepted ;
this self-evident truth. He would not have admitted that it is always possible
that we are mistaken. There are matters of fact as certain as any truth in
4.
Euclid, There are some matters of fact, Beattie remarks, with regard to which
1. Elements, Vol.II, Ch.II, Sec.IV, p. 16^ 0. /'
2. Stewart's view is that a demonstration has "hypothetical" or suppositional 
premisses, and the "truth" of its conclusions is no more than the fact that they...b 
necessarily follow from their premisses. (Elements,Vol.II, Ch.I, ,Sec,III.)3. Eleiaents, Vol.II, Gh.II, 3ec.IV,pp.l80-IÜI.4. In any case demonstration could not monopolize certainty, because it is nevear-hl 
formally demonstrable that the demonstrative operations have been carried out 
correctly, however absolutely certain it may be that they have been. And the 
rules of demonstration have themselves been discovered by "our fallible and un- : 
certain faculties, and have no authority but that of human judgment".(intellect- \ 
ual Powers,VII, Ch.IV,p.486.) Reid will not allow any proposition an irammity 
from human error in virtue of its category. . Every proposition has to be put CX 
together and understood by someone. fJ
; ' - V  ' ' - g  ^
............. :ioi X :
H'tr^we know that if we knew everything, we would have to change our opinions about...Si;
I. A '
them. We know that what we have sat on, bumped into, moved up to the table . /.
will not surprisingly turn out to have been an hallucinatory chair. We would XT:
refuse to believe anybody who said he thought he might be dreaming that he was /■'"
awake. We have been certain and not merely felt certain that there were heads S'T:
under the hats looked domi on from the window. There is a stage in the verific^f
tion of a proposition after which we have a clairvoyant anticipation of the
results of further verifications, after wliich, Reid says, "to desire more evid- ■ ;
2ence would be absurd". * li,
Hume argued that no judgment we ever make can be more than probable, and
that only temporarily. Its evidence has always two determinants, one""derived, I;
IXfrom the nature of the object" and the other "from the nature of the understandsr
ing",and the second always subtracts from the first. Ho matter what the grounds'
for a judgment appear to be, we must always allow something for the possibility'll
that we are making a mistake. Beginning with less than certainty, we end with- ' ;
out even probability, for the subtractions must go on. The reliability of the '•’I,
"faculty which judges" has to be assessed, and we might be loaking a mistake. The
assessment has to be assessed, and we might be making a mistake. By "all the
rules of logic" the confidence to which we were originally entitled is whittled
down and wMttled down, and as it had only a finite value to begin with and the
3 'reassessments never end, it ends in nothing.
We make mistakes and this proves, Reid says, that we can make mistakes. It
does nothing to prove that we never know that we are not making a mistake. Our
general capacity for error is irrelevant to our being right or wrong in particul-,.:
ar cases, except in so far as keeping it in mind makes us rather less likely to / ;
go wrong. I am reaiinded, Reid continues, of the fallibility of human judgment
1. Immutable Truth, Pt.II, Oh.I, Sec.571).207%
2. Intellectual Powers, VII. Ch.Ill, p.432.
3. Treatise, Bk.I, Pt. IV, Sec, I, p.182,
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when I claim to have reached a conclusion demonstratively. I go over ray reason- , 
ing severalttimes and can find no flaw, have it checked bÿ someone else, who can ;■ 
find no flaw, am willing to hear from the sceptic "what steps in it he thinks yk 
fallacious, and why. He makes no objection to any part of the demonstration,
but pleads my fallibility in judging. I have made the proper allowance for this ,.!
' ' I. '
already, by being open to conviction."
Hume does not make it quite clear whether the competence of the understanding: yj 
is to be examined and re-e.xainined with regard to the matter in hand or with re- 
gard to other matters; whether we are to watch its performance on the saiae , 
argument over and over again or try it out on other arguments. Reid takes it forg: 
granted that if you want to find out whether you have made a mistake in A, you 
work at A again; you do not turn to B and then to the rest of the alphabet. And 
to come to the same conclusion a second and a third time is a good reason for 
thinking that you came to the right conclusion the first time, and consequently f X 
for thinlclng that the understanding is capable of truth, what more does anyone 
want who wants assurances of what Hume calls the * truth and fidelity* of our 
faculties?
I might, of course, Reid says, have grounds for being suspicious of my form-.f % 
er proceeding. I might have been in a hurry or excited or too interested in gett­
ing a particular result. I have to go back over the argument again, cooly, 'I
slowly and with the opposite interest. "It is evident that this review of the ' 
subject may confirm my first judgment, notwithstanding the suspicious circumst- _ rp 
ances that attended it. Though the judge was biassed or corrupted, it does not y 
follow that the sentence was unjust. The rectitude of the decision does not ■ 
depend upon the character of the judge, but upon the nature of the case. From Vy' 
that only, it must be determined whether the decision be just. The circumstances 
that rendered it suspicious are mere presumptions, which have no force against "'T.:
I. Intellectual Powers, VII, Ch. IV, p.467.
I'
I. “•
direct evidence."
■ Our reason and our judgment show their capacity for truth by presenting us -■ 
with it in particular cases. The sceptic is perhaps still dissatisfied, and wanta 
to ask how we know that what we are calling 'truth* is truth? He cannot see that 
the answer to the question How do we know that we are not always maiclng a mis- ' 
take? is that we often do make mistakes. He does not know what it would be
like to make a mistake or not to maJce a mistake. Is he asking a question or x  
merely going through the motions of asking one? If he is asking a question, 
then, thehpnly' answer hef cah.-giyeninvthat he .will have to tak^them on trust. No 
demonstration of their reliability is possible. The attempt would be like tak- 
ing a suspected liar's word that he is honest. For the Same reason no reason 
can be given for suspecting them. No argument can be advanced for or against t b:- 
them until we have new faculties to sit in judgment on the old, Xnthe meantime 
we are not left with a choice as to whether or not we shall rely on the ones we
have As a brief intellectual feat we can hold ourselves in sceptical suspence
h'i:towards them, and a man can stand on his hands for a minute or so but he cannot • .
go a journey on them - it is against nature. Stop admiring him and he will soon .y
3 ' ' 'be found walking on iiis feet like other people, ’ As Hume remarks after dcBionstr- -
ating that no proposition is more probable than any other; "Whoever has taken
the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism, has really disputed 
without an antagonist. "
Hume and Reid disagree about the validity of an argument for total scepticism, 
but they both agree that nobody could really believe what the argument would 
prove even if it were valid. How nearly the difference between common sense and b 
scepticism is a matter of what one chooses to say about the same empirical facts-.y
1. Intellectual Powers, VII, Ch.IV,. p.487. : y
2. Cp. G. Ryle, Dilemmas, p.94 ff. bî
3. Intellectual Powers, VI, Ch.V, p. 448.
4. Treatise, Bk. I, Pt. IV, Sec.I, p.183. X
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What Hume chooses to say ~ scepticism imposes too great a strain on the imaginatbl
ion - leaves the feelirjg that scepticism has the last word, ("If we believe, tnat 
fire warms, or water refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too much pains to I 
tMîok otherwise.") The difference between common sense and scepticism is a diffei 
ence in the way of looking at the same empirical facts. For scepticism there is^ b 
no right way, or, if there is, nobody knows what it is. For common sense theie is 
a right way and we know what it is, and therefore right and wrong words to expre# 
it, or at least a right and wrong intonation when the words which the sceptical 
philosopher and the common sense philosopher use are the same, I
The sceptical language of philosophers, Reid and Stewart recognized, is not 
always to be taken at its face value. V/ords such as 'merely probable' even the 
word 'doubtful', are perhaps being used with meanings different from the meanings' 
they have in common language. If the philosopher, reluctant to have his sceptic­
ism withdrawn from him, replies that by ' doubtful ' he does mean what everybody m 
means by it, is willing to use any of its ordinary synonyms, then for the Common 
Sense philosophers the sceptical assertions are false and need some refutation: 
they show their falsity in particular instances, the sceptic does not believe 
them himself, cannot act on them. The Common Sense philosophers, however, could $ 
hardly liave objected to hearing from modem critics of the sceptical language of 
philosophers that there was nothing to be refuted, that no meaning had been given:;, 
to the word 'doubtful'. What would the sceptic count as certain? He does not 
know. What sort of evidence would remove doubt? No evidence would remove the -j 
doubt, A 'doubt' which is not contrasted with any certainty and which no imagin­
able evidence would remove is not a doubt. The shell of t he word is in the 
sceptic's speech but it has nothing inside it. His behaviour shows that he does  ^
not believe his assertions; being without meaning there is nothing to believe in ,., 
them. The illusion of a conflict here between a philosophical assertion and X
common sense is cast by the illusion of an assertion, in which the key words seem 
to have a meaning because they had a meaning in the familiar contexts from which c:" 
they were borrowed. ;■
We have now to consider whether philosophical theories which seem to reject 
common sense beliefs altogether really do so. And it is^fairly clear consequencel of the establishment of common sense truths by paradigmatic cases that whatever F 
these theories are doing they cannot be doing what they may seem to be doing.
When philosophers say that there are no material objects but only ideas, sensatàron 
perceptions, that there is no permanent self but only the flux of experience; i" 
when they say these and similar things, we have missed their point if we thinlc
they are denying what everybody knows to be true. Their point is to reject a metaphysics in which common sense has no interest, or perhaps to put forward i: 
a metaphysics in wMch common sense has no interest. Or they are giving
. an'analysis' pi Uie piotipn, ,pl laaterial object, .pel C-x den bity, and so on. (how '
. ,feadiiy. a nldliosppKér^ Who. has there were nojmaterial objects, only
clusters of sensations, would change his statement into Thefb'are material objects
and': they are. .ohly cluaters of sensations. ) Or. again, the IhrigUage of cosoraon sense
/_ is pèrlmpe being;'criticised'by theitheoriee; there ie no .gudstioh of their '
proposing alternative beliefs'to t^e beliefs of common eehse.
- v/' Hâve then the 6^ philosophers been defending the beliefs of coi'mon
, sense dgainst imaginaiy menaces? .3tme of. these interpretations, of the nature
,, of phi 1 osophical 'paradox, the collision'between common sénsë^ cand philosophical
paradoxilooks like a purely: linguistic collision; Is it purely linguistic on
A^thè'éè-Vinterpretatipns and purely linguistic oh the other;interpretations also? ^
/ \IÉ: it'ohi3!( the.Ian^uage in%hioh thé views of phenqmenaiists,.. positivists, c,'/
" . deteiminists. hâve been expressed that is intolerable to cdimbn. sense, while it is
''' -A ' :  ^  ^ ' '......  /- -t' . ' ^
- ' heh^i^l towards the ^ visxthemseltes, since it has no metaphysical po omitments?
' Erovide&RtW..paradoxical 'p^lbsopher ’doeélnôt say, such things as that there are 
fv no material objects' (end does not use words such as 'ideaikin a way that loakes it
I sound as'if ..he waS' SayingVthem)'^ .cap me'an what he mesnt' w^hen .he did say them, ^
\ , and/face no protest If rpm common sen^e? . I
.1: : ■ ■ ; .philosophers ..nowadays have learnt so thoroughly to speak with the vulgar
• ^ / Iwhile they .kthink with the-,1 darned^ * that none of them of any. sophistication,
' 'whatever their.ÿidwsy would deny, for example, that unaterial objects exist, or
; alio# anyone to .put.that cphstruction on their words, any more than they would
g- , . say that: they were" taking away .tils''distinction between/right and wrong whatever 
. . #: .théîr .analysis of 'ri^ t.' .and 'wrong'# That mode of ;speech belongs to a bygone i; 
ai : y ihnpcence; Humels views, have not changed/ but his language is hoif the same as
\ r ... 'Reid'd/^  % . ' : / .'i
' : ' ' K ^  ; k . A - ' \ '  - '} r . ' : : ' -  /  . T V ' . / f ' ' '  .' . , ' .  - /  '  . '  ' ' ' " y  Z ' :  '  . - :  ' l U V
l i " - :  '" '.’ ■ ■, ■ ■ , "  .' ' ■' ' :
. - ' ' . '  . ' " ' ' ' ' ^ i: / 2* The Metaphysical Commitment ■ of Coriaaon Sense
'1/%: The Common Sense philosophers would have thought that their occupation had
tv ■ '"'I'■• "' ■- ■ ■/:■ . gone if it could have been shown to them that the truth of common sense beliefs
does not come into philosophical dispute. Professor.Moore,attempts to show-this;./
by shifting the place of dispute over common sense beliefs from bheir truth to n
their analysis.
"The earth has existed for many years past.'* This is certainly tiue andyits|Ç 
analysis quite uncertain. True in some sense or other and its analysis discloses,,:: 
which sense? No, true in its 'ordinary sense*, the sense in which everybody 
would naturally understand it. One hesitates to ask what the statement means \ - 
in this ordinary sense. "Such an expression as 'The earth has existed for many - '
years past * is the very type of an unambiguous expression, the meaning of which / y
I. ■ •we all understand.** ' Still if the question is aslced,it can be ansivered simply. - b
You can be told the same thing over agàin in the same words or the same thing ' fl:
over again in different words. But once talk has been begun ebout enalyzed and
imanalyzed meanings here, and the uncertainty of the second has been reflected / '.f
back on the first ^ the time for ttiat answer seems to have passed. Once you have I
reflected that the statement has got to be true xdaichever of its analyses is tfiiepi
and once you have turned over in. your mind some of its possible analyses (includ^^
ing the one which resolves the unperceived existence of material things into theiri'
non-existence except as permanent possibilities of sensation), there is a doubt - y
about the meaning the statement must have in order to satisfy bhese conditions,'
and it is Hot a doubt which you can be sent to the dictionary lo resolve.
Is this objection to Moore a general objection to philosopnical analysis on '
the ground that you could not know what P means unless you know whether it
X or Y or 2, where P is a proposition to be analyzed, and X, ..Yand 2 are its proposed 
I. /JA Defence of Coimaon Sense G ont eiaporpiy Bri t i sh. Philos dp] jy.( 2nd. series ), p. 198. J
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analysiCs^  It is asking a particular question: What could be the ordinary 
meaning of the statement about the earth's past existence if its analyzed meaning 
may be what Mill can be taken as saying it is, or what the naivest realist says 
it is, or if it may be anything between these two extremes? For all these 
proposals must be reckoned as analytic possibilities if the proposers are not to 
be represented as doubting or denying a fact which common sense unhesitatingly 
accepts.
There is a sense in which the statement is certain beyond all philosophical 
dispute, and that is in so far as it asserts what has been observed and what 
could have been observed (if there had bem observers where no one was). In so 
far as it is verifiable, this is as far as it is veriable. And one might have 
supposed that this was its pre-analytic meaning, the sense Moore was referring 
to in which eveiyine would naturally understand it (and in which truth could be 
empirically established for anyone who happened to doubt it). And why should 
anyone not understand it to be asserting simply this? Nothing, it might be said, 
is left out; formiat lias been observed is the earth - parts of it, and what could 
have been observed is the earth - the whole of it. With this meaning", however, 
all it means, with no content but a phenomenal content asserting nothing but a 
conditional filling for the blanlcs in the earth's observed existence, all analyse: 
except those of one type are initially proscribed, and Moore wants to keep the 
range of possible analyses wide open*
Ü0 again, what is;the statement asserting when it is asserting something so 
obviously true that all philosophical dispute is shifted from its truth to its 
analysis, and yet something which is open to such radically opposed types of anal­
ysis? Let us for simplicity concentrate on the verbs without paying any special 
attention to the particularity of the subject, and since the earth has not been -
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always all of it continuously under people's observation, let us treat the 
problem as one of providing for different types of analysis of a statement assert­
ing the existence of a material thing at times when it lias not been perceived. We; 
want a sense of "existed", its ordinary sense, which will allow the statement the  ^
possibility of either a phenomenal!stic or a non-phenomenalistic analysis, the 
correct analysis to be synonymous in meaixlng with the unanalyzed statement. And ; 
the sense which m e  naturally thinks of as the ordinary sense of "existed" does ;j 
not have the necessary plasticity. In the ordinary sense of the word, for example 
somethlng which does not exist except.as a set of possibilities of sensation, doee 
not exist. Understanding the word "existed" in this ordinary sense, one would not 
naturally understand "The earth existed for many years past" to be asserting 
simply what has been observed and what could have beun observed if observers who 
were absent had been present.
Even supposing, however, that the required sense is to be found, and that one 
has somehow missed it because of its very ordinariness, all philosophical disputé:; 
would not be shifted from the truth of the statement to the correctness of its 
analysis. Because if the unanalyzed statement might be synonymous in meaning 
with a statement giving some analysis of the second type, that is enough. For the 
phenomenal!st ex officio, it might be false.
The philosophers who came to share Moore's conviction that the beliefs of
common sense are true beyond all doubt^as often as not had epistemological reasons
among their reasons for keeping anything metaphysical out of common sense beliefSj
and their analyses - there were to be no inexplicable intuitions. There is
nothing mysterious in the manner in which certainties of common sense come to be 
certainties. The truths about the ordinary things which are the topics of 
ordinary beliefs are found out in the ordinary ways; by looking and listening, I 
touching and handling, looking harder and moving up closer if there is some doubt 
whether a thing is what it seems to be, asking other people, and so on and so on. 
These familiar procedures of ordinary life give us the particular truths of 
common sense, ;
And there is the short way for establishing the general truths of common sense; 
We learn the common sense language of Imowledge and doubt, of reality and illusion 
body and mind, cause and effect, of choice, of morality, by being introduced to 
situations in which it applies and shorn how to apply it. The general truths of
common sense are :
I. "....any expression which expresses the analysandum must be synonymous with 
any expression which expresses the analysans." This, Moore explains, is a 
condition of "analysis" as he has understood the word. (The Philosophy of Moore, 
p.663.)
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guaranteed by the fact that there is an applicable language of'common sense,
"We are apt to imagine that those who formed languages’ were no metaphysicians",■, ; ' T ' ' ' ' _ .. X o
Reid remarks - wrongly in his opinion. But how very correct our 'supposition is 
on this view of the nature of common sense truths. More7 however, than meta- 
physics has gone out of them when their truth is a truth; that can be established 
linguistically. ^he thinness of their truth with this certification is in prop- - 
ortioii to their Incorrigibility, their incorrigibility in proportion to the approx­
imation of the descriptive expressions in them to names; since the more descript­
ive they are , the more they say something about what they refer to, the more 
they risk being misdescriptions.’ I cannot ask someone whose name I know to be A, 
Are you really N or only called ; his being called ‘I* is his being M, If ifc 
is;i!%)OSSible to doubt, for instance, that there are independently existing ^
material objects, because in order to know the meaning of the expression tindepend- 
ently existing material object* one has had to be shown its application, then
what it is impossible to doubt is that there are things called 'independently2.'existing material objects'.
If we cannot have a logical justification for the beliefs of common sense
and leave any body to them, we can still have an empirical justification for them-
with the implication tliat their content is purely phenomenal. If you are not
convinced that it is, you can be given a priori assurances and perhaps deprived
of speech.to express y'our ^ ^ssatisfaction, ^'Presumably wiiat people mean must be
3.confined to what they can mean A* ’ And what they can mean can be limited by
general principles; by HdlAe.'s principle of conceptual empiricism, by Russell*;'
4k . ' ' ,principle of acquaintance, " by the verification principle to eliioinate undecirablf
acquaintances. ■
I. Intellectual Powers. TI, Ch, 17/ p.441.
2 A.bi Woqal^y, Common Sense"^ , Mind, JulyI933.
3.A',8. huncan-Jones, 'Does ■philosophy Analysé Common Sense?*,, Aristotelian 
HocietylprOceedlnÉs, Sup. 7al.k7l, n.145. I , ; ' 7:4. : h BVeiy .:proposrtlon whichAwe ; can understand must be ■ composed wholly of constikuentsHith'which we arè.tacqüainked.
The philosopher who. has drmm bbimdarles for sigiiifioant-.apeech by allowing,
it only phenomenal reference has liie opponent atua severe disadvantage, Wlien you
talk about the existence of unperceiyed material objects/ abô# self-identity,' 
free will ... you have to mean what he means when he talks about them, or mean
nothing. . On the other hand, he has to mean what you mean, for the same reason.
And as he is afraid of being taken to mean what you ^  mean, he naturally finds
himself saying what cannot be said, explaining what 'unperceived existence' does ,
not mean, opposing a serial to a humeriçai self-identity and the ' liberty of
spontaneity ' to the ' liberty of indifference'. Phenomenalistic types of opinion
in general are understood only by contrast .with opposed views, '
With his theory of how descriptive words come to have a meaning, Huiae ought, 
even more than Berkeley, to have appeared in the role of a philosopher of common 
sense, scraping off the encrustations of metaphysical nonsense from the purity of' 
its beliefs. He would have done so if he had not been Hume, The Treatise was 
intended to shock. And besides there was too much of Éeid in Hume for him to fit 
comfortably into that role. The result is that when Berkeley and Hume consider ' 
their philosophies in relation to common sense, Hume .seems old-fashioned compared 
with Berkeley.
No great changes are necessary in order to bring Hume up to date. All that Ims 
to be done is to make him consistent by making a few excisions. What people mean " 
must be confined to what they can mean; what they can mean has been prescribed; 
the tension between the natural and universal- beliefs Of mankind and "philosophy" 
disappears - it depended on Hume's forgetfully allowing men to mean more than 
they could. Then some commonplaces on the language/of impressions and ideas' as 
being the language of analysis, and therefore not in competition witli the lan^ .uagc 
of common sense but a technical vocabulaiy to be used in its philosophical 
elucidation; and the absurdities which arise from the confusion of the two sorts
Ill
langudge referred-, back to. their .Huthbrsî'l V; Hwae i à : no I onger parddoxi eal 
opppnent^ .of 'common sense _but a ^Hilbsopher with iCBiodlar pre^uppdsrtidne co 
twentieth centuiy phiiosqphefs,. engaged like them -in ita/anâlysis., not 
'denÿrngDor quêsjïiqnii^ .the existence of material objects^ Hclfrideiitity,. other 
/mind8#6r\an^ Of the thi.nge. thaÿ ' coWon sense is imshakably chnvinced : of ; on the ' I 
contrary, teking;th#m;for_gfant'edin Order .to tell u8.what'%ey^^ ,
/ik-The opposition between :c^  ^ statements and philoso^ >hical paradoxes
is alt(%êther illusory on this interpretation of the ziature of; philosophical- 
paradpx. There, seemed to be an .opposition of matter of fact statements to mat ker 
.pf/fact stateWhts. There is only one set-cf matter of fact statements, but these 
aië stàtpd in alternative languages; in otdinhry language and in a technical 
langiiage .forvits elucidation: and the, same thing is said in both. The illusion
of'paradox' arises;when the technical langùage borrows ordinary words and uses 
them with: h#lmeanings; And théÿ. are/imderstood by the readèMor hearer in their 
ordinary And 'thewiilusion will be strengthêned'if in the course of
philosophical elucidation a philosopher happens to do what lipme:does not do; that 
is rejepthso&e metap^sical mi'8ihte,fpretatibn of a common sense statement with a 
verbal déniai of a coomoh sense statement. .IBbree will, for instance is denied 
when, what is meant/is that' ihdeterim.ni8m is false and no part of common sense . 
beli.e/. : ; '
'.There is another interpretation of the nature of philosophical paradox* Gn . 
this*ether interpretation the paradoxes.are;again really linguistic-and apparently 
faotml/ but'tl^s. time really paradoxical. The Coimon 8èhsë-;pliiloBopher8 would 
fouhdeitherintezpretation. equally disconcerting.
. /.^Lord-hi^éhli^^d by imp.lfcation - if one has not misunderstood him -, that
Gh,V,p.444
I. ' ,.;
wiicnever anybody sees anything, what he sees is part of liis own brain. When 
Reid encountered an earlier version of this opinion, ho rejected it as against > I 
ooimph/aensc ^ d  empirically false. In Professor I4alcolm'-G. view it is against ' % 
commdn sênSe and false, but not empirically false,.
' RRussell was not n^clnglan ëiDpirical statement. In the .normal .sort of circum­
stances in which .q person Would .ordinarily say that he sees the postman, Russell 
.would agree with'him'as'to :.w the particular circumstances of. the situation 
.were^ ;: RusSell would not disagree with him about,.any questioh of empirical facL: 
yetiRi^sell -wouid jstill sayhthat. what he . really saw'Was not the postman but part 
ofjhis own'brain* It appears then that they disagree/, not about any en^irical - ^
fàçtd,/but about'.what language shall be used to describe those- facts. Russell
was. saying that it. is really a moreHorrect way of ^eakirig %o Say . that you soe 
a part c^'youf brain, ^ than to say you seé the. postnian." .And the reply to' 
Russell that it. is the postman and not part of our brain'that we née, )^y be 
interpreted, Mlcoim snys, as meaning that it is correct, language to. sdy' the first 
thi% and quite incofrect to say the second. What'malces,-the one way of spealdLng ' 
correct and- the other incorrect cannot, on Malcblmj.s yiew/. be the fact that it is
the postman we- see and not part of the brain, except in so far as this fact' is 
identical with the fact.'that that particular thiiig is always called a ^postmen' 
andlnever a-/part of the brain*..
, \ . Reid did .not have to deal mth a treatment of philosophical paradox as , sophist, 
icated: as this, and M s  only direct contribution to its’discussion is his reminder 
' that itlis on the.face of it unplausible that a statementjlfhich'purports to be 
. about one thing, should actually be about another quite :different thing. Unplaus-- 
ible, for instance, that, statégients which have eveiy àppearahcé 'of being about 
the: ri^ht/and ;M conduct should really be .about someon&^tK fcelings about
2. "j^ Ibbre'Ahd OMihary iangùâgc", The Hiilosophy of'G.2. ,Moore, p.33Û*
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conduct,^ '* And that statements which are intended to be factual should ins bead 
be linguistic, has a similar, initial unplausibility. For it is presumably not 
Malcolmls view that a philosopher in making some paradoxical assertion or other 
intends his assertion ..tonbe a linguistic one; he does not himself see through its 
factual disguise. And it can remain impenetrable to him no matter how much he In" 
talked to. If a man says X and Someone says to him, What you really mean is Y 
and he agrees, then Y no doubt is what he really means. But if he keeps insisting 
that Y is not what he means, then in an obvious sense of 'meaning* Y is not what 
he means. In what sense of the word does the paradoxical philosopher mean tne sor
Iof thin^Malcolm asserts that he does if he denies that he does?I
Supposing, however, that these apparently factual statements have been correct
ly construed as linguistic statements, they are more paradoxical than ever* In
the sense in which correct language is the standard language we are taught to
2.'
speak and in which we correct deviations from it, no one who had learnt the 
language could deny that it is correct language to call the thing we always do 
call a 'postman* a 'postman*, %
Why then would the paradoxical philosopher be saying that the ordinary languag
for, describing the objects of perception is incorrect? His only reason for saying
this would be that it incorrectly describes the facts. But since his factual
comment has been cancelled, this reason is taken away from him. He is allowed f
to say that there is something wrong with ordinary language but not allowed to 
say why. , f
In the. statement that we never see anything but some part of our own brain, 
ordinary words are run into such an extraordinary combination that no meaning
comes through. There are, however, philosophical paradoxes which are worded i , I
1. Active Powers, V, Ch.VII,K 673* ‘
2. ,,.'*we should smile, and correct his language" (the child's who remarks to
people sitting on cliairs around the room, #iat it is "M^hly probable*^here are . ; chairs in_ the room). Malcolm, p.335. ' .. 1
LiiA III---- ra-,v-- A - / A - ; : A '  : - ;
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intelligibly, and which are not linguistic assertions or recoimnendatione because
they are either reasons for these, or because the philosopher is quite satisfied^ 
with ordinary language as it is and does not want to change it at all. A man 
with a phenomenal ist doctrine might want to cut the word * permanent* out of our;,; 
vocabulary because there is nothing for it to apply to. On the other hand, he - 
may claim that there is nothing in the established usage of the word inconsistent 
with his doctrine. In neither case does the doctrine disappear into a'linguistic 
proposal or assertion.
The question which has to be decided before it can be decided whether common, 
sense has any philosophical opponents who reject any of its beliefs as false, 
meaningless or radically confused, is a general question about the content of 
common sense beliefs. Have these beliefs no more than a * phenomenal* content, 
if we may now use this word for want of another more widely than is customary; 
or do they also have, and again for want of a better word, something that might 
be called a * me ta physical* content? (Almost any word would.be a better word in 
Beattie's judgment ; a * met aphy si cal*' opinion is the kind of opinion to be found ; 
in Hume.)
The distinction marked by these words * phenomenal" and 'metaphysical''' should
become sufficiently clear as we go along. In the meantime a rough indication of.
it can be given by asking whether common sense beliefs are beliefs which are
wholly, or or beliefs which are not more than partially capable of empirical
verification; whether the significance ofthe language in which they are expressed
is exhausted by reference to what can fall under the senses and (the speaker's)
I :introspection, or whether it goes beyond this to what these cannot reach. * Thus 
the coioraon sense belief in the existence of material things includes the belief 
in their existence at times when we are not perceiving them. And the statement 
that there is thid and that in the attic specifies the things that could be seen 
and handled by anyone going into the attic. Does it say what is there whether 
anyone goes there or not? It does. Is being in the attic when no one is in the 
attic being able to be seen and handled by anyone going in to the attic (anyone
not blind, sleep-walking.,.,)? The ordinary language of personal identity:I. Sooner or later speaking indiscriminately of common sense beliefs is bound 
to lead to difficulties, and it does so here. For with regard to at least one of 
these beliefs, the belief that the future can be anticipated from the past, the 
issue of a single or of a double content does not arise. It does not arise 
because of the high level of generality in the belief about the future. V/hatevei account we give of, say, the material things of past experience, we<shall give the same account of the material things of future experience. But the belief ;* 
would be a * metaphysical* belief, in the sense in which "metaphysical* is here 
being used, if we are driven back on to self-evidence for it.
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is it exiiausteci in its inward reference by reference to the continuity of my 
experience and to feelings of being the "same person" when Ï use it of myself ; 
and, when ypu use it of me, by reference to my public uniqueness? And again 
when I talk of other people's joys and griefs am I altogether speaking, as I 
partly am, of their smiles and laughter, their hunched shoulders and wan faces, 
or also of what these "express"? It is against common sense to deny that we 
have free will* Is it against common sense to deny that we have free will in I- 
any sense in which it is not verifiably true that we have free will?
If there is nothing in the beliefs of common sense which is not verifiably 
true, if the language of common sense does not go beyond a phenomenal reference, 
the paradoxical philosophers of the past were not taking anything away from } 
common sense. Their paradoxes were merely verbal and were designed to protest 
against their metaphysical opponents' (perhaps meaningless) addition to it, or 
were occasioned by the misleading.language in which the analysis of its state-  ^
ment8 was conducted. These philosophers only seemed to be against common sense 
because they did not speak its language ; either saying, or sounding as if they 
were saying, that there are no material things etc., but not meaningthat there
are not, in any sense in which common sense believes that there are. If, however
there is a metaphysical as well as a phenomenal level to the beliefs of common
sense, and if consequently its language lias a double reference, philosophers
who hold the same views as their paradoxical predecessors are really against
common sense though they speak its language.
What more is there to common sense beliefs than their empirically verifiable
content? For tliis question to be answered in any detail, the beliefs would
have to be taken one by one. This, however, can be said in general. Just what
I.
more may be a matter for philosophical elucidation. But philosophical elucid- ■ 
ation is not needed equally in all these beliefs, and perhaps not at all for
some of them.
I. Stewart mentions the wordlessness of the general beliefs ol common sense in 
ordinary men. They are taken too much for granted ever to become explicit. No 
one but a philosopher would think of stating them to himself or anyone else, 
(Elements, VolII, Ch.I, Sec.I, p.37.)
The man who was ‘asked, what he.meant 'by other people's feelings^ would bo puzzled 
to Miow: #Mt you. meant,by the .question; - asked idiat hè.,m%aht when he said that the 
Bea-chest is still ihcthe attic when eyeiÿone is domistaifs/ he. could'be quickly 
puzzie^ to )mow VMt' he meant À . Was he saying that the- tMhA' is lihere looking the 
sameVwheiilno one is about as when .someone sees it? If Bo,./lle is soon hesi lata ng. 
•Or‘perhaps he is already acquainted with the philosophers dr the,popular physicists, 
and .is sure that he did not mean any thing so simple. What/did he mean? Will he 
settle for the primary '/qualities without the secondary , or for atoms and electrons? 
Where does cpramon. sense say a- final Bo to the whittling down--of .uhperceived 
..materfMobjectsfromwhat they, are when perceived? .This has to be found out, if 
it bah'be 'found out/ cômmôh sense does not-have a prepared ahsvzerhAiicli ib is wait* 
.in^  : to'caipare with the results of the philosophical clarification.of its belief, 
But^  this inheterMnatenessbsiibt present in all cororfion sense beliefs, and when.it,, 
is present'it may not be in their meatphysical aspect. The metajmysical notion 
of numerical self-identity is clear enough/even if i t, i s ùiibat i sf ac t oiy in o liiez = 
-waySf/-•The puzzle is-to explain wliat one means by 'oneself! without relerence to 
thiS'notion. ' .
, "Who. can doubt -whether men have ; universally believed bhe .existence ol a ma 1er- 
ial world:., that every, change’that happens in nature must • have* a cause... tliat 
there is a right.and a wrong in human conduct?" Bo one. And because ail piiii- J
osox3Hers would give Reidls answer to his question, his question.as it s bauds is ;
too naive to have any philosoibical point. ..Reid asked, .however, though only half 
realizing it, a question.about beliefs with a metaphysical content and ^ot an 
anmiér about beliefs id. th ai merely phenomenal content.; Because, the Comoion oenso 1
philosophers qnly half-realized tMt there were the two levels \ih c6i'mon sense 
beliefs/ they mistook the doubts'and-denials,; bf their truWh^ thé metaphysical ^
level If qridoUbtS'and'denials of thMr truth.at'. the phèhqmèhal, l^Vel. .But occausc
I. Inbellcclual powers, Vi, Ch. IV
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they half-realized it, they could not quite bring, themeelv.ee.to dismiee theseI.questionings and rejections as intellectual make-belief or.inaaiie delusion. ' I 
, A philosopher asserts that there are ^no unperceived tables and chairs, defin-? 
es the mental life of other people in terms of their actual and possible 
beMviour, thinks with Eume timt he himself is a "bundle of (fLYferent'percepk-
ions which suceed each other with an inconceivable rapidity".... .You may call(V 2 ^ >
his position ' metaphysical limacy’, as Reid does, but it would be polemically % 
much.more satisfactory if it could have been shomi to be ordinary lunacy. And -*  ^ >4
this it would have been if he had denied those truths of common sense in their ‘
■
phenomenal aspect ; if, for example, every time he was shown a chair he was 
convinced that there was nothing there at all or anything but.a chair; if, again/ 
he was convinced that other people were mindless automata; if he was sure that he 
was no more the same person in the morning and in the evening than (as Beattie 
thinks Hume might as well have said) "Nero is the Man of Ross". If the plains- 
opher accepts the beliefs of common sense in their phenomenal meaning, he will 
behave like other men, and without any inccbsistency bet when theory and practice.
The Common Sense philosophers are always saying that one of the features 
which stamps a belief as a belief of common sense, stamps it with the mark of
/ ' r
i n e s c a p E l b l e  t r u t h ,  i s  t h e  f a c t . t h a t  " e v e n  t h o s e  w h o  r e j e c t  i t  i n  s p e c u l a t i o n ,
3. 'find themselves under a necessity of being governed by it in their practice".
1. Reid's and Stewart's misunderstanding was intermittent; Beattie!s and Oswald's rarely falters. The following is typically Beattie and Oswald: "Thai we cannot'
do some things,, but have it in our power to do others, .is what no man in his senses will hesitate to affirm. I can take up my staff from the ground, but I 
cannot lift a stone of a thousand weight... « When a ihan asks me a question, I ' 
have it in my power to answer or be silent, te^ -answer-èr-4;eri5l^  ^ to answer, softly or roughlÿ, in terms of respect or in-terms of contempt. Ibrequent /'t
temptations to vice fall in my way; I may yield or I may resist. ...But this
idea fof powerj has had the misfortune to come under the examination of Mr. 'HUME..." (immutable Truth Pt. II, Ch.II, See. Ill, pp. 29W93.) '72. Inquiry, Ch.V. Sec. VIIyn.l27. .
3. Intellectual Powers, VI;,- Ch.V, p.447. -
'Criterioh, . ReM and .Ms-school are opposing a . Metàphv sirelly 
l^ded o.o^ oh- sense to. phenomenalism and to a version Oi::'cOimoh' sense that ifould '
/ ' h iit ill: Mth phenomenalism,' Half in the dark about what, thëy âre doing, they - - , ^
- . adopt ; the phenomeiialist criterion of meaning end truth as their'criterion of 
/ 'the.meaning and truth of the propositions/of common sense, it is'tautological 
that the phenomenâi oohtent of a belief is ei%>irically veriiffable) and IsMolo^^- 
icar that .empirical verification could,not establish; that a belief so much as had 
ahMetapi^SicM .content. We\shall indeed never open the door .quick enough to 
/:/. catch tablesyànd chair# snapping hack into existence,,,or/alternatively waitin;_, . 
f or us with a .continuot^ duration' T a phenomonalist metaphysics is no more 
empirical -than its contrary.- ;But what the 0 onnTion Sense philosophers had more , 
formdably tjo reckon with is not a,phenomenalistic metaphysics, but an interpret-^
: ation;'hf‘'.iho .beliefs of commonlsehse that is not Ihconsistent with it, an inter-
pretatidn of them'as altogether metaphysically neutral, not going beyond phenom­
ena either, positively or negatively, "
beliefs of commop sense,. Reid says, are reflected'.in thO structure of 
language, in-its universal grammar. It. is usually taken for granted thaL any , ' 
opinion, whether true or false, can be expressed equally in any language which 
;■ has.-sufficient words for the purpose. There ife a most. important exception to
f; this general rule; "There'are certain, common opinions of viankind, upon which
" / .c . ' \ . . %/'! .the .stricture and grafmmryOf all languages are.,founded." All languages are - "
recalcitrant to the expression of opinions which are at'variance with these
.. cqmmohnpiniohs'; :
' ' ' "hahgua^e is. the express,image and- picture of human thoughts'; and from ttie
picture we may draw some,pertain conclusiohsnonoefhihg.the original#
f ' - )'V7e. find in all' languages the- same parts' pf spbech;\ we find; nouns, substantive
andiad^ ectivei^ .verbs;,;^ ^^  a^ d. passive/in their Vdri^^ numbers and
' I. InteilectualJPowers,. .1;,..Gh,I. n'.229.% % -. : b-i'f .T Y
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moods0 Some rules of syntax are the same in all languages,
"Now what is common in the structure of languages, indicates an uniformity of - 
opinion in those things upon which the structure is grounded. --
"The distinction between substances and the qualities belonging to them; 
between thought andüie being that thinks; between thought and the objects of 'B 
thought; is to be found in the structure of all languages. And, therefore, 
systems of philosophy, which abolish those distinctions, wage war with the common '
TX . k
sense of mani-cind."
It is not to the ordinary use of ordinary words that Reid is going for ^
philosophical illumination here and elsewhere when he speaks in the same way; it i
is to supposedly common features of the grammar of all languages, "The philosophy
of grammar, and that of human understanding, are more nearly allied than is 2.commonly imagined." The metaphysical doctrines of causation, of substance and its"
■ : i t 5
modifications and of the independence of the objects of cognition from cognition - 
are in front of anyone who knows how to phrse. Reid is not always so naive. "be
can only expect in the structure of languages, those distinctions which all man-
3.
kind in the common business of life have occasion to make,"
Beattie also wrote on universal grammar, but without looking for the confirm­
ation of the metaphysical beliefs of common sense, ¥e might compare, for instance, 
what he thought of the import of substantives with Reid's opinion. There must be
substantives. "Men could not speak of one another, or of anything without
substantives." A substantive is "a word denoting a substance"; or more properly j
is "a word denoting a thing spoken of". Now the things we speak of either have a i
real existence, as man, tree, house, hatchet; or have had a real existence, as I
Babylon, Eden, Caesar; or are spoken of as if they had existed, or did exist, as “]
Jupiter, Fairy, Lilliput; or are conceived by the mind as having at least the ^
1. Intellectual Powers, VI, Ch.IV, p.440.
2. Brief Account of. Aristotle's Logic, Sec.V, p.692. y 3# Intellectual Powers, I, Ch.V, p.238.
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kfcapacity of being characterized by qualities, as virtue, beauty, motion, swiftness.
Thus the structure of language allows us to speak of a quality as a "thing" and, 
since abstract nouns can take adjectives, as a thing that may be characterized
by other qualities. And this, Beattie remarks, is very nearly the "description
of a substance", Beattie does, however, doubt whether abstract nouns are essentia]
parts of speech. Though they are found in every known language, they could perhap;^
I •always be dispensed with by circumstances.' *
Beattie's treatment of substantives is typical of his treatment of other
features of universal grammar. Why is there a universal grammar? "Certain modes
of human thought "are common to all men in the circumstances of human life* Univé]2.ersal grammar is the system of Imnguistic necessities for their expression.
We have already met instances and shall meet others of Reid's appeal tp
common language in philosophical discussion; The appeal is sometimes destructive €
and made in order to oppose a theory, not to oppose a theory to a theory, not
even to put anything in place of a theory ("Let us next consider th e proper
meaning of the word impression in English, that we may see how far it is fit to
express either the operations of the mind or their objects.,..") In this way it
is an incident in Reid's argument against the theory of ideas, The appeal is
sometimes made in order to oppose a conviction to a theory; the objectivity
implicit in the language of morality, for instance, set against subjectivist
theormes of the nature of morality. And in some instances Reid is able to show
3.some recalcitrance in common language to phenomenalist elucidation, * But 
incidently; on Reid's view common language is the repositary of the metaphysics 
of common sense primarily in its structure rather than in its content.
If Reid is wrong about the nature of common sense beliefs why do ordinary 
people refuse to accept their phenomenal!Stic analyses? When told "This is the -|
1, Dissertations, pp.323-324. ;
2, Dissertations, p.322. , vi
3, There are anticipations of Reid in an isolated passage in Turnbull : "Such ' ways of speaking are of universal use and extent : none are more such: but to say fy 
that such phrases, received in all languages, and universally understood, have
no meaning at all, is to assert an absurdity no less gross than this; that men ! 
may discourse, hold correspondence, and be influenced and determined in their 
correspondence with one another, without any ideas at all. Common language is 
built upon fact, or universal feeling.... It is only such philosophers, who seeking the knowledge of human nature, not from experience, but from I know not  ^
what subtle theories of their own invention, depart from common language, and i 
therefore are not understood by others, and sadly perplex and involve themselves."j 
(principles of Moral philosophy, p. 16.) >^ 4
sort of thing you really mean", why do they not say "Yes, that is the sort of 
thing I really mean", They have it patiently explained to them, for example, thatt
the philosopher is not telling them that there are no tables; that on the contrary
HÏ1 ’he is telling them what tables are They are impressed. They do not think that 
"There are tables and they are clusters of sensations" is any better than '
"There are no tables, only clusters of sensations", The phenomenal!stic analyses;';}
are rejected by ordinary men as soon as they are proposed and understood and if ‘'/M' *3they are suspected of being phenEdzket&e, before they are understood,
Perhaps not all with equal decision, at any rate after enough talk has been - .-’M  
gone through, xt depends on the clarity of the belief and the proportion between 
its two kinds of content. The exteriorization of other people's minds into 
their behaviour is rejected with complete scepticism; the unperceived material 
object survives perhaps as a nescio quid, clung to with puzzled stubbornness; 
and the phenomenal!stic analyses of other common sense beliefs are turned down 
more or less emphatically and with a more or less definite feeling of what chas 
been left out. If the Common Sense philosophers are right in holding that the 
metaphysical beliefs of common sense are self-evident, and in looking to the 
testimony of ordinary men to bear them out, they must be prepared to find
disturbingly that, as far as the testimony goes, some of them might be more
self-evident than others, certainly that it is clearer in some than in others 
what it is that is self-evident.
Let the beliefs of common sense be refused the possibility of a metaphysical 
content, and their truth can be withdraw from philosophical dispute. Reid and 
his school will not accept their eirenicon. These beliefs cannot be freed from 
their metaphysical commitments and remain the beliefs of common sense. And their 
truth is not jeopardized by the weight they carry; no unloading is needed to 'Imake them safe. They are true as they are, and are known to be so, if not by all ] 
men, then by most men and by all men most of their time. Reid has no answer to
the question "How do we know that they are true"? except tliat it is the kind of
question that cannot always be asked id it is ever to answered. In the long 't'-irun we are driven back to the constitution of our nature. The beliefs of common
sense its imanswerable authority.
Sir James Mackintosh remarks that he observed to Dr. Brown in I8I2 that ReidI
Î
. . . .  . . . . .  _
and Lume "differed more in words Wian in opimoa". Broim answorod; "Yes, Hold
bowled oub, We mast bel]ove on outward world, .bub adaed in a wbLspec, we can
give no roapon for onr belief. Kume crios out, we can give no reason for sucli j
I.. a^ nobion:: : and wMspere,. T own we-cannot get rid -of it*" .a-
I, Dissertation on fclie Progress of Ethical Pliilosoplij, (2nd. edition) p.3>40.
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CHAPTER IV >' COMMO|f SENSE - (2)
'Reason and Common Sense'
"There is this difference", Priestley remarks, "between the antient and these
modem sceptics [keid and his schoo^ , that the antients professed neither to
understand nor believe any thing, whereas these modems, believe every thing,I.though they profess to understand nothing." But there is a more dangerous 
scepticism in this "new and strange" appeal to common sense than the denial that 
reasons can be given for our natural and universal beliefs. That is bad; it is 
a sceptical credulity. What is worse is that these beliefs are drowned in 
subjectivity.
The "great doctrine of Mr Locke" - the doctrine that truth is a matter of 
the agreements and disagreements between ideas - made "truth to depend upon the 
necessary nature of things, to be absolute. unchangeable, and everlasting". The 
doctrine of common sense makes it depend upon "the arbitrary constitution of our 
nature" and so en to be "a thing that is relative to ourselves only". Beattie 
called his book em Essay on the Immutability of Truth, but he says in it that we 
know nothing of the "eternal relations of things". He says that we know no more 
of truth and falsehood than that "our constitution determines us in some cases 
to believe, in others to disbelieve; and that to us is truth which we feel that 
we must believe, and that to us is falsehood which we feel that we must disbelievJI 
Truth has entirely gone, Priestley comments, with the renunciation of its 
objectivity. We are left by Beattie with how things appear to us and are never 
to know how they are in themselves - "which alone is strictly speaking the truth"- 
when we are told by Beattie that "we ceui only see with our own eyes, and judge 
by our own faculties".
Beattie does not break with his school in the matter. Reid and Oswald also
Z. Immutable Truth, Pt. II, Ch. I, Sec.II, p.196.|. Examination, Preface, p.XXI.
T.:; Ci
/////[ ;■ sigmfiçàntl , call their final authority for truth term.'which philosophy
era hayo kept for Y those fadultie# ih consequence of wMchvwç are liable to 
;///" feelings relative to ourselves onlyand from which they have not pretended to
' draw any conclusions concerning the nature of things". The system of cormon sense. Î
: - V puts feeling in thé place of reason and‘therefore relative in the place of ' " j
- : ' absolute truth; - . - , ^
- Priestley's strictures will form a convenientftext for the exposition that will ,
r y ' occupy this section. We shall begia with the fundaanental disagreement between '
V; / Priestley and the Gbamon Sense philosophers on the nature of sense; ~
. priestleyls mistake, in Reid's opinion, is the general mistake of pMlosophers,-j. A"-.... : - . ' \
and the whole point of the Inquiry was to correct it^ Feelings relative to our- j
' selves, and from which no conclusions can be drawn as to the nature. of things, is '
; ; > What sense perception, construed according to the theory of-ideas^ leaves us with# ;
/ On that: thebry from sense we have sensations and nothing :else, nothing that takes
\ us out of ourselves. And when philosophers have recognized other senses besides
; the external senses, a moral sense, for instance, their interpretation of them is
the same; feelings are what we have by them and nothing eise. Reid does not use j
the word 'sense' the way the philosophers use it; he Uses it as it is used in -j
coiïmioh; speech where it "always implies/judgment", where 'good sense* is 'good . -M
judgraeht/, 'nonsense' *absu:M judgment*, where colours and sounds are ' judged* ' J 
by .the; eye, aiid so on. From which "it is natural to think that common sense should j
.V- ' ■ 2. ■ / .. : : ' 1mean ccmnon judgment ; and so i t really does. " And equally natural, • in Reid * s ]
opiniohr for one holding that the sole province of sense is to provide us with r]
sensatibns. or ideas, to infer that the sole province : of ju%ment is to perceive t
\ ' -'7 :...'.. ' / ' ' \ ' ' ' - ' " ' ' "^1  ^ , their relations# Not accepting the premiss, Reid dœs not accept the conclusion# ' i
■•/■“-■ I. Bxamhation. .vpp^ I23-'ff ; .... ....... .... '; : : 2# Ihmiœtimi: Powers. Iff Ch. II. n;423/ / . ^
___ / _ _ _ '
' H'.
Sense -.(unless disqiiÿéreÿ^ àhà/çégmon séhàe, through^  the:, jû^knèp$ involved in 7i 
them, do not leave us locked up within ourselves; they ef^be \ us so thorou^lyk^ 
that they prsent; us with tMhgs as they would; be even if wé/p^rsônally did not 
exist, , . / .y '
Beattie offer# a formai' Af^ ^^  of hommon sense. It is "that power of the '
mind wMch perceiyes tiuth, or common belief, nqt by,progressâive argumentation, 
but by an instantaneous, instihctiye, and irrésistible impulse ; derived neither 
from education nor from habit,; but from hature;;^  acting independently on bur willj 
whenever' i^  ^ Object is presented,^ according to an established law, and therefore,/
nrooerlv called. Sense; and acting in a similar manner ubon all. or at least ' - '
upon a majority of -imnki^ and therefore properly called Common Sense," . _
, ; : Sow would this def ini ti bn bui t the other Q qimbh Sense philbsophers? Oswald \
, would : be very, happy with it ,; and there Xb} hot a great deal in it for Reid to 
object to. He would not care to authorize without qüalificat^ ^^  instantané!ty
and .irjmsistibility of the operation of cppnbn senses- like, o eyes
and there it is - even thou^ hb himself says that the propositions of common " /
sensesense are believed as sbon? ao: uhder8tobd& There/arë/obstructions to common 
sensed other than congeiiital defect, which are not paralleled in thé external 
se%es w M c M  ta&ng as^^M model. Understanding the propositions of -
coimbniaense is more thanimderstdhM^ the words of the sentences in which they, 
are stated; t h ^ .have tor /viewed in "^ thélr proper light;!* ; . ^ ëid does not 
explain tills reraaik, and of coU^ the fact is that if; beihg^yiewed in their 
proper li^$, means having/ their real meaning undërstbod, and if jReid is right 
about the natM bf iiheir^  ^r^  ^ if Jthey have a metaphysical, as well as
a phehoiibnnl:: content,. tben:t^ philosbphërs who will dissent from their ‘
truth are soma of those who have understood them. Reid probably intended by the
K':.
S.»/:?:siS--;::
m ,#:V<,vV--/ '■%#
.3 /
remrk to summarizé thé sort of thing he elsewhere 'says ; in de ; A sufficient'/ 
schooling in speptibel philosophy can reduce the otherwise irresistible pres§uia|| 
of cqmmqn sense:belief to a fitful insistence, and there are powerful intellect­
ual motives for the philosophical invention of scepticism, hbtably the deterrai^l 
ation to leave nothing unexplained and to adopt explanatory hypotheses witMuïfeiP 
expectedly destructive conseqUehces. It is obvious that Beattie would agree'or 
he would not have written his book. . : •
%  account of common sense, in the passage in wtrlch he defines it is
"censurable in almost every line", Stewart asserts. *. To begin with, the affected 
. x preci sipn of. défini ti on, is ; quite out of place ; "The very idea, indeed, of appeal-! 
/ . ihg to commbh sense. virtually implies tkmt these words are to be understood in ]
their oidinary acceptation, wrestmcted ahd unmodified by. any technical refine- /J 
ments and cbiment Stewart is inain criticism is that Beattie not only supposes ' J 
that ;'common sense* means "something quite distinct from reason, but something \ 
which bears so close an analogy to the powers of external sense, as tp be improp- 
// ■; eriy called by the same name". Eow much more imexceptionably Reid speaks of - ^ 
/i.,, c omaon sense when he speaks of it-as that "degree of vSense*') in/virtue of which I
we are;."capable of managing .our own affairs" ' and of being: "answerable for. our 
conduct to others"; when he explains, that it is "called common sense because it /! 
is: coîniaon! to all men with whom we çân transact business": when he adds that the
same degree.of understanding "which equips a :imn for the” business! of life, makes j
. ' ' ' ' ' " . ' him capable of discerning,what.is true and what is false in matters that are self- '
evident and which he distinctly understands". Stewart does not notice that tne !
philosophical opponents: of the truths of cbimon sense have been defined into „ j
madnéssv ..And wishing to stress .Reid's view of common sense as an energy of the
understanding, he passes over;Reid's agreement with Beattie that it is also right-'
ly tho^^ti of as a sensé ..\^ hëh/sëhâé is rightly thpug^ ‘ ""J; /m&g ... -.
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Hqwçvër comparatively xmexceptienable Reid's language is, the whole appeal to 
'common sense' is,-in Stewart's opinion, most unfortunately worded. The appeal is" 
in fact to the Vfundamental laws of belief", and it is not part of the function of] 
what is ordinarily called 'common sense* to authorize these. "The phrase Common . %
Sense, as it is generally understood, is nearly synonymous with mother-wit....
and refers, not to the speculative convictions of the understanding, but to that , , 
prudence and discretion which are the foundation of successful conduct." Reid, . 
admittedly with some precedent from other philosophers, turned the everyday 
expression: Icoimaon;sense' into a technical term by giving it a meaning which it 
does not have in ordinary language, by making it mean the faculty which has self- 
evidehÿtruth as its province* . A regrettable consequence, Stewart remarks, of this 
change in its meaning is that 'Common Sense* too easily became a school label, 
under which wide differences of opinion disappeared, and independent thinkers were 
made responsible for each other's doctrines. And even more regrettably, all of 
them (at least to "title-page readers") seemed from the associations of the word, - 
to be lining themselves up on the side of the vulgar whenever the vulgar were 
against/the learned. / [
It is not/certain that Stewart is right in thinking that Reid was using ' 
'common sense', with a new meaning. Like the word 'Idea', 'common sense* was a 
philosopher's word; at any rake a learned word, before it became everybody's woih. ' 
Without actually speaking of a 'faculty' of common sense, Reid uses the word 
'common sense* with a faculty reference, and also in reference to a set of beliefs { 
or principles*
After first translating the Latin translation of Aristotle * s 
and ;so beginning with a meaning that had no connection with its later meaning, 
'cbmDibn .sense', in its faculty reference became one of \the vague synonyms for
'1
I. "Life of Reid", Reid's Collected Works, p.28. - \2. Elements. Vol.II, Ch. I, 3ec.Hl/ pp.67-69; Life of Reia. p.28.
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intelligence. ' Théïi moving into-the vernacular it came: to signify average 
: intè^igencM : the depreci^ ' 'merèLcoimqh/ ' ) and also practical
sagacity/ settling down to/,t^  its 6ost ' familiar meaning/:.Vheh it refers to
mental endowment. An C^ord Dictiqnar^^ an earif :eighteenth century
writer shows how little  ^it has, changed Since, then: "By a man of ! coumon sense we  ^j 
mean one who knows as we say, cMlkxfrbm cheese". There/does hbt seem to he much' 
sanction for Reidls opinion that Tcp^bn: sense* is the proper name for the faculty j 
which has first principles as its 'province, - * : ’ " M
V Ih-Heid; the principles "wMpÜ' the. cohstitution ,of. our nature; leads us to ^
heiievé, and which we are-under a necessity to take - for : granted in the common 1
cohcerhs: of lif^ * without. being/table to give a reason for. ; V*.. are what we |
call: the principles of common sense; and wbat is manifestly contrary to them , ;
is :what we/call a b s u r d " W e  are how more accustomed in everyday speech to the  ^
:usa^; by w^ch if something .is a ' matter of common aenbé ' it £s;^ 6bviously sensible ^ 
thing to dpi Alternatively, it is an obvious inductive inference, and what is , /;
against, common sense is an inductive :absuMltyv This id' h o t / d e f i n ­
ed the' f cpmrnon sense of a pebpljei as "the 'movable index of its average judgment , 
an&/i^ ; - ^ But ! côîmqn <^en%y^ that one meaning when it means a ^
set of beliefs* And ih Reid*s time /there was not -,/any more^ ^^ t^ there is now, a ' - 
' established û#àge in - spee^^ p^illbsoiMcal .paradoxes as against w  
comioh ;sense, and of the/beliefs opposed tb them as coimon sense beliefs# It, or "
'7':/;...% . . 7  ' ' - '7/7 ' 3*. *something near it ; is a: way Of .èpeàking to be found in Berkeley and Hume, . "j
and: behind the Engli sh. word /the Latin sensus commühis: : an approximately I
.Reidian meaning among its meanings-. • . " .
■ ' , . - - .■'Stewart wants the ihteiiectual power'which Reid calls:'common:sense' called f j
'reason' - as ay matter of linguistic propriety# He is hot ' preparing a quick \'\
1/ Digui^, Ghyll, Sec. VI, p.I08. '
■2. Aids to Reflection, 10th. Aphorism on Spiritual Religion.
3. Berkeley, Three.Dialogues, pass.; Hume,, >j
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sec.I. - / 1
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destruction for thëVpMlôsppM of c6f#6n. s#8e/// if ; there was a
/ man whbéè: behaviour revealed a disbelief in hie own existence ; in his self-identity 
in the : reality cf the thing# %rôuâd. about/^  ^ it would nob %» good: English to sqy.H 
that/he had ho common sehèe. : Me/would- say that: he had lost his reason. And the / 
' anneal ;to common sense has an older and more venerable wording as the "anneal , > 
the .light -Of human reason from the reasdnings of the: schools"v
- In the'Inquiry Reid : had sgoken as if there could bê" ^  oipjgqsit i on between 
reason and/common sense in which one would Mve to yield to the other; common
sense Vdeclines the tribunal of reason;" if Reason "#11: not be the servant of 
Gomnoh Sen^ imst be', heih Aave*'. -In- tliêvîhfellectuàl-Ebwers Reid has come to 
réaifzé/that this is not the way to speak. (Êb never was a way of speak-.
Ing : y ! G pd ,^Ve us ,pur ^ asqn  ^ d  our comaon sense; tk^/oppOsitidn was between 
common sense and misused reason. ) Reason and comiaoh sense, go. together in nature 
as they do; in the phrase. Rbasbh has two, functions,, an iiitWtive f o n  and a 
deductive function.. 'Common senseis an alternative name for reason in its 
intuitive functloh* . Indèed all,the/the G qmmon Sehse phi1osophers, except Beattie 
who follows the earlier. Reidv in keeping the word 'reasont for 'reasoning', are 
sooner or later willing of anxious to Use 'bommoh sense t/ahd 'reason' interchange- i, _ X X  ' x /  ' , % /  / . / x  '-' : ; X / / X ' x x ; x / /  / A , , x  -j
ably. : Oswald is at some painstÿo:î]#:e/it clear that ?feeid]^ '/^ .# not do as a -J
substitute for /commoh sense', because feelings;ought to be disciplined^by reason, ^
- . 7  4. 1and because to exalt feeling in this way would, be to give a; lioenc to bigotry.  ^ t 
&t#art objects to. the, 6 # ^ %  up (hoiiëj;ime8,% of
mathemtical and metaphysical (and moral)/ axioms; particular truths derived from  ^* 
perception, memory and;consciousness, along with the general principles of common ' ' 
sense into a single class of intuitive.truths referable to a single /principle of »
------------- :-----------:------------------r
4. .In Appeal VoL I, jpp.I3I-I42. _ ;
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/ Where; Reid;Write8 ' coimbnv séW^ ' ; Stewart w .'reasoh* * ; Stewart does 
not bbliterate 'distinct species of , intuitive evidence' with 'reason'
and Reid does not with t h e ' c o m m o n  sense', (Beattie cluiasily follows Reid.) , 
xReid does oblitera% thé signifie^ distinct species of evidence
and jusb because he is convinced that they/ are comnletely  ^distinct * ; Logicians.
bave/:ttied;Aby. analy'Zihg tl^ Wtf^ < Mnds: of evi%e^^ to/;fihd o M  some common 7
featurexin them, in virtud/qf: wüçh they are evidenced / T Sehdoimen - sought it 
under the name of the criterion of truth. There, hâve be#hi maqy suggestions. 
Descartes' is the most celebrated. Reid, does not understand wliat Descartes A  
meant by ! clarity' dndr 'distinctness' , and the more he considers the different i 
knids/of evidence the less/he can see that they liavê 'anything: in coimon, except ; 
this/that "they are : all fitted, by Nature to produce/belief ih;the human mind, some ( 
of them in the highest, degree;,: which, we-call certainty, : others in various degrees : 
accqrding to circimstances; %;\/
Thehevidence of perception, memory and. consqioushess/ of I the other modes
of/cqg^ is in each;qasd miiqUe." wbat.lleid calls ' the -first- principles of
contingent.trithsg ;are generalizatiohs of the! partieuiar evidence of perception, 
memory and of the other modes of cognition conceihed withtAtterB fact. The 
first principles of contingent truth have nothing in common with each other 
, except that they are all self-evident; ; and the first principles of contingent -
truth have nothing in comnion with the'first principles of necessary truths''"/"I" -': ' - -vyv/ghxcëpt/sëlfTevidehcei/.H v '-'//%
I./Mfdv6f Reid; v.  ^\ ' : ' ;:2vahWlle6tuai?'P . - ; ' . -, ;/ '//:j3. The distinction between necessary and contingent truths, Reid explains < J(intellectual Powers. VI, Ch. V, p.442) coincides nearly, but not quite, with the ' well-known distinction between ! abstract ' truths and 'matter of fact' truths. The \ | law of contradiction is a.necessary truth; that other people exist, a contingent truth; but that God exists is a necessary truth.
NqtMiig ih the published writings of the aoimon Sense phil^ makes it
quite/blear whether any of ,: them recognized that some;: of the/principles they
/ / ;: . regarded as necessary have selfrcontradiêtory contradicttries and some do not*
% : Without explicitly marking the logical distinction between the two knids of truth
they kbep them confused* It is, quite clear that they would hot liave thought
that the logical distinction between them: was epistèmologically disturbing* Their
view would have been, that we can say why the contradictories of one sort of
necessary proposition are impossible, and we cannot say w|iythe contradictories 
of the other sort are impossible, but we can see - unless our intelligence is in
some Way impaired - that the contradictories of both, sorts are equally impossible.’
Hamiltoh remarks :tliat the distinction between the analytic and synthetic
necessary truths is to be found in George Campbell's Philosdphy of Rhetoric and
\ - '1.7 ./ ' ' ' - -77: ' " ' 1that it attracted Stewart's attention, (Stewart had also read Kant with dislike !-X . . ' . j
/ ' ' . 'y ihcomprehension* ) Both Reid : and SteWart of course knew Campbell ' s book well.
V ' 7 ' \  - _ . ' . , " jCampbell defended/Reid against Priestley, assented to the philosophy of common I
sense in general and developed it in this particular, if hdmltbn is not mistaken*,
In Campbell*s;view mathematical propositions are''identical^ propositions, but
not tautologies. 4 and I are 5 is not like 5 is 5. In thè Arithmetical propositrl
" ioh" the number 5 appears in the subject and predicate in different aspects . \
' ■ ‘ (divided in the,subject, single in the predicate), whereas in the tautology the
■ subject is stérilely repeated in the predicate. Mathematical propositions differ
7/7;: .'- - _ . / .\ ' / . - : '
:, ' . in kind though not in superior evidence from the intuitive principles of common j’ , . - ’^'<■'3
sense. The difference is that "no conclusions concerning actual existence" can
\ '/ . \  be drawn from a mathematical proposition* The principle of causation is unique 1
I. /Reid*.s Collected Works, . Note A , pt 2* : cp ". * * .from ho imthematical truth can we deduce the existence of
anything; not even of the objects of the science." (intellectual Powers, VI, 
Gh%pV442-^V . ...
«T ^ “ 1
A'hC.
132
among the principles of common sense in that its denial is "not only false but - v ^
I- :contradictory". Reid and Stewart had nothing to learn in this matter from . j
" t" ' - - 'I. \ "
Campbell. Stewart was interested in his account of the nature of mathematical . \\
. '7propositions, not in his comparison between them and the propositions of common j
At some time or other Reid/came to recognize clearly, the; :f orrûaI distinction |
' ' itiiiM . -Y' ; .. 1betwéèn : the two of : t ruths which he regarded as. éq^llÿ necessary # McGosh »
printed ; in ah: appendix, to his Scottish PhiiosopK f iaMeht s of several papers - ^
of^ 'Reidls; One ,of ;them(it was: undated with a , ’
/ question and ; answer.: Is there hot / a: difference of some
first/prinçiplès landYqthers? A/ "There are various differences perhaps. This / j
seems/ tp- be one, that y ; in some/ first principl^  ^, the predicate of the proposition
is evidently contained in the subject: it in in this, two and three are equal to }
■:.fiye|^ ‘/à In these and the like self-evident principles,
thé ./subjeçt inclu#S the predicate the yez^ ,: notion of it;.' There are other -
first prihcipies in which the predicate is not contained in the notion of the
suibjëct;: ahÿ where :W affdLrm/thàt;a t^i^ -WM have a, ; ^
cause. Here the;beginning of emstehce 'ahd/causatiqn Are /really different notions,
’ ' ; nor does the first ;ihdlude the last/, . : ;.. The truth of principles of the first;3 
/ kîîié is only pqrceiying some part of tHê de;@:nition:qi::a thing to belong to it,..."
„%en Reid' arid istewdrt say that- coaimon/sende/ their source in
: - , ; reasonÿ or that: their denM goes against ;rea they tMnk they are saying (and
;/ , /■ \ Stewa]^/i8 : especially/:qlear about tHis) "sqmbthing liii^istically correct. They Ü
, ;Y/' db not delude themselves into thihking that they are 'giving ;h reason for these /
' % ' beliefs, 'let alone the b reasons* 80 far from thinking that, they regard .™^
it as one of the marks of a common sense belief that nobody asks a reason for it. 7
1. ' ^  Philosophy of Rhetoric, V0I.I, m.f." Gh.V. 00. 105-113 (1776 edition) ,
2, Elements, Vol.II, Ch.I, Sec.I, pp. 26-30.
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#  ' who : i-easoh# : / t)iey can be given- do .not ask for them when
theÿ;:canhqt be given qnd are not needed., They do not: want,.fc have it proved to
. them that they exist and are the same persbhp from hour to hohr or tliat other - "
people besides themselves exist*;- They do not want any of thes#/matters about „ 
wMch; there is ho doubt-put beyond doubt by arguments. It has been the vice of, Y“ 
phi 1 osophersin Reid* s opiniOh, to Want this*. And once proof/is insisted on and 
never /fouhd, it. is hardly .possible not to begin, questioning the most obvious • •;/ 
things. The only way to resolve a Qartesian, dou^ t; with/regain to them is to draw
badk out of it*. To hope to go through with it .and emerge by is sophis- 1
/Y - '/ ' -/ 7. .: ' ' ,ticated credulity. It is trying to make more.evident;what is; already as evident / 
as it can be and from preîni ses that are arbi tari ly privileged. /But philosophers \ j
. '#t:Y / '777 : ' . ' '7 - 7" 77!have^been Miling to take: the only way out with its rebuke pride, !
and so to them the of failed demonstrations tells against the truth of
c ommoh sense : be li ef s when it ought / to tell agdinst thé attei^f to demonstrate it.' .
. Reid ànd/B are never, tired^  demonstrating that démonsti^i on must proceed ‘
from indemonstrable premisses.' Thé first principles from which demonstati ons ' - j 
proceed shine with the light of an imbOrrowed truth. As we sliall see later it.is 
Reid!s/conviction (and Beattie 's f rom/him^ that the principles of common sense ' t 
are hot‘only indemohstrable but premisses.' Y
If the truths of comraohr sense are self-evident; how can there be any dissent" i
from them? To answer this question is the first of two most difficult problems for./I
the philohophy of Common Senqe. Part of the, explanation has just been given. The' Î 
unsatisfied demand for démonstration casts a shadow of doubt over the truths of i 
common, sense. More importantlyv the logic of the theory of ideas adopted unsuspect] 
/ ingly as an explahatory' hypothesis, tias driven philosophers in^ a rejection of -
, common sense./ And the sheer dislike; qf /a Mltiplicity of inexplicable principles, 7
/ '/' is important* To /re.cqghiAe : the /principle# of, çommbn sense as self-evident is to /y
 //: ;
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acquiesce in this multiplicity. The whole tendency of modern philosophy is 
: ' V. ;::.X - 77:' Y 7,7: 7:
against such an acquiescence, a revolution, Reid remarks, against the extravag- ' a
ahce. with which the ^ ahcieM ^Mldsophy » dêa^ in first/ principle#. In the new ^ ï
economy (impo&sibly down to: one principle; in Descartes, grudgingly, supplemented ; 
by/hi# süccessqrsjtwhatçyér is hot open to deductive explanation; and is not >, 
inductive gehefalization is due. for psychological explahatibh. , And there is no
-y.-. 7 '' 7 / \ .Y-;.,-'";':deductionqf the truths of coinraon aense. . ' , ■
In Beattie!^ /the philosophers who re jec t : the self-evident truths of
comidon sense impose on théômeivëa/ànd Ot]^ :¥i& 'MG^iihglesst.a^ 'ambiguous* 
words* In Beattie 'meaningless* is an expletive, and' the /sharing ambiguities he ^ J 
menti Ohs; ate so grossly obvious - for exdmple ;*sightl:isra a subjective
sense Add an objective sense and idealism reads the subjective/aense into the J 
objective sense - that it is hard to imagine how anyone could : hope to trap others '2. Ti
;
in-them, let alone-be trapped/himself. ;,8tilllit is. a fact that Beattie had the J 
idea that philosophical paradoxes were rooted in the - ambiguities of common speech, 
even if it was an idqa that he was hot able tbddo anythingYwith.
'All/rthat.tho Common Sense philosophers have t o offer/in/further explanation 
of the Mystery/of dissent froà self-evident truth: is that/those: who cannot see 
it, when the difficulties have been cleared out of the way, lack the capacity to ! 
see it #;/ And in, calling , this a.'lack.! of * Commbh sense * : or of Y;reason ' they obscur-"- 
ed 'frbm themseives how di;stufbiiïgl^  ^particular the privation is* / It is obviously ; 
not ÿie : absence of the se^ e^/degree : of understanding as equips: à: man tor the  ^.1 
ordinary business Of/life,A in/which Èuiaé and Reid get.ion equaily. well. Nor is ; 
it,a defect in reason or intelligence which has any.other manifestation than ihisD 
single one of;an i n a b i l i t y / m e t a p h y s i c a l ,truths of cqmnon sense. \ Y  
,/!//; The ; first /jof/the. two^ . prqblems for the philqsqphy of / c^ Sense is to ,  ^ /
,TS/Ihtellectual//Power#f;'\-VI';-'-Gh7vllv::Pl:46 " " n
2V:Immutable Truth, PtJ II, Ch.II, 3eo.I, p.231 ff. ^
explain how dissent from'the self-evident truths, of common sense is possible.
The second is to provide some reason for thinking that in spite of this dissent " ' 
they are self-evident - evident in themselves, truths.which do.not need any out­
side justification and which therefore ought tb be assented to as soon asiuhder&iY 
stood - some reason for thinking that their self-evidence is not merely evidence ; 
to oneself and to numbers of other people* The truths of common sense are as a 
matter of fact self-evident to all sensible and reasonable men, Reid and Stewart■/ 
have been saying, and this would be a reason for thinking’ that they are so in 
themselves, that their truth ought to be uni-versally acknowledged, if there was Yl; 
some roark of a sensible and reasonable man other than the fact that he is a man 
to whom the truths of coimaon sense/are self-evident.: :: '7 :7 .
The Common Sense philosophers cannot be asked to demonstrate that. the: propos­
itions of common sense are self-evident* That is a contradictory demand. There i 
is no_contradiction in demonstrating that a proposition cannot be denied without ^ 
self-contradiction, but the propositions of common sense are not logically 
necessary truths* The only proof there could be that the propositions of'comnion Y 
sense arecevident in themselves is their evidence to people. The Common Sense ' 
philosophers can be asked to explain why these propositions are not self-evident,,, 
to everybody. They try to explain, this. They can be asked to dispose of explanati 
ions of the origin::of common sense beliefs which explain away their appearance 
of self-evidence. They do not try to do this; They can be asked to show s u c h  ; 7 
a massive suffrage in favour of the intrinsic self-evidence of the propositions : 
of c ommon sense that it will be more likely tliat , those who canhot. see it cannot : Y 
see. what is there, than that those who claim to see it, 'see' what is not/there. 
The Cormon Sense philosophers are very ready to do this. - \
: If the propositions of common, sense are not assented to by everybody who v7 
understands them, they are assente#o by nearly everybody who understands^ them, :
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And this is a good reason for thinking that they really are self-evidently true, ' - 
for why should almost everyone think that they are unless they are? *
"In a matter of. common sense, every man is no less a competent judge than a - 
.mathematician is in a mathematical demonstration; and there: must be a,great ' -
prc#Wptiqn that the judgment of Mnkind, in such a imtter, is thé natural issue 
of those faculti which God ha# given them* . Such a\judgment can be erroneous 
only when there is some cause of the error, as general as the error is, ¥hen 
tMs can be. shéwn to bç the case, Î acknowledge it ought tb %yé its due weight. 
Butto: sup^ ^^ geneial deviation from truth among mankind in. things self-, -y. 71 
evidèiit , of which no cause' can be assigned ÿ is Mghly/ :imréàsOhabïé7  ' - ’ 7
Thdrë is a proper.and ah improper,place for the appeal to the-many against 
the/few, .and this. is /a proper place. This is whe^ the consensus gentium is to 
be inyoked against idiosyncrasy, If • the'decision on the self-evident truth of 
thé propositions of conmoh' cehqe was a; i#tter peybnd -1^  reach%oif common under­
standing", or a natter of being'in a position to màke récondite observations, ' 
the voice of mankind would have no authority abainst the expert. Where the expert 
and the ordinary Jnah are bn a level, as they are here; tMd Authority is final*
We are not dealing here, Stewart adds,' with-wliat may turn out to be, a nearly 
uhivCrsal prejudice which is due: to of thé facts; fi-he denial of
one of the fundamental ; .beliefs of the: hiimn/mind is riot 'something that we raa;y 
find in time to be like the'denial that^  t^  ^ sun mpvesTround the earth. It is 
like the. denial that there is/motion at all.
; ; Arih the authority of the consent, of ages and.riationsVis/MlMhe more final, 
sirice-the /^Iqsopher who quest ion#: 0%” denies #e: truths' of C^  ^ sense is a 
man divided against- hiiüâélf, sayi%:/one 4hirig/arid acting put/ another, with don- , 
flicting prpfesSional<and■unprofessioriaiV opinions, and almost/certainly also
I;! Intellectual Powers, VI, Ch.IV, p.440* " /
Zfmëméhts, Vol.II, Ch.I, Sec. Ill, pp.6l-62.
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inconsistent in his professional opinions. For it is the fate of the philosophers 
who reject some of the beliefs of common sense to find themselves in spite of ■ 
themselves, accepting others on its bare-authority. Thus they will perhaps \
allow that memory can be veracious, though when asked for their reasons thej /
. . 3/. '■ • , y
have none, every attempt to prove the- veracity o| memory, presupposing it. Or
7 ' . - ‘ . ' Y y ' !they will confidently expect the course of nature to remain the same, with no \
better justification. At least they can be depended upon not to call in question "
thé deliverances of "conscioushess If I am asked to provè that my inner life •
is not all mere seeming, I do not know where to look for the premisses. The
principle that consciousness does not deceive us has the characteristic marks of 1
a principle of common sense, certainty and indemonstrability.. ' c -i
. : !" - - -  ^ ' 7 7 , T; jApart, from the special difficulty (whether there is any logical room for the ' j
distinction between appearance and reality in the objects of consciousness") at "y
the. end of the argument, Reid's appeal as a whole to the-world agkinst tne . /
philosopher and to the philosopher against himself is altogether too easy. If the;
question was about common sense beliefs in their phenomenal content, this appeal
would-be entirely successful and unnecessary. But very few of the philosopheis
who diqown common, sense, beliefs in their metaphysical content adràit so obligingly |
as/Hume that they are rejecting natural and universal beliefs of mankind and that
they keep their scepticism : for the study. . '7 7',
The beliefs of common sense are not to bè sheltered from examination; every- ^
thing that can/be said against .them"ought to be heard. To put forward any belief
as a belief of ,commbh. Sense is in fact to invite its thorough/discussion. Is it , '
V./. './Y,..-: ... /r....:'
a belief of common sense or of prejudice aping common sensé?. Is it a belief which - 
all of nearly all men regard as self-evident and find irresistible, a belief which\ 
governs the practice of anyone professing to deny it, a belief for which no 
universal/ cause of error can be discovered to match its universality? TheseYæ: Ygÿisw . a
Y^'Y'/77":YY Y '. r Y  y'/';,':':' ' ' /  . 7  -
I.
criteria sift the beliefs of common sense from their comiterfeits.
The appeal to common sense, critics of the philosophy of Common Sense have , / 
traditionally said, is an appeal from the learned to the vulgar. It is, Reid — „? 
and Stewart say, an appeal from soine of the learned to the rest of mankind on 
matters and only on matters in which superior understanding gives no additional, 
competence, and an appeal from the theory to the practice of the dissidents, ' 
from their extraordinary to their ordinary beliefs. The discussion it ends is 7- 
a discussion of the truth of common sense beliefs, no.other aiscussion, and not 
a discussion whether or not a belief is a belief of common sense. Beattie would . 
subscribe to all this, at .least verbally, though he plainly thinks that it would y 
have been better if there had never been any philosophy. Oswald stands aside 
from: the other G ommon Bense philosophers when it comes to the limitations of :  ^
common sense. Oswald thinks that nothing is too hard for common sense, Priestley 
; rêmai^ theology al ohé, it qah : pstab^sh^ & è  prihqiÿiestqy natural " rel igi oh j 7 
dissolve the pretentions, Of the càth questions 7
on " the. divinity, of Christ , atonementthe new birth/ and / predestination, with 
..otheKs#%;r#^^ . A;''- - 77 "7"-
"y6d1a#k7 I Tbe.iieye what is seliYevident? I may as we 11 ask, why you ; 
believe wlmj is proved? 7 Neither (p;ieati:on admits of an answer; or rather, to 
both/questions the answer is7the æme, namely, BécauSe I mist, believe it. ** The 7 
nature of the necessity? ''We aie convinced by a proof, because our ^constitution 
is'AdcàiV’tbat'pAmust be convinced by it: and we believe a iselAevident axiom/
because /our cbnstitutiph ;is such that we. m#t; &t/!7 says very 7'’
oftëh: ÿhat the belief, in the" tjhiths of is forced Upon us by the
constitution of our natu re. When Reid and Beattie speak in this way, what they
;I'.Ylntëllëctual Powers/ T; ;Chn:f,;:p/%^/7•/p /  Ch. IV, p.439ff. 7'A „
2. Examination.. p. 298,
3. Beattie, Immutable Truth, Pt. I, Ch7 ll; gec.I, pp. 61-62, '; '
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are doing is exchanging the half logical, half psychological language of self- 
evidence for the wholly psychological language of compulsory belief. That is vail/,.i:
they are doing; saying the same thing over agdin in different words, the second . ^
time as finally as ,they can. T^hey are not putting fbrwaidA/M by which
// ' , , the principles of Acoimoh sonse are categories qf/the mnd: imposed upon a wholly 7
' r /secret noumenal r#lity, ways,in which werWvd; to think of tilings (bedause we,are<
A'Y.7 ' A : .made that way)',.butApefhap#^nb more7th^; that  ^perhaps\with/no, correspondence to y
7 Y7Ÿ: Ÿ' /A '7 '' ' ^
‘ ; : : 7 If from the constitution of natufë^ # must:; believe that the principles of
GommOn/sen^ are tide, I cannot believe that this belief may be^arbitrary effect 
7,’ V’ %...77. /ofYthe constitution of iay nature. The belief that it dictates to me the truths 7 
Y:../:7\;:y7 ' 7 ' A;çf/Qbn^ belief that 1$ dictates their truth/ 7 As-Briestley says y  ^
.'77.7-.. ’ %7;tK#7'b^h:.'6f /things is the way they are, not how they appear to us. And as 7 
Beattie says, to believe that you have the truth to Wii#e that your opinion 7 » 
7. A; .7; woujdAnot alter if ; you :¥ere7/:Perf ect^^ abqUainted with every thing, in the. univers#)
Y Y,-. ' ' Tç/bei^ ^^  Athàrefo;œAthàt/ÿ truth.- from the constitution of your nature,-
: 7 ; ■ : inyqlyés the belief onMtsYauthbrity' in its oWii cognitive transparency, is in--
: 7 ■ 7 - ' compatible with an agnostic reserve towards-the objectivity of its dictates. 7f
'• 77 . There, is ÿ however./standing invitatiohrto: W  relativism and tab kology in
Y;7;3- 77/assortions tliat thé-‘Constitution of ..Our,nature determines our beliefs and dis- 7
■' 7 - ,’ 7 beire^è7 11 :i'a too Much to expect that ; Beattie ; at' any rate, would- altogether :7
. ’ ' decline it, and he can move from relativism; to. tautology within a sentence; We -
' /know^^^^^  ^M  .of "the eternal relations; and /fitnesses of tilings" 7 in the only
7' 7 A" _ 77 relevant meaning her#, nothing : of how they, are in. themselves as distinct from
7 Y‘ how they^seem to us to be,. 7. ."that to usVisltruth which we feel we must believe"-^ '
v'-7'7:-V 7 we; must believe what we .must believe; 7 for Beattie is not defihing truth as 'whatA/:
A A. r.A Immutable Truth , Pt I, Ch.. I, p34.
we must believe', since he goes on to admit that we,can be wrong when we:are sureg
I. ■ ■ , ' ' '■ '  ^ . .we are right. ' / ",
In a rough paper Reid has discussed the ambiguity in the reference of. the
truths of common sense to the constitution of pur nature; "It is. one thing to y
say such a truth depends upon my constitution; it is another thing to say that
ray perception of that truth depends on my constitution .... Why do I believe
first principles? *...One philosopher says, Because I am so constituted that I -
must believe’ them. This,say some, is the only possible reason that can be giveh./
for the belief of first principles* But,say others, this is a very bad reason;
it makes truth a vague thing which depends on constitution. Is not this the
ancient Sceptical ^stem of Heraclitus, that man is the measure of truth, that
what is true to one man may be false to another? How shall we judge of this of .
this controversy? Answer, This question admits of two meanings.. I. For what ^
reason do you believe first principles? 2; To what cause is your belief of iirët,
principles to be ascribed? *Tq first, evidence is the sole and ultimate
ground of belief, and self-evidence is the strongest possible ground of belief...,
/ . ' 7- ' A /A"./ ' . ' ' . 'If I should be asked what is. thè cause of our perceiving evidence in first
principles, to this I can give no other answer but that God has given us the . .3. /
_ 2# .
faculty of judgment or common sense*"
The relativism of; which Priestley accused Reid and Beattie would be in Reid!#:
eyes a peculiarly absolute form of the theory of ideas. It is\is ambiguity, at ; 
least, with regard to this matter that Hamilton breaks with Reid's school. 'We :
' - . . - ' - - ' ’ _A A; .7/'#know nothing absolute - nothing existing absolutely, that is, in and for itself,
3. ■ ' ' '"-Aand without relation tp us and our faculties." The question is whether this
'rgreat axiom' of Hamilton's, the Relativity of Human Knowledge is not the trivial-/
A' ' 7- . 7.. Y . - ! ' 'A: ."'7 " 7  : 7'"77ity that Beattie's 'relativism' becomes at the end of Priestley's exposition of .
1. Immutable Truth. Pt. II. Ch.I. Sec*II. n*I96. --r-—  :  ^A
2. McCosh, The Scottish Phllosonhy. on. 474.-4 7 5, hectures on Metaphysics. Vol.I, p.136.
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it -/"we can only see with our own eyes, and judge with our own faculties".
Part of what Hamilton means by the relativity of knowledge is not triviaf 
in this sense. He holds with Reid and Stewart that behind the.observable charact*. 
eristics of matter and-mind lié the impenetrably mysterious "substances'» of 
matter and mind. We know that these substances exist because we know that with-  ^
out them their observable characteristics could not exist; Extension, figure - 
and magnitude. ,., thought, feeling and desire are called 'characteristics*, 
'attributes', 'properties' or by some other adjectival name to mark their clear - 
dependence on metaphysical substances. We know also from,the mutual incompatibil­
ity of the two sorts of characteristics that matter and mind do hot coincide in ^ 
substance, Reid, Stewart and Hamilton speak of this wholly oblique knowledge 
of substance as a relative knowledge of it.
What does Hamilton want us to understand by the general axiom of relativity? j 
He makes the answer more difficult by pointing to concealed substance and re- , ' 
veaied. attributes as its standaid exemplification. And there is no connection ’ 
at all between the axiom and what is supposed to be its exemplification. The 
relativity in the aMom iS 'a relativity to .our faculties of cognition, with some , 
implications of subjectivity. Thé .relativity in our knowledge of substance is - 
the fact that substance is not known otherwise than relatively to its attributes, , 
There are no implications of subjectivity.
The clearly untautological formulations of the axiom are extremely rare.
Still they occur: "Wè can know,-we can’cbnoeive, only what is relative. Our
knowledge of qualities or phenomena' is necessarily relative; for these exist
only as they exist in relation to our faculties)" And they would be sufficient
I. Reid, nearly Aif .not al^ÿs/ airqids .iming/the word 'Èubstance' of the mind and 
, Stewart hates its barbarity., it makes^'he hays, true statements sound like non- Y 
senses and conjures up the physical imagery that, is always a threat, to the phil- osophy of the mind. 'Being' is a better word, it would be better still "to
avoid, by the use-of the pronoun tliat any subst ant at ive whatever, ..Mind, is that 
which thinks; willS) etc. (Dissertation.... ,n. 542,'^  v Y'" 146.7
2, Reid's Collected Works, p.3^3> Op. Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol.I, pp.bl, 146, \
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to determine the interpretation of the ambiguous formulations as significantlyiT/p 
relativiStic (since we can hardly suppose that a philosopher could be seized 
with the urgency of insisting and insisting that everything that is known by us 
iSfkxiown by us), if it wdS; not/ that with the axiom significantly relativistic, y 
Hamilton's philosophy would be split into two contradictory halves. For no 
doctrine is more, reiterated by-HamltOh tha that in perception ,
the/ AMind iS’ face to ' face it , nothing whatever coming between
:it;ai^/them. 3Ih/its'typical statement : "The'external reality constitutes the
immediate and only object of perceptioh". It is the -common sense doctrine of 
perception and‘therefore Hamilton's own, and he is always watching for Reid's 
devidtiohs from it. ' ' A// ' , ^ ;
. YYet 'Ooinmenting on R e i d , ' s e n s e s  discioSe the nature of the " 
primary.; qualities as they are "in themselves", but give us merely a relative ", 
notion;of>the secondary qualities, informing us only that "they are qualities 
that affect ; uS| in a/ ceitdin/manner 4 that;/ is p^ sensation",
ron^ rk#,:A / "Reid; -modh /i:Aat ;jbhe f ormer - are Imowh j^^  absolutely ^
a M  in'themselves Yr that is, % out of : relation to our cognitive faculties; for he 
elsewhere W  that all our knowledge is relative" 1 it -is not possible to 
guess what çimtâined Reid ' Reid uses the
notion of " relativity!' in:/threq cqnhections; in connection with the secondary 
qualities of bodies; 1#^!% juet/WntlM in connection with substance in 
the way explained above, and in Cohnectipn with power - power; is/ known only 
relatively to its effects* , r - ‘ ' 'A
3 ; ;The critics and ez^osi to#/ of Bandlton have deait^  with : tMa remarkable 
inqoiisistehGy inAdlffei^^ /Mill !s ihclinâ#on is to; reduce the axiom ' '
of relativity:.to a truism. Hutcheson Stirling brings/thé relativism and the
p.58.
2; Intellectual Powers. II, Ch. XVII, p.313.
4. Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, Ch. III.
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' ' ' /  -  : , ' 'I;  ^ ' 3.»Vhaturai realism’' into b;ead~on Gollision,, .The HamltoiiLana Mansel and Veitch \
relativise the objects of perception; They are phenomena, jpintproducts of the
mind and of another reality which they screen off from the Mpd# But they are
Mobjective** phenomena an%**material", not ’’subjective repreBehtations" of
material things. Reid fould.: have had dôme difficulty in understanding this,
buthe could have made out ehough to recoghise '’ideas’* in yet another of their
chameleon variations.
' 2. Philosophy and the Thilosonhv of Common S^ense. _ 4-^
’’This universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the 
sli^test philosophy." - Hume.
’’philosophy hath no other foundations than the principles of ccmmon sense"--\ : ' ' ' " ' ' ' . . / ' : '
Reid,"
, Reid does not speak at great length of the functions of a philosophy of 
common sense, but it is clearly his opinion that there are two things that it 
has to do. The first is to refute assertions such as this of Hume’s and to 
account for their plausibility; The gestures against reason at the beginning of^  
the Inquiry .wereh^estures; Reid, never had any doubt that, nothing could be more 
serf bus than that reason could be found to be against copfioh sense. And he never ^ 
for a moment thought, that this' schism in nature, if it was there, could be plast­
ered over by calling 'common sense' 'reason*. It is a clmracteristic mark of 
common. Sense beliefs that we cannot give them up even if we cannot refute object-;"^  
ions to them. Nevertheless to refute objections to them is what the Common 
Sense philosopher exists for. The second work of the philosophy of common sense :
is to; establish Reid’s assertion and to show hoW; philospphy is t© be built upon
l#T?':8ir' William Kami It on. -hn i'■ 2^I0i - r-~r— t— - r:
2. : The
 .
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the foTmdation. of common sense.
The philosophy of common sense is to make itself imriecessaiy'. Its, present 
necessity is a misfortune. It is not valuable as a search after truth; it has  ^
made no positive;discoveries and will make none/ It is not even a school of 
instruction in other people ’ s discoveries, for its claim is that the tmths in 
which it is interested have always been known and are indeed momentous platitudes*, 
Some of them mght need a little clarification and precision of statement, but 
that is hot a task which could absorb all the powers of a philosopher. And with^ 
any metaphysical impulse to discover new truths, it is without any epistemolog- 
ical concern to justify the truths that are as old as human; nature. They need* " 
no justification and none is possible. The philosophy of common sense is called 
for only because these platitUjdes have been attacked and stiOuld be defended. Its 
philosophical value is polemical. Its best hope is to become with the attack 
on common sense an episode in man’s intellectual history. Something like this '^ 
would be Reid’s estimate of his philosophy from one point of view, and from that/ 
point of view sometMng like it must be a correct estimate, if Reid’s views on 
the nature, of common sense truth are correct*
Reid believes, however, that, in defending common sense he is defending phil-^ 
osophy also. In attempting to destroy common sense it was also destroying itself,
In that enterprise it is contemptible and to be cried out against, "I despise
\  ^ \ I.Philosophy, and renounce its guidance - let soul dwell with Common Sense.il
(A declamation which hung in the air over all Reid had written, to damage his
reputation and embarrass Stewhft, Philosophy is to be called back from this
suicidal activity and set in. the surçî path of a science.
Reid thinks that he knows what is behind the attack, on common sense. And
he thihks that in turning the light on to it he has revealed Important origins
I. IhduiËy, Ch,.I, 8ec.lliy p.Ipr.
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of philosophical error and, by contrast, necessary conditions for the attainment ;
of philosophical truth. The error is fundamentally an error of method; hypothesis
.where there should be severe induction; analogies where the facts should be left 
to their uniqueness and a vacuum in the place of first principles. Once the ■ 
proper method is adopted, the philosophy of common sense could disappear, Into > 
philosophy, and philosophy become what it has not yet been except in name, a ; • ■ ; 
science. '
We have seen Reid in the refutation of error. We have now to see how he maps:' 
out the path of philosophical progress.
, The objects of human knowledge, Reid states in the preface to the Intellectual 
Powerst fall into two great divisions; the material world and the world of minds 
(finite minds and God), The corresponding division of the sciences is into
I'natural philosophy and pneumatology or the philosophy of the mind. Until the ; 
time of Galileo and Bacon natural philosophy was the chaos of conflicting 
opinion that the philosophy of the mind still is. Its reformation was a refoim- >■ 
at ion in method/ The reformation of the philosophy of the mind will be a refoi^ 
ation in method,  ^: ;
In what the philosophy of common sense has to teach philosophy Reid does not:i;- 
think that there is really very much of his own; he has done little more than 
put together what he has learnt from Aristotle, Descartes and Bacon (especially : 
from Bacon). From Aristotle, the necessity for first principles; from Descartes,;, 
the uniqueness of the facts with which the philosophy of the mind is concerned;
from Bacon that the method of investigation is to be strictly inductive. Reid’s/
I. Are "grammar, logic, rhetoric ....morals, jurisprudence, .law, politics and the fine arts" sub-divisions of the philosophy of the mind? Not, Jouffroy points'-’ out, if the philosophy of the mind is described as the science which has mind for;: its object, "Aucune de ces sciences, aucun de ces arts n*a pour objet la connais­sance des esprits; seulement tous présupposent la connaissance d’un certain : esprit qui est l’esprit humain". (Oeuvres de Thomas Reid, /Préface du Traducteur, p. XXKVill) Ëeid becomes aware of this before the end of. his preface and ends it . by making a group of these sciences and arts because they have a common depend- ence on the knowledge of the mind as the root from which they grow and are all //-;
;
■ - . t : .
i,,-'
■ ■ ■ ' ■ •  ■ , '
.. ; ' ' ' . ' " '. ',1 special contribution,, so he considered and so Stewart considered, is to have
taught by precept and example that the method of investigation of these facts is
. ' ; 'jto:be strictly inductiveè , >
- . , - . . , -/A science of real existence must be based upon observation. There is a- % . .■ ■ *unique kind of obsexvajinn matching the mind’s uniqueness & It is, however,
'' : . . - ' ...difficult, so difficult that Reid can persuade himself that its difficulty is one j
' , ' Iof the principleVreasons why à science of the mind has hardly begun. It needs '
, . ' , ' ;a completely disinterested determination to find only what is there, all anticip- /. . ' . ; ' ' ' ]
atiOhs and prejudices laid aside; (In actual fact, Beattie remarks, it is usual- |
: ' ' " . .'jly undertakeh with a "metaphysical’! book in one’is hand.) Its objects are most ,j- 1^^/  ^ y .
fugitive. It is painfully against all our normal habits of concentration on /
what is outside of us - the operations of the mind by their very nature take our ^^ , -- ' ' -j
attention away from ourselves to what is outside of us. Finally, attention to „ î
' - - \ J . ' ' ' ' ' '^1what is going on in the mind is almost certain to modify it. h
There are these: difficulties in the way of the careful observation of the j
mind’s actions and passions which is the first stage in an inductive science of 
the mind. And how can anyone tell by attending to his own mind whether what he 
finds there are its peculiarities or features common to the minds of all men?
There are, however, ancillary sources of information in the enquiry into the 
mind which can take us beyond singularity to these universal features. These 
are; the common language of men ("the express image of their, thoughts"), their 
cortanon opinions ("the effect of their intellectual powers"),, their common actions
("the effect of their active powers"). The errors even^ and prejudices of men,' . . . . . , ^
when they are general, are instructive, since there must be a cause for them as {
nqurishe’d. In Stewart’s classification of the cclcnces and arts these sciences and arts go tqgether, W c  are .related to' the phil^ of the mind**somewhat*' as the whole of mëdlcihe is to anatomy. Wife bf Reid, p. 15) '
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general/the diaoovery of which will throw some light on the structure of the
human understanding. And here, in Reid's opinion, is the use of the history of
philosophy* It is a history of fanciful theorizing, contradiction and absurdity ;
clinging to truth* We may. be able to find the point of yiew from which things
. ' ' ' ' ' ' 't
appeared to the author of a system, and from it see improbabilities take on ^
plausibility. We shall, have learnt obliquely something of the operations of the;
' ; ■ \ .i- ; - 'mind which we could not perhaps have learnt in any other way.
The temptation to philosophers has always been to describe and to explain the^
operations of the mind by analogy with the operations of bodies. For the reasons
just mentioned, we are more familiar with the world outside us than with' the
inner world of ourselves/ and naturally think of the unfamiliar in terms of the ^ *
relatively familiar. And philosophers are hurried into these descriptions and %
explanations by the almost completely analogical vocabulary : which everyday langu-'
 ^ .2. /'  ^ ^
age has for the mind. Ordinary people, are not led astray, Reid appears to think,"
' ' '  ^ - Kby this analogical language. They are)not led astray because they do not try 
to turn it into theory. This is what philosophers have done, and wanting to 
make the operations.Of the mind intelligible, they have lookpd to the operations 
of bodies to make them intelligible. The theory of ideas is the great consequ- , 
ence. There are others; for example, the standard arguments [for determinism,
Reid considers, get their plausibility from the picture of the.self as the
subject of impressed forces. The philosophy of the mind that has come down to /7
IV. Intellectual Powers, I, Gh. V and V^ I; • ; , [ ,
2, Stewart regretfully turns down proposals for the invention of a new and - 
direct vocabulary for the statement, pf mental facts; The mêt^phofs in the old L 
words would "insinuate themselves into the new symbols, if hot when they were 
invented, then when they were taught. Two tMhgs can be dphe. i^ 
discohrse upon the mind. One is to keep varying the metâgbpfs . so that the - 
theories which could be read into them cancel each other put. The other is to 
attend as far as possible to what the words signify and as little as possible 
to the images that go along with them. (Elements, Voi.in^ &  55""59. ) ?
3;ihteilectual Powers, Iv, Ch. II, n.373. If this is Reid’s opinion^ it is not his 
G onsistent ' Ôpini on. The once [ uhiyersal belief - that. thé mindS imde of some 
subtle matter arose because men's earliest notions of being were all of material being. These notions;.moulded language and when the mind was described were
■: v V Ù r ^ h ' f " - .r- - vr y  :,- W , : y< ;^-., -v 1 4 3  -
• US from antiquity "is almost entirely drawn, not from aOcqrate reflection,, but 
from some conceived analogy between body and mind". .Philosophers have begun to \\ 
turn to the mind itself for its description and "by t h a t ; h a v e  made important,
: y , /discoveries". These, however, have been located in conceptual systems determined ’ 
by the old analogical notions proliferating into elaborate explanatory hypothesis.
/ 'y I*The combination was bound to have the sceptical consequences it has had, Reid H
is presumably thinking of the 'discovery', from a careful attention to their j 
nature, that sensations, could have no archetypes in the pj^sicàl world, and of the!
consequences of the incorporation of this discovery in a representative theoiy of ' '
' - ' perception. • , y j
: ' ' nothing has led to so many errors in the philosophy of the mind as the iioagin-
ary analogies between matter and mind. •Master and mind are totally different. ''
There is the same absurdity in trying to explain a mental action such as percept- ]
ion upon physical and psychological principles as in trying to explain, for ' J
instance, chemical affinity by desire; And nothing but mistakes pan come from ^
the attempt to get anything of philosophical importance out of the suggestions
of analogy in ordinary language; Reid and Stewart do not help Us to understand' ’N
how, with this total difference between matter and mind, the analogical language '■■ . .
is possible at all. "The slightest similitude or analogy; is thought sufficient ' j
- . . to justify the extension of a form of speech beyond its proper meaning, whenever % '
' ' ' 3"  ^ ' '71the language does not afford a more proper form." But there is not the slightest’ i 
similitude or analogy between matter and mind/ Somehow the analogical language  ^ ,
. ' -TJis there, and the philosophical way to treat it is to treat it as if it was not ' /
there. Since the dualism of the Gpmmon Sense philosophers is phenomenologically [ 
ti^Serred analogically to it ; , CinqUiiv ; Gh; VII.. p.gQ2/T-^ ™  11. • InteifectUal Powers. 1^. Gh.Vi/ p^ 24I;i2. Stewart, Elements. Vol.I, Introduction, p.54#3. Active Powers, I. Ch.II. p.516.
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absolute - Stewart is agnostic about the nature of what lies behind the phenomena- 
their negative attitude to ordinary language here was inevitable. And it is hard 
to see that they missed anything because of it which they could have wanted to " ' 
find./; They did hot expect that evidence would ever be needed that there are 
bodies and minds, that minds are things and agents though quite different from ' 
material ttiings and agents, or they might have found a use for the analogical 
language which seems to provide it.
, To prescribe to nature as philosophy had traditionally done, Bacon spoke of 
a"I’secqM|l%ll^* Brltis sicut Dii was the whisper heard In the Garden, and it 
is still in the ears of every philosopher who approaches nature with his mind
'made up how things are going tp be, for this is the approach of nature's author ' 
not of its interpreter. Philosophers have always been very ready, in Reid's 
opinion, to take, over the work of creation for they have always been very ready 
with 'conjectures', 'theories', 'hypotheses'. 'The words have all approximately 
the same meaning in Reid.) If philosophers continually rendnded themselves and - 
others that their conjectures are conjectures, no harm would,.have resulted, but 
these reminders are commonly absent , and truth put out of our reach behind 
conjecture and the illusion of it put into our possession. Descartes' corresponds, 
ent was right when he, remarked that the man who discourses on nature from the - » 
study may tell us what the world would have been like if God had given him the 
commission to make it, but he does not tell.us,,what the world is like. Would a. 
conjectural.anatomist have come anywhere near the truth? And the rest of nature 
is as impenetrable as the structure of the body to any method of investigation 
except tiiat of observation and its extension; in'experiment and the inductive
'r L! - . ' ' . . :  I*conclusions to be dxawn from their results.
RCidis conjectural -anatomist is not an easily recognizable type of philosopher 
I ./Intellectual Powers. I. Chill, n.236. . ’■ ■.% /./.,/'. - -
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or scientist, and the mention of him might lead one to suppose, that the only 
hÿpotHéhës, .tliat Reid condemns are bare-faced guesses. His* condeimations are 
more inclusive.
If a .philosopher claims to be able to account for some phenomenon of nature,
there {are two things we need to know from him. The first is whether there is
sufficient evidence that the cause he assigns really does exist. Satisfied that R-
there is, we?need to know whether the cause does explain the thing it is supposed '
to explain. Unless both these conditions are met, the explanation is nothing but ,
an hypothesis, -and unless some ihdicationchn be given how they might be met, its ':■ - I.'-' ' /
place, is on the rubbish heap. The; theory of ideas is a perfect hypothesis; it 
does not explain what it iwas invented, to explain, and there is no independent 
evidence for its truth. The theory that ideas are the only.Immediate objects of ' 
cognition is not a causal theory, and Reid's discussion of hypotheses is always 
of causal hypotheses, but the two defects in a causal explanation which leave it - 
a mere hypothesis, can have their analogies in anjf explanatory theory; Thus
.... ' . . ' CReid thinlcs that he has shown that there are no ideas and if there were ideas,
that they could not do what he thinks they were invented to do; make the cognlt-
ive operations of the mind intelligible. ' _
Reid is emphatic on the authority of these conditions; Their statement is
intended to be a paraphrase of the first of Newton's regulafe uhilosophandl. and
Newton's rules are if.maxims of common sense". In order to know what would satisfy
these, conditions, we need to know from Reid what it is for a.cause to 'explain'
its effect, and what we can treat as evidence that a cause really exists. . '
The causal explanations which we can give consist in assigning to an event
the-antecedents upon which it occurs and without which it does not occur t 
nothing more than that; We know of course that there must be something more than
151. I / ;
thàtjf something that, makes it happen,. something more to the occurrence of an 
event, than the bare occurrence of other events previously. But we never know 
how anything is made to happen. We do not know whether there are any real 
efficient causes, any agents in the strict sense of the wOrd, besides ourselves 
and God. For all we know, every effect that we do not produce ourselves may be » 
produced immediately by God, according to the rules of antecedence and consequence
I.that we regard as causal laws* Philosophical discovery is the discovery of these
causal uniformities and their subordination to more and more general uniformities.
"When we say that one thing produces another by a law of nature, this signifies
no more, but that one thing, which we call in popular language the cause, is .
constantly and invariably followed by another, which we call the effect; and
that we. know not how they are connected. Tiius,, we see it is a fact, that bodies
gravitate towards bodies; and that this gravitation is regulated by certain
mathematical proportions, according to the distances of the bodies from ,each
other, rand their quantities of matter. Being unable to discover the cause of
this gravitation, and presuming that it is the immediate opération, either of
theVAuthor of nature, or of some subordinate cause, which we have not hitherto
been able to reach, we call it a law of nature. If any philosopher should
hereafter be so happy as to discover the cause of gravitation, this can only be
done by discovering some more general law of nature, and the highest link, which r
we can trace, by just induction, is either this primary law of nature, or a
necessary consequence of it. To,trace out the laws of nature, by induction from
the phaenomena of nature, is all that true philosophy aims at, and all it can 2. '
ever reach." /
The relation of laws to events is different from the relation of events to 
events./ Why did a thing happen? We may be, asking what happened before it,
I."better tb< Lord Kambs":, : Reid's Collected Works, p.58^
/ I
152
asking for its cause. We may know what happened before it, but be unable to see
the connection between what went before and what came after. We are asking for /
the law connecting the events. There is a persistent tendency in Reid to confuse %
causes and causal laws. Here "the cause of gravitation" is the immediate actions#
of God or of some subordinate executive; the cause of gravitation is "some more /
general lawô of nature". At any time Reid is prepared to say that a natural cause|
is a constant antecedent; that a natural cause is a law connecting events in a con#
constant relation of antecedence and consequence. 4
Since to be a cause, in the sense in which philosophical investigation is [
concerned with causes, is no more than to be a constant antecedent, it might be -
thought that we have no means of knowing that something could be the cause of a 4
given phenomenOKu- except in so far as anything could be the cause of anything - [
without knowing that it actually is. Yet Reid always speaks of the independence 
of the two conditions which explanation must satisfy. Jne "syllogism" of 
discovery has a hypothetical first premiss and a categorical second premiss. "If ■{
such a cause exists, it will produce such a phenomenon: but that cause does exist:4
I. 'Therefore, etcZ" How could one be in a position to assert the first premiss 1
except as a truism from the second? Presumably it is by some analogy with what wej
have experienced - Descartes’ vortices could take the planets round the sun; we 1
have watched eddies in water take things round things.
•> How do we find out that a possible cause is a cause? Whether the possible
cause of something is its cause is "a question of fact" and to be settled bÿ
"positive evidence". How was the paradigm of scientific explanation, the principle
of the universal gravitation of matter, established? It was established "by W
induction, partly from our daily e.. peri ence, and from the experience of all nation^ ]
in all ages, in all places of earth, sea, and air, which we can reach; and partly
from the observations and experiments of philosophers, which shew that even air tg
and smoke, and every body upon which experiments have been made, gravitate |
precisely in proportion to the quantity of matter; that the sea and earth gravitatê{/jtowards the moon, and the moon towards them; that theplanets and comets gravitate M
towards the sun, and towards one another, and the sun towards them. This is the ^
sum of evidence,.... It is the same kind of evidence wMch we have, that fire will/| 
li ''Letter To%Qrd Karnes", Reid^s^ollected Works, p.57, l|
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I. fbum and water drown, that bread will nourish and arsenic poison." ^
One ought by now to have been able to take the proscription of "hypotheses"
for granted and press for action on it in the philosophy of the mind, but Hartley#as properly scientific |was recommending the method of hypothesis with pernaps even the implication that ÿA  j
it was nearer to the method of science than the methodological reflections of t
scientists; and he was using it in a physiological approach to the mind. There
may be no direct evidence at all for an hypothesis; "still, if it serves to J
explain and account for a great Variety of Phaenomena, it will have an indirect $
Evidence in its favour by this means. Thus we admit the Key of a Cypher to be #
a true one, when it explains the Cypher completely; and the Decypherer judges him#
self to approach to the true Key, in proportion as he advances in the Explanation/
$of the Cypher; and this without any direct Evidence at all. And as the false |
and imperfect Keys, which turn up to the Decypherer in his Researches, prepare /
the Way for the Discovery of the true and complete one, so any Hypothesis that |
has so much Plausibility, as to explain a considerable Ifumber of Facts, helps us i
to digest these Facts in proper Order, to bring new ones to Light, and to make [2. ' 3Expérimenta Crucis for the sake of future Inquirers." &
Reid is not disarmed by the end of this passage with its hints at the 1
5. Ideductive and indirect verification of hypotheseséby the predictions they authorize 
Let hypotheses " suggest experiments, or direct our inquiries; but let just 
induction alone govern our belief". It is the beginning of the passage, however,/ 
which mainly holds Reid’s attention. Hartley was saying that an hypothesis did 
not absolutely need independent confirmation of its truth if it could explain a 
wide range of phenomena. And Reid’s answer is to repeat that ’could explain' 
does not take us any way towards 'does explain'. Descartes’ vortices and Pope’s / 
gnomes and sylphs could explain a wide rang3 of phenomena.
1. "Letter to Lord Karnes", Reid's Collected Works, p.57,
2. Observations on Man. Pt.I, Ch.I, Sec.I, (1749 edition) pp.15-16.3. These hints are made plainer in Ch.III, Sec.II. Reid Icnew this section; hequotes from it.
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Reid fWSlGs for the mistake in the cypher-analogy;- To find hypothetically the
'. - , . ■ key to the cypher of nature "requires an understanding equal or superior to that
which #de the cypher". The mëtake in the cypher-ànalogy," Stewart says, is
that "there are few if any physical hypotheses, which afford the only way of
explaining the phenomena to which : they are applied; and therefore, admitting them ^
to he perfectly consistent .with all the^  kno^ facts, they leave us in the same
state of uncertainty, in Which the decypherer would find himself, if he should ' "J: / ' 2^  . \ r
discover a variety: of keys to the same cypher'".
The. common defect, Stewart- remarks^ elsewhere, in all theories for the generat­
ion of mental phenomena fro# psychological causes is that they are "entirely , ,
insusceptible of proof and-whati is more/ are of such a kind, : that it is neither,
. ' -  ^ 3*possible to confirm nor to refute them, by an appeal to experiment or observation" Z
let Stewart’s attitude to the place of hypotheses is very different from Reid’s, . "- - - . , . . _ -
The Copernican astronomy was justified even before it was confirmed by e.mpirical 
evidence. It was justified by its simplicity. The justification of simplicityy . j/,
in an explanation is that it is ahalagous to all that we know inductively of the J 
economy of nature. Analogies, Stewart continues, within the system of the; material!
. . .  - ' jworld will support hypotheses within the system of the material world, and this\  ^ . - ; y - . . ' . ^
is- true also of analogies and hypotheses within the system of the intellectual ' i
4» /
world. No analogies from one system will support hypotheses in the other. r '
îf Reid and Stewart;are to be believed, says Jouffroy, jrhe philosophy of the [ 
mind is. in its present state as a result of the perverse method applied by antiqwr '
' ^ ' ' ' - : ' ' ; I ' ' ' ' ' ' . ' 'ity in all the sciences, expelled under the influence of BaCon from the physical
., - ' ' -jsciences,, but still with an unrelaxed grip on the philosophy of the mind. And .
I. Intellectual PbwersZ lI/,Ch^/III. pi250i» ’
'2:# e W t 8  PP.'/3l3-3i4,3, Phi 1 bsdnhical Essays, : Preliiioihafv Dissertation. Ch. I*. p,8.4^ /.Ækmeiit8V: rVol.II7:ck^' IV. SBc, IT. ' ' ' ft . .
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thëy are believed; their opinion "has acquired among us-something of the author/; 
ity of an historical axiom".'
Reid and Stewart were not simply mistaken. The physical sciences were trahS/% 
formed by a transformationCof method; there has been no similar transformation , ; 
in the philospphy of the mind, .and its transformation will be a transformation ' : ' 
in method. Reid and Stewart saw the truth, but they did hottsee into the truth* ;; 
Why. did all the sciences begin in theory and analogical conjecture, and why has \ 
the philosophy of the mind not, emerged as a science from it? Reid and Stewart 
have no satisfactory explanation and consequently their account of the history 
of the sciences is unplausible and unillumnating even where it is factually. * I 
accurate. Newton*s regulaè philosophandl are, as Reid/says, maxims of conaaon 'Z /U 
sense* How could it occur to anyone to prefer analogy and conjecture to observât#' 
ion in the investigation of any part of nature that is dÿeh\to Observation? And / 
in fact when the description of a thing and of the laws of its behaviour has; been| 
straightforwardly wanted, men. have always examined the thi^y whether it is some/k
thing in the external world or in the mind itself. There is an absurd naivete ^ . ... . . . ^
in the suggestion that it is a modem proposal in the philosophy of the mind to , 
study the mind directly, a proposal. "first thoroughly undefstqpd, subscribed:;td 
and put into practice in Scotland at the end of the eighteenth century". ./VSS
The: questions which can be settled by observation have always been séttlèd/bÿt 
observation when there has been any direct interest in the answers to them. ? 1“ 
Natural philosophy and the philosophy of the mind began with no interest in the ■ 
answers to them; with an interest in vast metaphysical problems; What is the ' ; 
nature of the soul? Did it always exist? Will it always exist? What is its# 
relation to the body? The world external to man confronted* him with problems#oï;#ÿ 
similar ultijTfâcy. To the solution of such problems observation could not
'- ^ .' \ . . ' k'' - ' ' '
# ‘ contribute immediately anything but a basis for speculative systems. Once
/î ■ constiucted these'systems worked downwards and .deductively 'towards empirical ‘
// / , Conclusions which are matters for inductive investigation only. The reformation
•:>{, of enquiry consists in talcing first, questions which come last, in human interest^
. questions which can be settled by observation and experiment, and in the ansv/ers
to which and nowhere else lie implicit the solutions of any of the ultimate 
problems which have solutions. Reid and Stewart saw where the science of the
//'/ T' ' 1.
mind must begin; they failed to see why it had not begun there.
• : : , - It is now time to ask What Reid and Stewart think is to come from this
; ' concern over uniqueness of the mind and the proper methods of studying it. Reid
says, I may not have got very far, but this does not matter if I have been on ,: 2.
the .right road as far as I have gone; others may be able to go farther; But ^
where to? Stewart says that it is not so much by the. particular conclusions
that Reid reached as by the originality of the method, "so systematically pursued
\  ' .. '  - - '
- ■ :/ ■ in all his researches" that he "stands po conspicuously distinguished among those
' ' . ' ) " 5*' If%fho have hitherto prosecuted analytically the study of man." You see Reid at 
his. philosophical work, and you hear him talking about how the work of philosophy 
is to be done and it is hard to find any connection between the two. What has 
/ . induction to do with the argwaent between Reid and Hume? Supposing it is true
' that Reid has been able to give especially careful attention to the operations■' ' ' A r,/ " : . ... /of his mnd, how does, this contribute to the defence of common sense? The
philosophical method which Reid and Stewart advocate so urgently is a method of..
discovery, and the philosophers in Stewart's Dissertation on the history of phil-
' • osophy are always adding or failing to add to the "stock of human knowledge",
[. ' ':, # . but Reid does not seem to be trying to add to the .stock of knowledge. If you
I. Oeuvres- de ThomaS^Rèid,. Toi/: 1^ ^ '~r“* ~
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had; put in front of you in extracts Reid’s and Stewart’s remarks on method, 
coupled with their remarks on the special subject matter to which it is to be 
applied, you would think they came from books of psychology. Reid’s books are '  ^
not books of psychology; Stewart’s largely .are, put he takes it for granted that i 
his; remarks on method and subject matter apply to the parts of them that are not. '
ibr is it only^Reid and Stewart themselves speak abbut What they are doing in., 
philosophy that the pu%%li% contrast appears between - thb rWoW 4^4 the action.
Reid and Stewart showed how an Inductive philosophy of the mind is to proceed, 
McCosh says; this is one of their greatest, merits. The great lesson which 
Reid and-Stewart taught French philosophy, in Jouffroy’s ôpini on, was the possib-
ility of an inductive philosophy of the mind; any criticism that he has to make
- ^ ' #2, .r
of them is not to touch this acknowled'gémeht*;.
As the whole of Scottish philosophy from Hume through tb Hainiltpn is marked
Off in McCpsh’s judgment from other philosophical traditions; by a more or less
steady adherence to an inductive method of enquiry, (fitful in Hume, undeviating
in Reid and Stewart) too much.precision is not to be looked for in the description
of Reid and Stewart as inductive philosophers; let McGosh;plainly thought, as
Reid and Stewart themselves,did, that they had found* truth by observation and
inductive inference from. it. ' »
It is not difficult to understand in part why Jouffroy .thopgjat as he did. ,
Stewart mentions that in the French exposition,of Locke the two channels for the"
entrance of ideas were turned into one, ’ideas.of reflection* becoming ideas , /
derived from reflection on ideas of sense* The name of Locke and the work of
Condillac established a sensationalist scholasticism in France. In the eyes of %
the school of philosophers to wlilch Jouffroy belonged a Bacohian revolution was 
I ThéaSCbttish;- Philosophy , [pp / 4-5 ; P;3Q5; and pass.
2; ESQmssésxdaltelBsbpHié Morale (par Dugald Stewart ),; [Preface du Traducteur, 
SeC/! IT//[Oeuvres' de/ThomaslReid. , voi.,.I;cPi6ef ; " Sees/ .I-iV/ ' #
$//' ' . '. . . ' ' ' . . % . ' . ' ' ' .
/- - ' . .. ' " '  ' . ://.: needed and already existed. Reid and Stewart had turned to. the mind of man with ,
- patient observation and had rescued a whole order of reality from the distortions
of theory and system. The problems of philosophy could not be solved in the area
to which they were being sent for solution, the area covered by the physical ' /
sciences and a physicalist psychology* The place to look, for their solution was'/.;
. in the pure science of the mind which had begun in Scotland* Its facts, the ;||
phenomena of consciousness are as real as physical facts, apd with their laws can*
5; be known as certainly.
■ There are three things that Jouffroy thinks come out of Reid’s and Stewart's [
/. approach to philosophy. The first is that it sweeps away false .approaches* , This
V ' .  . .3 is Reid's and Stewart's own view. The special interest of, Jouffroy's school was’ %
. - . in the damage that the Inductive philosophy of the mind dOes to the deductive {
pretensions of sensationalistic and materialistic conceptions of the mind. It
was also Stewart's special interest - Hartley looms qyer his world with something’-
f/; of the size of Hume over Reid's, We have already noticed the more general "#
pqlemical use which Reid makes ,of the uniqueness of the. mind,. Thus it silences
/ , the questions as to how the.,mind can do what bodies cannot do; that is enter
. , into direct relationships with things remote in space and time. It disallows
: ' the analogies out of which the great sceptical hypothesis grows. And the induct//
ive method also has its destructive side; ' it' teaches us what to think of mere
hypotheses. The truths of common sense are not inductive discoveries, but their #
rediscovery, if théyliave been lost, will owe more to education in the inductive// ^ ^
method than ;to anythi%/#&se, for if they have been lost it will have been under / 
the rubbish of hypothesis* '
. ■ - The second thing that Reid and Stewart have. done, in Jouffroy's opinion is
' '[ ’ ' ' ' ' . - . ' ' ^4to have laid the proper foundations for a science of psychology. Reid saw him- ' "
' '' , ^
# / ; self at the beginning of something, and if it was'hot* at/the beginning of a
y. / * . .y . . ;*:-’-V' ■ ■ ■ . -■ , • ■ . ': ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ '., u- . ■ - . '
science of psychology, it is hard to imagine what it could have been. The c^ round
cleared,' "the foundations laid, it is time to begin the superstructure",
 ^ 1. ' . fStewart remarks. The superstructure, with which Stewart admits he has not got
very far, is more a descriptive psychology than anything else.
l#en Reid and Stewart looked at the future of the philosophy of the mind,
they thought they saw a. science with the two features of a developed science,
'analysis' and ‘synthesis*. The work of analysis is to reduce the phenomena in
any field of investigation to laws of the highest generality and simplicity.
The work of synthesis is to deduce the consequences of combinations of such
2" ' ' general laws. The works of Reid and Stewart contain no synthetic deduction of #
- . ' ' T:phenomena. How could they, their critics have asked, when they contain no anal- * 
y sis? Reid requires as many original principles to explain the nature of man
3*,' Jas most men have needed to explain the nature of the universe, Priestley says*
To philosophize is to simplify in Brown's view; Reid and Stewart refuse to simp-#
.. . . '' - /J; ,  lify and refuse to allow other philosophers to simplify; And whether these
critics were right or wrong in criticizing Reid and Stewart for resisting analytic 
/ simplification in the philosophy of the miid, theÿ were right in thinking that V;
- - the philosophy of Common Sense resisted it.
Reid and Stewart, were not working as they thought, Francis Jeffrey remarks, / 
V . towards a science of the mind that would parallel the physical sciences, and feive#
:. us like them information that we did not previously have, and no continuation of/
y , their work will brihg that science any nearer* They were doing something import0
: . . ' ' ' ' . .  ^ . yr. ant but quite different. What they were doing is more like what the grammarian ' l
does when he "arranges in technical order the words of a language which id
#• \ spoken familiarly", or: what a cartographer does when he maps out a man's native /
- • I ; ElemehtS; Î Vol.# l7"ïntr6ductioh ' #  ' ' : 3
2* -Outlihesl Stewart' s Collected Works, ¥ol.II* p;7. % Ij
. 4v 'o£3bhe Human: M W , ' kill. P.79. 1
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parish for him, than it is like the activity of a "chemist, or experimental philos- 
ophei". In the philosophy of the mind what is already known is/arranged for us, 
and as the philosopher has no sources of infomiation that are not available to 
all of us, this is all that can be done % Where, for instance, has the most care-
 ^X •  ^ S’.
ful reasoning brought us than "back to ,the creed and ignorance of the vulgar?
"logic,.whose end is the discovery of truth, is founded" j Campbell had said, 
"in the doctrine of the understanding; and ethics, (under which may be compre-, ^ /
, I -hended,economics, politics, and jurisprudence) are founded in that of the will."' 
In Reid ! s opinion "a distinct knowledge of the powers of the^  mind would undoubted# 
ly give great light to many other-branches of science"; The tree of knowledge 
has its roots in the knowledge of the human mind# The philosophy of the mind i
deserved to be studied not only because of its intrinsic dignity but also for 
the sake of many sciences, logic and ethics among them, which have an "immediate - 
connection" with it. And he quotes with approval the passage in wliich Hume
'■'/ - ■■ ■ ■ '3.proposes the capture of the citadel of the sciences in human nature. Stewart
shares Reid's unsuspicious admiration for Hume's project; It was; Stewart says,
Reid's great/object to prepare the way for the acGçmplishment of that design .
"by exemplifying, in an analysis of our most important,intellectual and active
\ \ ■ ; ■ • ■ 4# /
principles, the only method of carrying it successfully into execution"# One #
of the main objects %ich Stewart Mmself had in view when he began his enquiries -
into the human mind, was to establish and exemplify the "fundamental principle" -
that "in order, to prepare the way for a just and comprehensivè system of Logic,
a orevlous survey, of our nature, considered as one great whole, is indispensably
req##te'!; - - /.  ^ . y  •  ^ ;:j
îi#. Retiçwtof ^ têwart':s VLifÿ of Reid" ; Edinburgh'^Review
2 . The Phiidsbnhy of RhetbriC. Vol .1 ; ' Introduction, p#i2. , >J
3. Rëidj;- tïhtéïiëctuai fbwefs. y Preface;. Huinë.-' Treatise, Introduction.
5;'Pfailosonhical Essays; Preliminary Disseftation, Gh.Ii; p.49, - '
* # : -  . / - :  . ' ' ' " ' / :  ' - :' - .
■ ' . In spite of the design and of the connections and relations they mentioned -
/;■ /'■ ■ V " . 3;: ; " ... w -Reid, and Stewart were able to leave the discontinuity between psychology^ logic 
and ethics intact. , To make the system of logic more comprebonsive, Stewart 
. wrote on the logic of induction. He gaye it no foundation in human nature, apart
from finding a guarantee there of the truth of the inductive principle. And thafÿ 
"logic of morals" (the phrase is Stewart's) is independent of the psychology of
morals in every tiling that Reid and Stewart wrote. -i/|' ' ' ' . .. ^-4
Thé virtues of the philosophy of Reid and Stewart were nbt exhausted in .
.4 'Jouffroy ' 8 eyes by its. usefulness in controversy with philosophical error and .by/#
the directions it gave for the construction of a science of the mind which would
have significant implications for other philosophical disciplines. He saw in it #
also the potentialities of metaphysical development. This'is not an opinion -that;/
Reid and Stewart share. They were not looking themselves for answers to great /'
questions of philosophy and did not think that anyone who was looking for them
would ever find them. Beyond the range of common sense the metaphysical darkness
V - is impehetrable. Reid allows himself a brief speculation on time and eternity . /
and on the infinity of space in extent and divisibility; enough to see that whe)^
we discuss such questions we have gone beyond the limits of human understanding
/ \ , ReidKdouid,\sèe,„ however, that space and time are necessarily endless and that § 0
# space is also eternal. Pure space is so nearly nothing that "it seems incapablef^
of creation.or of annihilation"; And = the nunc stans of which)ihe Schoolmen spoke)#
has as, much meaning for Rpid .as 'square circle', To Stewart traditional metaphys//
ical enquiry is a "frivclous and..absurd" intrusion into mysteries "placed beyond'-## 
1:' . ' ' ' 2.:' ' ' , ; ' . '' ^the reach of our faculties". Stewart is nevertheless..to be found illicitly in
possession of metaphysical opinions, holding strongly to the axiomtic eternity 
of space and time. The conviction of their "necessary existence" is "inseparable"
I. ■IsMlectual_Pgwers, II,'CH. XIX; III, Ch.III. /. .' .t: '
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from the very conception" of .them, . ' .
There is one exception to the proscription of ali metaphysicB, except, the
■' - : - "  . - ' , / metaphysics of common sense & It is within our competence to find out that there i
is a God. The principles of common sense include the principle that "from  ^ 1
certain signs or indications in the effect# we may infer that there must have J 
been intelligence, wisdom; or other intellectual or moral qualities in the cause".j 
This principle is the major premiss in the theistic .syllogism; The minor-premiss ! 
is that the world displays .these signs and indications; The principle is not i 
derived from experience; experience cannot show that there is a. connection 
between two things when only one of them is a matter of experience. Another 
person's work is open to my experience; the intelligence and purpose which con­
trived it are not. (indeed.each of us comes to know his.own intellectual powers, ! 
as distinct from the actions in which they are exerted, just as he comes to know 
another person's - "by the effects which.they produce'*;) The man who can see
no force in the argument for design ought to be able to see no evidence that there,
' 2. ' " .:j
are any intelligent beings besides himself. ^
The principles of common sense are not truths which have to be reached in 1,
' - ' ' 'some later stage of philosophical development, reappearing there with a deductive j 
justification behind them. Still less are they mere approximations to truth , ^- . ■ I
which are to disappear in some later stage of philosophical development, and be i
replaced by the truths they hinted at and which a philosopher has discovered;
They are truths without which other truths could not be reached. They are first
- ~ ' El
principles in philosophy. Their place is not in the superstructure; they are 
its foundations. "Philosophy hath no other foundations than the principles of
common sense.tt
.Why .has the history of mathematics been à history of unbroken progress with
I ; .philosophical Essays,. Pt^ I , II/ Gh. 11/-p;! 16, 24 lhtellectual#POifers/ VI, Ch.VI, pp# 4^0~4èl.
i?'.-
_ hardly any disputes and these soon settled? Mathematics were founded upon first ,<
principles, upon a*'few axioms and definitions", and Is the rigorous deduction of,
their consequences. Why waa the history of natural philosophy a battlefield until^
Bacon and Newton? It was because natural philosophy was without first principles/
and bacause hypothesis was pitted against hypothesis. ' //'-'/FiiS
"Lord Bacon first-delineated the only solid foundation on which natural '
philosophy can be built ; and Sir Isaac Newton reduced the, principles laid‘ dOwn/ÿg
, ' by Bacon in to three or four axioms, which he calls regulae {philosophandi, From
>)' these, together with the phenomena observed by the senses, which he likewise lays.«.
down as first principles, he deducesby strict reasoning, the propositions conr. /
' ' in
tained in the third book of his "Principia", and his "Optics"; and by this;means 1
has raised a fabrick in those two branches of natural philosophy, which is, not,,
liable to be shaken by doubtful disputation; but stands immovable upon the basis /
of self-evident principles," When first principles are listed and agreed upon
for "the other branches of philosophy" they can expect a similar stability and ?
progress. The "great desideratum in logic" is a schedule of first principles - -
and the subscription of philosophers to it, Reid’s list of the first princlple^g
Ï-
of necessary and contingent truth is submitted as its rough draft, Reid is mis- - 
taken, Stewart maintains, (I^/qbout the nature of mathematical demonstration (II) 
about the nature of Newtonian principles (III) about the function of the princip­
les of common sense in philosophy, (Stewart is dealing only with the common sense 
principles that Reid calls 'principles of contingent truthsl. His remarks dp nqt 
apply to the principles that lay dqwn 'necessary' truths, except in so far as ^
purely, logical principles might have got mixed up in their heterogeneity, "They 
do not .apply, for instance, to-the principle of causation.)
The premisses for geometrical demonstration it is clearly geometrical J
. .. I r ïh te llë d W  VI^ ■Ch'3W:p.436'^;- ' .•  ^ #
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that Rèid is thitmng of - ^re not GelfreVident -truthè# They aie &
' not truths at all. The premisses are the definitions; not the axioms and defin-/
' ' ' , " ’ '  ^ JL *
itibna, 'as Reid"sometimes says, still less the axioms alone, as he sometimes says*
The [axioms are deductively quite sterile; Nothing iS implicit in such self-evid-#
entftruths as that if equals are taken from equals, the remainders are equal*
. But although the axioms are, not "the principles of our reasoning, either in >
arithmetic or in geometry, their truth is supposed.or implied in all our reason- ^
. ings in both; and, if it were called in question, our further progress would , 3 
/ ' 2v - ' ' ^
be impossible* ' v
The Newtonian principles are not like mathematical axioms, because they are :* 
principles of deduction, and because, they are. reached by induction* The princip-' 
les in the philosophy of the mind which correspond to the Newtonian principles 
in natural philosophy are those "general laws of our constitution" which are
reached by analytic examination of the facts of consciousness and similarly < > . ■
. / - - - ' % '. . ' J* , ' - ' ' ' .explain deductively a great range of phenomena. (Arid of course Newton's proced-%
ural rules are no part at all of his premisses).
The principles of common sense are matter,of fact propositions and so are the ,' - ' ' ' . . .
Newtonian principles* The likeness between them ends there* The principles of >
common aense are like the mathematical axioms in several respects* Those are Aj
intuitively self-evident, and deductively nothing atdall will come from them* /
"From such propositions as these - 1 exist; Ï am the same person to-day that % #
was yesterday; the material world has an existence independent of my mind; the-El
general’ laws of nature will continue, in future, to operate uniformly as in the '
time.Jpast - no inference can be deduced, any more than from the intuitive trutiis
' " -'^ '4. ' ' .. ,
' prefixed: to the Elements of .Euclid." The principles of common sense are, how-
everf like math^  ^ axioms in ahother respect. Théÿ are presupposed ,in all #■ ' 1* Ihteilectual • Powers , x Vf / Gh# iV y pi;436 p #442 ' - : ' '  ' ' : p
'7 . ,3; Elements,.v6l.II, Ch*I, 8ec*I, pp*33-34;.Vol*1, Introduction, pp.51-52* ^
4. Section II, pp.45-46. ; .
H-:
our tîrdxàlng* They are not- data from' which conclusions can be drawn; they are - 
vincula which give coherence [to all the particular links of : the chaih" j('p.39)#
That; is why Stewart prefers to call the general truths of common sense ' fundament­
al laws of belief*, or * constitutive elements of human reason* rather than with 
Reid and Beattie 'first principles* * Thus all our reasonings concerning nature , 
take for granted its confoipity and the existence of a material world independent, f 
of our perceptions of it; all our reasonings take for granted our own self- 
identity and the reliability, of memory. #
"If the account now given of these laws of belief be just, the great argument 
vjhich has been commonly urged in support of their authority,’ and which manifestly ' 
confounds them with what are properly called principles of reasoning, is not at 
all applicable to the subject; or at least does not rest the point in dispute 
upon its right foundation.. If there were no first principles, (it has been said), 
or in other words, if a reason could be given for everything, no process of 
deduct ion could possibly be bfought to a conclusion. The, remark is indisputably ' 
true; but it only proves (what no logician of the present times will venture to , 
deny) that the mathematician could not demonstrate a single theorem, unless he *  ^
were first allowed to lay down his definitions; nor the natural philosopher 
explain or account for a single phenomenon, unless he were allowed to assume, 88^, 
acknowledged facts, certain general laws of nature. What inference does this a /j 
afford in favour of that particular class of truths to which the preceding , /
observations relate, and against which the ingenuity of modem sceptics has been
more particularly directed? If I be not deceived, these truths are still, more #
intimately connected with the operations of the reasoning- faculty than has been 
generally imagined; not as the Principles from which our reasonings set out, and# 
on which they ultimately depend, but as the necessary conditions on which every , ‘
,  ,___________________________________________________________
: 1': : ■■ ■ ■ '-v-■-'3:: y v v - ' - ' ■ ; 3
. . ,, - . „ ' . •:■//■' ■ ■■ step of the deduction tacitly proceeds; of rather (if I maÿyüSe the expression)
as essential elements which enter into the composition of reason itself •" (pp.46#/,
. ■ ■ ■ . ^47.)
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C H àFm V THE LàUGOAGE OF SEHSATIQH
ï. Natural Signs #■
The truths of common sense have no logical antecedents. How do we know, for 
example, that there is an external world? In one way the question is unanswerable. 
Unanswerable, if it is aslcing for a proof that there is an external world. All 
the efforts of philosophers to prove that there is have not, Reid says, produced
an argument fit to convince anybody. In another way there is an answer to it.
J-!:' #1%The principles upon which we do in fact come to a knowledge of the external world 
can be discovered, and it is part of the business of the philosopher of common 
sense to discover them. He will have discovered the foundations in nature and in
human nature of many of the truths of common sense.
Language, says Reid, is commonly supposed to be something that men have
entirely invented. By nature they are as dumb as brutes, but they are more
intelligent, and have taught themselves to speak by contriving artificial signs
to express their thoughts and purposes and having these signs established by
compact. This account of the origin of language is too marvellous for Reid, There
is one very obvious explanation of the origin of language and it is philosophically
interesting because it "tends to lay open some of the first principles of human ' 
I.
nature". The word ‘'language* may be extended to include "all those signs which 
mankind use in order to communicate to others their thoughts and intentions, their 
purposes and desires. And such signs may be conceived to be of two kinds: First,
such as have no meaning but what is affixed to them by compact or agreement among , 
those who use them - these are artificial signs; Secondly, such as, previous to 
all compact or agreement, have a meaning which every man understands by the 
principles of his nature. Language, so far as it consists of artificial signs, 
may be called artificial! so far as it consists of natural signs, I call it
I. Inaui.ry. Cb.Iy, Seoill, ppll7-118.
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natural I think it is demonstrable,” Reid continues, "that, if mankind had
not a natural language, they could never have invented an artificial one by theirS 
reason and ingenuity. For all artificial language supposes some compact or ■ 
agreement to affix a certain meaning to certain signs; therefore, there must be 
compacts or agreements before the use of artificial signs; but there can be no 
compact or agreement without signs, nor without language; and, therefore, there 
must be a natural language before any artificial language can be invented,
The primordial language is not a dead language. Its vocabulary is still vrhatg 
it was; gesture, modulation of the voice and varying facial expression. These 
are natural signs, significant apart from convention. They do not have to be Jj 
given a meaning; nature has already given them a meaning, We do not have to 
learn it; nature has already taught us. Babies are frightened by grim and 
menacing faces. Everyone who has watched children will have noticed that they 
can very easily distinguish between what is said to them playfully and what in 
earnest. They go by the natural signs, the tone of voice, the half-smile, when 
these contradict the 'artificial* signs. If we want any further evidence that
"Ithere is a wordless language and an intuitive understanding of it, there is the !1fact that men who have no conventional language in common can communicate with 
one another. ^
Everybody will admit, Reid remarks, that there is a wordless language of
Jgesture, intonation and facial expression; the question is whether its interpret- '
'  j
ation has to be learnt. How could it be learnt? - -1
"When we see the sign, and see the thing signified always conjoined with it, 
experience may be the instructor, and teach us how that sign is to be interpreted,
?!But how shall experience instruct us when we see the sign only, when the thing
signified is invisible? Mow, this is the case here: the thoughts and passions -,
of the mind, as well as the mind itself, are invisible, and therefore their 
flMnaulrv. o'h.lV. Sec.II. pp.II7-II8.
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connection with any sensible sign cannot be first discovered by experience; therçW
I.
must be some earlier source of this knowledge#”
Reid's statement of the case for a natural language prior to all conventionalkig
languages and still contemporaneous with them could survive empirical criticism#
He was indeed very much impressed by classical references to the range of comaunij
ation that was possible without the use of words# There was the dispute between
Cicero and Roscius over whether an orator could convey anything by words which
an actor could not convey in dumb-show# There was the Roman pantomime, with
Lucian's story of the king on the Euxine who wanted to borrow a pantomimist fromyt
Nero so that he could dispense with an army of interpreters in negotiations with.:/'# 
2. ' ' 
his neighbours# Reid thirties, however, that the proto-language of mankind must
have been very circumscribed, sufficient merely for the barest necessities of
communication, but sufficient, therefore, for the establishment of a conventional r!
language# He did think that its vocabulary was and is everywhere the same, and
everywhere intelligible without having to be learnt. In fact the expressive signb]
of men's feelings and intentions are hardly more universal than the universal
grammar, on which iteid leans so heavily, in conventional languages. But their
want of universality would not destroy Reid's theoiy. His theory requires no
more than that the members of a group should have been able to understand one
another without speech, inorder to be able to proceed to the invention of speechi
the
And Reid is not committed to view that the connections which nature has establish 
between feelings and their physical manifestations are too rigid to be capable of f' 
modification by discipline, natural signs being replaced by conventional signs 
whose interpretation has to be learnt. The Japanese smile would not refute him, | 
It is enough that there are some natural signs which are immediately intelligible!
I, Intellectual Powers, VI, Ch,V, pp,449-490# 2# Intellectual Powers, VI, Gh,V, p#450#
•'V.Ï'v-feiïi:
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A behaviour!stic interpretation of the signs of what is passing in the mind, 
an interpretation of them as means by which we go from the overt to the overt and 
never from the overt to the covert, would be more troublesome to Reid than any 
empirical criticism of his theory* Reid's whole philosophy requires the principle/ 
that transitions can be made from sensible signs to the altogether different things 
which they signify - transitions which go beyond experience if 'experience* is 
confined for epistemological security to sensations and other states of our ovjn / 
consciousness, but which in their directness form part of what is ordinarily called 
' experience * • We experience and do not infer a man's anger from the marks of it 3; 
on his face. Physical objects are themselves objects of experience and their 
existence does not have to be deduced from objects of experience. And the struct­
ure of experience is similar in both cases, Reid considers, and in neither does 
experience have a phenomenal termination.
The natural signs in the native language of manlcind belong to one class of
natural signs. There are for Reid three classes of natural signs. In all three 
classes the connection between the sign and what it signifies is established by 
nature - it is this that distinguishes a natural sign from a conventional sign.
The signs of the first class are not understood intuitively; they might mean any­
thing, as far as we are concerned, until we find out what they do mean. They are 
in themselves like words in an unfamiliar language. High streaky clouds are a 
sign of wind, and the blueness of hills a sign of their distance. We have discov- :; 
ered this by experience and would never have Icnotm it othervrise. This class of 
natural signs is the "foundation of true philosophy", which is nothing but the 
discovery by observation and experiment of the matter of fact connections establish­
ed by nature, their reduction to general laws and the deduction of the consequences 
of these laws. Philosophy has traditionally been described as a search for causes.
"What we commonly call natural causes might, with more propriety, be called
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natural signs, and what we call effects, the things signified. The causes have no
proper efficiency or causality, as far as we know; and all we can certainly affirm
is, that nature hath established a constant conjunction between them and the things
called their effects; and hath given to mankind a disposition to observe thoseI.
connections, to confide in their continuance."
In the second class of natural signs the sign itself explains itself. The 
signs of this class make up the natural language of mankind. They are also, and 1
I
for this reason, the foundation of the fine arts. In the expressiveness of the |
arts we hear again the primordial language which we can all understand and to which^1we respond at a level deeper than the level of the understanding. (Abolish ']
conventional languages, and in a century every man would be a painter or a musician ]I I
or an actor.) Reid does not think that art is simply the disciplined communication I
of emotion, but he does think that it must be the expression of some aspect of the
mind. There is no beauty or sublimity im material things apart from the -
’signature' of mind somehow upon them. The beauty and sublimity of nature is God's
mind, so to speak, sensibly present. And in another way, Reid perhaps suggests,
it is the expression of our own minds. Even our everyday prose descriptions of
nature are full of worn-out poetry; the sea rages and the skies lower - things2,
external to man made signs of what is within him. ,r Î
The problem of our knowledge of other minds is thus easily solved as far as it
■has a solution. We know them through their self-disclosure in natural signs, for
these are "so many openings into the souls of our fellow-men, by which their sehti-
ments become visible to the eye". The epistemological problem has not, of course,,
been solved. No reason has been given to justify our claim to a knowledge of other
minds; no premisses have been provided for a deductive conclusion. The inference
from the sign to its signification has its own unique logic. No one can "perceive 
•~i:;;4|Lgjiiat; ck.v, ae'c a ii,
Gli, V, Sec.Ill, p.122; Active Powers. Till, Ch.IT, p.503. 3, Active Powers. Ill, Pt.II, Gh.VI, p.574.
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any necessary connection between the signs of such operations, and the things sigh^
I. ;rified by them". Nevertheless the connections are there, the signs do signify, .ran
and it is through them that a man's private consciousness becomes publically "/C
/' ripaccessible to bther men before they can speak to one another and while/they speak :;.g
to one another* And since the belief that everyone lives an inner life of thought^
feeling and desire does not come to us through reasoning, it would not be surprisr^ l
ing if we were unable to give a reason for it, and that the ordinary man should '3S
find the demand for such a reason astonishing. Tell him that he must have a
reason, that he cannot be so credulous as to hold the conviction with such ■ ^
strength and be unable to say anything at all in support of it, and you might get j",
from him an argument that would equally prove a watch or a puppet to be alive and;
conscious. Show him that his argument is a very bad argument. I ou "cannot make
him in the least doubtful"; you have not touched the foundations of his belief, v
One could indeed give a reason for concluding that other men are intelligent 'V>;
beings; what they do bears the marks of intelligence. And in the same way the
world shows itself to be the work of intelligence. But men do not infer thought
and intention in other men by applying the argument from design. And in any case,'^
the principle upon which the argument from design depends is itself a principle .3^2. 'gfor which no reason can be given.
It is, Stewart agrees, through the interpretation of natural signs that we 
become aware of other people's states of mind. It is not by analogical inference. 
We did not, for example, come to know that people are happy when they are smiling ' 
by first observing in our own case that a smile is an expression of hapiness and 
then by inferring happiness in someone else from its expression on his face. A 
child would have had to leana somehow to identify what it feels on its own face 
with what it sees on another person's face. We would have previously had to
T7%cti^Towefs Ch7VIp.b65T" ^
2. Intellectual Powers. VI, Ch.V, pp.448-449#
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observe ourselves in mirrors in order to be able to make out from someone else's 
display of emotion which was being disl-payed. Reid, however, is asking too much -A
of US in asking us to accept the opinion that the natural signs of an emotion 
would convey an idea of it to someone who had never felt it himself* (Stewart - g
IStakes it for granted that this Reid's opinion. It was Reid's opinion that even
babies could make out something of people's dispositions towards them from their
looks and the sound of their voices, but nothing he has said indicates whether or -
not he held that the natural signs of all the emotions are interpretable without
the prior experience in ourselves of what they signify fin others.)
Stewart thinks that the interpretation of the natural signs of other people's }
I. '
states of mind is accounted for by what he calls the 'law of sympathetic imitation! 
The connection of emotions with their expression is reversible. The emotions 
produce their appropriate expression, and similar conditions of the body to those 
constituting their expression produce something of the correspondent emotions. -ÿ 
We imitate, without noticing it, the bodily manifestations of other people's 
emotions and in consequence similar emotions are aroused in us. Sympathetic 
imitation, Stewart points out, is strongest in children, and his theory could j' 
allow that as we grow older the natural signs come to operate for us with acquired# 
meanings (shifting from the second to the first of Reid's classes). It is thus 
not by sympathetic imitation that a grown man sees into the mind of another man. ’ 
Stewart considers he has explained something Reid left unexplained - the mechanics:! 
of the interpretation of a class of natural signs, not noticing the gap between
jstates of mind sympathetically induced in us and our knowledge that someone else j
shares them,
'States of mind' in general Stewart speaks of, and 'emotion' in particular, ?J
but he always illustrates his theory with the emotions. Reid speaks of 'thoughts',.
' p u r p o s e s ' , ' d e s i r e s '  and 's e n t i m e n t s ' and ' p a s s i o n s  o f  t h e  mind' a s  all signified ’ 
f T E l e m e n t s . f ü £ '  Ï Ï I , "sec.Il " p . 137 f f , “ T i
; - ,  ^ 'j
to us by natural signs. He hardly illustrates his theory with anything except 
the passions and sentiments,
"A third class of natural signs comprehends those which, though we never
before had any notion or any conception of the thing signified, do suggest it, or
conjure it up, as it were by a natural kind of magic, and at once give us a
I,
conception and create a belief of it." And as the first class of natural slfens
is the foundation of "true philosophy" and the second of the fine arts, so the
third is "the foundation of common sense - a part of human nature which hath2.never been explained.". Thus the common sense belief in an external world is 
grounded upon #ie fact that our sensations, themselves nothing but modifications 
of ourselves, are yet signs of the presence of physical objects existing in entire 
independence of us. In all the classes of natural signs nature has established 
the connection between the signs and what they signify. In none of them is the 
connection, as far as we know, a necessary connection. In the second and third 
classes the signs are interpreted intuitively, but not in the first. How does 
the third class differ from the second? Reid does not elaborate the difference, b u  
but it seems to turn on the origin of the conceptions involved in the interpret- 4 
ation of the signs.
To understand a natural sign is to have a conception of the thing signified, ]
:and a belief in its existence. The conceptions involved in understanding a ]
i
\
natural sign of the third class are obtainable in one way only, and that is by
understanding the sign. Thus there is a single source of the conception of a ,-1physical object as well as of the belief in physical objects. It is the signifie- ,
at^ry power of the sensations which we have from them. There is a single source ^
I. Inquiry, GhiV, Sec.Ill, p.122; ' Tj2' Inani^, Ch.V, Sec.III,p.I22; J
“3, The signs of the first class presumably create anything between a firm belief ' .and a mere tendency to belieaccording to our experience of the constancy of tho i
connection between the sign and what it is a sign of. We put, for example,different reliance on different weather signs. "j
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of the conception of the substantial self and of the belief in it. All our
experiences signify, as part of their reference, the subject to which they belong.
The conceptions involved in understanding signs of the second class are obtainable
without the intermediacy of natural signs, obtainable from our consciousness of
the operations of our minds. Reid leaves it doubtful whether they could also be
read off, independently of any experiences we might have had ourselves, from the
natural signs of the operations of other people's minds,
thefoundation of comraon sense - a part of human nature which hath never
been explained," Hamilton’s note directs our attention to Stewart’s comment,
Stewart’s comment is that Reid is using ’common sense' here with a "technical
meaning of his own, and has even spoken of this meaning as a thing not generally I,
understood". It is an odd comment for Stewart to have made, when the purpose 
of the chapter on natural signs is so plain# Reid is not engaged In elucidating 
the meaning of 'common sense', but in providing the only knid. of answer he thinks 
possible to anyone asking how we come to know that the beliefs of common sense 
are true; Nature is so constituted that certain phenomenal facts are signs of 
certain metaphysical facts and human nature is so constituted as to be able to 
interpret these signs intuitively. . i
'-JIt is untidyness in a point of detail that our belief in other minds depends
'ion natural signs belonging to the second class. There are more important anomalies^
1The inductive principle stands aside from other common sense beliefs as a condition!
iof the operation of signs of the first class. The belief in free will is not 4
jreached by any interpi^avtibhoii of natural signs, and Reid has made the immediacy -i 
of memory so thorough that nothing seems to be left which could function as a 
sign connecting the present with the past,
Reid would be deeply unimpressed by this criticism. If some of the beliefs
IT Elements, yoi, pi, Sec.Ill, p#6 8.
A/.' a ;- ~ A.-'■ AA'-'- ■ : ' f ' T'AA: A A' //A: A' -Av- A. ■ ■■■■■:- r- y- 'AÀA-V""
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of common sense dispense with a foundation which others of them require, an “ > 
inductive philosophy of the mind has to recognize that this is so, and to resist 
the temptation of theoretical completeness*
Scattered through the Inquiry are the fragments of an elaborate though un­
systematic analogy between the systems of natural signs and a language, (it is 
perhaps because the idea has become so thoroughly Reid's own that he does not 
fully realize how much of it comes from Berkeley.) ¥e shall put the fragments 
together. To begin with, natural signs are in one way really much more like words / 
than would occur to us when we think of the signs as established by "nature".
Words are sounds or marks which have no significance in themselves, but are made
to stand
significant by being arbitrarily chosen for things or to perform some syntactical | ^ 1function. Nature has not chosen to establish relations of signification, but II
the true author of these is not nature but nature's author. Reid is always ;
' i
emphasizing the arbitrariness of the connections in nature; apart from God's j 
appointment, anything might have gone with anything, for all we know to the ,iI'. . icontrary. But' just as the connections between words and the things they are made i
!to stand for, once established, retain by custom some permanence, so by the custom j
of Divine providence the connections between one thing and another once establish- ./ '
ed remain established. !
aSjWhen the way in which we come to understand the languages of nature and the 3
Iway in which we come to understand human languages is compared, a partial break j 
appears in the analogy. All human languages have to be learnt. Only one of the 1 
languages of nature has to be learnÿ. (The Novum Organon is its grammar-book, ; 
Reid remarks. The borrowed materials for Reid's analogy are from Bacon when they''; 
are not from Berkeley.) One of the systems of natural signs resumes the likeness" i 
to a language in being a means of communication between men, and just as it is I
-c-a-a.v;- . A-..:,. ' J'
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necessary for us to know our mother tongue before we can learn a language, so it 
is necessary to imow this‘language* before we can learn a language*
Though, however, only one of the systems of natural signs is a means of 
communication,^  between men, all of them function in something which has some 
resemblance to communication. They are all languages in which the "testimony" 
of nature is communicated, to men. The strain is taken off the analogy a little 
when we again remind ourselves that Reid is not merely personifying nature.
Nature's speech is God's at second hand. It is God in fact, in Reid's philosophy, ^
who lays the foundation of common sense. (The mottos of Reid's first two books i
are; "The inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding." "Who hath put ] 
wisdom in the inward parts?") It is not indeed the case that without a belief in 
God we shall sooner or later find ourselves without the beliefs of common sense.
They force themselves on us whatever our other beliefs. But if it is a question {
of how we could be in a position to know their truth, and in the way Reid supposed,i
of how things must be for this to be possible, what other answer is there than a
reference to the way God has made us and the world? It would be too improbable ~ j 
that there should merely happen to be systems of phenomenal signs with metaphysical] 
significations, signs which we should merely happen to be able to understand i- iv L 
intuitively. One would more readily believe that they do exist, if one also 
believed tliat they were intended to exist, and so had this further resemblance to 
a language « 'J
Human language would be impossible without a disposition in speakers to speak j1-J
the truth and in hearers to believe what they are told. God has matched in us
jthe two principles of *'veracity'' and "credulity". Reid sees an analogy to the
first of these principles in the fact of the regularity of nature. "If there j
Iwere not a principle of veracity in the human mind, men's words would not be signs i1of their thoughts: and if there were no regularity in the course of nature, no *
...... . . j
TV... ;
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I.
one thing could be a natural sign of another." He sees an analogy to the second
of them in the fact that we are intuitively certain of this regularity. Though 
part of this testimony of nature is given in a language whose meaning is learnt, 'j.g; 
by custom", it is not by custom, it is by an "original principle implanted in 
human minds", that we know that there is the unbroken connection, without which 
the language of nature could not exist, between the signs and the things they ;
Why is Reid so deeply interested in the analogy between systems of natural . 
signs and a language? There is no likeness between words and what they stand for^ i^
nor any necessary connection between them. There is no likeness between natural
fAsigns and what they signify, nor (so far as we know) any necessary connection 
between them. When we have learnt the meaning of a word, the word "suggests" the #
thing it stands for and "creates a belief of it". When we have learnt the meaning/
"4of a natural sign, or know its meaning without having to learn it, the sign 
operates in a similar way to produce a conception of what it signifies and a belié.f|
2 yin its existence. * The purpose of the analogy is to illuminate the operation 
of natural signs. Natural signs and words do the same thing in a similar way#
We need in fact to have understood Reid's account of the operation of natural 
signs in order to understand the double function he is ascribing to words; other^ || 
wise we should not know what he means when he says that words" cr@ât©an^bgl4çf",.4n || 
the things they stand fot. Natural signs do this; words merely as words do not#40 
Reid no doubt on reflection would entirely agree. The analogy between natural 
signs and language at this point will have to be between natural signs and a 
special use of language, its use with the intention of producing belief. It willj0 
have to be, as Reid more usually makes it, the analogy between the testimony of hat] 
ure expressed through natural signs and human testimony expressed through wordsv
In both to understand the sign, whether it is a verbal sign or a natural sign, iS;#]
1. InQuiryr  ch.VI. Sec.XXIV, p.lgs. ^2. InauiCT-. Ch, Vi, Sec.^XIV, p.I?5. , , 'UlllS
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to pass immediately from the sign to *'a conception and a belief of the thing 
signified".
%
tu
-#
c
2. Sensation and
There is a language of sensation. Sensations are the natural signs of . 'J
physical objects and their properties and as such constitute this language, and /r
4it is by understanding the signification of these signs that we are enabled to _
'1know all that we do know of physical objects and their properties. For without - À' 
perception we could know nothing of them at all, and to perceive a physical object., 
is to have the "conception and belief of it" "suggested" to us by the sensations 
that we have from it. Reid says that he has no theory of perception, and Stewart. 
says that Reid has no theory of perception. They mean that Reid's account of 
perception is nothing more tlian a straightforward description of the central facts' 
involved by the constitution of our nature in perception, and that the inexplicab­
ility of the connections between these facts is recognized by Reid and left “3:
untampered with by conjecture. The wording of the description has the sound of 
theory, and in any case it will be convenient to speak of Reid's theory of ^
perception. 7*
Reid introduces his theory in its application to the simpler senses, beginning
with the sense of smell. There are advantages in taking the more complicated 'cl
sense of touch first - for one thing, what Reid calls 'sensations' are less doubt%#4fully sensations. "m
I pick up a billiard ball, I immediately perceive it to be round, smooth and&l 
hard. If I attend carefully to all that I am aware of, or can become aware of as 'I;l
hold the ball, I notice the feelings in my finger-tips and the palm of my hand, -/g 
These feelings have no names of their own in any language. ¥hen they are referred.^  
to at all, they are referred to significantly as feelings of roundness, of hardnessi
_ ___
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of smoothness* We have to bring ourselves to attend to them, just as we have to
bring ourselves to attend to the look of the words on a page we are reading, for
like words their function is to point away from themselves. These feelings Reid
calls 'sensations’. The sensations are not in the thing I am holding in my hand*
Where are they? Reid says they are "in the mind" * One might have thought that
an untheoretical description of the facts of perception would have said with
ordinary men that the feelings are in the finger-tips ahd the palm of the hand.
If Reid's purpose in speaking of the location of sensations had been the ordinary j
man's , the familiar words would have been the right words* When "a man says he
has a pain in his toe, he is perfectly understood, both by himself and those who
hear him* This is all that he intends* He really feels what he and all men call 
I.
a pain in the toe." For practical purposes he locates his sensations where their 
causes are. He has no occasion to reflect on the esse of sensations, and thereforej 
none to ask and answer a philosopher's question.
INow let us compare the feelings of roundness, hardness and smoothness with
roundness, hardness and smoothness. They are as different as things can be, with-'] 
out one property in common. And when we compare their modes of existence, we ^^4 
find that we are comparing things that can exist no longer than we are aware of 3 
them with things that exist whether we are aware of them or not. Yet all I have 
to go on (supposing my eyes are shut) in perceiving that I am holding something 4
round, smooth and hard are the sensations in my finger-tips and the palm of my 
hand. If I had been bom blind, these are all that I would ever have had to go on* ! 
I cannot have learnt the significance of these sensations. I can learn that one 
thing is the sign of another thing, and so learn to infer one from the other, when .
> JI can experience the two things independently and discover their connection* But '
this is not how it is here. There is no resemblance between sensations and
I. Intellectual Powers, II, Ch.XVIII, p.32o,
> 1
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physical qualities, and when we look for any "tie or connection" between them,
anything that would begin to explain why this sensation "suggests" or ‘iintroduces*';
that quality, we can find nothing at all. Take hardness, for instance, and the i
feeling of hardness. The feeling is no sort of copy of the quality ; "nor will
the logician ever be able to shew a reason why we should conclude hardness from
I.
this feeling, rather than softness, or any other quality whatsoever."
what answer would Rerd give to the logician who said that the reason why the
feeling of hardness suggests hardness and nothing else, is that a hard object, as fi
far as common sense is concerned, is nothing but an object which gives us the
feeling of hardness when we press against it? B y'hardness', Reid says, we mean !
in common speech something "whose parts stick so firmly together, that they can-2.
not be displaced without considerable force". Reid might have been persuaded a 
easily enough that this is a natural philosopher's account of hardness. He him­
self maintains that the sensations which we have from the secondary qualities of 
physical objects signify no more than that there is something or other in the 
objects in virtue of which we have these sensations from them. It would not 
damage his theory of perception if he had to speak in the same way of hardness.
It would destroy it if he had to speak in the same way of one physical quality 
after another. What conception do we have of smoothness? Is a smooth surface 
simply one which gives silky feelings to the hand that is run over it? Not even 
to a blind man, Reid is certain; a blind man can feel the absence of irregular!t 
ies in it and therefore he knows what a smooth surface is, not merely what it is / 
relative to us, (Though a relative concept, smoothness is an objectively relative 
concept.) And our concept of figure is of it as it is in itself, and our concept - 
of the extension which is presupposed by all other physical qualities.
How do we come to have the idea of extension? We are told by philosophers
i r ilquliÿi cZ V, Sec.V, p.125. 
^aquiry. Ch. V, Sec. V, p.125,
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that the idea of extension isian idea of sensation as if that put an end to any 
difficulty in the matter* We are told something that conceals a mystery under 
a show of obviousness. How does a sensation or a combination of sensations give 
us the idea of extension? If we reflect on the origin of this idea and of our 
belief that we live in a world of extended objects, we shall have to recognize ■
once again the inexplicable operation of sensations as natural signs. \;7
"The notion of extension is so familiar to us from infancy, and so constantly -
obtruded by everything we see and feel, that we are apt to think it obvious how. ;
it comes into the mind; but upon a narrower examination we shall find it utterly
inexplicable. It is true we have feelings of touch, which every moment present aa
extension to the mind; but how they come to do so, is the question; for those
feelings do no more resemble extension, than they resemble justice or courage - '
nor can the existence of extended things be inferred from those feelings by any < /'J
rules of reasoning; so that the feelings we have by touch, can neither explain
I,
how we get the notion, nor how we come by the belief of extended things,"
The simple truth is that we know by "a natural and original principle of our '//
constitution" how to interpret the sensations of touch; 3g
Whatthas Reid explained that the philosophers left unexplained when they said ^
that the idea of extension is an idea of sensation? Nothing. It is the ansvrer
required by Reid’s doctrine. The connection between every natural sign and the ;
thing it signifies is altogether inexplicable. Our knowledge of thei^connection
is altogether inexplicable, when the sign is a sign belonging to either the ’/?|
second or third class of natural signs. If the doctrine explains nothing, does
it even assert anything that anyone would deny? It asserts that we know intuitiyetl
ly the signification of the sensations which we have from physical objects, and
that, if we did not, experience could not inform us. And these assertions would:.;#] 
I. InqSry, ' Ch.V, SecTvr  ^ ~ ^
 ^ ^
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be denied by philosophers denying that we have any knowledge of physical objects 
and by philosophers with a claim to be able to derive all our knowledge from  ^
experience.
We now turn to the other senses. Reid examines two of these in detail. The 1
.1examination of the sense of smell gives results he thinks transferable with trivialj 
modifications to the other senses. The sense of sight requires separate attention;
IThere is a sensation of smell. We had no difficulty in understanding the j
!phrase 'sensation of touch' ; we have to be helped to understand the meaning of
A,'sensation of smell'. One would like to say that Reid speaks of 'sensation ofA Ismell' where we would ordinarily speak of a 'smell*. Reid would disown this I1attempt at elucidation. The words 'smell', 'taste*, 'sound', as also 'heat* and J
'cold', he considers all have a kind of ambiguity; as words in common use, they |■à'S
stand for certain 'sensations* and also for the qualities of physical objects in
virtue of which we have these 'sensations' and primarily for the qualities. These 1!words have only a kind ot ambiguity. They can hardly be said to stand sometimes \ 
for the qualities and sometimes for the 'sensations'. They cover both in a single-i 
application, there b,ing no occasion in the common affairs of life to distinguish j 
between them. It is essential for philosophers to make the distinction. Reid uses] 
the expression 'sensation of smell' (of taste, of sound.,.,) in order to make the ,
distinction. And if he has not misdescribed the ordinary use of the word 'small',]
J(and of other words which resemble it) we shall have understood what it is that #1
he is referring to by the expression; it is not the physical quality; it is the 
other thing named by the same word as names the physical quality. ;||
We shall not perhaps have understood why Reid is calling it a 'sensation*. 
Examine its nature. It is simply such as it appears to be. We know practically :M 
nothing by the sense of smell as it is a quality of some physical object; its A
.1
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nature is a matter for physical enquiry. For the other thing designated by the
weed * smell*, there is no other source of information than the sense of smell.
And this thing is plainly something to which it would be absurd to ascribe any
physical properties, even spatial location. It is plainly something which cannotr;-:
exist except in a sentient being and its duration is the duration of the conscious^I.
ness of it. These are the characteristics of a sensation* #
If, when they are pointed out to us, we are unable to discern these character#' 
isties in the 'sensation' of smell or in the 'sensations' of taste, sound, and 4m 
colour, if we think that these things are not sensations, that some or all of them*i 
might exist in the absence of any sentient being, Reid is unable to say anything j4
that will make their nature more evident. He has explanations showing why it is # 
unnoticed before it is pointed out; We do not attend to the sound of words, but | 
to their sense; not to natural signs, but to the things they signify. And sensat^ j 
ions in their normal self -effacement before the things they signify seem to mer^ e^ j 
into them and to take on their alien characteristics and have their own oblitéra 
ed.
Sensations are essentially identical with the awareness of them, and signify 
objects which are essentially distinct from the awareness of them, external
-3objects, objects of perception. "The same mode of expression is used to denote 
sensation and perception; and, therefore, we are apt to look upon them as things^ 
of the same nature. Thus, I feel a pain; 1 see a tree : the first denoteth a 
sensation, the last a perception. The grammatical analysis of both expressions vi 
is the same; for both consist of an active verb and an object. But, if we attendg 
to the things signified by these expressions, we shall find that, in the first, ,.W 
the distinction between the act and the object is not real but grammatical; in #f| 
the second, the distinction is not only grammatical but real*
I. Inquiry, Ch.II, Sec.II, p.105. -•ÏÜ
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"The form of expression, 1 feel pain, might seem to imply that the feeling is
something distinct from the pain felt; yet, in reàlity, there is no distinction.
As thinking a thought is an expression which could signify no more than thinking,
80 feeling a pain signifies no more than being pained. What we have said is
applicable to every other mere sensation  Perception, ...... hath always an
object distinct from the act by which it is perceived; an object which may existI.
whether it be perceived or not."
Imagine a man suddenly and for the first time in his life given the power of 
smell, and there is a rose in front of him. Ee has a sensation of smell. What 
does he perceive by means of the sensation? Not the rose, not to begin with; He 
is aware of a new sensation in himself and aware that he id not himself the cause
of it. He knomnothing else about its cause. The sensation signifies its occult - 2.
cause. (By means of the sensation its occult cause is perceived. This Reid does
not say, but his theory of perception requires him to be willing to say it,)
When the rose is taken away the sensation of smell disappears, returns when
the rose is brought back. The cause of thensensation then is the rose or something
in the rose. When tliis has been learnt, the sensation becomes a sign of the '"j
' #presence of a rose, shifting for all practical purposes from the third to the first ' 
class of natural signs. The rose becomes an object of perception through smell.
We are now in a position to understand the "real foundation" for the distinction!
4between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies Is-thie ; Our senses "give i1us a direct and a distinct notion of the primary qualities, and inform us what they " 
are in themselves. But of the secondary qualities, our senses give us only a
" 1relative and obscure notion. They inform us only, that they are qualities that J 
affect us in a certain manner - that is, produce in us a certain sensation; but 
as to what they are in themselves, our senses leave us in the dark." The too
A
t
1. Inquiry. Gh.VI, SecvXX, pp.182-183.2. Inquiry. Ch.II, Sec.II, p. 105.3i Intellectual Powers, II, ChiXVII, p^ 3I3;
unqualified assertion that sensations efface themselves before the things they 
signify has to be corrected.
"We may see why the sensations belonging to secondary qualities are an object 
of our attention, while those which belong to the primary are not,
"The first are not only signs of the object perceived, but they bear a capital 
part in the notion we form of it. We conceive it only as that which occasions 
such a sensation, and therefore cannot reflect upon it without thinking of the Î1sensation which it occasions: we have nooother mark whereby to distinguish it. ' #
The thought of a secondary quality, therefore, always carries us back to the J^
sensation which it produces. We give the same name to both, and are apt to con- i]
found them together, j
conception 4"But, having a clear and distinct^of primary qualities, we have no need when j
" !we think of them, to recall their sensations. When a primaiy quality is perceived, ]
4the sensation immediately leads our thought to the quality signified by it, and #
is itself forgot. We have no occasion afterwards to reflect upon it; and so we 
come to be as little acquainted with it as if we had never felt it. This is the
case with the sensations of all primary qualities, when they are not so painful or
I. 3pleasant as to draw our attention." J
#
Nobody asks to be told what extension, figure, hardness and softness, smooth- -
ness and roughness, solidity, divisibility and motion are. His senses have already ; 
told him. And the information supplied concerning the nature and existence of theseI
qualities is entirely objective information. When we perceive that something is
round, smooth and hard we know implicitly that it is perceived as it would be if I
we did not exist. We know implicitly from the testimony of the senses that even #
the secondary qualities of bodies are whatever they are in complete independence. I
of ourselves, (Sense experience has essentially tiiis objectivity, and we have 1
I. Intellectual Powers, II, Gh.XVII, p.315.
misunderstood Reid unless we have seen a similar objectivity in common sense as J 
part of the implication of the analogy between sense and common sense.)
Nobody knows by the sense of smell what smell in the rose is, by the sense of 
taste what taste in the pineapple is, by the glow of warmth what heat in the fire 
is. These are matters for "-'philosophical"investigation, in which, Reid mentions, , 
there has been a good deal of progress. Interested, a "plain man'* asks a ('modem 
philosopher" what, for instance, smell in plants is. "The philosopher tells him, ]
that there is no smell in plants, nor anything but in the mind; and that it is j
impossible there can be smell but in the mind; and that all this hath been u I
I. :demonstrated by modern philosophy," Who is to blame for the plain man's opinion 
of the philosopher? The philosopher is to blame. For either he means by tlie
word 'smell* what other men mean by it - primarily the external quality - and then j
'Jhis opinion isreally absurd, or else abusing language-she expresses a true opinion ^
absurdly.  ^j
1The encounter between the plain man and the philosopher is repeated in the j 
Intellectual Powers. This time the philosopher is assuring him that fire is not 1 
hot. Reid now thinics that there is some confusion in the plain man's mind to j 
begin with. It is not to be expected that he will have made distinctions which
4the everyday affairs of life do not require. He does not therefore distinguish | 
between primary and secondary qualities. His notions of the primary qualities 
are clear and accurate; of the secondary qualities, not so much erroneous as ]
clouded. A secondary quality is "the unknown cause or occasion of a well-known ,^ 
effect". As plain men we have not had to distinguish between the objective and 1 
the subjective components in our notions of the secondary qualities. The philosG ' 4 
opher has been asked a question which cannot be answered until the distinctions
are made. Ee has made the distinctions, but without any respect for ordinary
I. Inquiry, Ch.II, Sec,¥111, p.Il2<
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language. When he has explained himself and the plain man has thought about hcafc,
I,
they no longer charge each other with opposite absurdities,
Vfe have now to deal with the sense of sight and to consider first colour and 
then * visible'figurai,
"By colour, all men, who have not been tutored by modern philosophy, underst­
and, not a sensation of the mind, which can have no existence when it is not 
perceived, but a quality or modification of bodies, which continues to be the 
same whether it is seen or not. The scarlet-rose which is before me, is still a 
scarlet-rose when I shut my eyes, and was so at midnight when no eye saw it. The 
colour remains when the appearance ceases; it remains the same when the appear- ' 
ance changes. For wheni view this scarlet-rose through a pair of green spectacles, 
the appearance is changed; but I do not conceive the colour of the rose changed;.# 
To a person in the jaundice, it has still another appearance; but he is easily q 
convinced that the change is in'his eye, and not in the colour of the object.
Every different degree of light makes it have a different appearance, and totàl 
darkness takes away all appearance, but makes not the least change in the colour of
Jthe body." qIThe appearance of colour is a sensation. "Mr. Locke calls it ^  idea" and, ^1Reid adds astonishingly, "it may be called so with the greatest propriety....It
hwvA, 3 * ]a knid of thought, and can only be the act of a percipient or thinking being." j
The sensation of colour is never called 'colour*, Reid says, though he also says I
Ithat sensation and quality are run together so closely in the imagination as to be '
mistaken for the same thing. He then denounces with especial severity the :
philosophical paradox that visible objects have no colour and that colour is in #
4. . Jsomething invisible, the mind, I
1. Intellectual Powers, II, Ch.XVII, pp.315-316.2. Inquiry, Ch.VI, 8ec.IV, p.137.3# Inquiry. Ch. VI, SecIV, p.137.
4. Inquiry. Ch. VI, Secs. IV-V.
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Stewart has a brief conjectural history of the external!zation of the sensat-:^ 
ion of colour. The connection of the sensation of colour with "visible extension 
and figure" is a matter of association, but since the association began as soon 
as our eyes opened, it is now indissoluble. It is not improbable that visible 
extension and figure would appear to us at first merely as "modifications of the //, 
mind". Distance is not perceived by sight until sight has learnt from touch. a
Visible figure comes to be visually located where tangible figure is, the sensat-S
I'ion of colour moving with its associate to an illusory distance# '
To locate "visible objects" in the mind, to deny them externally is, Reid 1says - he is criticizing Berkeley - to affirm "a top and a bottom, a right and a #
.left in the mind", Reid is not well enough acquainted with the "topography of
the mind" to be able to give any sense to these words. Alternatively, it is to M
2.
deny any resemblance between the objects of sight and the objects of touch. |j
Reid "shaves off extension" from the appearance of colour when he wants to A
3.have it a sensation. He even seems to thinlc that with certain deformations of
the eye colour can be seen unextended, and it looks then as things do when seen ''|S
4;through a "glass of broken jelly", their colour visible but not their shape.
1Stewart does not offer any experimental assistance to make it easier for us to 
imagine how visible extension and figure would look if they ever appeared to us
as modifie ations of the mind, <i;/|
■A
Visible figure, Reid says, is the one exception to the rule that there is no ■
similitude and no necessary connection between a natural sign and what it signifiesj 5.
Visible figure is a natural sign of real figure, resembles it and is necessarily , 
connected with it. The visible figure of a thing is its perspectival figure. A 4
thing has one real shape which does not change with the different points of view '
1. Dissertation, Ft.I, Ch.II, p.131. ' "4M2. Inquiry, Ch.VI, Sec.XI, p. 155. . pi
3. John Féam, The Physiolotoy of the Human Mind, p, JiT- g
4. Intellectual Powers, Ch.VI, Sec. VIII, p.145.5. Inquiry, Ch.VI, Secs.VII-VIII.
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and distances from which it is seen and as many different apparent shapes as there
are points of view and distances from which it is seen, (Berkeley has apprppriat-
eljf called the real shape 'tangible* figure because it is ascertained, as nearly 
as it can be ascertained, by touch.)
Visible figure is not a sensation. It is a real figure - a "real and external
object to the eye" - though not the real figure of the thing of which it is the
appearance. The structure of the eye partly determines its nature. relation^
between real figure and visible figure, as determined by the structure of the eye,
is the relation between a three-dimensional figure and its projection on to the ji 
surface of a sphere. It is altogether irrelevant to the existence of visible 
figure that it is seen (assuming that Reid means by 'external'here what he means
by it elsewhere). 2.'
.
A peculiarity in the awareness of visible figure is that it is an awareness 
of an external object which is not conveyed by any sensation. There is no sensat;-^  
ion present whenever we .see except the 'sensation' of colour, and we might Reid 
thinks, have been so constituted as to be able to see figure without being ableI. , ito see colour. Jll
There is a necessary connection between visible figure and its dimensions and'^ 8 
real figure and its dimensions. Visible figure with its magnitude is mathematic#g 
ally deducible, given the real figure of a thing, its magnitude and »'position", 4m
It is not impossible for a blind man to understand the laws of perspective. He -M
1could therefore calculate a thing's visible figure, from these data. He needs i
1only to be able to "project the outline of a given body, upon the surface of a / 
hollow sphere, whose centre is in the eye. This projection is the visible figure J 
he wants; for it is the same figure with that which is projected upon the tunica
I. it appears to me to be evident that ....the varieties in our perceptionsof colour are the means of our perception of visible figure." (Stewart in a letter to Reid, X^ rssertation, pp. 133-134.)
- ''A'.4
retina in vision." "On the retina" cannot be Reid's answer to the question 4
"Where is visible figure?" He often remarks with obvious truth that we never 'M
see the retinas of our eyes or anything on them. One would have supposed from thë| 
other things that Reid said that he located visible figure on the surface of the 
eye. The boy who was ’couched* by Cheselden and whose reports of what he saw as 
soon as he was able to see were seized on eagerly by everybody, including Reid, 
with questions concerning perception which they wanted empirically settled,
reported, it was understood by Reid, that he first saw colours and shapes up
against his eyes.
Visible figure would not be the sign of anything to the blind man* To other,/- 
men it is a sign of the real figure of the thing they are looking at. They do i 
not look at it, never notice it. We do not see the book on the table across the #
room as a two-dimensional patch of colour about the size of a hand; We see it in 4
;
its three dimensions and the size it is. The appearance of things constitute a '-j
visual language, which once learnt and familiar, takes us straight to the things •
its signs signify as though we perceived these things "without the intervention of 1
I. .'ri
any sign" , ;
The perception of real figure through visible figure as its sign is an 44
* acquired perception*. The perception of visible figure (if we attend to it so 
as to perceive it) is an * original * perception. The perception of real figure 4
I 4
by touch is an ’original* perception. Inacquired perceptions original perceptionsdI 1become signs, Reid has nothing new to say on the manner in which acquired j
perceptions are acquired. The principle is that the proper objects of one sense
'1
are found by experience to be connected with the proper objects of another sense, JJand so become their customary signs, Reid substantially repeats from Berkeley * '"1 
and the optical writers of the time their account of the education of vision to ' !'4. . ..  . , ,I. Inqmry. Ch. VI, Sec.XIX, p.182. J
'i#
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the
a perception of distancée and of^real shape and size of objects at a distance. :|
Reid is especially anxious to insist on the psychological immediacy of acquired
visual perception. Custom Eby a kind of legerdemain" has withdrawn the "original ;
and proper objects of sight" and has put in their place "objects of touch, which
I*have length, and thickness, and a determinate distance from the eye". Jhe senses 
of smell and hearing perceive distance and locality after a similar though 
simpler schooling.
Acquired perceptions extend beyond the substitution of the proper objects of vS 
one sense for those of another. The perception that this is the smell of a rose u,
and that the sound of a passing coach are acquired perceptions,
, "::yPerception has its ana tombal conditions and its physiological antecedents.
Reid's general attitude to these is that they create no problems and solve no
problems of what would now be called 'philosophical' interest - perception is an/ÿ
"act of the mind", In particular there are two things to be said. The first is#
that while it is a fact of our constitution that perception does not take place ■ 4
without the appropriate sense organ and unless certain physiological events have
taken place, we have no reason at all to suppose that these events are in any way ,4
»'efficient' causes of perception, that they transmit anything, do anything, to the fl' J
mind as a result of which the act of perception takes place, (This is Reid's j 
deliberate view, though he sometimes speaks casually of the body as 'acting on' the, 
mind. ) Reid, however, has no scheme of occasionalism or pre-established harmony. iThe impression one gathers from his published writings is that it is part of his #
, Imetaphysical abstinence to have no theory on the relation of body and mind. In I2. ' { 
the MS; Lectures on the Fine Arts he has opinions that are definite enoughs There*
is much to be said for occasionalism but "it has been carried greatly too far", j4-l iThere is a plain contradiction in asserting that God does, and that the human mind '
1. Inquiry. Ch VI, Sec.XIX, n.p.I82.
2. Edinburgh University Library, Laing MSS 176, pp.21-23.
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cannot, act on matter. Both are spirits. If we think that the mind acts on the - 
body, we are probably not mistaken. We are almost certainly mistaken if we think 
that the body acts on the mind. It does not seem possible that any of the modes 
of material action of which we have any knowledge could have effects in other 
than material things.
The second consideration for emphasis with regard to the anatomical and ;{| 
physiological conditions of perception is their complete arbitrariness as far as 
we can tell. For all we know, we might have been made so as to "taste with our lilI- 1fingers, to smell with our ears, and to hear by the nose". We might have been
so made as to,have all the sensations and perceptions we do have with no sense %  
organs at all, or without any of the occurrences in nerves and brain which begin 
with changes in them. Sensations follow unaccountably upon the transmission of
impressions from the sense organs to the brain; perception upon sensation, 
unaccountably. There is not one link in the chain of events from the impression % 
on the sense organ to the final perception of which we can be sure that it had to .5
be what it was for the result to be what it was,
"We Blight, perhaps, have been made of such a constitution as to have our present 
perceptions connected with other sensations. We might, perhaps, have had the 
perception of external objects, without either impressions upon the organs of #  
sense, or sensations. Or, lastly, The perceptions we have, might have been 
immediately connected with the impressions upon our organs, without any interven-^ ;^f]
<" • ■ ,r‘'jlion of sensations," One thing is certain: If we had the sensations alone or
1" Inquiry,Ch,VI. Sec.XXI, p.l87, i
2, Inquiry,Ch,VI, Sec,XXI, p,I87» A speculative agnosticism as to the signifie- J
ance of the anatomical and physiological conditions of perception is a characterise^ 
tic of the philosophy of Common Sense, Stewart gives a muted version of Reid, ] j 
(Elements,Vol.I, Ch.I, ), The following is from a note-book of Beattie’s (Aber-’j
deen MSS,, B22) "Our sould may, perhaps, be not really assisted in external
perception by the respective organs of sense, but only hindered from it by the ,1 
other parts of our body: the ears, for example, may possibly be, not parts of Iour body enabling the mind to hear, but only the sole parts of our body which do -not obstruct hearing; and which can admit those impressions of sound, that a - Îspirit might receive immediately." ,  , . J
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the impressions and sensations alone we would have been merely sentient and not
percipient beings, unable to form even the conception of external objects,
The perception of an object "implies" both a conception of it and "a beliefI,
of its present existence". According to Reid, Hamilton comments, "perception 
is only the conception (imagination) of an object, accompanied with a belief of its 
present existence". This could hardly be Reid’s view. It would commit him to 
holding that any belief in the present existence of anything is a perception of it, 
since he holds that every belief implies a conception of its object. Hamilton 
takes the statement he is commenting on out of the whole context of sensations as 
natural signs in which Reid's doctrine of perception is really set. He has a good 
deal of excuse; the section in the Inquiry and the chapter in the Intellectual  ^
Powers, each with the heading "Of Perception", are misleadingly written out of
context, Reid does not say in either that perception is merely a matter of concep-
'j
tion and belief, but he could not say what more there is to it if sensations are i
-t 1to be left out of it. And therefore he cannot say Jdiat we might have all the j1perceptions we do have "without any intervention of sensations". Sensations are ;ipart of the essential structure of perception; the conception and belief of an j
Ï iexternal object which are aspects of it, are aspects of the operation of sensations
as natural signs, ]-, I
There is, however, a puzzling remark in this section from the Inquiry, It j
X  ^Jsuggests - and there are half-hints elsewhere to the same effect - that Reid might ’
have had two views on the nature of perception. "I am conscious of this act of ^
my mind |gie act of perceptio^, and I can reflect upon it; but it is too simple I
to admit of an analysis, and I cannot find proper words to describe it." The 1theory of natural signs with acquired or original meanings is an analysis of ^
perception. If there is a diffementsview of the nature of perception here, it is
I. Inquiry. Ch.VI* Sec.XX, p.183,
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the view that all that can be said of perception itself is that it is perception.
It is a type of view which Reid always found philosophically attractive. There 
are in fact a number of features in this section of the Inquiry which are less 
characteristic of the Inquiry than of the Intellectual Powers where natural signs 
are much more rarely spoken of.
In one part of the Intellectual Powers where Reid deals at length with sensat- , 
ions as signs he speaks inconsistently of what it is that they signify. The chapter 
"Of Sensation" begins with the familiar doctrine that sensations signify objects - - 
of perception. The word ’smell’, ’taste’ ’sound’ are words fœ "a sensation and a 
quality perceived by means of that sensation. The first is the sign, the last the rt,thing signified. As both are conjoined by nature, and as the purposes of common , 
life do not require them to be disjoined in our thoughts, they are both expressed 
by the same name," (p.3lO). The qualities perceived by touch are perceived "by 
means of a sensation which indicates them" (p*3Il). On the next page, after 
references to the real complexity of some operations of the mind under their -r
apparent simplicity, Reid says that sensation signifies perception, plainly meaning 
the act and not the object; "Every different perception is conjoined with a sen- 
sation that is proper to it. The one is the sign, the other the thing signified, ;]
They coalesce in ou# imagination. They are signified by one name, and are consid- !
Iered as one simple operation. The purposes of life do not require them to be -it1distinguished" (p.312), There is nothing elsewhere in Reid to elucidate the state- '
ment that sensation is a sign of perception, or to show its relation to the doctrine^
■ .-ithat sensations are the signd of external objects. The failure by philosophers . , *
to distinguish between sensation and perception, Reid remarks here, has occasioned i
"imost of their mistakes with regard to the senses. 4
The most serious of these mistakes is to think that the objects of the senses
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are always internal objects - as they would be if sensation was perception -
never external objects. When Reid calls the object of perception an "external"
object he means that it is an object which does not depend for its existence on
being perceived. In a draft of the first voüiume of the Elements wiiich he sent to
Reid, Stewart has one criticism to make of Reid's doctrine of perception, Reid
understood the criticism to be that he had not distinguished between an
"independent" existence and a "permanent" existence and had implied that by the |
senses we are equally and immediately aware of both. ( l  think you will have a 'j
just notion of the defect you mention", Reid tells Stewart, "if you distinguish bel
between an independent existence and a permanent existence.")
Reid's reply is; "My sense do not testify that the sun and moon continue to 
exist when I do not perceive them. For anything my senses testify, they might 
have been created the moment X perceived them and annihilated the moment after.
If I have anywhere made their existence when I perceived them not, to be the 
testimony of my senses as distinguished from all my other powers, I think it is 
an error. But I do not remember that I have done this." He has never, he explains 
tried to give a reason for our belief in the continued existence of the things we j 
perceive because he did not know of anyone who "ever acknowledged a real external.e 
existence of the objects of sense when perceived and at the same time denied their j 
existence when they are not perceived". The perception of an object is the per^
' 9ception of it as externaly just as the consciousness of any of the operations of' j• , Ithe mind is a consciousness of it as internal, y:
Presumably Reid sent his documents to Stewart, In the Elements as it now -W
  ^stands, (in the first edition as well as in subsequent editions) Reid's doctrine
of perception is given the completion Stewart considers it needs in order to be (g# 
"completely satisfactory". Reid "has shewn that certain sensations are, by law of'i 
nature, accompanied with an irresistible belief of the existence of certain 4
qualities of external objects. But this law extends no farther than to the presen'i
existence of quality; that is , to its existence while we feel the corresponding
I.'*'Criticism and Remarks on Stewart's "Elements'*" Aberdeen ESS. 2131*4. I
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sensation. Whence is it, then, that we ascribe to the quality an existence 
independent of our perception? I apprehend we learn to do this by experience 
alone. We find that we cannot, as in the case of imagination, dismiss or recall 
the perception of an external object. If I open my eyes, I cannot prevent myself 
from seeing the prospect which is before me. I learn, therefore to ascribe to the 
object of my senses, not only an existence at the time I perceive them, but an 
independent and a permanent existence;" g
If we learn by experienceto ascribe to the objects of perception both an 
"independent" and a "permanent" existence, perception by itself does nothing to 
show its irrelevanceto the existence of its objects. It does not occur to /
Stewart that he is abolishing Reid's theory of perception; he thinks he is ..k 
correcting an incidental mistake.
We have now before us the materials on which to decide whether Reid's theory 
of perception is a theory of direct perception. Reid's theory of "original" 
perception is a theory of sensations as natural signs (with the anomaly of visible j
figure as an object of perception without a sensation to signify it). Bis theory JI
of "acquired" perception is a theory of original perceptions as natural signd.
Is the perception of things through their natural signs direct perception of them? ;
How do natural signs present the mind with the things they signify? They "suggest";
them Reid has other words. He does say that natural signs "introduce" the2.
things they signify, that they "present" them; fairly often that they "indicate" J.
'4
them. But "suggest" is much his most unusual word. And it might seem hard to j
imagine ho%^  perception could be made out to be more devious, subjective and 
uncertain than by being made out to be the result of "suggestion".
"I beg’ leave to make use of the word suggestion, because I know not one more ]
proper, to express a power of the mind, which seems entirely to have escaped the > j
I. Gh.in. 13.153. Go. Philosophical Essays" II, Cia.II, Sec\ï,'''pp.ï65-I06, where ! 
our belief in the "permanent" existence of an object perceived is accounted for as': 
an instance of our general belief in the uniformity of nature. ,
2.,Inquiry, Ch.V, Sec.II, p,ï2o; Sec.IV, pl23.
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notice of philosophers, and to which we owe many of our simple notions which are ,
neither impressions nor ideas, as well as many original principles of belief,
I shall endeavour to illustrate, by an example, what I understand by this word,
We all know, that a certain kind of sound suggests immediately to the mind, a
coach passing in the street; and not only produces the imagination, but theI*
belief, that a coach is passing,"
Mr, Winch has demonstrated so thoroughly the impropriety of the word
'suggestion', in one of its standard uses, to the contexts in which Reid uses 2,the word, that if Reid could have seen the demonstration, he would probably 
have wished that he had used some other terra instead to mean what he meant by 
‘suggestion*. As Winch points out, (pp.329ff.) the circumstances in which we
would say "I hear a sound that suggests a passing coach" are circumstances in
thewhich we V7ould not say "I hear a coach". We say first when we know that what weA
hear is not a coach but something which suggests a passing coach - pine cones , : 
blown over a frozen grovmd in winter - is Winch’s example; or when the sound 
might be the sound of a coach but we are quite unsure whether it is. Again, to 
adapt one of Winch's examples, if you are looking at a camel and are asked "What 
does that suggest to you? you mighttsay "All the romance of the desert" - some- 
thing of this sort - anything but "A camel". That is something you would perhaps |
say only if the sight of the came 1,.suggested nothing to you at all. If a thing 4!'Isuggests another thing to us, it makes us imagine it, as the sound of the pine JI
cones makes us imagine a coach or the sight of a camel makes us imagine something I 
.which is not a camel. There is normally no place for belief. If ^W^listening for
A  ^ 4
the coach and hear a sound which suggests it, a sound which might be the sound of ii
1the coach, there is perhaps a flicker of belief, but no more than thaÿ. The 
notions then of ‘perception’ and of ‘suggestion’"fall quite apart" (p.336).
1. Inquiry, Ch. XI, Sec.VII, p.Ill, k
2. "The Motion of ’Suggestion’ in Thomas Reid’s Theory of Perception", l
Philosophical Quarterly. Oct. 1953» ^
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Winch anticipates an objection. His argument against Reid is based on twenti­
eth century usage of the word 'suggest'; Reid was '’discussing" eighteenth usage; 
and the two usages might have diverged widely enough’ to invalidate the argument, ' 
The possibility can be ruled out. If the "use of ’suggest' in Reid’s environment
corresponded to his own philosophical usage, the difference from our current
to sayusage would be so marked as to make us want that the whole concept of 'perception'A
had radically altered in the last ywo hundred years". An alteration of such 
magnitude could not have gone unnoticed.
It is not V/inch’s contention that Reid's theory of perception is nonsense 
his contention is that Reid's theory is false (p.336). False, because it implies
that all perception is doubtful perception, that expressions of the form "I hear -
?
see, taste, ....something which suggests X" are always more appropriate than then
simple statement that I hear, see ....X. "Philosophical theories of the type of -- - &
Reid's have an attractive appearance because of their air of caution and’taking 
nothing for granted'; but this obse^ive over-caution, far from being a merit, 
results in an obscuration of the linguistic distinctions which enable us to 
discriminate between conditions'where caution is necessary, and those where it is '
not." (p.33l). i
To establish his contention Winch should have been building up evidence that yj
!Reiduses the word 'suggests’, with the ordinary meaning whic^ Winch's examples 
illustrate, in an extraordinary context. Had the word been in Reid's theory with 
all these familiar implications of subjectivity and uncertainty, this would have ] 
been enough to show that Reid's theory is the thorough misinterpretation of the î
r]facts of perception that Winch thinks it is. It is not in Reid's theory with
,   ■ jthese implications. $6 otake an essential point; We can have by perceptual ’sugg-j 
estion', Reid maintain^, and usually do, an irresis tible conviction of the exist- 
ence of the object of perception. The irresistibility of the belief involved in ‘
■k
' ' '' ' '   2 0 0  '-'"^
ibi
original perception is implicit throughout Reid's discussion of the nature of
perception - it is after all his final answer to philosophical doubts about an /.j:' ■
external world. Having introduced the term with the explanation already quoted, “ "
its
Reid goes on to mention the range of application sensation suggests the
^ '3notion of present existence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel does
now existe.memory suggests the notion of past existence, and the belief that
what we remember did exist in time past ...,our sensations and thoughts do also
suggest the notion of a mind, and the belief of its existence, and of its relaticM
to our thoughts... .any change in nature, suggests to us the notion of a cause,
and compels our belief of its existence." By the "natural principle" of suggest-;>
'ion we have all these beliefs; all of them beliefs of common sense; all of them- 
therefore irresistible. /{
If there is a single standard use for 'suggests', and it is the use descril
..
by Winch, then the word is in Reid's theory of perception with hardly atrace of
,Èits proper meaning. Thera is, however, a less common but not uncommon use of " 
'suggests' in which the word does not carry any implications of doubt or hesitati 
ion, Reid 8 employment of the word seems to have at least some affinities with 
■ thi.s use. I may be quite sure of something and then ask What suggested that to ,a|
Die? (I knew she was a school-teacher. What made me think so? What suggested to t 
me that she was? ) Granted that X suggests I, there are two questions we might
• ' - fask. We might ask What does X suggest? What suggested)]^ ? The second seems to be;,; 
Reid's question. And in confirmation; The first question could not be asked 
unless X is noticed. The sound of a passing coach could not easily go unnoticed,
- but many natural signs suggest the things they signify in self-effacement ; They i
most perfectly conform to Reid's conception of a natural sign whm they do, .,y; 
Reid unfortunately did not discuss the way the word 'suggests' is used. He ; 
ÿ borrowed the word unconsciously from Berkeley employing it, Stewart remarks, as,;#
'■ . .■i'.'.bL 'J'L/ “■ . . _.. J . 'i" ' ' ' ' ‘ f ■ \ '........    “i".     ; 'v . • : y.;.'
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a tectmical terra. And not in the interests of philosophical caution. Reid's 
theory, at least of original perception, is too incautious. How can you misunder­
stand a completely familiar word? Natural signs in original perception are like 
completely familiar words. How can they he misundersttod if there are such tinngs 
as these natural signs at all? Words well understood in familiar contexts may be 
misunderstood in unfamiliar contexts. We learn the perceptual meaning of signs 
of the first class in a comparatively narrow range of contexts, and consequently -, 
are always liable to mistakes in acquired perception.
With the misunderstanding which the word 'suggestion* invites for Reid's 
theory out of the way, we can ask again whether it is a theory of direct percept-. , 
ion. To begin with perception by touch. We feel the shape, the solidity, the 
smoothness or roughness of whatever it is we are holding; feel them, Reid says, , 
by means of the sensation of touch. What would it be for perception by touch to 
be more direct than it is on Reid's account of it? But will the theory of 
natural signs fit Reid's descriptive account of perception by touch? The theory* 
itself explains why it must appear inappropriate, for it is a theory of the psych-^ l^ 
ological directness and the logical indirectness of perceptual experience, and 
because the first isaa feature of the experience, the second does not appear as j 
a feature of it. Consequently, the 'transition' of the mind from the sign to '"fl 
what it signifies, the induced conception and belief 'suggested' by the sign are j
"Jbound to seem misdescriptions of the familiar simplicity of the experience. .
'■INatural signs operate here as if they did not exist, ‘I
In nineteenth century discussions of Reid, as in Hamilton, for example, and 
Mill, passages which seemed to be assertions of direct perception were set along- ‘ , 
side passages which seemed to be assertions of indirect perception, and Reid's . j 
inconsistency pointed out. The indirect passages all belong to the exposition of 3
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Reid's theory of perception. The contrasted passages assert that it is things ■ : 
themselves that we perceive and not their representatives in the mind. There is 
no reason to suppose that Reid would have acknowledged any inconsistency between 
them, that he would have been willing to change either the theory or the assertions 
of direct perception. The theory authorizes them. We see and handle material 
things, Reid says. The indirectness in perception which the theory recognizes 
does not rule out this plain speech, and the psychological immediacy which it also 
recognizes demands it.
Visible figure does not fit.Reid's theory. He has no explanations. It is 
just a fact that there is no sensation by which it is signified, and therefore 
no analysis of what it is to see it. There is an analysis of what it is to see
the real figure of a thing. It is similar to the analysis of the perception of
real figure by touch, with this difference that the perceptual sign is not a 
sensation and its signification has to be leamt. To ask for real figure to be 
seen more directly perceived by sight than it is, is to ask for the abolition of 
the laws of perspective.
The objects of perception are external objects. It may not be easy or even 
possible to show how the perception of tangible or visible figure could be more ;
direct than Reid makes them out to be. If a theory of the direct perception of 4
the 'secondary qualities' are wanted, it,would be provided by any theory which I
held that what Reid calls the 'sensations' of colour, sound, smell and taste are 
external objects, that is objects which exist independently of our experience of ■ 
them. In calling them sensations Reid claims that he is giving them the name 
that their nature requires. The external objects corresponding to them, signified 
by them, and therefore perceived through them are their occult 'causes' or 
occasions' in material things.
I. Ammg-^thom,#!! prominence to Reid's remarks on sensations as premieres, ‘
physical objects as conclusions, and the unique logic of signification which ^cohnects them deductively. M  '8%iio8PPhy  ^p.213.)-
_ ■.- -  ' ' ' - ■ (f f - - '33-,3: ,.4.:.',;.' ' , -3 . ■ f, - ^
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When Reid is attacking the theory of ideas, Thomas Brown remarks, he will noti,.
allow that a thing can be said to be perceived if only its effects are perceived.
When the polemic is over and Reid is expounding his own theory, he is expounding2.
the theory of ideas.
The theory of ideas in its simplest form, in which no entities are multiplied,' 
and in which to perceive an external object is to refer a sensation to its external 
cause. This, according to Brown, is all that perception is when it is more than 
sensation, the perception of the primary qualities of matter equally with percept­
ion of its secondary qualities. There is a distinction between the primary and 
the secondary qualities of matter: we define matter in terms of incompressibility
and extension. These are therefore to us its primary qualities, but all we know of
s
them is that from them we have feelings of resistance^ and ^feelings of extension* 
as all we know of its secondary qualities is that from them we have other kinds 
of sensation. Nevertheless we have an irresistible belief that matter exists
.s'-^rrindependently of Us, a belief which primitively depends on the feeling of resist^gc 
ance. Gur experience of extension by itself would leave us without the notion of jJexternal existence^being in origin nothing but the experience of succession in 1
muscular feelings. It is a feeling of resistance interrupting a familiar series ’ Ij
.Jof muscular feelings (something impeding the free movement of a limb) which first
", jmakes us aware of an external object - as a feeling of resistance it compels our :
ibelief that it has a cause which is independent of ourselves. Then by association ,
with this feeling extension and our other sensations are brought to have external i
3. ÿ
reference..f-— -----:-------   —-- -— ----            — ----------    —---1. intellectual Powers, II, Ch.VIII, p. q
2, Brown, The Philosophy of the Human Hind, p.IbO.3* The Philosophy of the Huraan Mind, Lectures XXIV ~ XXVII. There are some state­ments in these lectures and elsewhere in Brown which are not easily reconciled u 
with his general doctrine that our knowledge of matter in all its properties is 
essentially relative'^  (in Reid’s sense of the term. Brown explains) to its effects^
on us in sensation, )
: ,, , . , .
!04
3, Perceptual Relativity 
It is, Hume acknowledges, the natural belief of all men that we perceive 
external objects immediately,
"But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the 
slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the . 
mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only inlets, through 
which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate 
intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to 
diminish, as we remove farther from it; but the real table, which exists independ- 
ent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which
was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, , ■ -j 
who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, 
this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting ' I
icopies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independ-
I. . L1ent."
We have to distinguish, Reid says, between 'real' and 'apparent' magnitude, 
between the size a thing is and the size it looks. The concept of real inagniluoo i 
is primarily a concept of touch. Apparent magnitude is seen not touched. Except ]
in astronomy whose objects of study are beyond the reach of touch, apparent magnit-j
' -, ;
ude had no name until Berkeley gave it one. He called it 'visible magnitude'. It 
had no name because it was unnoticed, serving only as a sign of real magnitude " 'j 
and distance. In the sense in which visible magnitude is seen, real magnitude is ; 
never seen. Similarly we do not hear coaches or bells in the sense in which we
y, Sec.XII, Pt.I, p.152.
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hear sounds. It would be absurd to say simply that we never hear a coach or a bell;
We hear them and even at a distance or close at hand. Usage is the arbiter of I-
speech and usage has prescribed the same word for original and acquired perception;^
We are now in a position to consider Hume's sceptical argument. "The table
removewe see seems to diminish as we farther from it... but the real table suffers no alt'fi
 ^ 2, 
alteration.... therefore, it is not the real table we see," Reid admits the
premisses and denies the conclusion. Restated and freed from their ambiguity, the
premisses point to the opposite conclusion. The table seems to diminish, "that is>|
its apparent magnitude is diminished" ; suffers no alteration"in its realumag#tude'.',
Suppose for the moment that we do see the real table. "Must not this real table
seem to diminish as we remove farther from it? It is demonstrable that it must. !!
How then can tliis apparent diminution be an argument that it is not the real table 7
When that which must happen to the real table, as we remove farther from it, does . i
actually happen to the table we see, it is absurd to conclude from this, that it ih?
not the real table we see."
The disagreement between Reid and Hume is only half verbal. There is an '-V.
implied real disagreement over the status of visible figure. To Reid visible
figure is an external object, an object which can exist unseen. In Hume's opinion;
it is nothing when it is not seen- His argument has no tendency to show that Reid
is mistaken. Of course, as Reid continually reminds us, we do not pay any attent- '
ion to visible figure; it is of no importance to us except as a sign. Whether or/
not, then, it exists independently of us would hardly seem to be a matter which
concerns common sense.
Reid cannot allow it to be a matter of no consequence to common sense. It is y
a conviction of common sense that we see external objects and do not merely infer %,
them from something else that we do see. Reid has a theory which has to be 
ÎT~Iyitellectuaï Powers. II, Ch.XXII, p.336. E-,
2. Intellectual Powers, II, Gh.XIV, p.304.
3. Intellectual Powers, II, Ch. XIV, p.304
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squared with^conviction. His theory is that we do not see 'real* figure in the %■
sense in which we see 'visible^ figure. (liUine's argument is an argument for this
theory.) If we do not, then unless visible figure exists when it is not seen, no .
external object is seen in the primary sense of the word. We can properly say that
we see the real shape and size of a thing and as properly and more illuminatingly,
Reid maintains, we can say that we judge of its real shape and size, infer them,
from its visual appearances. Seeing a thing's real shape and size is not something
different from judging or inferring its real shape and size from its visual /
appearances* This is what seeing the real shape and size is.
Plain ijnen surely think that they see the table in the primary sense of 'see*,
in the sense in which they see visible figure. They are not likely to be satisfied,
by being told that they see an external object but not the external object that
they thinlc they see. And is not this what they are being told by Reid in defence
of their common sense? lot necessarily, provided that Reid is prepared to say a ,3
thing has as many different shapes as there are different positions from which it
might be seen.
It is something we may choose to say, something which will be neither true nor 
false. It is not something covered by the testimony of nature. Nature's speech 
in the matter ends with the fiat that a thing cannot have different shapes in the ,- 
one place which it occupies. The generality of the statement that a thing has as 
many shapes as there are positions from which it might be seen is objectionable 
because we want to speak of the real shape (by which we mean either the shape in ~ 
virtue of which the thing lias its 'apparent* shapes or the most familiar of these)w 
But"the tower looks from here as if it has the shape of a pepper pot", "has the 
shape of a pepper-pot from here" are idiomatic alternatives. If we are making a 
philosophical choice between them we can choose whichever makes us more comfortable 
Reid would prefer the former; nothing is to impair the primacy of tangible fi;.
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figure. It is the real figure of a thing, though we need to be reminded that the 
spatial conceptions we have even from touch may be no more than fragmentary. The 
reminder precedes a discussion of Berkeley's argument that touch and sight report 
conflictingly concerning the shape of a thing, that we have no reason to accept 
the information of one sense rather than that of the other, and must therefore IT; 
regard both tangible and visible figure as ideal. One would expect Reid to reply!# 
to Berkeley as he had to Hume, He does so with a cryptic introduction. Berkel.eyls^  
argument, he says, "loses all its force, if it be true, as was formerly hinted, that 
visible figure and extension are only a partial conception, and the tangible figure : 
and extension a more complete conception of that figure and extension which is 
really in the object". In the passage (p,325*) referred back to, Reid has said 
that a being with more senses than we have might have a more complete conception 
cTf space than we have, just as we have a more complete conception of space from ,! 
touch than we do from sight.
How are these considerations supposed to be relevant to the refutation of 
Berkeley? Sight gives us the conception of a two-dimensional space, touch adds a- • 
third dimension, and we have a space in which the laws of perspective will apply.
The visible appearances of tilings are governed by these laws and are found by sight 
to be what by these laws they must be. The testimonies of sight and touch are ; 
consequently mutually corroborative. It is hard to imagine anything else that 
Reid might have had in mind.
Beattie repeats Reid. The distinction between tangible and visible figure and- I 
magnitude is valuable to Beattie chiefly because, without it, the senses cannot b^ tpj 
cleared of the charge that they are fallacious. And it is a principle of common 
sense that "things are as they appear to the senses to be"; the correction of
2. ' j
every mistake in perception depends upon it. The tower seems to be no* bigger than-; ,;
Intellectual Powers, II, Ch.XIX, pi326.
2. Immutable Truth, Pt, I, Ch.II, Sec.II, p i 6 6 .
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(your thumb. How is this^  sensation to be reconciled with your belief that the tower
is fifty feet high? There is no difficulty; tangible magnitude is the object o§0
your belief, visible magnitude of your sensation, "When we see a lump of salt at q:
a little distance, we may perhaps take it for sugar. Is this a false sensation?
is this a proof, either that our taste, or that our sight is fallacious? No: this;
is only an erroneous opinion formed upon a true sensation# A false sensation we -
cannot suppose it to be, without supposing that tastes are perceived by the eyes. ,
And you cannot believe your opinion of the magnitude of these towers to be a false
sensation, except you believe that tangible qualities are perceived by sight.
When we speak of the magnitude of objects, we generally mean the tangible magnit-
Ï.
ude, which is no more an object of sight than of hearing."
Fallacies of the senses# It is from philosophers, Reid reflects, that one 
hears of these rather than from ordinary men. Still a man who has had a counter- 
feit coin passed off on him might complain that his senses had deceived him. We 
can find ordinary uses for the phrase 'a fallacy of the senses', let would we
mean that the senses have deceived us? Thoughtlessly perhaps, Reid remembers 
talking to a man who was not satisfied with the refutation of the doctrine of 
Transubstantiation by an appeal to the testimony of the senses: Any one of the
senses can deceive us* How do we know that there are not times when they are all 
deceiving us? Reid asked for an instance of the concurrence of several senses in
deception. Clay, he was told, could be moulded into the shape of an apple, painted■ " ^
and dabbed with essence of apple - there is a thing which ti> sight, touch and 
smell is an apple. The senses testify, Reid answered, that the thing has the 
shape, colour and smell of an apple, and it has. If I conclude that because this 
thing has some of the qualities of an apple, that it is an apple, my mistake is a 
mistake of unjustified inference.
I" Immutable Truth. Pt.II, Ch.I, 8ec.II, p.173.
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In Reid's alternative language the mistake is a misinterpretation of natural 
signs whose signification has been learnt by experience, but which are not ^
exclusively connected with the things they have been found to signify. Almost 
every experiment in optics, Reid remarks, to a man who knows nothing of optics must 
make him thinic that he cannot trust his eyes. We are no longer surprised to sec 
our reflection in a mirror, but how could a man be more grossly imposed on by his 
sight than to see himself in front of himself? Yet to anyone acquainted with the 
principles of optics, this surprising appearance constitutes part of the "visual 
language" of nature. He understands this language and knows that there is no 
deception in it, nothing at all misleading. We need to have discovered the context 
of nature's speech not to misunderstand it or find it ambiguous. Thus in vision, 
"the same appearance to the eye, may, in different circumstances, indicatewhich
different things. Therefore, when the circumstances are uiimovm upon the inter-h ;
pretation of the sign depends, their meaning must be ambiguous; and when the
circumstances are mistaken, the meaning of the signs must also be mistaken. ’-’m
"This is the case in all the phaenomena which we call"fallacies of the senses;
and particularly in those which are called fallacies in vision. The appearance
of things to the eye always corresponds to the fixed laws of Nature; therefore, if ";
we speak properly, there is no fallacy in the senses. Nature always speaketh the
same language, and useth the same signs in the same circumstances; but we sometimes
mistake the meaning of the signs, either through ignorance of the laws of Nature,
I.or through ignorance o^ the circumstances which attend the signs."
The deceptions of sense which most nearly deserve the name are those which are
•.■-4
due to disordered sense: the sour taste of sweet wine to the sick, the pain felt
in the toes after a leg has been cut off, everything yellowed in jaundice. But j2. J
what does one expect from a disordered instrument? Nature has constituted our
I» Inquiry. Ch.VI, SecXXIII, p.194.2, Have we any criteria for deciding when a sense is not disordered? Beattie has i 
a list; Are the perceptions communicated by a sense "clear and definite",
sensations signs of external objects only under certain conditions. The condit-- :
ions are Impressions made by the object, signifie# upon sense-organs and through 4M
them upon nerves and brain. The sensation follows its immediate antecedent, the
impression on the brain, whatever the antecedents of the impression on the brain.
When the remoter antecedents of the sensation are not those which nature has
established for the perception of an object, the sensation will be a false percep- 
I.
tual sign. (The meaning then of the signs even in original perception is a
contextual meaning, ^  that for all their familiarity, they can be misinterpreted^ )
The sensation itself, apart from its reference can have no falsity in it, and the
philosophers who hold the theory of ideas should, in Reid's opinion, withdraw
their complaints about the unreliability of the senses. "If the senses testify
nothing, they cannot give false testimony." They testify nothing, if their office
2.
is "only to give us the ideas of external objects".
It is part of the human condition that all our faculties are liable to damage -.
or disturbance which unfits them for their natural functions, but as this
vulnerability is common to them all, it is no justification for singling out the!!!
senses as unreliable. Philosophers have traditionally singled them out, and to j
this mistake they have usually added another; they have usually held that one of
functions of reason is to detect the fallacies of sense. (The senses are levellers
reason puts a proper distance between philosophers and the rest of mankind. ) We
are in fact as much exposed to error in the use of our reason as in the use of
our senses, and the errors we do fall into "with regard to objects of sense are
not corrected by reason, but by more accurate attention to the informations we
3.may receive by our senses themselves".
"uniformly similar in similar circumstances", compatible with the "perceptions !f| 
of my other faculties", with other men’s perceptions, able to be acted on with security ? (Immutable Truth, Pt, II, Ch. I, Sec. II, pp.I98-199.)I" Intellectual Powers! II, Ch.XVIII, pp.32o-32l.Intellectual Powers. II, Ch.XXII, p.339.
3. Intellectual Powers, II, Ch.XXII, p.339. -
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The relativity of sensations does not disturb the common sense belief in the ';| 
absolute existence of physical objects, does not hint at the possibility of a
metaphysical fallacy of the senses, their representing to us as independent objectsy;
objects which are dependent on us. On the contrary, when a man "feels the same
water hot to one hand and cold to the other, this gives him occasion to distinguish, j
between the feeling and the heat of the body; and, although he knows that the
sensations are contrary, he does not imagine that the body can have contrary
qualities at the same time. And when he finds a different taste in the same body
in sickness and in health, he is easily convinced, that the quality in the body
called taste is the same as before, although the sensations he has from it are 
I.
perhaps opposite."
Reid has not discussed the significance of the different information which we 
have from different organs of touch (the hole in a tooth which feels large to the J
tongue and small to the finger); has not shown how this relativity is no impediment 
to our acquaintance with the tangible qualities of a thing as they are in themselves. 
The relativity of sensations could carry no threat to the small absolute he claims 
for its secondary qualities.
-a
Ch.Il, Sec.IX, ppII3-II4.
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CHAPTER VI PERSONAL IDENTITY AND FREE WILL
I. Personal Identity
Among Reid's manuscripts there is a fragment of philosophy which is not yet
fully Common Sense, Reid is asking what the self is, "I mean not now to enquire
whether I am body or spirit, whether substance or accident, but what is the I
concerning which these enquiries may be made?"  The succession of ideas "I
can divide and separate. But I cannot so much a^ '.vsh^ Dpose myself divided or sep-
arated. Yet when the train of ideas is taken away what remains? I confess I
know not....I seem to have no idea of it and yet am under an invincible necessity
I.
of believing there is some such thing," The fragment ends there, and if Reid
^**0returned to the problem of a metaphysically neutral meaning for 'the self*, 
trace of his enquiry has survived. The philosophy of Common Sense will not allow 
the ignorance that is necessary in order to be able to ask the question Reid 
wished to ask. It will not alloxf even a provisional doubt as to whether the self 
is "substance or accident", that any meaninig can be found for *1’, such that we car
- / .Vfix what it is we are speaking' of, and then proceed to enquire into its category,
ûthervâse the ignorance confessed in the fragment is the ignorance taught by the
philosophy of Common Sense, and the argument against the self as a succession of
ideas is the argument of the philosophy of Common Sense.
Sensations are doubly natural signs; they signify their objects and they
simplify their subject. Different sensations signify different external things;
all sensations signify the same internal thing, the self to which they all belong.
Our sensations "suggest to us a sentient being or mind to which they belong - a
being which hath a permanent existence, although the sentations are transient and :
of short duration ~ a being which is still the same, while its sensations and
other operations are varied ten thousand ways - a being which hath the same ;
Î! Aberdeen M S . , 2l3lT4% THe'' piece of" paper is hated October 2Z; A74B. ' ™
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relation to all that infinite variety of thoughts, purposes, actions, affections,.
enjoyments, and sufferings, which we are conscious of, or can remember. The
conception of a mind is neither an idea of sensation nor of reflection; for it
is neither like any of our sensations, nor like anything we are conscious of.
The first conception of it, as well as the belief of it, and of the common
relation it bears to all that we are conscious of, or remember, is suggested to '
I,
every thinking being, we do not knowhow."
"It must be from some one impression that the idea of the self is obtained, 
if it is to pass for clear and intelligible." No, Reid says, not from any 
impression, not in the way that Hume meant. But when Hume said that there was 
no ’impression' of the self, he was not mistaken. If all the objects of consciou­
sness were to file past consciousness, the self would not be among them. Hume 
gave reasons why the self must be absent from this procession and claimed that
experiment confirmed its absence. Reid and Stewart, who agree with one another 
’
on this matter, do not report negative results from an introspective experiment, 
nor do they give a priori reasons for ruling out the self as a possible object of 
consciousness.
The objects of consciousness are "our present pains, our pleasures, our
hppes, our fears, our desires, our doubts, our thoughts of every kind; in a word,
all the passions, and all the actions and operations of our own minds, while 2.
they are present". Is there no consciousness of the self because the self is 
not a transitory object? This cannot be the reason. Like perception and unlike 
memory, consciousness must have objects that are contemporary with its act. 
Perception has permanent objects, though perception as such knows nothing of
their past and future. For the same reason, and if nothing else prevented it,1. lïiQtiiiv. Ch.V, 8ec.ni, p.122. ~ ' j
2. Intellectual Powers, V. Ch.V, p.442, In Reid's view, we are (effottlessly) 
conscious of everything that goes on in our minds; We can 'reflect' upon the >1
objects of consciousness as well as upon those of perception, that is consider |them attentively, and without this reflection our notions of them must be more or j
I e s 8  . % a g u 8 . ,  ,.( l n t e U e c t o a l , P O w e r g ^  : B . 4 4 3 - ) .  I
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there could be a consciousness of the self, though no consciousness of its perman%
ence, any more than we are conscious-.5tiiat its operations are fugitive. ;
In restricting the range of consciousness to the present, Reid claims to be
using’ the term with philosophical precision, without the least criticism of the
laxer use of it in everyday speech. We say in everyday speech that we saw a
thing move. And correctly. It would be ridiculous to find fault with a way of
speaking which is the ordinary way and has a perfectly clear meaning. By 'the
present' philosophers mean the point of time dividing the future from the past.
By ‘the present' we mean in everyday life a variable period of time going back intb
the past and on into the future. There is a before and after in motion. Therefore!
speaking philosopMcally, we do not see a thing move; speaking with the vulgar, \
we do, Neither of these forms of speech is more correct than the other - to use "
a term 'laxly* is to use it correctly where precision would be out of place - and 5
both are needed for different purposes. Similarly there is no occasion "in
common discourse, to fix accurately the limits between consciousness and memory".
If this is not done in philosophy "we confound the different powers of the mind,
I.
and ascribe to one what really belongs to another",
We are not conscious of the self Reid and Stewart say. They do not say why, 
nor indicate how they would set about arguing a man out of the mistaken belief 
that the self was one of the things of which he was conscious (provided he was 
not claiming to be conscious of its identity through time). Is it perhaps a 
mistake which is bound to arise with the states of the self as natural signs of 
the self? Natural signs are unnoticed, are so unobtrusive that the mind seems to be 
as directly aware of the objects they signify to it as if the signs were altogether! 
absent. ,
If the states of the self are its natural signs, they are natural signs !
I. Intellectual Powers, III, Ch.VI, p.351. "I
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without this transparency. They do not concentrate all the attention on the |
thing they signify, but on themselves; they are no^ effaced before the feature- j;
less substance of the self. Their analogies with natural signs which operate in |
perception would be with those which signify the secondary qualities of bodies, t
And in a further respect; Those natural signs signify something occult, and the !
states of the self signify something occult, We know nothing of the being of the !
mind absolutely; our conception of it is of it simply as the subject of its powers!
and operations. This is Reid's and Stewart's strong opinion. They may have held !
it to be an obvious consequence that the self, the mind as subject, is not an :i
object of consciousness; we could not know by consciousness that a thing is, j
without knowing what it is, i
The sensations from the secondary qualities are signs signifying their unknown
causes. Is the understanding of these signs any more than a particular applicat- |
ion of the general principle of causation? It is a little more; it is to infer '
a cause whose esse is not percipi. That the states of the self signify the self !
seems to be no more than an instance of the principle that anything not itself a j
substance must belong to one , In the Intellectual,Powers this principle, no
f " :longer disguised by the language of sign and signification, is straightforwardly )
the principle upon which we refer the states of the self to their subject. There -
■Iare some things which show that they cannot exist without belonging to something !Ielse, in the special sense of 'belonging to' which is technically called 'inherence!1in a subject'. Motion, for example, must be the motion of something, shape the |
I. Ishape of something ^ all the 'immediate' objects of perception are qualities of I
material substance, bound to it by the essential incompleteness of their being. a
I, Visible figure? If asked about the category of visible figure, Reid has said ! 
in the Inquiry, the best he could do by way of an answer was to list its charactexr| 
isties, so that those who were familiar with the categories could decide fob them-# 
selves where to place it. He gives thelist and adds the remark that wherever "a 1projection of the sphere" or a perspective drawing have "their lodgings in the categories", visible figure "will be found to dwell next door". (inquiry, CH. VI, Sec. VIII, p.m '
And similarly another substance is presupposed in the existence of everything of
which we are conscious. Anyone denying that extension, figure, size...require
a subject to wMch they belong; that thought, feeling, desire.. .require a subject^
to which they belong is beyond argument as a man who "denies first principles^ ' • *
He will, however, find, if he reflects, that the structure of his speech c ont radio'
I. ■ ilots him.
Stewart is always sparing with the language of sign and signj.fication, and 
does not use it in the present connection. Upon the occurrence of any sensation 
"we learn two facts at once; the existence of the sensation, and our own ex­
istence as sentient beings - in other words, the very exercise of consciousness 
necessarily implies a belief, not only of the present existence of what is felt, J 
but of the present existence of that which feels and thinks; or (to employ plain-! 
er language) the present existence of that being which I denote by the words I and% 
myself♦ Of these facts, however, it is the former alone of which we can properly
be said to be conscious, agreeably to the rigorous interpretation of the express- I 2.
ion." But as in every sensation, in every experience, there is immediately 
implicit a reference to the self, it is not surprising that we should read this 
habitual inference from the facts of consciousness into the facts of consciousness# 
The Cogito. ergo sum, Stewart adds does not "deserve all the ridicule" that I 
has been poured upon it. By Beattie, for instance. Could anything be absurder ! 
than that anyone should try to prove his own existence? When Milton's Adam woke g
from the sleep which followed his creation, one of his first thoughts, Beattie |
1remarks, was to enquire into the cause of his existence. In Dryden's improvment !
upon Milton, Adam is obliged to "prove his existence by argument" before being all#)
owed to engage in any further enqtiiry. "Dryden it seems, had read Des Cartes;
T* Intellectual Powers,' I, Ch.II, p.232. ^
Philosophical Essays, Pt. I, Ch.I, p.58. |
3. "What am I? or from whence? - For that I am
I know, because I think." (The State of Innocence Act, <:.5cenel.) I
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I.
but Milton bad studied nature,"
Stewart is inclined to think tlmt Descartes was not so much concerned to prove
his own existence as if there was some doubt about it, as to state the truth which;
Stewart has been stating, that the self is not an object of consciousness but is
plainly declared by all the objects of consciousness.
Every man whose mind is not unhinged is convinced of his identity as far back $
as he can remember. What is he convinced of when he is convinced of his identity
all
through this time? He is convinced that the self to which his present experiences#|A
belong was the self to which all his past experiences belonged. They have come 
and gone; it has remained through them all with an unbroken existence as one single* 
identical thing. We cannot define the notion of identity and do not need to. We 
itay say, if we wish, that identity is a relation between a thing at one time and a 4Ithing at another time, but we do not have the words to express the diff erence betwel 
between this relation and its contraries, although we are in no danger of confusing# 
it with any of its contraries. Diversity is a contrary relation, and similitude 
and dissimilitude are two more contrary relations widch everyone easily distinguisbl 
es from identity and diversity,. Identity implies an "unterrupted continuance of eæÉIexistence. That which hath ceased to exist, cannot be the same with that which A1afterwards begins to exist; for this would be to suppose a being to exist after 
it ceased to exist, and to have had existence before it was produced."
The sell is obviously indivisible; "a part of a person is a manifest absurdity''^  
People do of course (or did) speak of parts of their person, and there are contexts I 
in which 'a part of onesself ‘ would find a natural place. Éeid leaves these familiar
'Iexpressions quite unnoticed, a neglect which he would no doubt have justified on .4 
the grounds that ‘person* or ‘self* in such expressions are used with a figurative 
extension of their proper meaning. It would not have occurred to Reid to wonder
1, Immutable Truth, Pt. I, ChiI ^ec.III, p.77.
2. Intellectual Powers, m  ch.IV, p.344.■ ■I iMi iinn 1^ », 01,1 II. ii^ÉniM^i I  ^ ...
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whether the meaning with which he used the words is at all their common meaning# ^ 
And perhaps it is not to be expected that something so much taken for granted as 
the self, always there and always the same, should have thrust itself into lingvi 
uistic prominence.
%  personal identity then is "the continued existence of that indivisible
thing whj.eh I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is something which
thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought,
I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and
suffers. My thoughts, and actions, and feelings, change every moment - they
have no continued, but a successive existence; but that self or _I, to which they
belong, is permanent, and has the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, ^I.
actions, and feelings, which I call mine."
What evidence do I have for the fact of my personal identity through time?
I have the unimpeachable evidence of memory. I shall not be asked by anyone who 
Imows what he is asking, to prove that memoiy is not always fallacious. It would 
have to be always fallacious for its testimony to our personal identity to be 
nd.staken; "everything that a man remembers convinces him that he existed at the 
time remembered". The testimony of memory cannot be split into halves, into a 
reliable half that things happened and into an unreliable half that I was con­
cerned in them# I remember what happened and with the same assurance my part in 
it. Something I did; "my memory testifies not only that this was done, but that
it was done by me who now remember it", Reid says (forgetting that each faculty
is to have its proper work ascribed to it, and that memory is intruding upon
the present). "If it was done by me, I must have existed at that time, and2.
continued to exist from that time to the present."
1. Intellectual Powers, III, Ch.IV, p.345.
2. Intellactual Powers. Ill, Ch.IV, p.345.
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It is especially Stewart's opinion that the beliefs cf common sense are h
conditions of thought and intelligent action, their presuppositions, the vincula '
of their coherence. Stewart leaves hisopinion almost unargued. Reid has an
argument to show that our belief in our personal identity has the status which
Stewart later claimed collectively for the beliefs of common sense. #
"We may observe, first of all, that this conviction is indispensably
necessary to all exercise of reason. The operations of reason, whether in action
or in speculation, are made up of successive parts. The antecedent are the
foundation of the consequent, and, without the conviction that the antecedent I
have been seen or done by me, I could have no reason to proceed to the consequentI.
in any speculation, or in any active project whatever."
The evidence which people have of other people's self-identity, and there­
fore of their own farther back than they can remember, is of a completely i
different kind from the evidence they have of their own identity as far back as | 
they can remember. The evidence for other people's identity is the evidence of v| 
similarity. The man I met today looks like the man I met a year ago, behaves ih)^  
every way as he did; I have no doubt that he is the man I met a year ago. Mhen# 
ever we find great similarity we presume identity unless there is some reason à 
not to. Since the indirect evidence for identity is a matter of similarity, and# 
similarity is a matter of degree, it is evidence which varies from what will | 
justify certainty, to a justification for no more than the barest presumption.
One supposes that Reid saw that his account of the transition from phenomenal 
similarity to metaphysical identity is very plliptical; he does not give any 
indication. Nor any indication whether he would allow that the everyday express­
ions for personal identity change their primary meaning to something less occult 
when we use them not of ourselves but of others. Ho metaphysical thoughts cross '
I* Intellectual Powers, III, Ch.IV, p.344.
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as someoneour minds when we recognize someone^wn have met before. It is perhaps that we 
stop at the signs whose significance we would always go on to realize, but in the 
ordinary business of life have no oceasion to. Reid does not say.
Personal identity is a 'perfect identity'*; that is there are no degrees of it. 
The identity of material things is imperfect; they are made up of parts which thé 
are always losing and replacing with other parts, or simply losing. If the change 
is gradual enough it might even become total, and the thing still be considered tl 
same thing as long as it keeps the same name. 'Identity' is a word with this
ambiguity, that it is vague when applied to things and precise when applied to *
persons. The changes which '"‘common language*^  makes consistent with the identity 
of things differ in number and degree, not in kind from those which destroy it. 
Questions, therefore, as to whether a thing is the same thing at difierent times 
are verbal questions. They have either no right answers or the usual answers are 
the right answers.'*
To make personal identity consist in "consciousness alone", as Locke does, is 
to confuse the evidence that a man has for his identity with M s  identity. This 
is very paradoxical and has vemy paradoxical consequences. It follows that none ; 
of us were ever born; that "a man may be, and at the same- %*##-not be , the t; 
person that did a particular action.
"Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for 
robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in the first campaign^ 
and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be - I
admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of hisii 
having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of 3
his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost consciousness of his flogging. #
£
"These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr Locke's doctrine, that he '|| 
I. intellectual Powers, f||^ ch.IV, p.346.
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who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he
àwho took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it /
follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person :j
with him who was flogged at school. But the general* s consciousness does reac)
SO far back as his flogging - therefore, according to Mr Locke's doctrine, he 1B|
■4not the person who was flogged. Therefore, the general is, and at the same M
I.time is not the same person with him who was flogged at school." J
The self, the mind, is that which thinks and feels and desires and wills. -1:i
But when you ask, not what it does, but what it is, there is no answer. You :| 
are not satisfied with the information that matter is extended, solid, divisible]
you knew it had these properties and now want to know the nature of the "thing k
■itself". There is again no answer. We do imow what some things are ^in them- #
selves*. Our notions of these can be called 'direct' ."Of other things, we know #
*1not what they are in themselves, but only that they have certain properties or I
■i
attributes, or certain relations to other things: of these our conception is !2. ,, 1 
only relative. If a thing is distinguished from other things by ant extraneous 4
circumstance, by its place for example, as a book might be by Its location on a-#!
book-shelf, we have a merely relative conception of it. The secondary qualities^ 
of bodies are unknow causes of known effects ; we have relative notions of the f 
secondary qualities of bodies. We have direct notions of their primary qualities 
and it is part of the work of natural philosophy to convert our relative notions • 
of secondary qualities into direct notions. #
We have also relative notions of another kind, notions which are derived not| 
from the accidental circumstances of things, but from their"essential attributes'!
Inotions which cannot be turned into direct notions. One term only of a relations;
is presented and its correlative and the relation read off intuitively from it*;|
1. Intellectual Powers, III, Ch.VI, p.351, f
2, Active Powers, I,, Ch.X, p. 513,
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These are our notions of matter and mind as substantial things.
What is it that is left in obscurity if the "essential attributes" of matter 
and mind are disclosed? Presumably attributes which are still more essential, >1; 
the ground of those which make the essential difference between matter and mind - 
in our experience of them. For if the substances were featureless in themselves; 
or if their features were simply their observable features, there would be ^'
nothing absent in the relative concept which would be present in the direct 1
concept which we might have had if God had given us different intellectual #
powers. 3
A relative knowledge of matter and mind is an absolute ignorance of their # 
essential nature, and any words which do not sharply remind us of our ignorance g 
have to be avoided. The words 'spiritual being' are not agnostic enough for f 
Stewart, It is, he remarks, unfortunate that the two very important negative | 
truths, whose recognition we owe especially to Descartes, should have been I 
obscured (one of them by Descartes’ commentation, the other by Descartes g■ y
himself) under misleadingly positive language. How much futile controversy 3
might have been stifled if the simple facts had been simply stated: the mind I
is immaterial, and some of our concepts are not derived from sensation. InsteadII.
we have the mysteries of the mind's 'spirituality' and of 'innate ideas'. 5
If we are absolutely ignorant of the essential nature of matter and mind, I 
how do we know that they are essentially different? The question is too obvious 
to have escaped Reid's notice and since he has not answered it and speaks with ^ 
untroubled conviction of two substances, he must have thought the traditional 
answer satisfactory: The opposite properties of matter and mind could not inher
in a single substance. The activity of the mind and the inertia of matter, the 
indivisibility of the mind, the divisibility of matter; Reid heavily emphasizes
I. Dissertation, pp. 117, 148,
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these contrasted features of matter and mind, and he may have considered that -f
there was no longer any meaning in the words 'belonging to a subject' if these
'are supposed to be properties which could belong to the same subject, #
I' IStewart is less consistently sure than Reid that the difference between
matter and mind goes beyond their phenomenal difference, and not very intereste».,, 
in whether it does so or not. Ho important human concerns are affected either 4
- Vway, and certainly not the question of our immortality. We have better assur- i"Iances of our immortality than from the soul's simplicity; we have "the moral #1
judgments and moral feelings of the human heart". "The proper use of the argu-4
%ment concerning the immateriality of mind, is not to establish any positive S|
conclusion as to its destiny hereafter; but to repel the reasonings alleged by 3■i
materialists, as proofs that its annihilation must be the obvious and necessary %2. ' 
effect of the dissolution of the body." I
But the science of the mind depends upon the recognition that the phenomenal
difference between matter and mind is absolute, that they are two entirely 4
V ÿseparate worlds for investigation, that nothing found in one of them can be #
applied to the solution of any problems in the other. The science of the mind is
the examination of the facts of consciousness, their reduction to general laws
and the deduction of the consequences of these laws. The metaphysical material-«
1istsare comparatively harmless, because metaphysical; the psychological materia^
istshave a programme which will end the science of the mind. Stewart is usually 'À1mild critic, but he is always fierce against Hartley and the philosophers who d
ihave shared his views. "Many absurd theoried have, indeed, at different times bq
,1^
been produced by our countrymen; but I know of no part of Europe where such ' 4■1systems as those of Hartley and Bonnet have been so uniformly treated with the 3
3.contemptthey deserve as in Scotland."
1. Cp. Elements, Vol.I, Introduction, p.47 with Dissertation, pp.66-69, p.114.
2. Dissertation, pp.113-116.
3 . Dissertation, p.433#
  '' '   ' '
:
Reid of course agrees with Stewart that the philosophy of the mind is to he . ' 
built upon a pure phenomenology of the mind, but the metaphysical interests of 
common sense have also to be watched, and common sense is implicitly dualist T 
root and branch. Bodies and minds are altogether different kinds of thmngs, 
not tilings that might merge into identity below their manifested properties, 
though common sense has had to wait on philosophy (on Descartes in particular, 
Reid thinks) to know how to put the difference properly. In the ancient world 1Vphilosophers and the vulgar alike had no better concepts for the purpose than a #
Tdistinction between 'gross' and 'subtle' matter. It is not surprising that the v
■f
tendency "to materialize the mind and its contents" should have had so long a
history. The language for the description of the mind has been borrowed from J 
the language for the description of material things, the earliest objects of evdi 
everyone's attention and the strongest for most men all their lives. 4
Every man knows, however inarticulately, that his being is indivisible and 3ÿjthat he is capable of originating action. He has therefore, the premisses for J
: Hthe deduction of the soul's immateriality, since material being is essentially 4%
■divisible and essentially passive. The essential passivity of matter, the fact 3 
it acts only as it is acted upon, is not an intuitive deliverance of common
-1sense. It is a fact established by experience and so thoroughly that it .isI. ^
now " a fundamental principle of natural philosophy", In the infancy of the race';
men not icnowing what caused the behaviour of material things but knowing that yIsomething must, read into them an activity like the activity they found in them-j 
selves. The relics of this notion are to be found in all languages. Thus the 
analogies between matter and mind have not always been drawn in one direction, 1 
Their expulsion was a necessity for natural philosophy and is for the philosophyJ 
of the mi.nd.
I, Aberdeen MSS., 2131*6,
... ' . ' k
2%
It is the universal conviction of men, Beattie says, that we have souls
which are completely different things from our bodies. No arguments are needed 
in support of this conviction; no arguments can shift it. This conviction has' 
intuitive evidence; it has "the evidence of internal sense". Whatever any man 
may say, he shows in his conversation and behaviour "by plain signs" that he ? 
makes an absolute distinction between his body and his soul* Beattie has heard ' 
of only one man whose professed belief that he had no soul was uncontradicted ’’ 
by his behaviour# He was a clergyman of a generation back and he became certain 
that God had for some reason removed his soul and left him a mere animal* Every 
one will agree that this melancholy delusion was due to madness, to a "depravat­
ion of the intellect" as real as if a person had come to believe that he was 
I.
without a body. 1
Without personal identity, no moral responsibility* And no philosopher is f 
ïound disputing it. This is frustrating because the Common Sense philospphers 
did not intend the statement as an eirenical statement. They are quite sure 
that ordinary men, and the philosophers who have resolved personal identity intc 
a serial identity, do not mean the same thing by the 'same person'*. The person­
al identity implied by moral responsibility is the identity of the samé 
individual being through time. There could still be the deceptive agreement*
If one is to be driven into tectmicalities which will have to be laboriously 
explained to the plain man whose convictions are being defended, if his convict­
ions cannot be stated in his own language because philosophers have made it 
ambiguous, then the identity presupposed is the identity of ‘substance*.
When Hume explains in turn in his ovm vocabulary what personal identity is, 
he says it is "that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we 
have an intimate memory and consciousness". Reid and %%ae are now able to
I. Immutable Truth. Pt.I, Ch.II, Sec.II, pp.79-81. Treatise7 &.II, Pt.I, 8ec.II, P.277*
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disagree on the presupposition of moral responsibility. The personal identity 4
which consists in the unity of a series is inadequate for it,Reid is saying. A 4
series is not the sort of thing that can do things and be held responsible for t
them; none of the capacities of persons are capacities of series. Only the
individual members of a series are ever actual. Therefore if our personal
identity is to be resolved into a serial identity, and somethihg real is to be
responsible for what something real has done, future members of the series will
be made responsible for the actions of past members; that is for what they
themselves have not done and could not have prevented. "If one set of ideas
makes a covenant, another breaks it, and a third is punished for it, there is
I.
reason to think that justice is no natural virtue in this system,"
Our moral responsibility for an action is not more evident than the personal 
identity which it implies, nor more evident than the freedom of the will which 
it also implies, While the truths of common sense do not form a system of truths 
connected by mutual implications, there are some necessary connections between 
some of them. Moral responsibility presupposes personal identity and free will;? 
free will a self which cannot be resolved into its actions and passions, and l-j 
which is immaterial in nature, '
2, Free Will I
We shall find, unless Hume is greatly mistaken, that "all men have ever 4
agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty, according to any reasoffe
able sense, which can be put on these terms; and that the whole controversy hass
2. 1 
hitherto turned merely upon words',* 3IIt is taken for granted by everyone that "the conjunction between motives
• 3and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and 'I 
effect in any part of nature". (p.88.) Do we need reminders? A prisoner on |
1. Inquiry, Ch.X , Sec.71, p.109.2. mnquiry. Sec.TIII, Pt,!] p.81.
;
the way to the scaffold knows he will die from the inflexibility of his guards % 
as inevitably as from the edge of the axe. A man who has left a purse full of M
gold on the pavement at Charing Cross would as little expect to find it untouched 
on his return as to have seen it fly off like a feather. Human life depends as ‘1 
much upon the uniformity of human behaviour as upon the uniformity of nature. d:: -1^Nothing of what is ordinarily said of the inconsistency and unreliability of |
‘I
men contradicts, or is thought to contradict, the uniform dependence of their |Iactions upon their motives. We allow for our ignorance of character or 3
■Vi
circumstances.
■g
Everyone who acknowledges this uniformity in men's behaviour, and everyone 1
■ ■!
does "in common life", acknowledges a necessity in human actions. Anyone who
denies a necessity in human actions is stumbling over the word ‘necessity*. He 1■3
thinks of necessity as constraint or compulsion, and he knows that many of his  ^j'i
actions are free from constraint or compulsion. In the Treatise Hume had Imentioned that ‘liberty* in the "most common sense" of the word means no con- #
4
straint or compulsion, without mentioning that in the most common sense of the \: '3 
■words ‘liberty‘ and 'necessity* are opposites. He had even spoken of the bonds:;
"I.of necessity’* from which we can never free ourselves. In the Enquir.y the bonds I
V
of necessity are not heard of, and the word * necessity‘ itself might have dis- 1 
appeared with advantage. It disappearance would manoeuvre the indeterminist 
nearer to unintelligible speech, and its presence brings with it the clanking ,3
of chains. Necessity is no more than "the constant conjunction of like objects"/;
-
or from another point of view, it is the inference from m e  to the other, found0 
upon their constant conjunction.(p.97.) /
The belief in liberty is as universal as the belief in necessity. No one 
denies that we have "a power of acting or not acting, according to the deteimin-
„2£-ÎÈÎ ZiH:” (p*95.); that there are many things which we can do, if we 
I' _ P ^ ^ 1 47 j gvy y ' / '7**" _  :
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chose to. And obviously there is no contradiction between necessity, as Hume ;4
;has defined it, and liberty as Èume has defined it, i
It is a verbal embarrassment to Hume to be at once reconciling 'liberty * ÿ
4and 'necessity^ , and attacking the 'doctrine of liberty*. To avoid it we shall :.i 
where it is likely to arise use the names 'determinism* and 'indeterminism* I
for the opposed doctrines and keep th.. word 'free will * as far as possible n 3
neutral between them,
In the Treatise more strongly than in the Enquiry, but in the Enquiry also|
Hume gives the impression that he thought that the belief in the indeterminacy s3
of the will is a very general belief, a widespread illusion. There is not 3;
.0simply a universal belief in determinism and a universal belief in the free ,4 
will which is consistent with it, "Few are capable of distinguishing betwixt ■>; 
the liberty of spontaneity, as it is call'd in the schools, and the liberty of 3
indifference; betwixt that which is oppos'd to violence, and that which means r
I-a negation of necessity and causes." Necessity may be denied in words by peopl# 
who have misunderstood the word 'necessity*, and indeterminism is asserted .. 
against necessity by people who have not thought out the meaning of IMetdmin- 'i 
ism . There is then a universal belief in determinism and in a freedom of the
will compatible with it, and a veiy general belief in a freedom of the will ::g
incompatible with it. (And since people have imagined that they could actually %
iexperience the indeterminacy of choice, some factual argument, as well as "a tmf'.- 
intelligible definitions" is needed to end the controversy over free will.) 3 
The'doctrine ot indeterminism, in opinion, either means nothing, or %
.isomething absurd. As the negation of necessity and causes, the doctrine is |
intelligible and absurd. For what is this negation but the assertion that all ;|
human actions are random and chance occurrences? It is unintelligible, has no
I. Treatise. Bk.II, Pt.III, Sec.II, p.407.
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meaning at all^ when it is construed as an attempt to combine the negation of N 
necessity with the assertion of causes, since ’necessity' is an essential part 3 
of what we mean by 'cause'. Some philosophers try to make a distinction between; 
causes which are necessary and others which are not, Hume will allow the
distinction when he sees 'cause' defined with the idea of necessary connection /j
dleft out, and the origin of the idea expressed by the definition clearly /
indicated. He is sure that he will never see it, We would have no notion of I
cause and effect if we had had no experience of the constant conjunction of 4
objects; we have no other notion of cause and effect than the notion of this |
conjunction with the inference founded upon it, "And this constancy forms the ’
very essence of necessity, nor have we any other idea of it." A definition of |
'cause' omitting these circumstances will either be unintelligible, or the terms'
I. 1in it will be synonymous with the term to be defined;* 3|
Moral responsibility presupposes free will. It presupposes the free will
which is compatible with determinism, and it is incompatible with a free will,,, .j
incompatible with determinism. "Actions are, by their very nature, temporary Ig 
and perisMng; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and 1 
disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his A
honour, if good; nor infamy if evil. The actions themselves may be blameablc;.
they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion; But the person | 
is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is / 
durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is '3
impossible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment or 4
vengeance. According to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and 3 
consequentlypauses, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the j 
most horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character 3
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anyvjise concerned in his actions, since they are not derived from it." (p.98)
The belief in liberty and the belief in necessity, Hume might have said, 
are beliefs of common sense, if anything is. Both are universal (though as a { 
universal belief the belief in necessity does not ^o under that name); and if S 
either is denied in theory, it is affirmed in practice. And both are implied /j 
by the common sense belief in moral responsibility. The work that the common | 
sense philosopher has to do on these beliefs is the work that Hume has been 4 
doing: clarifying them, showing their mutual consistency, prising off a third )
and false belief which has fastened on to the first. Hurne might have said this , 
also. . i
One would have expected that when Reid came to deal with the questions of
liberty and necessity, he would have dealt with Hume, and either have accepted
his work in principle, or have set about exposing it as more dangerous to common 
sense than an open attack upon common sense, Reid hardly mentions Hume, Priestli 
seems to have displaced Hume to some extent in Reid's attention as Reid grew | 
older - not the Priestley of the Examination, but Priestley the materialist ,! 
and necessitarian - and there is some manuscript indication that the essay on J 
the Liberty of Moral Agents was not put into its final form until most of the 
rest of the Active Powers had been written. It is Priestley who figures in the! 
discussion, Priestley and Leibniz, and Reid's argument has to be deflected from ; 
them on to Hume, if we want his answer to Hume, ]
"If it cannot be proved that we always act from necessity, there is no need 1
I. • 1of arguments on the other side to convince us that we are free agents." The /
common sense philosopher is concerned with arguments against our free agency, y
and first with its apparent assertion and real denial. /
A power of acting according to the determinations of the will, What more
I. Active Powers, IV, Ch.VI, p.62o,
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does anyone want in the way of free will than to be able to do a thing if one %
chooses? To be able to choose to do it or choose not to do it. Besides the
power to act as we will. we require "a power over the déterminât!ons of the will /
~ Jitself", We have, in Reid's opinion, half the free will we think we have, if 
have no more of it than Hume allows us, We are able to do many things if we 'i 
choose, but have no liberty of choice. Or has Hume been misunderstood? He does 
say that the liberty of the will is a ' hypothetical ' liberty and this seems to
imply that "We could sometimes have done something we did not do" needs the
expansion of "if we had chosen", in order to bring out the meaning in which it is
a true statement (and verifiably true). And this leaves unanswered, might evehy
seem to rule out the question, "Could we ever have chosen to do anything which  ^
we did not do?"
In maintaining the liberty which is opposed to 'violence*, Hume would certain
ly maintain that he had provided for our being able to choose, and had not left '
us with merely executive powers. There are obvious things that he might have
said: Whenever we declare that we could not have chosen to do otherwise, we are-
prepared to state what it was that prevented us| Threats or physical compulsion; 
we acted in the grip of an ungovernable passion; before we had time to thinic.
Circumstances such as these take away our power of choice, and Hume of course
denies with plain common sense that we always find ourselves in circumstances 
such as these.
The scheme of necessity, Reid is convinced, cannot allow us a power over the
determinations of the will. A power of acting as we choose, but not the power of
choice, if the choice is between genuinely open alternatives. And necessitarian 
philosophers have very generally argued that there is a logical absurdity in
speaking of a power over the determinations of the will. :
I, Active Powers, IV, Ch.I, p.599. 4
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"Liberty, they say, consists only in a power to act as we will ; and it is |
impossible to conceive in any being a greater liberty than this. Hence it follow#
that liberty does not extend to the determinations of the will, but only to the '
actions consequent to its determination, and depending upon the will. To say 4
that we have power to will such an action, is to say, that we may will it, if we I
will. This supposes the will to be determined by a prior will; and, for the samel
reason, that will must be determined by a will prior to it, and so on in an
infinite series of wills, which is absurd* To act freely, therefore, can mean ?
nothing more than to act voluntarily; and this is all the liberty that can be
I.
conceived in man, or in any being."
This argument, Reid says, does not touch his definition of liberty, since it % 
is an argument grounded upon a definition "totally different". His definition 
is "a power over the deteminations of the will itself".
There must be more to Reid's answer than shows on the surface. It is perhaps, 
this, that the argument is improperly assimilating 'to be able to do a thing' and; 
'to be able to choose to do it'* To be able to do a thing is to be able to do it, 
if oneochooses. The necessitarian philosopher is demanding a similar expansion - 
for the other phrase and then pointing to the absurdity in speaking of a power 
over the determinations of the will. Reid's answer is then a denial that ‘a powei 
over the determinations of the will* conceals any ^ lypothetical,
The necessitarian philosopher has not yet finished with Reid's definition, ' 
He now appeals to ordinary language against it, When we say that we have power 
over something we mean that it is under the control of our will, so that it is 
meaningless to say that we have power over the detérminations of our will.
The significance of our ordinary way of speaking has been misunderstood. ?
"In common life, when men speak of what is, or is not, in a man's power, they : 
I. Active Powers, IV, Ch.I, p.bOl,
attend only to the external and visible effects, which only can be perceived, an<
which only can affect them. Of these, it is true that nothing is in a man's
power but what depends upno his will, and this is all that is meant by this
common saying. i
"But this is so far from excluding his will from being in his power, that if
necessarily implies it. For to say that what depends upon the will is in a manf
power, but the will is not in his power, is to say that the end is in his power|
but the means necessary to that end are not in his power, which is a i c.
I.
contradiction."
To have free will, to be a free agent, is to have power over the determin- 4 
ations of the will (and, but this is not in dispute, to have power to act as 3 
we will). The doctrine of necessity is the doctrine that the determination of 1
the will is "the necessary consequence of the constitution of the person, and th
2 ■ *’^» V-rcircumstances in which he is placed". It is a consequence of the possession of 
free will that a man's actions might have been different, the constitution of ■ %
his person being what it was and his circumstances what they were. Might have
been different and yet, Reid maintains,were not random occurrences, were the #
actions of an agent, actions which have had a cause as every event must. We 1
have now to see Reid with the problem on his hands of combining the denial of *
necessity with the assertion of causes. 1
Reid will allow no exceptions to the principle of causation. "Neither -
3. jexistence, nor any mode of existence, can begin without an efficient cause." '<
This is a necessary truth and a principle of common sense, and like every 
principle of common sense it governs the conduct of every man whether he acknow^ 
ledges it or not. "And", Reid says in a bad moment, "if it were posf-ible for 
any man to root out this principle from his mind, he must give up everything 3
1. Active Powers. IV, Ch.X p.602,
2. Active Powers, IV, Ch.I, p.602,3. Active Powers, IV, Ch.II, p.603#-  — —'  - - - • . » « - * —'
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that is called common prudence, and be fit only to be confined as insane," An
'Î
efficient cause is a cause which produces its effect, makes it happen, brings it#
"1
into existence. By an 'efficient cause* Reid means more than these synonyms j.3
indicate, but they sufficiently mark the distinction he is initially making y 
between an efficient cause and a cause which is no more than a constant anteced-:■ ' .t
ent. By a 'cause* we primarily mean, Reid never doubts, an efficient cause. y: i
There is also a cluster of secondary meanings to the word. In the most iioportan'l 
of these, the constant antecedents of phenomena are called’causes *, Natural -
philosophy is concerned with causes in this sense, and we are concerned with - e
i
causes in this sense, Reid would have admitted on reflection, when we regulate |
our lives with common prudence, 3
How did we come to have the notion of an efficient cause? We are ourselves# 
the efficient causes of our voluntary actions. Without the knowledge of our own# 
agency we should, in all probability, have been without the notion of an efficieri' 
cause, and consequently, ignorant of the necessary truth in which this notion /
figures. We certainly have no notion of an active power which is not analogous |
to the power which we find in ourselves; that is a power which is exerted by ; 
"will and understanding". The Divine agency is something that we can understand ;
Jup to a point; material agency defeats our comprehension.
Why does Reid find the notion of material agency so peculiarly baffling? He # 
has very nearly defined agency in such a way that only persons can be agents. # 
Active power is the power to originate change, the power to act without being J
acted upon; a power therefore which therefore belongs to will, and, as far as wé|
can see, to nothing else. Matter acts only as it is acted upon; its nature 1 
excludes spontaneity.
everything which undergoes any change, must either be the efficient
*I 7' ActÏve "Pow^, fVr 'cïï7ri,‘'’‘p76Ü37 i
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cause of that change in itself, or it must be changed ^  some other being. 4
"In the first case, it is said to have active power, and to act in producing?
that change. In the second case, it is merely passive, or is acted upon, and ;
I.
the activ. power is in that being only which produces the change."
"Power to produce any effect, implies power not to produce it. We can '1
conceive no way in which power may be determined to one of these rather than the'2.
other, in a being that has no will."
The power in virtue of which an efficient cause produces its effect is
"active power' .^ How then could any material thing possibly be an efficient cause
Reid listens unconiprehendingly to the assertion of the possibility. If there is;
any meaning in the words he hears, it is "essentially different" from the meaning
3.he has for the words 'power' and 'efficiency*.
Does Reid think that matter can do anything at all, act even with a derivativ
4.
agency? Standard commentary on Reid represents him as considering it highly /
doubtful, as holding that causal transactions between material things are the
occasions for the actions of real agents, that tnere are no occult depths in a /
physical cause in virtue of which it is more than a constant antecedent. It may 1
be so. Mature displays numberless effects, Reid says, but the agent is always
behind the scenes. The agent he suggests is God Himself or some being to which
5.
God has delegated agency. But the main evidence for this interpretation of Reid 
is constituted by his repeated denials that matter could be capable of agency, of; 
efficient causality. And as the meaning which he puts upon these words is 
essentially different from the meaning they have for anyone else, there is nothing 
in these denialsto justify the opinion that Reid held matter to be so inert as to\
1. Active Powers, IV, Ch.II, p.603.
2. Active Powers, I, Ch. V, p.523#3. Jhjtiye_Powers, I, Ch.VI, p.525.
4. Cousin, Phi1osophie Ecossai se, Lee.XXIII, p.550 If.; McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy, p.225,
5. Active Powers, I, Ch.V, p.522.
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be incapable of action, incapable of producing effects, even when it is acted |
upon. V
To say that we derive our notion of efficient cause from our activity as J
efficient causes is, Reid recognizes, to say very little. Agency is not intro-
spectible. If all our ideas have to be ideas of sensation or of reflection, we 1
do not have the idea of efficient cause. We do have the idea of it. Some of #
our ideas are not ideas either of sensation or of reflection. Everyone who kno%
the language knows that the word 'cause' has a meaning, and a primary meaning,
which is not given by the addition together of the ideas of priority, contiguity
and constant conjunction. The power in virtue of which an agent can be an agent
is no more an object of consciousness than it is of touch or sight. But we have
the idea of powerthough the idea is matched by no 'impression'. If we had no
idea of power, if the word 'power' was a word without any meaning, we could not
I 'distinguish between sense and nonsense in a discussion of the nature of power. * !
The freedom of the will is a necessary consequence of the fact that we are #
the causes of our own actions. To be an agent is to be free to choose how one r:2.
shall act and to able to act as one chooses. Let us keep our attention fixed 
on the meaning of 'cause' and the meaning of 'agent', and we shall 'immediately . 
perceive a contradiction in the terms necessary cause and necessary agent". And 1 
to say that man is "a free agent, is no more than to say that, in some instances
he is truly an agent and a cause, and is not merely acted upon as a passive
3. ■ ;instrument". Neither existence nor any mode of existence can begin without an# 
efficient cause, and its efficient cause is a being actualizing the power of * 
self-determining choice. •
1. Active Powers, I, Ch.I, p.*2. Philosophers may "dispute innocently, whether we be the proper efficient 
causes of the voluntary motions of our own body: or whether we be onl^ r, as
whatever else may have concurred in its production. (Active Powers,I, ChVIII, p.52 
3. Active Powers, TV, Ch,III, p.6o7. . .  . ....
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Can anything be salvaged from the conclusion which Reid has made inevitable 
by the meanings he has put into his words? The question-begging meaning of 'self 
determining agent* would have to come out of the meaning of ‘efficient cause' i 
and the word left to mean efficient cause. The making of a choice is an occurr^l 
ence, and like every other occurrence must have a cause* What is its cause?
Reid can still give the answer he wanted to give: A "free action is an effect
produced by a being who had power and will to produce it; therefore it is not %
I"an effect without a cause." If it is not part of the meaning of 'cause' that a 
cause is a self-determining agent, it is equally not part of its meaning that a 
cause is a necessary agent. A cause is a cause. <
Reid acknowledges that if a cause is nothing but "such previous circumstanced
2. Ias are constantly followed by a certain effect", then an act of free choice is an
event without a cause. But this is not what is meant by 'cause' in the principle
that everything that happens must have a cause. There could be an exception to |
the principle, if the cause required was a cause in the sense of the definition I
which Priestley is repeating from Hume. It would follow from thid definition /
"that whatever was singular in its nature, or the first thing of its kind, could3 
3# t
have no cause." (And the antecedent circumstances are as nothing to the origin
of a thing if their connection with the thing is merely antecedence. ) If a thing
cannot begin to exist without a cause, it is an efficient cause on which its /
existence depends,a cause which brings it into existence.
Reid also acknowledges, he says, that to,establish the doctrine of necessity •]
it is sufficient that "throughout all nature, the same consequences should
4. 1
invariably result from the same circumstances". 1
1. Active Powers, IV, Ch.IX, p.626. I
2. Priestley, The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity,. p.II. Priestley goes baci 
on Hume by adding "the constancy of the result making us conclude that there # must be a sufficient reason, in the nature of things, why it should be produced i those circumstances". 13. Active Powers, IV, Ch.IX, p.627* R
4* Active Powers, XV, Ch.IX, p .626. .
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How is our free will in any way affected by the fact that, as a matter of 4 
fact, the same consequences invariably follow upon the same antecedents? I do ■ 
not in any way have to do the thing that I do because I always would do that 
thing in those circumstances. And a philosopher who held a deteminist theory bjp; 
the kind which Hume held might continue: With causal necessity dissolvea, into |
this mere matter of fact - "constancy forms the very essence of necessity, nor ?
have we any other idea of it" - all the fatality has gone out of it. "'Twas
I.  ^ '1utterly impossible for us to have acted otherwise" means no more than that all pi
actions have been predictable in principle. The indeterminist contradiction of 1
the determinist statement means no more than that some of our actions have been #
unpredictable in principle. And unpredictability in principle is no foundation
for moral responsibility. It is its dissolution. If indeterûnisni is true, a
man's actions are events which merely happen to happen. He is not the author of #
them; they proceed from nothing in him that is "constant and durable"; however %
bad they are, he is always innocent.
Reid gives no reasons for his opinion that the doctrine of necessity is admitt|
when it is admitted that the same antecedents have invariably as a matter oi fact!
the same consequents. And we shall come later on to his argument that the i
uniformity,' which we do find in human behaviour is consistent with our having a :
power over the determinations of our wills and is indeeed what is to be expected ^
from our having this power, we shall also defer the question whether a sense
consistent with moral responsibility can be found for "It is possible for us -j
sometimes to have acted otherwise" when, as a necessitarian proposition, "It is /
impossible for us ever to have acted otherwise" has become "All our actions havet^
been predictable in principle", At the moment our concern is with whether indeteâ
minism leaves human actions without agents. We have Reid's answer and implied in 
I. Treatise. Bk.II. Pt.III. Sec.II. p.407.
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it, Hume's criticism of an indeterminist theory turned against Hume's theory of 
our agency.
It is on Hume'8 view of causation that no man is ever really the author of 
his actions. One thing happens and then another thing happens; nothing is ever | 
made to happen, brought into existence. There are Invariable patterns of ante- 4, 
cedent and consequent, but between antecedent and consequent there is no other 
connection than sequence. They are entirely loose and separate in themselves.
But a man's actions are not his actions unless he really brings them into exist- < 
ence and not his actions unless he brings them into existence without having to d( 
so. And a man's free actions do proceed from the most constant and durable thing; 
in him, from his personal being which is responsible foi all that he does, becausl 
it is the self-determining agent in all that he does.. If of course the self is 1 
resolved into a series of associated perceptions, it would be absurd to suppose ti 
that it could be a free agent; absurd to suppose it capable of any sort of agencj
The opinion that our actions are determined by our motives involves, in Reldl#
opinion, a similar absurdity. Motives are turned into causes or agents acting ,1
upon the person whose motives they are, when in fact they are "neither causes nor]
agents. They suppose an efficient cause, and can do nothing without it. We
cannot, without absurdity, suppose a motive either to act, or be acted upon; it #
is equally incapable of action and of passion; because it is not a thing that f
exists, but a thing that is conceived; it is what the schoolmen called an ens #
ration!s. Motives, therefore, may influence to action, but they do not act. They/
may be compared to advice, or exhortation, which leaves a man still at liberty. •
For in vain is advice given when there is not a power either to do or to forbear -I
what it recommends. In like mnner, motives suppose liberty in the agent, other/
I.wise they have no influence at all,"
I. Active Powers, IV, Ch.IV, p.608,
. - t;-.'
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We do ask "Vfhat caused him to act in that way", and might ask ttiis question #
asking for M s  motives, and Reid is not saying that there would then be any i .pfi
■impropriety in tiie wording of the question. The word 'cause* is a very ambigu-:) 
I,
ous word; many secondary meanings have grown out of its primary meaning. Thei'el
is a definition of * cause * which covers all its meanings; "Causa est id, quo f 
posito ponitur Effectua, quo sublato tollitur. This, %tou will easily see, incluq 
many relations, and, I believe, includes all that in any language are expressed 1 
by cause, though in some languages some of the relations included under the def-/
i nit ion may not be called causes, on account, perhaps, of their having some other2. J
word appropriated to signify such relations." Since a motive is called a cause #
in this highly general sense, we are encouraged to think that it is a cause in |
the sense in which it is not and could not be.
Once motives are regarded as efficient causes, as forces, analogy suggests '
the law of their operation, "Every action, or change of action, in an intellig- ;
ent being, is proportional to the force of motives impressed, and in the directid
3. , :fof tiiat force.
•J
E v e n  supposing i t  true that we never act w i t h o u t  a motive, necessitarian ;■ 
t h e o r y  has misconstrued what it Is to act w i t h  a  motive: t h e  theory represents 1
i t  as being a c t e d  u p o n  by a motive. It i s ,  however, not e v e n  true that we never/ 
act without a m o t i v e . W e  o f t e n  do, and act m o r e o v e r  with " f o r e t h o u g h t  a n d  will" 
Cases frequently occur in which an end of s o m e  i m p o r t a n c e  m a y  be reached equally q 
well by any one of a number of different means, A man h a s  n o  difficulty i n  t a k i h j  
one o f  t h S G S  r a t h e r  t h a n  another, though the one h e  s e l e c t s  has no t i t l e  to
preference over the others. And if men cannot act without a motive, what are i
1. Aristotle's "distinction of causes into four kinds is not a division of a ? 
genus into its species, but of an ambiguous word into its different meanings", "Letter to James Gregory", Reid's Collected Works, p.75.2."Letter to James Gregory", Reid's Collected Works,p.76. #
3. Active Powers, IV, Ch.IV. p.609.
:
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such words as 'wilfullness' and 'caprice' doing in the language? There is admit
edly no moral value in a motiveless action, but the fact that we can act without
a motive shows that the will can reinforce a weak motive against a strong motive)
1 1and this is a fact of great moral consequence- #
The characteristic assertion, of necessitarian theory is the assertion that i
where there are contrary motives the strongest prevails. It is put forward as a 1
self-evident truth. I'how does one, Reid asks,' set about testing the relative 4
strengths of motives^ Where there are two motives of the same xvind it may be
easy enough to say which is the stronger. Thus a bribe of a thousand pounds ;
provides a stronger motive than a bribe of a hundred pounds. But when the mot- =
ives are of different kinds, when, for example duty and interest are opposed, hov:
do we discover which is the stronger? Examining the answer to this question, we?
see that the proposition that the strongest motive always prevails is either ‘
tautologically true or empirically false. Is prevalence to be the test of 1
strenght? Then the proposition is an identical proposition. There is some othei
test of strength? There is only one other; motives differ in felt strength.
This can mean nothing but that the stronger of two contrary motives is the one
to which it is easier to yield, against which a severer effort of self-govemmeni
has to be made if it is to be resisted. And it is not true that people always :
I. “ /
do what it 18 easiest to do. q
Do we ever have to summon up reserves of self-control in order to resist ' 
advice or exhortation? Motives may be reasons for an action, as Reid seems to ■; 
i^ pljÿ ) and therefore not psychological forces; may be final causes, as Hamilton; 
remarks in elucidation of Reid, and therefore not efficient causes. But related;: 
to a final cause for an action, to a reason for an action, is some impulse to an? 
action, whatever its proper name should be; and as the word 'impulse' indicates;
I. Active Powers, IV, Ch.IV, p.6o9*
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and as the words which describe it indicate ('weak', 'strong', 'irresistible'), 4
it is something analogous to a force. If these impulses are not to be called 4
'motives’, the necessitarian vrill give them any generic name that Reid pleases, j
'desires' and 'aversions' perhaps, maintaining that they are the determinants of|
human behaviour, 1
Reid does not dispute their presence; 'impulse' is a wordhe uses himself with
its qualifying adjectives. His dispute is with the necessitarian opinion of the i
relation of the impulses of desire and aversion to the will. Some philosophers ■
use the notion of desire to elide the will by representing desire "as a modifie-^
ation of the will" ("Will as a modification of Desire", Hamilton corrects Reid).
To will is one thing, to desire is another, and this distinction is clearly #
marked in common language. "A man may desire riches, he may desire pleasure, but;2,to will riches or to will pleasure is not English, nor is it sense". What we q 
will "must be an action, and our own action; what we desire may not be our own 
action; it may be no action at all....we may desire what we do not will, and will
3. , :iwhat we do not desire." (We may have contrary desires, Stewart adds, drawing st 
still further upon Locke, but not contrary wills.) It does happen, Reid agrees# 
that desire rising to ungovernable passion over-rides the will and determines a ■ 
man's actions, and when this happens, he is no longer responsible for the things ' 
he does, 's , :
"If man be a free agent, and be not governed by motives all his actions ' 
must be mere caprice" - Reid is speaking for the determinist philosopher. Reid's 
main concern is to dispose of the objection that men are ungovernable unless thef 
actions are governed by their motives; rewards and punishments will have no
effect upon them. In this context Reid touches incidentally on the matter of the;
I. 'Will', Brown says, is desire immediately terminating in action; 'desire', as
distinguished from will, is desire without immediate effeet.(Observâtions on 
Cause and Effect, pp.62-63. The following pages introduce introduce some compile ation into this simplicity.) 2. "Fragments of the Intellectual Powers, " Abeidee
Fisa. 2 1 3 1.3 . 3. Active Powers^ II, .Ch.I, p.532.
predictability of our behaviour if our wills are free. We shall summarize the y 
argument against indeterminism from the predictability of human behaviour and i 
(after a comment upon it) see how Reid handles it.
If men's actions are not determined by their motives, their actions are random 
occurrences even though they might have 'efficient ' causes. But in fact we can - 
nearly always say why we did (and when we are puzzled, other people can often 
enlighten us), and the more we know of a man's character the more predictable Mp; 
behaviour is. These facts are inconsistent with an indeterniinist theory and 
consequences of a deterannist theory.
Any action done with a motive allows an answer to the question “Why did you ^ 
do that?" The answer is the same on a determinist or on an indeterminist theory&i 
It states the motive, what is finally unanswerable on an indeterminist theory is; 
a question asking why preference was given to one rather than another of two 
conflicting motives. The indeterminist might ask whether the answer which determ 
imism finally requires - "I acted the way I did because I am the person I am" - : 
is very much more illuminating thah the silence which indeterminism imposes. He | 
might ask this and receive the reply: Much more illuminating, because otherwise
a man's actions in certain circumstances give no indication of his actions in 
similar circumstances.
In Reid's opinion the facts with regard to the calaulability of human behavior 
are as we would expect them to be, if men were free agents in the sense in which ; 
determinism denies that they are. The facts are that people usually act in q 
character and occasionally out of character. Suppose that men have "moral liberty 
What use "may they be expected to make of this liberty? it-may surely be 
expected?' It may surely be expected, that, of the various actions within the 
sphere of their power, they will choose what pleases them most for the present,
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or wixat appears to be most for their real, though distant, good. When there is "
a competition between these motives, the foolish will prefer present gratificatW
ion; the wise the greater and more’distant good,
"Row, is not this the very way in which we see men act? Is it not weak read:
oning, therefore, to argue, that men have not liberty, because tney act in that
I, '
very way in which they would act if they had liberty?" :
Reid's problem is to explain how the choices we make can be free in the
indeterminist sense and yet substantially predictable. In answer to it he seems
to be saying that we choose according to our character, and is not this what the-
determinist says? There is no reason why the indeterminist should not say it. )
It is a statement which is neutral as between determinism and indeterminism;
'in accordance with' is not 'following necessarily from'. The sort of choices the choices which he is likely to go on making, though he makes 
a man does make could show them all freely, because they show how he is setting
his will, how he is exerting the power which he has over its determinations.
Something to this effect Reid must have meant, if he is attempting an answer to :
the determinist objection and not, in spite of himself, simply speaking as a
determinist.
There is a further reason why our behaviour should be largely calculable 
though our wills are free: Every choice in one direction makes another choice -
in the same direction easier and therefore more likely. To have free will as  ^
we have it does not, in Reid's opinion, imply that any choice we might make is 
as probable as any other. To have free will is to have a power over the determ-r’
inations of the will, and we have this power in varying degrees according to the'
circumstances in which we find ourselves. "In different men the power of self- : 
government is different, and in the same man at different times." It is diminish 
ed in proportion to the violence of desire* and passion, and diminished in ^
I, Active Powers, IV, Ch.IV, p.612,
proportion to the strength of habit. (Our power of self-de termination mn ■
another sense - which Reid does not realize is another sense, because he uses -
'power over the determinations of the will* and * power of self-government * as
I.
aynonyraous - is increased, Reid mentions, by good habits.)
Stewart's account of free will is a reproduction of Reid's with one apparent i
and one real deviation. Our free actions, Stewart appears to say, are uncaused, ;
and this is not a violation of the principle of causation, "The argument for
Necessity derives all its force from the maxim "that every change requires a
cause." But this maxim, although true with respect to inanimate matter, does
not apply to intelligent agents, which cannot be conceived without the power of :\
self-determination." The principle of causation is "generally stated in too
unqualified a manner; It is "every change in inanimate matter" which requires a
cause, The ' determinations of voluntary agents" need no causes, because the
agent is himself "the author of them; nor could anything have led philosophers
to look for any other causes of them, but an apprehended analogy between volition
2. ;
in a mind and motion in a body," As Stewart is simply concerned to make room J
for free agency, he is presumably not exempting from causation the changes
undergone involuntarily by intelligent beings; he was not thinking of these
when he said that only changes in inanimate matter have causes. And a few pages"'
later he speaks of free actions as 'effects' of self-determining causes.
To ground the defence of free will in any way upon the proposition that we
can act without motives is a mistake, Stewart says. We certainly cannot act as
rational beings without motives. "The question is not concerning the influence
of motives, but concerning the nature of that influence. The advocates for
Necessity represent it as the influence of a cause in producing its effect, The^
advocates for Liberty acknowledge that the motive is the occasion of acting, or
1. Active Powers, II,- Ch.II, p.534.HfCh.VI, pp.619-620.2. Active Powers, I, Appendix, 8ec.II, p.352.
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the reason for acting; but contend that it is so far from being the efficient
cause of it, that it supposes the efficiency to exist elsewhere, viz., in the
mind of the agent. Between these two opinions there is an essential distinction
The one represents man merely as a passive instrument. According to the other, ;
he is really an agent, and the sole author of his own actions. He acts, indeed y
from motives, but he has the power of choice among different ones. When he acts
from a particular motive, it is not because this motive is stronger than others y
but because he willed to act in this way. Indeed, it may be questioned if the
strength conveys any idea when applied to motives. It is obviously an analogiod
or metaphorical expression, borrowed from a class of phenomena essentially
I.
different."
It is "a dictate of common sense, that we can be under no obligation to do ■
2.
what it is impossible for us to do". We do not blame madmen and idiots for wha
they do. They do not know right from wrong, nor if they did, would they be
responsible for their actions, since it is not in their power to make them 
different. There is the same darkness in the understanding of infants and the 
same incapacity for self-government, It would be unthinkable to blame them for 
anything. Children have very little power of self-government and therefore we 
hardly hold them morally responsible. There are ungovernable passions and these 
cancel moral responsibility as completely as madness. They are madness while 
they last. If we never in practice allow that even the fiercest passion excul­
pates a man completely, it is because we are never quite sure that it was 
irresistible. Passion is always allowed to be some excuse for an action. It 
excuses because it invades the power of self-determination. There is then "a 
perfect correspondence between power, on the one hand, and moral obligation and
and imaccountableness, on the other .... every limitation of the first produces
1. Active Powers,I, Appendix, p.370,
2. Active Powers, IV, Ch.VI, p.617.
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I. :
a corresponding limitation of the two last."
Does Reid think that the doctrine of necessity abolishes the distinctions 
between actions which could not have been avoided (for which there is no respon­
sibility), actions that it would have been very hard to avoid (for which there is 
diminished responsibility), and actions which could have easily been avoided (for 
which there is full responsibility)? It seems that he does; Upon the "system of 
Liberty", he says, these distinctions are "perfectly intelligible"; "but, I think;
irreconcileable to that of Necessity; for, How can there be an easy and a dificuii
in actions equally subject to necessity? or, How can power be greater or less, -2.
increased or diminished, in those who have no power?"
Reid could no doubt have been pwrsuaded that a determinist theory does not 
abolish the empirical distinctions between the three classes of actions. He would 
still have insisted that the moral distinctions could not be grounded upon the ' 
empirical distinctions if these are set in the context of a determinist theoiy,
A determinist theory will provide for the distinction between actions which 'could 
have and those which 'could not' have been avoided, using these expressions to - 
mark the difterence between actions done under no physical or psychological copmul 
sion and others where there was compulsion. It is not yet a determinist theory 
in making this provision; it has not yet defined itself against indeterminism.
The explanations have been given in order that the determinist assertion will not ' 
be misunderstood, the assertion that we could not have done anything that we did 
not do. Further explanations may be needed, further senses of 'could have ' 
recognized, in which, consistently with deterministic inevitability, we could have 
done something tlmt we did not do. They will be given, the further senses 
recognized, and with the risk of misunderstanding" removed, the determinist
assertion is repeated. Whatever else Reid may have thought that the necessitarian
1, Active Powers, IV, Gh.VII, p.622.
2. Active powers, IV, Ch.VI, p.620. ■
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philosopher was committed to, he knew that he was saying that we could not have
done anything that we did not do, and he knew what was meant.
In what sense of 'could have' is the indeterminist asserting that we could 
have done things that we did not do? In the sense in which the necessitarian is 
denying that we could have done them. This easy answer is not open to the :
indeterminist when the determinist is asserting that the meaning of 'could have';;
is exhausted when its empirical senses have been exhausted; and that it is 
meaningless to say in any further sense (except a purely logical one) that we 
could, ever have done anything which we did not do.
Reid would deny that this further meaning has to be looked for. It is the 
meaning which our words have when we admit that we could have acted otherwise, 
because we did not act under compulsion; no one forced the action on us, no 
ungovernable passion had us powerless.
If we had to do whatever we have done (or if there is no meaning except 
meanings of a kind consistent with determinism in saying that we did not have to)
then the consequences are, in Priewtley's and Reid's opinion, that nothing is ’
ever our fault. Men "cannot accuse themselves of having done anything wrong, inA
the ultimate sense of the words. In a strict sense, they have nothing to do with
repentance, confession, and pardon - these being adapted to a fallacious view of 
I.
things." A great deliverance, Priestley thinks. He has been reluctant to "give
up his liberty" until he had come to see that necessity really sets men free.
With a restoration, Reid says taking up Priestley's theme, "to the state of
innocence. "It delivers them from all the pangs of guilt and remorse, and from
all fear about their future conduct, .... They may be as secure that they shall2.
do nothing wrong as those who have finished their course’,*'
It will be objected, Reid remarks, that feelings of guilt and remorse and__
1. Priestley, The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, pi&c.
2. Active Powers, iv, ch.VI, p.618.
resolutions of amendment do not imply a belief in the liberty of our will, since 
those who subscribe to the doctrine of necessity are to be found blaming themselv( 
and others for their actions, repenting and resolving to do better. They are and 
not surprisingly, Reid agrees; when a common sense belief is given up in speculat­
ion, it keeps its hold on a man in practice.
The belief in our free agency has a double grip upon us; its own and our 
realization that without it the presuppositions of morality have gone: No
obligation without the possibility of complying with it; no possibility of 
complying with it unless we can do what we do not do; no merit or demerit fnr 
doing what is unavoidable; no rewards or punishments, no just rewards or punish­
ments, where there is no merit or demerit, "If we adopt the system of necessity,; 
the terms moral obligation and unaccountableness, praise and blame, merit and 
demerit, justice and injustice, reward and punishment, wisdom, and folly virtue 
and vice, ought to be disused, or to have new meanings given to them when they
are used in religion, in morals, or in civil government; for, upon that system, #
I.
there can be no such things as they have been always used to signify."
That 'ought' implies 'can', is not a proposition which divides philosophers. 
Their unanimity breaks up when it comes to the elucidation of 'can'. ¥e need not 
concern ourselves here with any analogical refinements; 'Can' in the indeterminif 
sense, or in one or several of the senses compatible with determinism? This is m 
a question which is answerable without a decision on the nature of moral obligati< 
If the whble point of moral utterances is, for example, to urge principles of 
conduct upon others or upon ourselves, if the significance of the words of morally 
is confined to their function in this activity, then the presupposition of moral 
utterances on any occasion of their use is the belief that the relevant physical 
capacity is present and duress of any kind sufficiently absent. There WDuld be
I. Active Powers. IV, Ch.VIX, p.622,
250
no point in construing 'can' indetermnistically. But if, as Reid was convinced! 
there is an immutable law, and right actions are those which keep it and wrong 
actions those which break it (and moral utterances are true when they correspond 
to its prescriptions, false when they deviate from them), then its prescriptions 
do seem to imply a free will which is inconsistent with determinism.
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CHAFTER VII MORAL DI8TINCTIŒ8
Matter of Fact and Moral Fact.
Nothing is more familiar to us than moral approbation and disapprobation. ■ It 
is strange then that their nature should have become a matter for dispute. The : 
dispute is one which has arisen among philosophers, but not because the;y have 
begun to pay closer attention to the operations of their minds in approbation 
and disapprobation than had been given previously, and have found an illusory 
clarity darken into obscurity. The dispute has had another origin. It is the 
"modern system of Ideas and 'Impressions" which has obliged philosophers to ask ■ 
with sophisticated ignorance, what approbation and disapprobation are, whether 
they include 'a real judgment' which 'like other judgments must be true or false*. 
or whether they do no more than express some "agreeable or uneasy feeling".
Before the advent of this system nothing "would have appeared more absurd thai 
to say, that wheni condemn a man for what he has done, I pass no judgment at all 
about the man, but only express some uneasy feeling in myself". It is a consequ-;! 
ence of the new system that this apparent absurdity of speech is the appropriate 
description of the facts. Not a consequence which was immediately obvious; time 
was needed to enter into the spirit of the system. Descartes and Locke went so 
far as to transform the secondary qualities of bodies into "feelings or sensationi 
and to deprive the senses of the office of judgment, making them merely channels 
through which ideas were conveyed into the mind. Judgment is subsequently possib3 
and immediately on the relation of id^as to ideas. Judgment on the relation of 
ideas to the external world must be mediated by reasoning, and the premisses 
allowed will support no conclusions. Locke's principles in Berkeley's hands 
transformed the primary qualities into sensations and left no external world to be
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even the indirect object of judgment. The same principles applied to matters of
taste showed that "beauty and deformity are not anything in the objects, ,,..but
certain feelings in the mind of the spectator". The same principles take the
judgment out of moral approbation and disapprobation and leave them as the
expression of feeling, or if there is a judgment left to them,it is about certaii
I.
of our feelings.
Many operations of the mind which go under a single name are complex and hav( 
feelingsor sensation as a constituent and judgment or belief as another, and the; 
constituents inseparably related. In some of them the belief is "a consequence
of the sensation and regulated by it", as in sense perception. More often the
of dependence between the constituents is reversed. Thus no one feels grateful 
unless he believes that some kindness has been done to him, or frightened unless 
he thinks there is something to be frightened of. Moral approbation is complex. 
There is fealing in it, a complex feeling, and judgment, and the feeling is 
dependent on the judgment, would change to its contrary if the judgment changed
to its contrary. The judgment is that the conduct approved of "merits esteem".
It is a judgment which cannot be resolved into the expression of a feeling of ap] 
approval, or into a judgment that one has a feeling of approval,
I might say of someone that his conduct is "highly approvable". Suppose I 
say instead that his conduct "gave me a very agreeable feeling"» If "approbatii 
be nothing but an agreeable feeling", the first of these statements means no mor< 
than the second. There is "no rule in grammar or rhetoric, nor any usage in 
language, by which these two,speeches can be construed so as to have the same 
meaning. The first expresses plainly an opinion or judgment of the conduct of 
the man, but says nothing of the speaker. The second only testifies a fact
concerning' the speaker - to wit, that he had such a feeling," And again the firs 
I' ' Active Powers, V, Ch.VII, pp.670-671.
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can be contradicted without giving affront, but not the second; "for, as every
man must know his own feelings, to deny that a man had a feeling which he affirm;
he had, is to charge him with falsehood,"
The first statement, therefore, cannot have the same meaning as the second; ■
can therefore, in Reid's opinion, have no meaning at all, if to approve is no
more than to have feelings of an agreeable kind towards the object of approval,
"This doctrine ,.,.That moral approbation is merely a feeling without judgmei
necessarily,carries along with it this consequence, that a form of speech, upon
one of the most common topics of discourse, which either has no meaning, or a
meaning irreconcilable to all rules of grammar or rhetoric, is found to be commoj
and familiar in all languages and in all ages of the world, while every man knowi
how to express the meaning, if it have any, inplain and proper language."
"Such a consequence I think sufficient to sink any philosophical opinion on
I.which it hangs."
Reid's place in the history of moral philosophy is as a critic of subjectivii
views of the nature of morality. The subjectivist views had been his own views.2.
He announces his conversion from them in a paper with the title "Whether our 
Moral Determinations are real Judgments which must be true or false and whose 
Truth depends not upon the constitution of the Person who judges but upon the 
Nature of the things which he judges?" "l'confess, gays, I liave not always
been of the same mind in this question, having been long pretty much determined 
one side, after wards dubious and uncertain and for some time past more inclined 
to the contrary side. I wish however to guard against the zeal of a convert.
And as I qxpect to hear in this meeting the objections against the opinion which 
I am to propose set in the sbrongest light, I shall not be a,shamed upon convictic 
to return to my first faith."
Active Powers. V, Ch.VII, pp.673-674.
2. Aberdeen MSS., 2131.3*
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The surprising thing is how late Reid's conversion was* He mentions at the 
end of the fifth last chapter of the Active Powers that the four last chapters 
were written in substance "long ago, and read in a literary society"* The 
philosophical society at Aberdeen, one supposed with Hamilton; so that these 
chapters would have been written in substance before the Inquiry was published* 
And accordingly one treated the chapter whose contents have just been summarized 
as a commentary on the statement in the Dedication to the Inquiry that "virtue" 
was destroyed in the general catastrophe brought on by the theory of ideas, 
assuming as a matter of course that the objectivity argued for in the Inquiry 
extended to morality.
The discourse was not read to the philosophical society at Aberdeen as its 
minute book (Aberdeen MS.,539) shows. It appears to lave been given, mth a 
number of others preserved among the Reid manuscripts in the University of 
Aberdeen, to a literary society in Glasgow shortly after Reid went there.
What then did Reid iiave in mind in the Inquiry when he spoke of the theory of 
ideas as carrying implications fatal to morality? The self resolved into a bundlj 
of perceptions, no moral subject, no moral agent. It seems to have been this 
that Reid was thinking of.
In the discourse Reid has concentrated, with one or two additional details, 
observations on the nature of the moral judgment which are scattered in the Activ 
Powers: the moral judgment is a real judgment, a judgment in which the speaker
is not the "subject", a judgment involving unique concepts. It is not enough to 
maintain that the moral judgment is a real judgment, which like other judgments 
must be true or false, which therefore cannot be resolved into the expression of 
some feeling. "To have the toothache is not to judge but to feel, but to affirm 
that one has the toothache is not to feul but to judge. The feeling cannot be
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true or false, but the affiliation must be true or false". To affirm that one
has feelings of a certain kind from the contemplation of an action is to make a 
real judgment. It is a judgment in which one is oneself the "subject". It must 
be true or false, but it will change from truth to falsity with a change in. one's 
feelings. Are our moral determinations judgments of this kind? This question, 
along with the question whether they are real judgments at all, is to be answered 
by examining the manner in which our moral determinations are expressed in 
language. And the manner in which they are expressed in language ia a plain 
declaration of "the common sense of mankind" that they are judgments and are quit 
unlike judgments of this kind; that they are true or false according to the 
constitution of the things judged and independently of the constitution of the 
person judging. They are objective judgments then, and the notions involved in 
them appear to the most careful reflection to be notions" of a peculiar nature 
and unlike to anything else".
Moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense, Hume says. Reid agrees
that moral distinctions can be said to be derived from a moral sense. He differs
from Hume on the nature of a sense and therefore on the nature of the moral sense
"Mr, Hmie will have the Moral Sense to be only a power of feeling without judging
There is this analogy between the senses and the moral sense; "as by them we hav
not only the original conceptions of the various qualities of bodies, but the
original judgment that this body has such a quality, that such another; so by our
moral faculty, we Mve both the original conceptions of right and wren g in conduc
of merit and demerit, and the original judgments that this conduct is right, that
2.is wrong; that this character has worth, that demerit."
The concept expressed by the word "ought" appears to be for Reid the unifying 
moral concept. The right and the good are what ought to be done; tne wrong and
1. Active Powers. V, Ch.VII, p.674.2. Active Powers, III, Ch.VI, p.590<
the bad what ought not to be done. A good man is a man who consistently does his 
duty. If you were to maintain that a better man is a man who does more than his 
duty you would, so far as Reid's opinion can be ascertained, be maintaining a 
moral impossibility, but “better" could be paraphrased as “ought to be more 
admired, more highly esteemed", is "more estimable, more admirable".
The concept of obligation is indefinable but clearly a relational concept.
S I.(And "to determine relational is the province of judgment I not of feeling". )
"If we examine the abstract notions of Duty, or Moral Obligation, it appears t 
be neither any real quality of the action considered by itself, nor of the agent 
considered without respect to the action, but a certain relation between the one 
and the other,
"When we say a man ought to do such a thing, the ought, which expresses the
moral obligation, has a respect, on the one hand, to the person who ought ; and, on
the other, to the action which he ought to do. Those two correlates are essential
to every moral obligation; take away either, and it has no existence. So tliat, if
we seek the place of moral obligation among the categories, it belongs to the
2.
category of relation."
If moral judgments are real judgments which like all other judgments must be 
true or false, what are the facts which make them true or false? Take any action, 
Hume says, allowed to be vicious; wilful murder for instance. What other facts 
are there here besides the strangling hands and the intention to kill and the 
motive behind it? "There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entire: 
escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you 
turn your reflexion into your o\m breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, 
which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact .... It liej
in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or
1. Active Powers, V, Ch.VII, p.677.2. Active Pnwersb III, Pt.III, Oh.VI, pp.588-589.
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character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of
your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of i
Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold,
which, according' to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but
I,
perceptions in the mind,"
There is , in Reid's view, no quality in the action besides its matter of
fact qualities, A physical and psychological description would be a complete
description of the action. But there is a fact besides the fact that the actior
was done and with such and such motives and besides the fact that contemplating
it we feel a sentiment of disapprobation. It is the fact that what was done
ought not to have been done (and ought to be condemnea by everybody). And the
judgment which states this fact is, Reid maintains, a judgment in the same sense
as a judgment wliich states any matter of fact*
It is difficult to avoid spaeking of moral 'qualities', 'properties',
'attributes', using these words quite non-c ommi ttally * They occur so rarely in
2,Reid as to suggest that their avoidance is deliberate. Yet Reid does say 
emphatically that beauty is a quality, is a property of thmngs, and says so in
discussing the conclusions which Hume draws from the analogy between beauty and 
virtue. There is the analogy, Reid agrees: Hume is as mistaken about the natur
of beauty as he is about the nature of virtue, has the same paradoxical opinions
with regard to both, and with regard to both is opposed by "the common language
3.and common sense of mankind".
Continuation of footnote 2 from previous page; The "Sentimental 
philosophers,''Reid says, demand a definition of this relation. There is none 
any more than there is of equality, similitude or contrariety. Other words migi be used instead of Vobligation"), but none are "plainer" than this word or "bett< understood". (Aberdeen ESS., 2131.3.)1. Treatise. Bk.III, Pt.I, Sec.I, pp.468-469.
2. Dr, Raphael (The Moral Sense, p. 184) draws attention to the break in the symmetry of the language in which Reid speaks of the resemblance between the senses and the moral sense: .From the senses "original conceptions oi the yariou^ qualities of bodies" and original judgments that this body has such a quality; .
Reid's discussion of the nature of beauty needs fairly careful attention. If 
one took account only of certain of its prominent features and neglected other 
unobtrusive features, one could come to the mistaken conclusion that Reid's 
disagreement with Hume is merely verbal, and since Reid and Hume agree that ther< 
is a close analogy between beauty and virtue, to the further conclusion that the; 
disagreement over the nature of morality is verbal, or that Reid has two inconsi! 
ent opinions on the nature of morality.
There is, in Reid's view, a close analogy not only between moral approbation
and aesthetic taste, but also between aesthetic taste and physical taste.
Aesthetic taste, like the taste of the palate, enjoys some things and dislikes
others, finds others *.ih‘different and is sometimes undecided. Things are bitter
or sweet whether they are tasted or not; when they are tasted, sensations corres|
ending to them are produced. Things are beautiful or ugly whether they are seen
or not; being seen, they produce in the spectator a correspondent emotion. Taste
in bodies is a secondary quality; we know no more about it by tasting than that
it is something or other which gives us a certain sensation. We may be as
ignorant of what it is that makes an object beautiful, knowing that it is beautii
but unable to say why. On the other hand a person may be able to see how in a
work of art, for example, "every part is fitted with exact judgment to its end.
Its beauty is then no longer mysterious, but ’"perfectly comprehended"; he knows
I.
"wherein it consists, as well as how it affects him". The different kinds of 
tastes are innumerable and nearly all of them, as they have no names of their owr 
are named from the bodies to which they belong. And this is true of the différer 
kinds of beauty also, and they are still more radically heterogeneous , As the
Continuation of 2 and footnote 3 from previous page from the moral sense, "original conceptions of right and wrong" and "original judgments that this 
conduct is right, that is wrong".3# Active Powers, V, Ch.VII, ^ p.6'77.
I. Intellectual Powers, VII||^.491.A
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nature of the secondary qualities of bodies is a matter for philosophical enquir; 
so philosophers properlyc concern themselves with the attempt to discover what it 
is that malces beauty beauty wherever it is found. A mathematical démonstration, 
the human face, a stroke of wit may all be beautiful. There appears to be "no 
identity or even similarity" in the beauty of things so diversely beautiful.
Then why are they called beautiful"? If they do not have some common character­
istic, they must have some common relation to us or to something else. Not to 
anything else; there is nothing that could be the centre of this circumference 
except ourselves,
"All the objects we call beautiful agree in two things, which seem to concur
in our sense of beauty. First, when they are perceived or even imagined, they
produce a certain agreeable emotion or feeling in the mind; and secondly. This
agreeable emotion is accompanied with an opinion or belief of their having some
I.
perfection or excellence belonging to them."
There is the greatest variety in aesthetic emotion, but broadly it is of two 
kinds; There are the emotioni aroused by grandeur or sublimity and the emotion 
aroused by beauty - if we now use the word "beauty" more narrowly and properly 
than we have hitherto been doing.
I. Intellectual Powers, VIII, Ch.IV, p.498. Stewart does not disagree with Re; 
though without mentioning Reid, he introduces his discussion ofthe nature of 
beauty with a protest against the naivety of the assumption that things must have 
something in common in ordur to have the same name. The assumption overlooks the "transitivity" of names. Suppose that "A,B, G, D, E denote a series of objec 
that A possesses some one quality in common withB; B a quality in common with 0; 
C a quality in common with D; D a quality in common witliE; - while, at the same 
time, no quality can be found which belongs in common to any three objects in th< 
series. Is it not conceivable, that the affinity between A and B may produce a transference of the name of the first to the second; and that, in consequence of the other affinities which connect the remaining objects together, the same name 
may pass in succession from B to C; from C to D; and from Dto B?" In this way a 
"common appelation" will arise between A and E, and A and 1 have nothing in cn comioon. (Every metaphor, Stewart adds is "necessarily a transitive expression, 
although there are many transitive expressions which can, with no propriety, be said to be metaphorical". (Philosophical Essays, Pt.II, Ch.I,pp.I95-196.)
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"The emotion produced by beautiful objects is gay and pleasant. It sweetens
and humanises the temper, is friendly to every benevolent affection, and tends
to allay sullen and angry passions. It enlivens the mind, and disposes it to
I.
other it to other agreeable emotions, such as those of love, hope, and joy." The
emotion aroused by grandeur is "awful, solemn, and serious; inspires magnanimity2.
and a contempt of what is mean".
There is indeed a very real sense in which beauty and sublimity are in the
mind; in the mind of the creator not in the mind of the spectator, (in so far
as we project our feelings on to nature we create before we contemplate what
moves.us to aesthetic emotion.) To look for them in anything physical, thought
of as merely physical, is to look for the living among the dead. If we imaginât
ively adopt the Epicurean philosophy while contemplating the sublimities of the
world we find that the earth, the sea and the stars no longer have any aesthetic
significance; "the clashing of atoms by blind chance" has nothing in it fit to
elevate the soul with the emotion of grandeur, A "great work is a work of great
power, great wisdom, and great goodness, well contrived for some important end,
3.
But power, wisdom, and goodness, are properly the attributes of mind only". Th 
are expressed in the work, given a "body" there, clothed with sensible qualities 
there, and the work has grandeur by derivation. In the same way there is an 
original beauty and a reflected beauty, and original beauty is an attribute of 
the mind. The original beauty is an intellectual or moral beaut) - the emphasis 
in the Inquiry on the comramnication of emotion has diminished in the Intellectua 
Powers - and its lustre is reflected on to the objects which manifest it. This 
is the main drift of Reid's opinion, that sensible beauty is borrowed beauty, 
Reid is not quite consistent. At least as we are constituted, he also says,
1. Intellectual Powers. VIII? Ch.IV, p.498.
2. Intellectual Powers, VIII, Ch.Ill, pp.494-495.
3* Intellectual Powers, VIII, Ch.Ill, p.496.
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beauty results from the commerce between the world of sense and the world of the
mind. Thus the language of poetry is pleasing because it is a language in which
I.
properties are figuratively e changed between the two worlds.
But this doctrine of Reid’s that beauty is in the mind is not of course the
paradoxical doctrine of modern philosophers that beauty is in the mind contempla*
ing, not in the object contemplated. According to Reid's doctrine beauty is in
the object, though originally in a remoter object than the objects of sense, and
there independently of anyone's contemplation of it; and derivatively in objects
of sense and there independently of anyone's contemplation of it. The paradoxic*
doctrine in the words of Hutcheson which Reid uses to state it is that beauty is
not "any quality supposed to be in the object which should, of itself, be beautij
ul, without relation to any mind which perceives it: for beauty, like other name*
of sensible ideas, properly denotes the perception of some mind; so cold, hot ,2,
sweet, bitter, denote the sensations in our minds." In looking at this paradox 
we can ignore as Reid does, the difference between original and derived beauty, 
and for convenience we shall also ignore the difference between beauty and 
sublimity.
The teaching of Locke on the nature of the secondary qualities is beiiind thi: 
paradox, Reid says. Locke "veiy properly distinguishes between the sensations 
which we have of heat and cold, for example, and "that quality or structure in tl
body which is adapted by Nature to produce those sensations in us",
"What remained to be determined was, whether the words, heat and cold, in 
common language, signify the sensations we feel, or the qualities of the object 
which are the cause of these sensations. Mr, Locke made heat and cold to signify 
only the sensations we feel, and not the qualities which are the cause of them.
And in this, I apprehend, lay his mistake. For it is evident, from the use of
I' Intellectual Powers. VIII, Ch.Ill, p.497.
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language, that hot and cold, sweet and hitter, are attributes of external objects
and not of the person who perceives them. Hence, it appears a monstrous paradox i
say, there is no heat in the fire, no sweetness in sugar; but, when explained
according to Mr. Locke's meaning, it is only, like most other paradoxes, an abuse
I.
of words."
Is this'all there is in Reid's opinion to the paradox which turns beauty into
feeling - the misapplication of a word? That it is one would naturally take to
be the implication of the general analogy tb which Reid gives such prominence
between aesthetic taste and the taste of the palate, between beauty and the
secondary qualities of bodies. The implication also of a number of its details,
and especially of the contrast between beauty as an 'occult' quality, when all we
know of it is how we are affected by it, and beauty as a quality "distinctly
conceived and ....specified". The judgment that somethin^ is beauty, Reid calls
in the first case an 'instinctive' judgment, and in the second case a 'rational2.
judgment of beauty'. They*arc? if this is all they are, simply matter of fact
judgments. And we may notice here that in one place Reid makes the 'real' 
in moral approbation simply a matter of fact judgment. He is illustrating ,fhe 
dependence of moral feeling on judgment. I see a man, he says, exerting himself 
energetically in a good cause, "I judge that this conduct merits esteem." 
Persuade me that he was bribed and my feelings are altogether different,
Reid has obscured here the thing that he is contending for. We know what it It is
^hat moral approbation includes a judgment of moral fact. The analogy between 
beauty and the secondary qualities has more seriously obscured Reid's parallel 
contention. It is that aesthetic approbation includes a judgment of value which 
is a judgment of fact.
I* Intellectual Powers. 7III, Ch.IV, p.499.2. Intellectual Powers. VIII, Ch.IV, pp.500-50l.3, Active Powers, V, Ch.VII, pp.672-673.
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There are two things common to all things which we call beautiful: they -.IIproduce in us "a certain agreeable emotion" and this agreeable emotion" is
accompanied with an opinion or belief of their having some perfection or S
excellence belonging to them". Grandeur "in objects" seems to me, Reid says, to 7-
be nothibg but* "such a degree of excellence, in one kind or another, as merits r 
I.
our admiration". %
An excellence or perfection, in Reid's view, is not a special quality which a t 
thing has over and above its other qualities. It is not a further characteristic 
which the thing has because it has other characteristics. In so far as an 
excellence or a perfection is a quality of a thing it is some one or several j
or all of its constitutive qualities. The beauty of a painting is the arrange- 'jj 
ment of its colours and shapes. As an excellence or perfection it is the fact '4
Athat this pattern is fit to arouse certain emotions, that it ought to be admired ^
iand praised. And this is a fact which is quite different from the fact that the 4
!tiling could or does produce these emotions, and as much a fact.
This is the objectivity which Reid was contending for against Hutcheson and D; 
Hume, the objectivity of judgments of value. If we listen to "the dictates of 
common sense, we must be convinced that there is a real excellence in some tilings; 
whatever our feelings or our constitution be" ; that a thing "has its excellenceo
from its own constitution, and not from ours". But Reid has conducted his j.:
argument as though it was the objectivity of a matter of fact judgment which has ' ^
to be asserted, as though he wanted and was arguing for the admission that in 1
everything that is beautiful or sublime there is something ox other, existing
independently of us, which causes us to feel certain emotions, and that this, 'j
whatever it is, is properly called the object's beauty or sublimity. It is some J
and adds itperfection or excellence, he adds,^ a^s though the whole point in dispute was not
1. Intellectual PnWersT VÏÏI "^hTîîlT~bT494l2. Intellectual Powers. VIIi; Ch.III, p.495. #
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over the nature of an excellence or a perfection,
Reid selected the wrong feature of the theory of ideas for attention in trac:
the effect of tie theory on opinions concerning beauty. He touched lightly the
I.
implications of its conceptual empiricism,' preoccupied with the general withdrai
from external reality he saw in the theory. In consequence his real dispute wi
other philosophers is left in the shadow of a dispute which he could see when hi
reflected was a dispute over words. Aesthetic judgments as well as moral judgmei
he id maintaining; state facts about matters of fact, facts of a unique kind,
the nature of which is indicated by the occurrence, explicitly or implicitly in
both judgments of the word 'ought* or of one of its synonyms.
How does the aesthetic 'ought' differ from the 'ought' of moral obligation?
Reid does not ask the question. He has a remark which points towards certain
features which would have to be recognized in an answer. There are some things
that “ought to please, and others that ought to displease. If they do not, it
2.
owing to some defect in the spectator," Unlike a moral defect, this is ardefe 
which it may or may not be in a man's powers to remove, ' Ought' here therefore 
does not imply 'can', and therefore failure to be or to do what one ought in th 
sense to be or to do does not carry anything analogous to guilt along with it.
Is it of any great importance whether or not moral Judgments are factual 
judgments and moral concepts unique and objective? The issue between Reid and 
Hume is not one which Reid appears to regard as of any practical consequence :
Theories of morals have no moral implicstibnte: they are related to our moral
3.
judgments as the theory of vision is to seeing. This is not consistently Reid 
view "...there cannot be better evidence that a theory of morals, or of any 
particular virtue, is false, thah when it subverts the practical rules of moral
1.With a passing mention that Price had shown its significance in this connecti 
(intellectual Powers, VIII, Ch.III, p.495. ) 4* Active Powers,V, Ch.V, p.660;
2. Intellectual Powers, VI, Ch.VI, p.453. Cp.V, Ch.IV, p.646,
3. Active Powers, V, Ch.II, pp.642-643.
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There is of course no question of a general theory of the nature of morality
contradicting a practical moral rule and Reid does not suggest, as one would
perhaps have expected him to (even if only in order to give a practical a^ÿlicat
ion to a common sense belief which would otherwise remain purely V"speculative'"^ );
that we might come to think the distinction between right and wrong is less
important then we had thought it was, if we become persuaded that it can be
resolved into a difference in our feelings.
The consequence which moral subjectivity does carry with it is that there ca
be no immutable morality. If what we call ^a moral judgment*' is no real judgmen
but merely the expression of some feeling that we have, or is a real judgment
but one merely, which states that we have that feeling, then all "the principles
of morals which we have been taught to consider as an immutable law to all
intelligent beings, have no other foundation but an arbitrary structure and fabr
in the constitution of the human mind. So that, by a change in our structure,
what is immoral might become moral,’ virtue might be turned into vice, and vice i:
virtue. And beings of a different structure, according to the variety of thei
I.feelings, may have different, nay opposite measures of moral good and evil,"
A real judgment has a tautological dependence on the constitution of one's
nature and a real independence of it unless it is a judgment about oneself, ¥e 
cannot "judge of visible objects" if the faculty of sight is missing, nor of 
beauty and deformity if we are without the faculty of taste. "If we suppose a 
being without any moral faculty in his fabric, I grant that he could not have th 
sentiments of blame and moral approbation.
"There are, therefore, judgments, as well as feelings, that are excited by 
the particular structure and fabric of the mind. But though it depends upon th
fabric of a mind, whether it have such a judgment or not, it depends not upon th 
I, Active Powers. V. Ch,VIII. nn.678-679^ ' ]
I .
fabric whether the judgment be true or not."
A further consequence of the opinion that morality depends upon the arbitra
constitution of our nature is that we could know nothing whatever of the moral
character of God, Indeed this is to state the conclusion too weakly: since
nothing "arbitrary or mutable can be conceived to enter into the description of
a nature eternal, immutable, and necessarily existent," the consequence is that2.
God has no moral character. 3.
• "True or false in morals ,... is necessarily so". This will not be denied
by anyone who allows that truth is there at all. What kind of evidence do we
have for moral propositions which, if true, are necessarily true? Locke held
that moral truths are capable of demonstration. His argument is that "the prec
real essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and so
the congruity or incongruity of the things themselves be certainly discovered;
in which consists perfect knowledge," Lock's examples are the two proposition
that there can be no injustice where there is no property, no argument where
there is absolute liberty; propositions, Locke says, "as certain as any
4,-
demonstration in Euclid".
Neither of these propositions, Reid remarks, is a demonstratêdnconclusion;'5.
both are true by definition, and Reid would not call them moral truths. The 
propositions, Reid says, which are correctly to be called 'moral' are not 
'abstract' propositions - Locke's argument applies only to abstract proposition 
but those which affirm "some moral obligation to be or not to be incumbemt on 
one or more individual persons" which affirm "something to be the duty of perso 
that really exist".
1. Active Powers, V, Gh.VII, p.676,
2. Active Powers, V, Ch.VII, p.676.
3« Intellectual Powers, V, Ch.Vi, p.454.
4-EEssay Goneerning Human Understanding, Bk.III, Gh.XI,p.156; Bk.IV, Ch.III, p2 
5. Intellectual Powers, VII. Ch.II, p.479-
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The proposition that there is more merit in a generous action than in an 
action which is no more than just, is an abstract proposition and a moral 
proposition. (Reid has earlier called it a ^moral axiom",) It is not the 
abstractness of Lockè’s propositions which disqualifies them as moral propositi< 
Reid has already explained their disqualification.
Moral truths divide into two classes. There is the class of principles, of 
moral axioms; such principles as that we ought to be faithful to our engagement; 
that we ought not to do to others anything which we would regard as unjust if 
done to ourselves in the same circumstances. No one who cannot see their truth 
can have it proved to him. Supposing that a man cannot see that he ought not tc 
do to someone else what he would think wrong if done to himself, Howould you 
reason with him? "You may possibly convince him by reasoning, that it is his
interest to observe this rule; but this is not to convince him that it is his
I.
duty." You can no more demonstrate to him that it is his duty than you can
argue a blind man into seeing colours. The "first principles of morals, intb
which all moral reasoning may be resolved, are perceived intuitively, and in a
manner more analogous tothe perceptions of sense than to the conclusions of2.
demonstrativereasoning", There is no question then of demonstrating the first 
principles of morals. There are no premisses for the demonstration and these 
principles are already intuitively self-evident.
The second class of moral truths as constituted by the application of princi 
les to particular cases. This is not Reid's description of this class. The 
second class of moral truths consists, he says of those that are deduced by 
reasoning from those that are self-evident. We shall see in a moment that Reid 
appears to say that no moral propositions are demonstrable and then to say that 
some of them are. The appearance of contradiction is caused by a shift irn the-
Active powers, m ,  Pt.III, 0^.71, p.591
2. Intellectual Powers, VII, Ch.III, p.481.
in. the meaning of 'demonstrable' and 'demonstrative evidence', and Reid adds to 
our difficulties bjr not marking off at the outset (as he does later on implicit 
the conclusions reached by moral reasoning’ as a sub-class within the class of 
derivative moral propositions.
Are any moral propositions demonstrable? The propositions^ Reid says, ‘hfhic 
I think are properly called moral, are those that affirm some moral obligation 
be, or not to be incumbent on one or more individual persons. To such proposit 
ions, Mr Locke's reasoning does not apply, because the subjects of the proposit 
are not things whose real essence may be perfectly known. They are creatures o 
God; their obligation results from the constitution which God hath given them, 
and the circumstances in which he hath placed them. That an individual hath su 
a constitution, and is placed in such circumstances, is not an abstract and
necessary, but a contingent truth. It is a matter of fact, and, therefore, not
I.
capable of demonstrative evidence, which belongs only to necessary truths."
Is our duty in our actual circumstances ever demonstrable? It is never
demonstrable. The "moral man" is not the abstraction Locke made him out to be2.
"a corporeal rational being". The moral man is a man in the particularity of h 
individual nature, with his duty determined by it and by his concrete circumst­
ances. His duty in the different circumstances in which he finds himself is 
never demonstrable, because it depends upon contingent matters of fact, and the, 
as such are incapable of demonstration and are therefore incapable of entering i 
premisses into a demonstration. This seems to be the reason which Reid is glvii 
for the inderaonstrability of all our actual duties.
Is Reid maintaining that we can never loiow for certain what we ought to do : 
any particular set of circumstances; that we can never know it for certain bee;
our obligations are determined partly by the constitution of our nature and
1. Intellectual PWers. VII, Ch,ïl7V.4'79l2. Essay. Bk.III, Gh.XI, pal57.
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partly by the nature of our circumstances, and these are matters of fact about
I.
which we can never have knowledge but only "probable opinion". Or is Reid 
maintaining merely that our actual duties are incapable of demonstration in a 
logician's technical sense of demonstration (sharing with Locke the view which 
assimilates all demonstration to mathematical demonstration); maintaining this, 
but not implying by this that they are never certain?
"The evidence which every man hath of his o\m existence, though ib be irres; 
tible, is not more demonstrative. And the same thing may be said of the eviden 
which everAoan hath, that he is a moral agent, and under certain moral obligati' 
This is the beginning of the paragraph which follows the paragraph we are 
considering. It is not perhaps entirely decisive against the first interprétât" 
ion of that paragraph, since Reid may be meaning by the obligations for which 
we have evidence as irresistible as the evidence for our own existence, the 
general obligations which are principles of morality. It is a;b least a reminde: 
that there are contingent matters of fact which, though formally Indemonstrable 
can be known with absolute certainty.
If the first interprétât!on is correct, Reid is about to contradict himself
For on the next page he says:
"I apprehend, that, in every kiind of duty we owe to God or man the
obligation of the most general rules of duty is self-evident; that tne applica'
ion those rules to particular actions is often no less evident ; and that, when ;
is not evident, but requires reasoning, that reasoning can very rarely be of th
demonstrative, but must be of the probable kind. Sometimes it depends upon the
temper, and talents, and circumstances of the man himself ; sometimes upon the
character and circumstances of others; sometimes upon both; and these are thing
which admit not of demonstration."
I. Raplmel, Sie Moral Sgnge, pp.Î71-172.
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low here Reid really is saying something about uncertainty in moral judgment
When it is not perfectly obvious that a general rule covers a particular case
(as it often is, as it often is as evident, for example, that we ought to keep
this promise as that we ought in general to keep our promises); where we have 1
reason out wloat we should do, taking into consideration our own circumstances
and the circumstances of other people, then we can very seldom reach conclus!or
which have demonstrative evidence and must content ourselves with probable 
I,opinion. Thus a magistrate knows tlmt he ought to promote the goo# of the 
community which has put him in office. He will very often be doubtful about ti 
best means to adopt and very rarely able to resolve his doubts by "démonstratif 
evidence", and will have to decide on what "appears most probable", But few 
moral oases require reasoning out. In "the common occurrences of life a man oi 
integrity ....sees his duty without reasoning as he sees the highway".
In the passage which we have just been considering 'demonstrative evidence' 
is contrasted with 'probable' evidence as conclusive with inconclusive evidence 
In the earlier passage this contrast is absent; the contrast is between logical 
different types of evidence. 'Demonstrative evidence ' is one type of evidence, 
the evidence forthe propositions which state our actual duties is never 
demonstrative, but there is no implication that it is never conclusive.
How is it possible for anyone to be morally mistalcen when he is not mistake 
with regard to any relevant matters of fact? It is not possible, Reid implies 
if moral judgments are expressions of some of our feelings or assertions that 
we have these feelings; for either nothing is asserted, or nothing that could t: 
false unless there is lying. A mistaken moral judgment is logically possible c
Reid's view of the nature of a moral judgment, but how could the mistake ever
I. Virtue does not suffer, Reid remarks at the end of the chapter. "To act 
against what appears most probable in a matter of duty, is as real a trespass 
against the first principles of morality, as to act against demonstration."
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come about? On tiiis Reid has very little to say. A man’s moral sensitivity
depends to a large extent on his moral character. And from "the varieties of
education, of fashion, of prejudices and of habits, men will come to have
conflicting moral opinions. The variety of their moral opinions is not greate
but much lees than the variety of their opinions on "speculative" matters, and
"as easily accounted for", Reid says, "from the common causes of error, in the
I.
one case as in the other". But there is no parallel between the cases except 
where the speculative matters are matters for which the only evidence is self-e 
evidence. And a failure to see what is self-evident is finally inexplicable.
The moral history and moral geography of mankind is altogether misinterpret
Stewart considers, if it is thought to prove that there is no fundamental
unanimity in men's moral opinions. In examining the moral codes of different
times and different places, allowance has to be madetfirst for the different
physical circumstances of peoples and for their different degrees of civilizat
And when this is done the illusion of fundamental contradiction between moral
codes begins to disappear. Thus, for example, where soil and climate are so
beneficent that the necessities of life and many of its luxuries are there for
the taking, the rights of property will be very contracted. People will think
about most things as everyone does about light and air, that they belong to no
one in particular. Theft as a rule will not be wrong or will be a trivial
offence. But if what is stolen is something that a man has made for himself
and values as his own, the offence will assume the proportions that it has
everywhere else. As an example of the difference which different degrees of
civilization make to moral rules, private vengeance is one thing in a society
such as ours and morally quite another thing in a society where the laws give
the individual no adequate protection,
I. Active Poimrs, III, Pt,III, Ch.V, p.587.
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External circumstances modify the application of moral principles and the
external features of an action do not reveal its moral character. The disposit
expressed in an action gives the action its moral significance. The Indians
around Hudson’s Bay ld.ll their aged parents, but in filial piety; they are not
to becèttèd as evidence that there are no innate practical principles.
Nature through moral principles prescribes ends to our conduct; it is left
to our reason to calculate the best means to attain tm these ends. Thus we oug
to aim at our own happiness and at the happiness of other men, but this princip
does not define "the constituents of happiness", nor the way to it. Differing
in opinion with regard, to the nature of hapiness and the means to attain it, me
must often differ in particular moral judgments, while they acknowledge and
because they acknowledge the same moral principles,
Stewart is not planing down the content of moral principles until there is
no material left in them over which there might be disagreement. He recognizes
many moral principles besides those which require us to seek our own and other
people’s happiness. He thinks vaguely of them all as prescribing ends to our
conduct, and leaving the means to our own discovery. He thinks also of them ae
primary rules of duty. Stewart is no kind of utilitarian. In his view the way
to public and private happiness is governed by these rules, and they are to be
obeyed not because, or not only because, obedience leads towards happiness, and
disobedience away from it, but because they are rules of unalterable right and 
I.
wrong.
2. The Principles of Action 
Moral distinctions, Hume argues, cannot be factual distinctions. A state­
ment of fact by itself has no practical implications; no one does anything or
avoids anything simply as a consequence of acknowledging its truth. But men
I. Active and Moral Powers, l^ .'lïTliîh.III,
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are "deterr'd from some actions by the opinion of injustice, amd impell’d to
others by that of obligation". Moral judgments as such have practical conseque
nces, and are therefore not factual judgments; the truth and falsity which
belongs to factual judgments does not belong to them. They cannot therefore
proceed from reason which is concerned with "truth or falsehood". The "merit"
of an action could not possibly be derived from its "conformity to reason"; no
actions can be either reasonable or unreasonable except in a "figurative and
improper way of speaking" which is philosophically intolerable.
in
There are two respects in which reason can directly influence our actions.
It may inform us of the existence of an object which is the "proper object" of
some "passion". The passion is aroused and it moves us to action. Or reason
indicates the means to ends dictated by desires(^discovers the connexion of
causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion"), and
because we will the ends we will the means. And that an object is an object of
certain kind and that the means to it are of a certain kind are both matter of
fact about which we may make true or false judgments. False judgments about
either might be said figuratively and misleadingly to make the passions and
actions connected with them unreasonable. There is no other truth and falsity i
I.
morals, no other reasonableness or unreasonableness in actions,
"As mankind have, in all ages, Reid says, understood reason to mean the powe 
by which not only our speculative opinions, but our actions ought to be regulate 
we may say, with perfect propriety, that all vice is contrary to reason; that, b 
reason, we are to judge of what we ought to do, as well as of what we ought to 
believe.....
"There are oÿher phrases which have been used on the same side of the 
Treatise. m,III, Pt.I, Sec.I, pp.456-466.
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question, which I see no reason for adopting, sucli as - acting contrary to the 
relations of things - contrary tot the reason of things - to the fitness of 
thing^ s - jW the__tr^ ^  tMngs - to absolute fitness. These phrases have not 
the authority oi common use-, -which, in matters of language is great. They seei 
to have been invented by some authors, with a view to explain the nature of vi< 
but X do not think they answer that end. If intended as definitions of vice, 
they are improper; because in the most favourable sense they can bear, they
extend to every kind of foolish and absurd conduct, as well as to that which i%
I.
vicious."
Reid has not changed his mind as to the source of our knowledge of moral 
distinctions in now speaking of reason as the power by which we judge of what t 
ought to do. The ’moral faculty ', ’ conscience ’ ' moral sense*, ' reason’ ; these 
are are all different names for the same thing, Reid does not say this, but he 
would have spoken his mind if he had said it* They are all of them sanctioned 
by common usage. The term ’moral sense’ may need some apology. Shaftesbury ar 
Hutcheson gave it wide currency, but it is "not new"; at least expressions verg
similar to it are old, the sensus recti et honest!" in Latin and the "sense of?..
duty'*' in English. The moral faculty was given the name "moral sense" no doubt
because of the evident analogy between it and the external senses. Philosophez
made the term ’moral sense’ into a term of theory by abridging the functions of
sense, by making it feeling without judgment. "This I take to be an abuse of a
3.
word." Reid would deny that he uses the term in the interests of a theory; it
not putting fonvard a philosophical theory to oppose a philosophical theory by
1. Active Powers, V, Ch.VII, p.67b.
2, Reid paid considerable attention to the way in which the word "reason" was
ordinarily used in moral contexts, but none to the ordinary significance of oth
expressions which he treats as equivalents. (Beattie remarks briefly that ’conscience’ is a term applièâ to a man’s moral "consideration of his own condu 
and that philosophers had invented the term ’moar^ sense*. (Elements of Moral 
Science, Vol.II, Ch.I, p.15.) 4. Active Powers,M l , Gh.VIJ, p.674.
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pointing to the objective implications of the word 'sense*.
The controversy in which it is debated whether 'moral sense' or 'reason* i; 
the proper description of the moral faculty, but in which the question of the 
objectivity of moral distinctions does not necessarily arise, attracts no more 
than Reid's casual notice, and at the point where the rationalists seemed to b« 
attempting explanatory definitions of virtue and vice. Otherwise it is a 
controversy to which he is indifferent. But if the faculty by which we frame 
judgments which must be true or false is to be called 'reason*, then it become;
philosophically important to call the moral faculty 'reason'.
Reid once held still more radically that the whole controversy as to "whet] 
moral distinctions are discerned by Reason or Sentiment" was trivial; it could
be settled and the manner in which it was to be settled showed its triviality,
I.Consider, Reid says, the agreement between the disputants: They agree (i) .th
there is a power of the mind by which we distinguish in "speculative" matters
between truth and falsehood; (ii) a power of the mind by which we can determin
which ends are "eligible" ; (iii) a power of the mind by which we can determin
the means appropriate to these ends. They agree that the first and third of
these powers are to be called 'reason*. They agree in their moral jdugments (
if they disagree it is not because they are divided on the question as to
whether moral distinctions are perceived by reason or sentiment). What are th
disagreeoients? One says that the second of these powers should be called
"reason" and the other denies that it should. They have the same moral percep
ions. "But says one, this perception is not feeling but seeing; says the othe
is not feeling but seeing." Their dispute is to be settled "not by arguments
but by authority", by the authority of customary speech. The truth is that tb
"different powers of the mind are not distinct individual beings, nor are the 
%. In one of his discourses;to the literary society at Glasgow (Aberdëen MSS.
^131.3.) This discourse is undated, but Reid mentions it in mentioning his conversion in moral theory.
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limits that divide one power from another fixed by nature. We divide the powe 
of the mind as we divide a joynt of meat, as best suits our convenience and 
occasions,"
Reid came to see that the real point in the dispute was whether or not mol 
distinctions are sui generis and objective, and it became a matter of import ar: 
to him which words were used. Objective words are needed to mark objective 
distinctions: 'reason*, and ' judgment ' and not ' sentiment * and ’feeling*.
Stewart does not share to any great extent Reid's veneration for common
language because it is common language. Which words are used here matters to
Stewart only in so far as the recognition of the objectivity and immutability,
right and wrong is kept safe. It is useful to say that moral distinctions are
perceived by reason; the word is^i emphatic safeguard. On the other hand it
perhaps suggests that moral discernment; is the result of reasoning. "Moral se
is a harmless enough expression in itself, although it has come to have danger
associations. Neither of those terms, nor any other, throws any light on the
origin; of our moral conceptions and judgments. The unique, unanalysable and
objective concepts of morality may be legitimately and unilluminatingly ascrib
to reason, or to the understanding. If we have laid it down that every simpl
idea is to have its origin in some "sense", we shall have to speak instead of
moral sense. And if the ideas of time, of number, of causation were "as impor
ant as those of right and wrong, or had been as much under the review of
philosophers, we might perhaps have had a sense of. Time, a sense of Number, anI.
a sense of Causation",
The moral faculty is an active power as well as an intellectual power; the 
judgments which state our duties, though factual judgments are practical
judgments; a regard to duty is a rational principle of action.
I. Outlines of Moral Philosophy,pt.II, Ch.I, 8ec.VI,p.24ff; A c ü Z â ^ M S ^  Powers, Vol.II, idc.IVT^ p&^ rp Ch.,II, p.24b.
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By the "principles of action" Reid explains that he means "everything the
incites us to act". When "moral imputation" is involved, nothing is to be
regarded as a man’ s action unless it is something which he "previously concei
and willed or determined to do". The words '^a man’s action‘d have a much mors
general meaning, wide enough to allow us to speak of involuntary actions’^,
Reid is enquiring into the principles of human action in this very general 
I,
sense. They fall, he thinks, into three classes and might be called *mechanî
•animal* and 'rational* principles.
No thought and no intention are required for an action which proceeds fror
the operation of a mechanical principle. What is done instinctively and vihi
is done by habit may be done without our even noticing it. Instincts and
habits are the two different kinds of mechanical principles. To breathe is
* instinctive *, to swallow, to imitate. The habits which are active principL
are those which do not merely facilitate an action, but those which incline i
towards its repetition.
Animal principles "operate upon the will" but do not presuppose any exer
2.
of reason. Animal principles may be divided into 'appetites', 'desires', 
'affections' (each of these words being given some arbitrary precision). An 
appetite i ^  compound of "uneasy sensation", always more or less specific, a 
of a desire which keeps pace with it, and it is periodical in its occurrence 
In desire, as distinguished from appetite, there is no single sensation as t 
is, for example , s single sensation of hunger, and there is no cycle of wan 
and satiety,
1. Active Powers, III, Pt.I, Ch.I, p.543.
2. Though Stewart is "always unwilling" to differ from Reid, he is bound tosay that the names which Reid has given to these two classes of active princ
les are beyond excuse. If any principles are common to animals and men, ins incts are, and to make desires and affections sub-classes of the class of
animal principles runs Reid into obvious absurdities of speech, when the desires and affections are particularized (Active Rawersv and Moral Powers, 
Vol.I, Introduction, p.125.)
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Desires may have persons or things for their objects. Affections have 
persons for their objects, and lead us to desire either their good or their 
hurt; are therefore either benevolent or malevolent affections. (It sounds 
oddly, Reid admits, but it is convenient to spealc of malevolent affections, ai 
there is the expression 'ill-affected' as some justification.) It seems to be 
Reid's opinion that the difference between 'desires' and 'affections' is 
constituted by the difference in the proportions and relations of desire and 
feeling which are components of both. In affections feeling predominates and 
desire takes its rise from feeling. When desires and affections are vehement, 
tempestuous, obsessive, they are oomaonly called 'passions'.
Mechanical principles of action operate without our will. Animal princip)
operate upon our will. There are also rational principles of action in man.
Without these, and left simply to appetites,desires and affections, our life
would be without direction.; The function of rational principles is to prescri
ultimate ends to our will and to govern our life accordingly. Reason has "in
ages, among the learned and unlearned, been conceived to have two offices - tc
regulate our belief, and jW regulate our actions and conduct, To act reas
ably, is a phrase no less common in all languages, than to judge reasonably. .
A way of speaicing so universal among men, common to the learned and the unleai
in all nations and in all languages, must have a meaning. To suppose it to be
words without meaning, is to treat, with undue contempt, the common sense of 
I.mankind."
That it comes within the province of reason to determine means to ends no
philosopher of course has denied. But reason is not a principle of action uni
it determines " the ends we ought to pursue, or the preference due to one end
above another". Hume denies that reason has any competence in this matter. " 
I^ 'Active Powers,^  III, Pt.III, Ch.I, p .
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shall endeavour to shew," Reid says,"that among the various ends of human 
actions, there are some of which, without reason, we could not even form a 
conception; and that, as aoon as they are conceived, a regard to them is, by 
our constitution, noj; only a principle of action but a leading and governing 
principle, to which all our animal principles are subordinate, and to which 
they ought to be subject,
"These X shall call rational principles; because they can exist only in
beings endowed with reason, and because, to act from these principles, is wh
X.
has always been meant by acting according to reason,
The ends prescribed to our conduct by reason are our "good upon the who 
(our general interest) and our moral duty. As ends they are principles of 
action; as prescribed by reason, rational principles, ¥e live as reasonable 
men when these principles in fact govern our conduct, and we act unreasonabl 
when we act in contradiction of either of them.
The conception of our good upon the whole is plainly a rational concept! 
Anything in which a man finds any part of his happiness is good to him, and 
is desired as soon as it is thought of. In the early part of our lives our 
is at the disposal of desires which do not look beyond "particular and prese 
objects", at the disposal of whichever of these desires happens to be the 
strongest at the time. When we are older, we leam by the exercise of our 
reason to think of consequences, looking backwards and foiv/ards; we leam to 
weigh one good against another, present satisfaction against future loss. W 
form the highly abstract and general conception of our good upon the whole, 
conception which is thus clearly "the offspring of reason, and can be only i 
beings endowed with reason. And if this conception gives rise to any princi 
of action in man,which he had not before, that principle may very properly b
I .  AG iisa 1 2 2 ^ .  I l l ,  P t . I I I ,  C h .I, p .580.
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I.
called a rational principle of action."
There is no doubt that this conception does give rise to a principle of 
action, does supply a motive to our will. There is a contradiction, Reid is 
nearly certain, in supposing an intelligent being to have the notion of good 
and not to desire it. There is atany rate some sort of impossibility in cont 
lating with complete indifference something which we know to be inseparable f 
our happiness.
The "sense of duty" is an active principle. The judgment that this is my
duty is a practical judgment; it states what X ought to do. It is a factual
judgment; if the judgment is a true judgment, it is a fact that this is what
ought to do. And moral judgments are not "dry and unaf fee ting", From the
constitution of our nature, even if there is no other necessity in the matter
and Reid is inclined to think that there is - we cannot regard something as o2.duty and regard it with perfect indifference. The sense of duty is a ratio 
principle of action - by common consent, Reid has nothing to add to his stat 
ment that to act as duty requires is part of what has always been meant by 
"acting according to reason".
It is self-evident that we ought to prefer our total good to any partial 
good standing in its way, and self-evident again that a concern for our duty 
ought to override any contrary inclination; and an evident consequence that t 
passions ought to be under the control of reason, for the passions demand 
immediate satisfaction with no concern for our general interest and none for 
right and wrong.
But at least sometimes in Reid, to oppose "the common sense of mankind" i 
simply to oppose "the common language of mankind". When Hume says "that men 
ought to be governed by their passions only, and that the use of reason is to
1. Active Powers, III, Pt.III, Ch.II, p.581.2, Active Poi^B, III, Pt.III, Ch.II,pp.580-581; V, Ch.VlI, p.677.
8^1
subservient to the passions, this, at first hearing, appears a shocking parad
repugnant to good morals and common sense; but , like most other paradoxes,
when explained according to his meaning, it is nothing but an abuse of words,
"For, if we give the name of passion to every principle of action, in ever
degree, and give the name of reason solely to the power of discerning the fit
ness of means to ends, it will be true that the use of reason is to be subser
I.
vient to the passions,"
Therational principles of action have authority over the whole of our 
conduct. Their requirements can never really conflict; in the justice of Go 
duty is always our interest. In their apparent conflict we do our duty, beca 
it is our duty, and if we need any further reason for doing it, because to do 
otherwise is to act immediately against our happiness, A prudential virtue w: 
very properly lack the exalted happiness which accompanies disinterested virt 
It will at least escape the misery of vice. The man who does what his duty 
requires is thus even so far as this world is concerned locking after his 
hapiness most effectively. If he is looking after his happiness effectively, 
he will find that he is led to a life of virtue. The principle of enlightene< 
self-interest leads "directly to the virtues of Prudence, Temperance, and For 
de. And , when we consider ourselves as social creatures, whose happiness or 
misery is very much connected with that of our fellow-men; when we consider t] 
there a©e many benevolent affections planted in our constitution, whose exert; 
make a capital part of our good and enjoyment: from these considerations, th:
1, In a later passage (ill, Pt.III, Ch.II, p.50l.) which otherwise closely reproduces this passage Reid speaks as though he thought Hume was maintaining something really paradoxical which could "only be defended by a gross and palpable abuse of words".
2, Reid shares the widespread eighteenth century belief in the superlative 
happiness arising from a consciousness of virtue. It is something which he perhaps owed partly to the instruction of Turnbull who had leamt from 
Shaftesbury. God Himself is happy, according to Turnbull,"from no other sourc but his absolute moral perfection". (Principles of Moral Philosophy p.iii.)
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principle leads us also, though more indirectly, to the practise of justice, 
humanity, and all the social virtues.
"It is true, that a regard to our omi good cannot,of itself, produce any
abenevolent affection. But, if such affections be,hart of our constitution
if the exercise of them make a capital part of our happiness, a regard to ou
own good ought to lead ms to cultivate and exercise them, as every benevolen
I.affection makes the good of others to be our own."
Duty and interest prescribe the same conduct. They are both "reasonable
motives to action", but entirely different. Anyone may be "satisfied of thi
who attends to his own conceptions, and the language of all mankind shews it
When I say, This is my interest, I mean one thing; wheni say,It is my duty, ,2.mean another thing."
Is it our duty to act with regard to our interest? Reid perhaps seems t 
hesitate. The principle of a regard to our good upon the whole gives us the 
conception of a right and wrong in human conduct. There is a "kind of self­
approbation" when we have done right in this way and, a"kind of remorse^ for
3.
folly. But Reid is not really hesitating: He is saying that we could make
these quasi-moral judgments on our ewn conduct independently of any moral
judgments we might make upon it; we could make them even if we lacked what :
strictly a moral sense. In the Intellectual Powers the principle that we ou
4
to seek our own happiness is mentioned as one of the first principles of mor 
Our duties unmistakably include, Stewart maintains, a duty to ourselves; 
the neglect of private good is morally wrong. If it does not call for the 
same indignation as injury to others, that is because it punishes itself, an
our indignation is softened by pity. ¥e all think that the man who has beha
Ï. Active Powers. Ill, Pt.III, Ch.Ill, p.584.2. Active Powers. Ill, Pt.III, Ch.V, p.587.3. Active Powers. Ill, Pt.III, Ch.II, p.582.
4. ~VÏÏ7 Ch.Ill, p.480.
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with wilful improvidence deserves to suffer for it and he thinks so himself
when he reflects. And his remorse is not merely a regret for lost hapiness; 1
is dissatisfied not only "condition" but with his conduct. Since improvidence
is immoral, a belief in rewards and punishments after death makes every bad 
I.
action worse.
What gives moral worth to an action? Every human action “takes its
denomination and its moral nature from the motive with which it is performed",
An act is not an act of benevolence unless it is done from benevolence, an ac'
of gratitude must be done from a sense of gratitude, an act of obedience from
regard to a command. And in general "that is an act of virtue which is done2.
from a regard to virtue". If we ask "whether an action deserving moral
approbation, must be done with the belief of its being morally good"? we are
«asking, Reid says, a question in practical '’'morals*'' and therefore a question
'tÂii-which is to be referred not to moral theory but to moral faculty. And any thA
which is committed to answering it in a way which conflicts with the answer i:
unhesitatingly receives from the moral faculty is in the position of any theo:
3.
in conflict with fact. An action to have moral worth must be done with the
belief that it is morally good.
The question and answer, as Reid words them, are ambiguous. Is it enough
that the action be done with the belief that it is morally good, or must it b(
done with this belief as the motive for doing it?
There is, Reid maintains, a set of self-evident propositions respecting
4.
guilt, innocence and moral worth, and the proposition under consideration tak( 
its place among them. Everything that we do is either right, wrong, or moral]
indifferent; and in everything that we do our conscience is altogether silent,
1. Active and Moral Powers, Vol.II, Bk.IV, Pt.II, Sec.I.
2. Active Powers. V, Ch.VI, p.667.
3. Active Powers, V, Ch.IV, p.646.
4. Active Powers, V, Oh.IV, pp.646-647,
or it informs us that what we are doing is right, wrong or morally indifférai 
If a man does something that is wrong, without the least suspicion that it U 
his conscience either silent or pronouncing the action indifferent he acts 
innocently. Re does not deserve either condemnation or approbation. Would 
any moralist disagree? Reid is sure that the disagreement would be merely 
verbal. He is considering simply the action done and the disposition with 
which it was done, disregarding previous circumstances. "If there was any 
previous culpable negligence or inattention which led him to a wrong judgmen" 
or hindered his forming a right one, that I do not exculpate." The moralist; 
who will not allow that a man acting with a clear conscience must be acting 
innocently, take his past and present conduct as a single whole, and in the 
whole there will perhaps be something to blame, Reid takes his conduct to 
pieces so as to put the blame where it lies. If a man does wlmt his consciei 
condemns, he incurs guilt and deserves condemnation, even though his consoiei 
should happen to be misinformed. If a man does what his conscience requires 
him to do, he deserves approbation. Now if he does what his conscience requ 
him to do he does it with some regard to the fact that he ought to do it, or 
with none. The second alternative is "not supposable"; moral judgments can 
leave the will unaffected. Reid might therefore have claimed that the ambigt 
in the proposition we are considering is of no account, since an action done 
with the belief that it is our duty is unavoidably an action done with this 
belief as a motive. But an important obscurity remains. Is the proposition 
asserting that a regard, to the rectitude of an action is the only motive whl< 
has moral worth? Passages which point to one answer have their indications 
cancelled by other passages. The question of the proper object of moral app: 
ation arose when Reid was comparing the affections with the virtues and vtcei
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What is the difference between them, between, for example, the affection of
benevolence and the virtue of benevolence? “Thevirtue of benevolence is a
fixed purpose or resolution to do good when we have opportunity, from a
conviction that it is right, and is our duty. The affection of benevolence
a propensity to do good, from natural constitution or habit, without regar#Î I.
to rectitude or duty." One might with some hesitation take this to imply
that a regard to the rectitude of an action is the only motive that has mor
truth. And in the chapter which has the proposition we are concerned with
its title Reid says that the "more weight the rectitude of the action has i
determining me to do it, the more I approve of my own conduct," On the oth
hand when he is faced with the objection that we approve immediately of
benevolence or of gratitude without “inquiring whether they are practised f:
a persuasion that they are our duty", he says that we know that they are ri,
without reflection.
Had Reid then bee asked whether it is better to do an act of charity wh:
is our duty from a sense of duty or from charity, we cannot be sure how we
could have answered.
There is, Hume nmintains, a logical absurdity in the view that it is a
regard to the virtue of an action which makes the action virtuous, "Before
can have such a regard, the action must be really virtuous; and this virtue
must be deriv'd from some virtuous motive : And consequently the virtuous2.
motive must be different from the regard to the virtue of the action,"
Reid paraphrases Hume's argument in order to bring out its "full strong* 
Our judgment cannot alter the nature of an action. If it is wrong and we ji 
it right , it is still wrong; no proposition becomes true rby being believec 
to be true. The conclusion therefore is that a man who does what he mistake
1. Active Powers, II, Ch.I?, p.5402. Treatise. Bk.III, Pt.II, 8 ec.I, p.478.
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believes to be right cannot act virtuously, nor viciously by doing what he
thinks is wrong, unless in fact it is wrong. A conclusion, Reid affirms, m l
I.
contradicts first principles of morals and the plainest common sense.
How was Reid able to arrive at this mi sunder standing of Hume? One of Run 
sentences seems to have immobilized his attention, and although he quotes 
versions of Hume's argument from different parts of the Treatise, this senten 
is almost all he sees; "An action must be virtuous before we can have a rega 
to its virtue",
Reid's reply to Hume can be moved across from the substitute argument to 
Hume's, It amounts to this: Hume has conjured up the illusion of circular!t
out of an ambiguity which is present in most of the moral nouns and their 
corresponding' adjectives. Virtue, goodness, rectitude in an action apart frc 
the agent is not the same thing as virtue, goodness,rectitude in the action a 
performed by the agent. Virtue in the action considered '^abstractly", that i 
apart from the disposition of tie agent who performs it, consists in this,"Tha 
it is an action which ought to be done by those who have the power and opport 
ity, and the capacity of perceiving their obligation to do it. ... .And this 
goodness is inherent in its nature, and inseparable from it. Ho opinion or 
judgment of an agent can in the least alter its nature." Virtue in the actic 
as performed by the agent is a matter of the disposition with which the actic 
performed, a disposition which at least includes some regard to the fact that 
is one's duty.
The reference to the agent's capacity to perceive his obligation comes
surprisingly into Reid's explanation of the virtue which is in the action
abstractly. Reid is engaged in dispelling the illusion of logical vice from
the proposition that to be virtuous an action must be done with a regard to 1 
I. Active Powers, V, Ch.IV, p.648.
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virtue, and in providing for our condemnation or approval when we have acted 
moral error.
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cmcLnsiŒ
"The whole of English and French philosophy in the eighteenth century comei
from Locke and its principle is the tabula rasa. Reid grounded Scottish
philosophy on the contrary principle and in so doing he raised himself above
his century and from Scotland reached across to Koenisberg, Kant in effect, a;
Reid, proposed to establish in metaphysics and morals speculative and practical
laws which depend on the constitution of human reason itself, laws which are n
derived from experience and which alone make experience possible. It is the Si
I.
enterprise differently carried out."
Two different enterprises, as Cousin elsewhere recognizes, with some simil* 
in their execution. The philosophy of Common Sense attempted a kind of 
’transcendental" justification of the principles of common sense. They are, 
Stewart maintained, the presuppositions of experience, the vincula of its 
coherence. We cannot act, Reid and Stewart maintained, on other principles. 
And their foundation is in the constitution of the mind; they are, Stewart safe 
"elements of human reason". They are elicited but not contributed by the *mati 
of experience, But they are metaphysical principles, and through them our 
cognition is conformed to its objects.
One of the ways in which the philosophy of Common Sense ended was in ambigi 
with the introduction into it of a proposition which seemed to bring it to 
conclusions similar to conclusions in the Kantian philosophy, Hamilton Kantiar 
Reid (at least in words) with the axiome of relativity. The axiom of relativii 
divides off things as they are "absolutely and in themselves" from things as 
they appear, so that everything that we know is "phenomenal - phenomenal of the
unknown". Ferrier Hegelian!zed Hamilton: subject and object are the syllables
I. Cousin, Philosophie ËËCossaise, p.581. " ^
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of a single ontological word and are meaningless apart from their place in its 
structure. There were no phenomenal!stic revisions of Hamilton comparable to 
the phenomenal!Stic revisions of Kant. With Ferrier the impulse which Reid ïu 
given to the development of Scottish philosophy died away.
In Hamilton an ambiguous ending to the philosophy of Common Sense, In Browi 
transition from the philosophy of Common Sense to the type of philosophy most c 
opposite to it. Intuitive and irresistible principles of belief, Bro% 
acknowledges, and in particular an irresistible belief in an external world, bi 
no more knovm of it than the fact that it is somethihg which causes usto have i 
sensations which,with constructions out of them, make up the entire world of oi 
experience. Its conversion into permanent possibilities of sensation would nc 
be a drastic revision.
Browns investigation into the natural tiistory of some of our common sense 
beliefs and of the notions involved in them also anticipated Mill; anticipated 
the "Psychological Method" which Mill set against the "Introspective Method" oi 
Reid and Hamilton, and by which he undertook to explain the origin of beliefs 
which they held to be grounded upon inexplicable intuitions into the truth of 
things, and as part of the explanation to show how what was without evidence 
had come to appear self-evident. With Mill's Examination of the Philosophy of 
Sir William Hamilton (1765), the philosophy of Common Sense went out of date, 
both for those who thought with Hill and those who opposed him.tThe philosophy of Common Sense has some features that will hold it back frc 
oblivion. Either there are no 'ideas' in thinking, remembering, perceiving, oi 
there is nothing but ideas, A crude proposition, and much of Reid's discussion 
of it is crude, but it is too important both in itself and for the interprétât 
ion of the history of philosophy from Descartes to Hume for philosophers ever
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to be over and done with it. "Common sense settles questions which philosopher;h
have raised. It is a philosophy prior to philosophy." The philosophy of Comme 
Sense arose in order to make some such claim. As it is one which deeply involi 
the nature both of philosophy and of common sense, it is not one which 
philosophers can altogether ignore.
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APfEHDIX : ri/ilOJSCHIPrS 01‘ læiD, BEATTIE M u  STEWART.
Reid After the death in 1942 of Miss Hilda Paterson of BirWood, Banchory 
the large collection of Reid MBS. which had come down to her as a descendant 
of Reid's was presented by her nt€ce to the library of King's College, 
Aberdeen, As a brief indication there are in this, collection;
(1) Bundles of papers on mathematical topics and on topics from the various
branches of natural philosophy. These papers are all short and in a more 01
less rough condition.
(2) A number of philosophical papers. Their condition also very rough and 
unfinished.
(3) Lectures on pneumatology, ethics, politics, jurisprudence and on "the 
Culture of the Mind" delivered at Glasgow.
(4) Several discourses read to the literary society at Glasgow,
The lectures on pneumatology and ethics, the discourses and the more
substantial of the philosophical papers form the basic material of the
Intellectual and Active Powers of which these are fragmentary drafts, Thex 
is not much in this material which has not been turned into one or other of 
these books.
(5) The M3, of the Intellectual Powers (substantially complete) and of the 
Active Powers (Essays I-IV)
(6 ) The M3, of the Phi 1 osophical Orations, four Latin orations delivered at 
King’s College 1757-1762. (These have been edited by W.R. Humphries, Aberde 
University Studies, Mo,113.)
(7) Criticism and Remarks on the first volume of Stewart's Elements
(8) Drafts of a few letters.
Most of the papers belong to Reid's Glasgow period; there are some from
time of hisAberdeen professorship and a few are still earlier. The dates ran 
from 1736-1792.
There is also in the library of King's College the "Motes of a Course of 
Lectures on Natural Philosophy" given by Reid at King's College during the se 
ion 1757-1758.
The library of the University of Edinburgh has part of Reid's "Lectures c 
the Fine Arts", given at Glasgow and a student's copy of his "Lectures on Log 
also given at Glasgow, (The logic lectures are in a volume with the title 
"Observations on Logic by Several Professors".)
There are letters of Reid's in the British Museum and in the National 
Library of Scotland, and in the National Library of Scotland an essay M  Reic 
on Erasmus.
Beattie The library of King's College, Aberdeen has a large collection of 
Beattie MSS. Four items are of some philosophical interest; "The Castle of 
Scepticism", an allegory against hime, Hobbes and Voltaire (edited by E.G. 
Mossner, University of Texas Studies in English KKVIl); "Hints for an Answer 1 
Dr.Priestley"; a note-book containing disconnected philosophical reflections; 
"Lectures on Moral Philosophy and Logic", given at Marischal College, There 
a student's copy of the lectures in the library of the University of Glasgow, 
Stewart Stewart's papers seem to have disappeared. His son destroyed many < 
them, (ptewa.t's Collected Works, VolVIII, editor's Introduction.) The 
library of the University of Edinburgh has four sets of lecture notes taken 
down by his students, three in moral philosophy (all substantially identical 
and substantially identical with the Outlines of Moral Philosophy) and one 
on political economy; a diary of tours, 1797-1803; an essay on J?he origin oi
- 1- •;
2%
Sanscrit; and a Stewart scrap-book**j some letters.
The National Library of Scotland has Motes on political economy taken from 
Stewart's lectures at Edinburgh, 1863-1804; the corrected proof of a fragment c 
the Active Powers; some letters of Stewart's .
The British Museum has some letters of Stewart's.
